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The Basque separatist armed organization ETA laid down arms in 2011 after forty years of 
armed campaign for independence. It was not a consequence of political negotiations. The 
Basque group did not achieve its goals. Yet, it unilaterally decided to end its armed activity 
forever. This research analyzes why and how ETA ended its armed campaign. It clarifies 
the events from the collapse of the last peace process in June 2007 to the announcement of 
the definitive end of ETA’s campaign in October 2011. It analyzes the evolution of ETA 
and the Basque conflict from the end of the 1970s and identifies the casual factors that led 
the Basque group toward its end. Thirty-eight in-depth interviews with actors directly 
related to those events and public and non-public documents produced by agencies 
involved in the process have been the main sources, as well as the accounts provided by 
the media at the time. The vast bibliography on Basque conflict and literature on the end 
of terrorist groups have been the main references for the analytical section of the research. 
This dissertation contends that ETA laid down arms because its constituency withdrew its 
support. The leadership and social base of the political movement to which ETA belongs 
concluded that armed strategy was not effective anymore and, furthermore, was damaging 
for the Basque pro-independence movement. After an internal struggle, in which the 
faction advocating for exclusively political means prevailed, ETA was driven toward a 
unilateral abandonment of armed struggle. 
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I was sitting in my office at the University of Nevada, Reno when I got an email from 
Martxelo Otamendi, the editor of the newspaper Berria. I had worked at this newspaper as 
a political correspondent until three years earlier, and I was still contributing with a weekly 
piece in the ‘Opinion’ section. “I’m not joking. Would you come to work at Berria for two 
or three weeks, starting next week? According to all indications, the big decision will come 
a few days after the conference.” Big decision meant the definitive end of the armed activity 
of ETA.1 The conference referred to a highly publicized meeting of relevant international 
personalities and Basque political leaders to be shortly held in the palace of Aiete in 
Donostia—San Sebastián, in Spanish—with the objective of promoting a resolution to the 
Basque conflict.    
I had been doing my Ph.D. work in Basque Studies since January 2011, carrying 
out research precisely on the end of ETA’s armed activity. When I presented my project in 
spring 2010 for an assistantship, not everybody believed that the countdown to ETA’s 
campaign had already started. I was asked again and again: “Are you sure the end of ETA 
is coming?” “Yes”—I would reply without hesitation. I did not have much privileged 
information, but, after ten years of political journalism, I had gotten used to reading 
between the lines of the documents made public by ETA and the broader political 
movement close to the armed organization, the Abertzale Left.2 
                                                          
1 Acronym for Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, meaning Basque Country and Freedom. 
2 The term abertzale means “patriotic.” The political term Abertzale Left refers to a pro-independence 
socio-political movement with no specific boundaries which includes a wide arrange or organizations. ETA 





I had reached my conclusion too early. My certainty would not have been so strong 
if I had known then what I know now. At that time, I was unaware of the seriousness of 
the internal struggle between those wanting ETA to abandon its armed strategy, and those 
aiming for the opposite. I knew that there was a confrontation within the Abertzale Left, 
but assumed that it was over when the movement made public in February 2010 the 
conclusions of the debate carried out among their social base. In any case, my prestige as 
a political forecaster increased when, in mid-October 2011, I announced to my colleagues 
in Reno that I had to urgently fly to the Basque Country because, finally, something 
definitive related to my research was about to happen. They started to believe that my 
research project made sense.      
I got Martxelo’s email on October 14, 2011. Three days later I was at the Reno-
Tahoe airport, ready to fly back to where everything was about to happen. Once the plane 
took off, my mind went back to many of the events and facts that I had covered as a political 
correspondent, trying to put the pieces together in an attempt to understand the whys and 
the hows of what was about to happen. I started as chief of the ‘Politics’ section of the 
Basque language daily paper Egunkaria in 2001, during a very troubled period. The 
collapse of the 1998-1999 peace process was recent. ETA had initiated a deadly campaign 
targeting politicians of the so-called constitutionalist parties,3 and also committed attacks 
against members of the media, judges, and businessmen, along with the more usual killings 
                                                          
changed its denomination over time: it was Herri Batasuna (HB), then Euskal Herritarrok (EH), and, until 
recently, Batasuna. Since these parties were banned in 2002, the political spokespersons of Batasuna had 
delivered their discourse and messages in the name of the “Abertzale Left.” 
3 Pro-Spain parties, namely the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), the PP (Partido Popular) and the 





of members of the security forces.4 I remember in particular the killing of the finance 
manager of the newspaper El Diario Vasco, Santiago Oleaga,5 and the failed attempt to 
murder Gorka Landaburu, editor of the Spanish weekly magazine Cambio 16, a journalist 
from my own hometown, Zarautz, who had been my handball coach in middle school. He 
lost four fingers as a result of the explosion of a letter bomb.6 At that time I also covered 
the public hearings on the banning of Batasuna in Madrid, at the Spanish Supreme Court. 
Sixteen judges decided that a political party, usually backed by more than fifteen percent 
of the Basque electorate, was no longer legal, as it was charged with politically supporting 
ETA.7 It was one more move against what the Spanish judiciary considered to be ETA’s 
civil network. This Spanish version of the War on Terror made its first serious move when 
the daily newspaper Egin was closed by the Spanish judiciary in July 1998, on the grounds 
that it was an instrument of ETA.8 Six months later, a new daily paper—Gara—-was 
founded as a response to the closure of Egin. Five years later, in February 2003, it was our 
turn. The Spanish Civil Guard shut down the offices of the only daily newspaper published 
in Basque, and arrested ten of the members and former members of our staff and board. 
                                                          
4 From the end of the ceasefire in December 1999 to May 2003 ETA killed six members of the PSOE, six of 
the PP, and one of the UPN (at the time in coalition with the PP). ETA also killed thirteen Spanish 
policemen and civil guards, five members of the Basque police, a member of the Catalan police, two 
people linked to the media, a businessman, a judge, an attorney, a prison officer, and eight other persons. 
Source: José María Calleja and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, La derrota de ETA. De la primera a la última 
víctima (Madrid: Adhara, 2006).    
5 Santiago Oleaga was killed on May 24, 2001. 
6 The attack against Gorka Landaburu occurred on May 15, 2001.  
7 Herri Batasuna (HB) and Euskal Herritarrok (EH) were also banned, but they were just the old names of 
Batasuna.  
8 In May 2009, the Spanish Supreme Court revoked the illicitness of Egin, but confirmed the prison 
sentences for 13 members of the staff and the board, who were tried in the macrosumario 18/98 along 
with a number of members of other civil associations linked to the Abertzale Left. In total 38 defendants 
were sentenced to prison. The Egin editor, Xabier Salutregi, was sentenced to seven and a half years, and 
the vice-editor Teresa Toda, to six years. Toda was released in November 2013 after having served the full 





Three months later, Berria took the vacuum left by Egunkaria, thanks to popular funding. 
Seven years later, after a trial against five of our colleagues, the final veredict stated that 
there was no evidence of any link between ETA and our newspaper, and, therefore, 
Egunkaria should never have been shut down. All defendants were absolved on all counts.  
 In Berria I worked from the beginning as a political correspondent, which was not 
quite like being a war correspondent, but it was not like being a standard political reporter 
either. There were killings, threats, extortion, arrests, tortures, and bannings of political 
and social organizations. Analyzing what was happening was part of my job, but I always 
failed to fully understand the sense of such violent expressions arising from the political 
conflict. At the end of the fateful year of the closure of our old newspaper and the birth of 
a new one, in December 2003, I had the exceptional chance to ask about the hidden clues 
of some of those violent expressions. I made a very special trip, from which no news items 
emerged. Until now. It is time to disclose that, too. 
I was working as usual in the newsroom of Berria, at the headquarters in Andoain, 
an inland town 16 kilometers from Donostia, when the editor called me to his private office. 
He talked to me almost whispering, as if he was telling me a secret. Was I prepared to cover 
a news conference of ETA, the clandestine group?—he asked. Obviously, it would not be 
like covering a standard press briefing. I could not tell anything to anybody, and I would 
have to move into a clandestine world, in which the war for independence and socialism 





The editor gave me a paper with a short note in it, indicating that a car would pick 
me up next Sunday at 6 am in a specific square of a town in the Northern Basque Country.9 
I drove to the meeting point and, after a nervous wait, a car with two people pulled up. 
They were not the underground people yet. It was another journalist, whom I knew, with a 
trusted friend as a driver. We drove north for more than an hour. It was dark. I did not need 
to know where exactly we were going, and I did not read the traffic signals. During the 
drive, we speculated about the news conference. Something big was about to be announced, 
we thought, because of the exceptional nature of the announcement. They very rarely gave 
news conferences. I remember my colleague talking about the possibility of ETA calling 
for a ceasefire, and myself replying that I did not see it likely, that there was no evidence 
for that. When we arrived at the front of a church in a small town, all I knew was that we 
were within the boundaries of the French state, most probably out of the Basque territory. 
When the time for the appointment came, nobody appeared. More than fifteen minutes 
later, a young woman driving a car arrived in a hurry. She apologized. She had had a flat 
tire. It was the moment for our driver to leave. We journalists jumped into the car, and the 
ETA activist drove us a short distance to a meadow where another militant, an older man, 
was waiting for us outside a van. We said hello to each other and we were asked to go into 
the back of the van, which had tinted windows and no seats. It was a good thing that I do 
not tend to get car sick, because it was a journey with many curves and slopes. I had the 
feeling that we went round and round in the same area. At one point, the van stopped, and 
two other men entered the van. They were journalists too; I knew one of them.  One joined 
                                                          





us in the back, and the other sat beside the drive. The passenger was asked to look down 
and not to stare outside. More curves and more slopes. 
When the van stopped again, and we were allowed to get out, we were asked not to 
look around and to go straight away into a country house in front of us. It was impossible 
not to realize that we were in the midst of a hilly and green landscape. We could perfectly 
well be in Basque land but could obviously be in any of the mountainous French southern 
regions contiguous to the Basque territories as well. Once inside, I recognized right away 
the man who was observing us from the midway of the indoor stairs. He looked much older 
than in the pictures published by the media, which pointed to him as the leader of the 
political apparatus of ETA, but he was perfectly recognizable. By the time we sat down 
around a rectangular wooden table, we were eight people, all men. Four journalists from 
the Basque media on one side of the table, and four activists of ETA on the other. I 
estimated that two of the militants were in their forties, one in his mid-thirties and the 
youngest probably in his late twenties. It was not any surprise that they were not masked. 
I knew that when they had been interviewed by colleagues they put masks on only for the 
pictures. I was ready for an extremely atypical press conference.  
But, there would be no press conference, no news. The alleged leader acted as a 
spokesperson from the beginning. While we were enjoying a coffee and cake served by 
them, he explained that a conference had been planned, but that they had decided to cancel 
it at the last moment because of some unexplained political circumstances. However, given 
that it had been so complicated to organize the logistics for the meeting, they decided to 





the case of the editor and vice-editor of the newspaper Egin, Xabier Salutregi and Teresa 
Toda. When they were accused of acting under ETA direction, one of the main pieces of 
evidence against them was that they had met the leader of the political apparatus of ETA 
at the time, José Luis Alvarez Santacristina, Txelis, a few days before they had been 
appointed to the paper’s staff. The defendants argued that it was a journalistic interview. 
The prosecutor maintained that they were receiving directions from ETA, rather than 
carrying out an interview.10        
On the one hand, I was upset and worried, because I was in a meeting with a 
clandestine group and I could not publish anything about the encounter afterward. It could 
certainly turn into legal trouble. On the other hand, I was lucky, since I was face to face 
with the spokespeople of ETA, an armed group that conditioned Basque and Spanish 
politics and social life so dramatically, and whose violent strategy was incomprehensible 
to me. For the first time, I had the privilege to ask them whatever I wanted. Three of us 
made some observations questioning the sense and the prudence of having such a meeting 
without the chance to publish anything afterward. Still, we did not make a big deal out of 
it. We knew that the off-the-record discussion could become a goldmine, in the event that 
they really responded to our questions. From then on, we talked for hours about armed 
struggle, the sense of some specific attacks, the suffering provoked by ETA, the difficulties 
of making the strategies of all Basque nationalists converge… All discussions were 
conducted in Basque. We did not record anything, and we did not even take notes, although 
                                                          
10 The defendants argued that the interview was eventually published, although several months later, 
because the interviewee was arrested while the piece was being edited and reviewed, and they needed 





I wrote down all I remembered in a small notebook when I got home very late that night, 
omitting details about the nature of the conversation and the participants at the meeting. 
By mid-morning, they made us read a document that was allegedly the 
announcement they would have made in the event that the press conference had not been 
canceled. They were silent while we read. I could not focus properly. While trying to 
concentrate on my reading, I realized that one of the activists went to a small table on top 
of which were the newspapers of the day, took our paper Berria, and opened it to the pages 
where my interview with the academic and former leader of the Abertzale Left, Francisco 
Letamendia, was published.11 While showing it to one of his companions, he pointed his 
finger at a specific paragraph of the interview, shaking his head. I knew very well what 
Letamendia said in it. When I asked him whether ETA’s violence was an obstacle for the 
Basque nationalists to act together, he replied that it was indispensable that ETA took “the 
Irish road” and abandon armed struggle.12 
We did not find much new in the document they gave us to read. In it, ETA declared 
with solemnity that they were prepared to engage in a peace process, under some 
conditions. That was not news. ETA had said that before. I noticed a kind of a 
disappointment from them, as if we did not find the novelty they expected us to detect. It 
was not the best context to read it carefully and try to read between lines. In any case, we 
                                                          
11 Francisco Letamendia was a member of the Spanish Parliament representing, first, Euskadiko Ezkerra 
(1977-1979), and then, Herri Batasuna (1979-1982). Later on, as a political scientist Letamendia has 
become a reference in the study of the Basque nationalism and, particularly, the history of ETA.  
12 Imanol Murua Uria, “Francisco Letamendia: ‘Espainia banaezina dela dioen artikulua militarrek sartu 






asked again and again, one way and another, whether we should expect a ceasefire or any 
kind of halt to facilitate a peace process. At the time, it was more than five months since 
ETA had committed its last killings,13 and there were speculations about the likelihood of 
some peace process. We did not get a clear response. We also asked about a recent request 
to ETA for a ceasefire by some well-known personalities in Basque culture and academia. 
The spokesperson finished the issue by arguing that you first need to wear the military 
helmet to be entitled to ask for a ceasefire. At one point, he referred to the assembly that 
their organization had held the previous year, signaling with a movement of the head to a 
pile of documents next to the computer. They were the written contributions of ETA 
activists. He explained that they debated openly about everything and he did not conceal 
that some of the militants proposed to end armed struggle. But, they were a minority.14      
We continued discussing at lunch time. We were served French pâté, roast chicken 
with lettuce, and red wine. In the end, the conversation did not turn into a goldmine. We 
talked for hours, now we knew more about the way of reasoning of ETA members, but we 
did not have any extra clue about what was happening behind the scenes and what were 
the real intentions of ETA. Anyhow, I believed to have understood that conditions for a 
peace process were still far away. One of them asked us whether the meeting had been 
useful for us. “At least, now we know that the speculations about a ceasefire do not 
correspond to reality,” I said. The leader, smiling as if he was joking, added: “We did not 
say it is not coming.” It was getting dark when the driver of the van took us to the town 
                                                          
13 Two Spanish policemen, Bonifacio Martín and Julián Envit, were killed in Zangotza (Navarre)—Sangüesa 
in Spanish—on May 30, 2003. 






and, without specifying where we were, gave us directions to reach the train station, in 
which we could take a train to the town where I had left my car early that same morning.  
We did not have a clue, but things were happening behind the scenes. Only ten days 
after our incursion into the underground, Batasuna publicly proposed to form a Basque 
nationalist unitary platform for the Spanish general elections.15 ETA was not a stranger to 
the initiative. On December 30, they declared in a short press release that they were 
prepared to take “whatever measures and steps” to facilitate that initiative.16 Between the 
lines, they were saying that they would declare a ceasefire if all nationalist parties would 
engage in a unitary electoral platform. It was just a symbolic gesture which they knew 
would reach nowhere because, in any case, the leading nationalist party, the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV), would not join forces with Batasuna. However, there was a strong 
signal about the willingness of ETA regarding the possibility of an eventual ceasefire under 
some given circumstances. 
Now we know that some were already working to create those circumstances. 
Arnaldo Otegi, the main leader of Batasuna, and Jesús Eguiguren,17 the president of the 
Basque branch of the PSOE, at the time the main opposition party in Spain, started talking 
as early as 2002. ETA contacted the mediators of the Henri Dunant (HD) Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue based in Switzerland soon after, and got in contact with the Spanish 
                                                          
15 The proposal was called “The Initiative of Bergara” because it was announced in that town.     
16 Erredakzioa, “‘Ekimena bururaino iristeko behar diren urrats guztiak’ egiteko prest agertu da ETA,” 
Berria, December 30, 2003, accessed October 4, 2014, 
www.berria.eus/albisteak/2732/bururaino_iristeko_urrats_guztiak_egiteko_prest_azaldu_da_eta.htm 
17 Basque correct spelling would be “Egiguren,” but he uses the Spanish spelling in his writings: 





government as soon as the socialist José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero took office in March 
2004. All these conversations converged in the peace process officially initiated when ETA 
declared a ceasefire in March 2006. The four men we had in front of us that day in 
December 2003 were among those behind the strategy that led to that process. Three of 
them were in prison by the time their strategy proved fruitful. Only the youngest, the one 
who barely spoke and had been in charge of roasting the chicken, was still in hiding. In 
fact, he was to be one of ETA’s negotiators in the near future when, in May 2007, the 
negotiation table in Geneva broke down after the last attempt to save the dying peace 
process. In June 2007, ETA released a statement announcing that they resumed the armed 
struggle.18         
As a citizen, I was disappointed. As a journalist, I was confused. I spent the last 
three years giving my readers a positive perspective about the process, explaining that there 
were serious difficulties, but predicting that this time the process would endure because, 
above all, everybody would lose with a resumption of ETA’s violence. The survival of the 
peace process was a necessity for all parties and, especially, for those who had in their 
hands the ability to reactivate the armed struggle. When the facts proved that I was totally 
mistaken, I felt that I had to try to do what I eventually did: clarify how and why the process 
failed. I released a book about the failed negotiations.19 When I happened to talk in public, 
I always jokingly answered the same way when asked whether I intended to write a sequel 
                                                          
18 ETA de facto broke the ceasefire in December 2006, when they blew up the terminal T-4 of Madrid 
airport, killing two people, Diego Armando Estacio and Carlos Alonso Palate, both Ecuador nationals. 
However, they shortly declared that the ceasefire was on, after having claimed responsibility for the 
attack.   
19 Loiolako Hegiak (Donostia: Elkar-Berria, 2010). Spanish version: El triángulo de Loiola (Donostia: 





to the book: “If I write any other book on the matter, it will have to have, unlike this one, 
a happy ending.” 
That happy ending was about to occur when, on October 17, 2011, I saw myself 
crossing the ocean in an American Airlines plane. The next day, four days after I received 
my editor’s email at my office in Reno, I was in front of a computer, along with my 
colleagues of the ‘Politics’ section of Berria. Our sources were certain that the big news 
was coming, but we did not have any hint about the exact day. In any case, we were 
working as if the news would come right the next minute, in a way only journalists do. 
Writing about events that had not yet happened, assuming that the piece would be published 
after the expected event happened. That anxiety lasted just two days.   
It was early afternoon when the editor called a few of us onto his office. Our 
colleagues in the International section were already busy working on the information 
related to the killing of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Our editor showed us a pen-drive. “It 
has arrived.” We saw a video in which a masked woman, with two other ETA members at 
her sides, read a short statement to announce the definitive end of ETA’s armed struggle. 
We read the written version of the statement just to make sure that we understood what we 
should have. Much work was already done, but there was much more to do. The 
information was withheld until 19:00. We knew that the Basque paper Gara also had the 
video. We learned later that Le Journal du Pays Basque, the BBC, The Guardian and The 
New York Times had it too.  
We journalists have a tendency to abuse the term ‘historic.’ This time it was. I made 





forget that Muammar Gaddafi died on yesterday’s date, but we will not forget which date 
ETA announced its decision to end its armed activity.”20 It is, indeed, unforgettable. The 
Basque media, with some exceptions, cheered the good news and treated it as an historic 
event. The giant headlines were more than justified: “At last!”21 “Peace,”22 “A new era for 
the Basque Country,”23 “ETA gave up arms”24… Diario de Navarra was an exception with 
its more critical perspective: “ETA surrenders without apologizing.”25 Most of the Spanish 
press, in contrast, treated the event as if it was bad news: “ETA neither dissolves nor 
disarms,”26 “ETA ceases their armed activity without disarming,”27 “ETA boasts of their 
murders and calls upon government to negotiate.”28 There were a few exceptions: “The 
end of terror,”29 “Bye-bye, ETA.”30  
This research is an attempt to understand and explain, why and how this historic 
event occurred. Why was it now feasible when it had not been during so many prior 
decades? Why did ETA make this decision without having achieved any of their political 
objectives? Why did they do it unilaterally, without any substantial negotiation with the 
Spanish government? And why at this specific time, neither sooner nor later? This research 
is based above all on the accounts of the people who, to a greater or lesser extent, were 
                                                          
20 Imanol Murua Uria, “Berandu, baina garaiz,” Berria, October 21, 2011, accessed August 25, 2014, 
http://www.berria.eus/dokumentuak/dokumentua850.pdf 
21 “¡Por fin!” El Correo, October 21, 2011. 
22 “Bakean,” Deia, October 21, 2011. 
23 “Un Nuevo tiempo para Euskal Herria,” Gara, October 21, 2011. 
24 “ETAk armak utzi ditu,” Berria, October 21, 2011. 
25 “ETA se rinde sin pedir perdón,” Diario de Navarra, October 21, 2011. 
26 “ETA ni se disuelve ni entrega las armas,” ABC, October 21, 2011. 
27 “ETA cesa su actividad armada sin entregar las armas,” La Razón, October 21, 2011. 
28 “ETA alardea de sus asesinatos y emplaza al gobierno a negociar,” El Mundo, October 21, 2011. 
29 “El fin del terror,” El País, October 21, 2011. 





instrumental in forcing the facts and stories behind ETA’s decision. It is not the truth of 






2. Hypothesis, methodology, and state of the art 
2.1. Identification of the research topic 
The Basque insurgent group ETA announced the definitive end of its armed activities in 
October 2011, after more than forty years of struggle for independence through violent 
methods. According to information publicly known, the end of ETA's campaign is not a 
consequence of any negotiations, but a unilateral decision. This research aims to clarify 
what drove the Basque group to such a decision.  
The main hypothesis of this investigation is that ETA decided to lay down its arms 
because the political movement traditionally backing the Basque insurgent group, under 
the guidance of the leadership of the outlawed political party Batasuna, withdrew its 
support. This political movement, the Abertzale Left, concluded that the political-military 
strategy was not only ineffective, but also damaging for the pro-independence 
objective.  However, many unanswered questions lie behind that assumption: why the pro-
independence political movement came to that conclusion at that specific moment, within 
that particular context; what factors led the leadership and the constituency of the political 
movement to determine that a political-military strategy was no longer effective; and what 
made the leadership of the political movement believe that they were in a position to 
confront–or persuade–the once unquestionable armed vanguard. 
The historical evolution of ETA and its context have to be considered in order to 
analyze the causes of the end of the Basque group’s campaign. The historical facts from 
the foundation of the militant group until the last attempted peace process in 2005-2007 





facts after 2007 are not clarified yet. There are a few research efforts and a few first-hand 
testimonies, but the stories behind ETA’s final decision are not etched in stone yet. Thus, 
constructing a narrative of the most recent facts leading to it is required in order to have a 
proper base from which to analyze its causal factors.  
Regarding the facts to be clarified, I have limited my research to the period from 
June 2007 to October 2011. In June 2007, ETA announced the end of the ceasefire called 
in March 2006. It was the end of the latest attempt to solve the conflict through 
negotiations. In October 2011, ETA announced the unilateral and definitive cessation of 
all armed activities. There is a need to clarify what happened in those four years, before 
analyzing the factors that led to the end of ETA’s long campaign. Interviews with the 
people regarded as influential on the studied events are the main information source in this 
research. Both public and internal documents of some key organizations, mainly ETA, are 
the second main source of data. Some media information regarding some selected events 
within the period 2007-2011 are also used as sources of information and, more specifically, 
as a basis to analyze the contrast between the information available at the time of the events, 
and the information collected at the time of the research. The analysis of the quality of that 
information will be a complementary tool to interpret more accurately the contents 






2.2. Hypothesis and research questions 
The fundamental aim of this research is to analyse the process which led ETA to put an 
end to its armed campaign. In order to fulfil the main purpose, I state the following 
hypotheses as a starting point:  
H1. The political movement to which ETA belongs, the Abertzale Left, ceased to support 
the armed struggle as a tool of forcing a negotiation with the Spanish state. Without the 
political support of the Abertzale Left’s constituency, the combined political-military 
strategy could no longer be implemented. 
H2. The decreasing support for armed struggle from its own constituency must be 
understood in the context of an increasing opposition to ETA in the Basque society as a 
whole. The majority of the Basque people have gradually evolved from an attitude of 
admiration or understanding of ETA under the Francoist regime to an increasingly strong 
opposition toward ETA over time.    
H3. ETA, as a military organization, was gradually weaker since the early 1990s, and its 
ability to maintain an effective war of attrition in order to force a political negotiation with 
the Spanish government diminished over time. The combined repression by the Spanish 
and French police and judiciary was instrumental in undermining ETA’s military power. 
H4. The banning of Batasuna and the judicial persecution of the organizations linked to the 
Abertzale Left politically asphyxiated the movement and prevented it from efficiently 





H5. The experiences of the previous failed peace processes in 1989 and 1998-1999, the 
outcome of the last negotiations in 2005-2007 led the Abertzale Left leadership to the 
conclusion that further negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government were very 
unlikely to happen, as neither the PP (Partido Popular) nor the PSOE (Partido Socialista 
Obrero Español) would have anything to win through such a process in a context in which 
the dominant discourse was one of stigmatization of dialogue with ETA.   
H6. The evolution of the international context left ETA isolated after the collapse of the 
Socialist Bloc, the decline of armed revolutionary movements all over the world, and the 
transition of many insurgent groups towards politics. The Irish political process and the 
IRA decision to lay down arms for good had an important impact on the Basque scenario. 
H7. Even though the end of ETA’s campaign is a consequence of a unilateral decision by 
the Abertzale Left, multilateral dialogue and contacts among various political actors, 
including ETA and the Spanish government, enhanced by international actors, have 
facilitated the process toward ETA’s end.   
H8. ETA’s ending pattern is, to a great extent, a unique model of armed insurgency 
termination, as it has been a direct consequence of a unilateral decision not triggered by 
either political concessions or police defeat, but by a demand from the insurgent group’s 
own constituency, and whose implementation has required a multilateral peace effort.         
H9. The media outlets have acted as political actors as much as means of information. The 
most powerful media organizations, especially the majority of the papers edited in Madrid, 





initiatives. Overall, the media could only partially report on the events leading to the 
demise of ETA’s campaign, as many key facts were at the time behind the scenes. 
The research questions related to the hypotheses are the following: 
RQ1. Why did the Abertzale Left leadership and constituency cease to support ETA’s 
armed struggle at this specific time, i.e., at the end of the 2010 decade, and not earlier?  
RQ2. Why did the leadership of Batasuna dare to question ETA’s decision to continue its 
campaign by promoting an open debate of an issue that had thus far been an exclusive 
competence of ETA? And, what factors enabled the political arm of the movement to 
persuade the military arm, or prevail over it? 
RQ3. What factors made the Basque people shift toward a gradually stronger opposition to 
ETA? 
RQ4. To what extent did the evolution of the nature of ETA’s actions—from targeting 
military persons to targeting civilians—influence the Basque people’s attitudes toward the 
armed group? 
RQ5. When and why did ETA’s military decline begin?  
RQ6. To what extent did the police and judicial repression over ETA influence the eventual 





RQ7. Did the banning of Batasuna and the judicial persecution of other of the Abertzale 
Left organizations trigger a reflection within the movement regarding the need to abandon 
its political-military strategy so that it could return to the political arena? 
RQ8. Did the post-Barajas scenario lead the Abertzale Left to conclude that further 
negotiation processes were unlikely to take place and that only unilateral steps could bring 
an eventual process to facilitate a way out? 
RQ9. What difference did the involvement of international actors make in a scenario in 
which the Abertzale Left movement decided to embrace an exclusively political strategy? 
RQ10. To what extent did the Spanish government led by the socialist José Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero engage in indirect dialogue with ETA through international mediators to facilitate 
the implementation of the Abertzale Left and ETA’s decision? 
RQ11. Which role did other Basque political actors play in order to facilitate the process 
toward ETA’s end?  
RQ12. To what extent did the collapse of the Socialist bloc, the decline of the guerrilla 
movements, and the outcome of the Irish peace process influence the transformation of the 
Abertzale Left and ETA? 
RQ13. To what extent did the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001 and the 3/11 attacks 
in Madrid in 2004 make even more difficult than before the justification of the use of 





RQ14. Is the Basque case a unique model as a pattern of the end of an armed insurgency?    
RQ15. Is the information reported by the media at the time of occurrence consistent with 
the narratives provided by the actors at the time of the research?  
RQ16. To what extent did the media act as political actors? 
RQ17. To what extent did the media outlets report on the process leading to the end of 
ETA’s campaign according to appropiate quality journalism standards? 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Outsider or insider researcher 
The nature of the relation of the qualitative researcher to the issue under study is an 
essential aspect of an investigation. The ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status of the researcher in 
relation to the communality shared with the informants conditions the perspective and the 
results of the study.31 There is no neutrality, but only a greater awareness of one’s bias.32 I 
need to be aware of my position regarding the issue under study in order to be aware of my 
bias. Being an insider researcher can enhance the depth and breadth of understanding of a 
community and its conflicts to an extent that may not be reachable by an outsider, but 
questions about the objectivity of an investigation are raised because one may be too close 
                                                          
31 Sonya Corbin Dwyer, and Jennifer L. Buckle, “The Space Between: On Being an Insider-Outsider in 
Qualitative Research,” International Institute for Qualitative Methodology 8, 1 (2009), 55.   
32 P. Rose, Writing on women: Essays in a renaissance (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), 77, 





to the phenomenon under study.33 Being an outsider or insider does not make one a better 
or worse researcher, but rather a different type of researcher.       
In my case, I am an outsider in relation to the specific organization at the core of 
the study, ETA, but an insider in relation to the society in which the Basque group has been 
active. My status as a Basque person makes me part of a political conflict in which ETA 
has operated. In addition, personal and professional experiences have made me live some 
aspects of the conflict linked to ETA closely. I grew up in a Basque nationalist family in a 
Basque speaking environment. My paternal grandfather fought against the Francoist forces 
as a soldier of the Basque army in the 1936-1939 war. He was in Gernika when the town 
was bombed by German warplanes, as was his wife (my grandmother) and their two older 
children (my uncles). They suffered under Francoism in silence, but proudly kept their 
nationalist sentiment behind closed doors, as did many other Basque nationalist families. 
My father was elected mayor of our hometown, Zarautz, as a candidate of the moderate 
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), in the first local elections after dictatorship, in 1979. As 
a child, I remember my father being furious because of City Council matters, mostly in 
relation to the radical opposition exerted by Herri Batasuna (HB), the political party of the 
Abertzale Left. Then, he was appointed president of the provincial government of 
Gipuzkoa in 1986, immediately before a dramatic split in his political party. He decided to 
leave the old party and joined the new splintered force, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA), a party 
somewhat more radical party in nationalistic terms, led by the former lehendakari—Basque 
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president—Carlos Garaikoetxea. My father was re-elected president of the provincial 
government as an EA candidate in 1987. This was during the period of the conflict about 
the Gipuzkoa-Navarre freeway project. As the president of the provincial cabinet, he was 
the top institutional leader in charge of part of the construction of the freeway, contested 
first by an ecological organization, Lurraldea, and then by ETA. The Basque armed group 
committed a number of bombings, including some killings, within their campaign to 
oppose the construction of the freeway. My father never had bodyguards, given that ETA 
did not target any Basque nationalist politicians at that time, and he was considered too 
much of a nationalist to be victim of an ETA attack. In any case, he was one of the most 
visible opponents of ETA during that period, which ended for him in 1991, when the PNV 
replaced EA in the provincial government thanks to a pact with the Basque branch of the 
Spanish socialist party, the PSOE. In sum, I grew up in an environment in which my 
father’s experiences as a politician had a great influence on my view of the Basque conflict 
and ETA.  
Things changed when I went to the university in Bilbao to study Journalism in the 
mid-1980s. I entered an environment in which leftist and radical nationalist ideas and 
organizations were well regarded. I started to see the people engaged in or close to the 
Abertzale Left differently, although I never lost my critical view of ETA. I started my 
career as a journalist in Argia, a Basque language weekly newspaper, and then I 
participated in the foundation of the first Basque language daily newspaper since 1937, 
Euskaldunon Egunkaria, in 1990. Both Argia and Egunkaria were independent papers with 





Ajuria Enea pact, which promoted a divisive line between those labeled as supporters of 
violence (‘violentos’) and those labeled as supporters of democracy (‘demócratas’). Most 
of the media were openly belligerent toward ETA and the Abertzale Left, and some placed 
our paper on the other side of the trench because of our lack of overt hostility. I was the 
senior political correspondent of the paper when, in February 2003, the Spanish Civil 
Guard shut down our paper, and arrested ten members and former members of our staff 
and board, following the orders of a judge in the Audiencia Nacional34 on the grounds that 
we were an instrument of ETA. I was at the gates of the prison of Soto del Real, Madrid, 
when our editor, Martxelo Otamendi, was released after five days of incommunicado 
detention and broke into tears as he tried to explain to his sister how he had been tortured 
by his interrogators.35 We never stopped publishing our daily newspaper. We managed to 
work out a sixteen-page special under the name of Egunero in the aftermath of the shut-
down, and kept on publishing it until we were able to found a standard new newspaper, 
Berria, three months later, thanks to popular crowdfunding.36 I continued to work as a 
political correspondent in Berria until I decided to quit in 2008.  
                                                          
34 The Audiencia Nacional is a special high court with jurisdiction over all the Spanish territory in terrorism 
issues, money laundering and other exceptional legal issues. It was created in 1977 as a substitute of the 
Francoist special court, the Tribunal de Orden Público. It deals with all cases related to ETA.  
35 Seven out of ten detainees in the operation against Egunkaria in February 2003 denounced that they 
were ill-treated and tortured. Six of them were imprisoned. Seven years later, five of them were tried in 
the Audiencia Nacional, which absolved them all. The jury resolved that there was not any evidence of any 
link between ETA and Egunkaria. The torture allegations were closed without any trial, but the European 
Human Rights Court ruled in favor of the only one who appealed to Strasbourg, the editor Martxelo 
Otamendi. The ruling established that the Spanish Court closed the case without having investigated it 
sufficiently, and was charged to pay the editor a compensation of 24,000 euros. 
36 More about the Egunkaria closure: Lorea Agirre, Gezurra ari du: Egunkaria-ren itxieraren kronika (Irun: 
Alberdania, 2004); Txema Ramírez de la Piscina et al., Egunkaria: amets baten egia (Donostia: Ttartalo, 
2010); Txema Ramírez de la Piscina and Teresa Agirreazaldegi, “’Euskaldunon Egunkaria:’ diario de 





In my career as a journalist I have interviewed a few people eventually killed or 
attacked by ETA, including Joxe Mari Korta, Juan Mari Jauregi and Gorka Landaburu.37 I 
also interviewed many people threatened by the armed group, and a number of persons 
arrested by the Spanish police forces, some of whom were tortured while under arrest. One 
of my friends from my college years became an ETA member and served a ten-year prison 
sentence in France. I visited him twice while in prison, and argued with him during those 
encounters about politics and ETA’s violent tactics. I developed a professional but also 
personal relationship with many Basque political actors of all factions during the first 
decade of the 2000s. My book, Loiolako hegiak, the reconstruction of the story behind the 
2005-2007 peace process, would not have been possible without those contacts. These 
previous professional relationships with most of the informants have facilitated my 
research for this dissertation, and, for sure, has influenced the results too. 
In sum, I am a “researcher in the middle,”38 neither a total outsider nor a complete 
insider, but a researcher who can only occupy the space between.39 
2.3.2. In-depth interviews and oral history 
Most of the data for this research was collected from January to December 2013. I 
conducted 34 oral interviews, and five written interviews. I gathered public documents, 
and some non-public documents of ETA and the Abertzale Left. Beyond these primary 
sources, I have examined a wide range of secondary sources in relation to the history of 
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ETA and the Basque conflict; previously published testimonies by political actors; news 
items from the media archives; and literature on the patterns of the end of insurgent groups. 
All informants in this research have been questioned following in-depth semi-
structured interview methods. According to Tom Wengraf, an in-depth interview aims to 
get more detailed knowledge about the researched question, and “to get a sense of how the 
apparently straight-forward is actually more complicated, of how the ‘surface appearances’ 
may be quite misleading about ‘depth realities.’”40 He defines a semi-structured interview 
as a special type of conversational interaction where questions are only partially prepared 
in advance and will therefore be largely improvised by the interviewer. 
 The interviews conducted in this type of research do not strictly comply with all 
features needed to be considered oral history interviews, as they have not been recorded 
for the purpose of placing them in public depositories available for future historians. 
However, the in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in this investigation sought to 
collect subjective accounts of the political process under study in order to establish some 
unknown facts which, however recent, are part of the history of ETA and the Basque 
conflict. Therefore, oral history principles and standards were to be taken into account. As 
stated by Ritchie, “simply put, oral history collects spoken memories and personal 
commentaries of historical significance through recorded interviews,”41 which is what has 
been done in this research. 
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The spoken memories of the participants or witnesses of any event are not ever 
going to definitively establish the facts once and for all. They will only provide personal 
and subjective accounts about what happened or what they believe happened. It is the task 
of the researcher, as noted by Portelli, “to understand the history of these tellings and then 
to explore the contradictions within the story, contextualize the telling, and thereby help 
the narrators create the fullest narrative possible at this moment of time.”42 Regarding the 
trustworthiness of oral testimonies, Ritchie states that “oral history is as reliable or 
unreliable as other research sources.”43 Indeed, Portelli rightly warns that many written 
documents come from oral sources.44 Moreover, there are circumstances in which oral 
sources can be more reliable than written ones. Ritchie remarks, for example, the obvious 
unreliability of the written press under certain circumstances, as “researchers have found 
more than one occasion of a local newspaper ignoring an entire event.”45 In political 
processes in which many events occurred behind the scenes, the reliability of written 
information can be even weaker. Political agents do not release real information about what 
is happening and, when they make public statements, they usually simply give politically 
correct speeches. Even internal documents give little information about what happens 
behind the scenes. In these cases, published information and documents can give a useful 
context, but little details. In the case of the Basque conflict, very little of what is narrated 
in books about the subsequent failed peace processes was in the news at the time of 
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43 Ritchie, Doing, 6. 
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occurrence.46 During the 2005-2007 peace process, no news about the negotiations prior to 
the ceasefire in March 2006 was published until the process collapsed. At that point, both 
sides leaked information about the secret talks. To have any meaningful information, 
researchers have to wait until the information sought can be told by direct participants. Oral 
historians and journalists share the problem stressed by Ritchie: “When the subject matter 
is a current event, take it for granted that almost everything will be closed for some 
period.”47   
Interviewees, naturally, will tell their side of the story. Subjectivity is in the core of 
oral testimonies. Ritchie reminds that “interviewees speak from their own point of view, 
and no two will tell a story exactly alike.”48 According to Portelli, oral sources are not 
objective, but this “applies to every source, though the holiness of writing leads us to forget 
it.” However, the subjectivity of the oral narrator is also a valuable source of information 
for oral historians, because “what informants believe is indeed a historical fact.”49 
Subjectivity, of course, is not only about narrators. The interview is also influenced by the 
interviewer’s subjectivity, and the interpretation of the narrative will be made according to 
this subjectivity: “All influence the ways we ask questions and respond to narrators and 
                                                          
46 Robert Clark, Negotiating with ETA (Reno: University of Nevada, 1990); Iñaki Egaña and Giovanni 
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interpret and evaluate what they say.”50 Thus, the narrative resulting from an interview is 
a product of the interaction between two subjectivities. As reminded by Abrams, 
“neutrality is not an option.” 51 
Oral testimonies are linked to memory and memory is linked to subjectivity. 
Narrators, as much as the interviewers, are telling, after all, what they remember, and will 
tell their stories according to their memories. Regardless of the recentness of the events 
narrated, “not every perceived event is retained in memory.”52 Indeed, memory is so 
influenced by the context that an oral testimony is never the same twice: “No story will be 
repeated twice in the identical manner. Each story we hear is unique.”53 
2.3.3. The choice of interviewees 
Paul Thompson contends that oral history has given “a new dimension” to history, because 
it has enabled historians to use “the life experience of all kinds” as historical evidence. In 
his approach, “oral history is a history built around people,” and “it allows heroes not just 
from the leaders, but also from the unknown majority of the people.”54 His perspective has 
been challenged, for instance, by Patrick O’Farrell, who views history based on ordinary 
people’s testimonies as uninteresting.55 Regarding this controversy, Larson states that 
“most of those currently practicing elite oral history” believe that that there is no need to 
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55 Patrick O’Farrell, “Oral History: Facts and Fiction,” Quadrant (November 1979), 5-6, cited by Mary A. 
Larson “Research Design and Strategies,” in History of Oral History. Foundations and Methodology, ed. 





exclude any of the two perspectives, and that “there is room for both types of 
interviewing.”56 Reality, as Thompson says, is “complex and many-sided.”57 The reality 
which provoked ETA’s decision to put an end to its violent strategy is also complex and 
many-sided, and needs to be addressed from different perspectives. A dissertation, 
obviously, cannot address a reality from all possible perspectives, and this research 
addresses this topic from one of the possible ones: it collects the oral testimonies of the 
decision makers. In this regard, it is not a social history of the events that facilitated the 
end of ETA’s violence, but the reconstruction of the events based on sources linked to 
decision making. Therefore, regarding the elite/non-elite dichotomy,58 it will not be a 
history from the bottom up, but a history based on elites’ testimonies. To some extent, I 
have followed the military historian mentioned by Ritchie, who, when questioned about 
the possibility of using oral histories to study the social acculturation of barracks’ life, 
responded: “I only interview generals.”59 
I have interviewed people who had valuable and reliable information about the 
political events or processes related to the end of ETA’s campaign. The interviewees are 
actors who had decision-making capacity in the institutions, associations, and parties 
involved in the events under study. I have interviewed former ETA militants; members of 
the Batasuna leadership, the outlawed pro-independence party; members of the leaderships 
of other pro-independence forces; members of the leadership of the other major Basque 
and Spanish political parties such as the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the Spanish 
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Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Popular Party (PP); former ministers of the Spanish and 
Basque governments; Basque and international mediators; Spanish judges; an ETA victim 
involved in victims associations; and a former spokesperson of a Basque pacifist 
association; amont others. This is the complete list of the interviewees, in alphabetical order 
by last name:  
- Altuna, Iñaki: member of the staff of the newspaper Gara, and editor of 
naiz.eus. 
- Ares, Rodolfo: former Basque government Home minister. 
- Asua, Adela: member of the Spanish Constitutional Court. 
- Bortairu, Jakes: member of the leadership of AB (Abertzale Batasuna). 
- Bidart, Filipe: former activist and ex-prisoner of Iparraterrak (IK). 
- Egibar, Joseba: member of the leadership of the PNV (Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco). 
- Eguiguren, Jesús: president of the PSE-EE, the Basque branch of the Spanish 
Socialist party.   
- Esnaola, Iñaki: former member of the leadership of HB (Herri Batasuna). 
- Etxeberria, Rufi: former member of the leadership of Batasuna, and member of 
the leaderhip of Sortu.  
- Etxebeste, Eugenio, “Antxon:” ETA chief negotiator in Algiers 1989, former 
prisoner.  
- Etxegarai, Alfonso: former ETA activist, deported to Sao Tome Island, Africa, 





- Fernández, Jonan: former senior leader of Elkarri, and Basque Government 
secretary general for Peace and Coexistence.  
- Giménez, Joaquín: magistrate of the Spanish Supreme Court. 
- Gisasola, Carmen: former ETA activist later dissociated from the armed group. 
- Gómez Bermúdez, Javier: magistrate of the Spanish Audiencia National. 
- Ioldi, Juan Karlos: former ETA activist, ex-prisoner. 
- Jauregui, Ramón:60 former Presidency minister at Zapatero cabinet. 
- Laespada, Fabian: former spokesperson of Gesto por la Paz. 
- Larreina, Rafa: member of the leadership of EA (Euskal Alkartasuna). 
- Lopez Ruiz, Antton, “Kubati:” former activist of ETA, ex-prisoner.  
- Manikkalingam, Ram: chairman of the IVC (International Verification 
Commission). 
- Matute, Oskar: senior leader of Alternatiba. 
- Mayor Oreja, Jaime: former Home minister at Aznar cabinet. 
- Ortuzar, Andoni: president of the PNV executive committee. 
- Oyarzabal, Iñaki:61 former secretary general of the Basque PP (Partido 
Popular). 
- Pagazaurtundua, Maite: former president of the FVT (Fundación de Víctimas 
del Terrorismo). 
- Rios, Paul: chairman of Lokarri. 
- Santxez Aburruza, Fermín: former ETA activist, ex-prisoner. 
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- Sanz, Miguel: former president of the government of Navarre. 
- Urain, Jokin: former ETA activist, ex-prisoner. 
- Uriarte, Juan María: bishop emeritus of Donostia. 
- Urizar, Pello: president of EA. 
- Zabaleta, Patxi: senior leader of Aralar. 
- Ziarreta, Unai: former president of EA. 
Three of the above listed interviews were conducted by writing. Carmen Gisasola 
was still in prison when interviewed, and sending a written questionnaire was the only 
feasible way to obtain her testimony. Alfonso Etxegarai was deported to Sao Tome, Africa, 
and was also interviewed by email. Juan María Uriarte, a Basque bishop who has 
participated in mediation efforts, preferred to answer the questions in writing. In addition, 
two researchers on specialized journalism, Montserrat Quesada Pérez and Francisco Esteve 
Ramírez, replied to my questions by email.        
Four other interviewees requested that their names were not disclosed. Three of 
them are somehow related to the Abertzale Left. I will reference them with the following 
codes: A1, A2, and A3. The fourth anonymous interviewee is related to mediation roles, 
and will be referenced by the code A4. 
2.3.4. Documentation 
I had access to a number of primary sources with valuable data for this investigation, mostly 
political documentation.  Most of the documents produced by ETA are not public. Some 





searches. Some of these documents are included in the judicial cases against alleged ETA 
militants, or members of the Abertzale Left accused of acting under ETA directions, so that 
the parties involved in the case can access them. Many of the seized documents, either 
partially or entirely, are leaked to some media. Sometimes, the media only obtain the 
interpretation given by the intelligence services of the security sources. Non-public 
documents by ETA are produced in Basque and, sometimes, the media only obtain from 
the security forces the Spanish translation of some extracts of the original document. The 
most common result is that the news based on ETA documents are biased, usually based 
on police interpretation, and often give misinformation rather than real information. I have 
avoided this kind of filtered information in relation to ETA’s documents. 
I have used original documents of the armed group, such as the most recent issues 
of their internal bulletin Zutabe; documents of ETA’s internal assembly in 2007-2008; a 
letter sent by ETA to members of the Abertzale Left; and other internal documents, along 
with the public statements made by ETA or its spokespersons. Several documents of other 
organizations of the Abertzale Left are not public either, some of which contain telling 
information for this investigation. I had access to the letter sent by the leadership of 
Batasuna to the Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (EPPK); the evaluation made by 
Batasuna about the internal battle within the Abertzale Left; the minutes of two meetings 
between representatives of Batasuna and the EPPK; the programmatic document Mugarri; 
and others. 
Other essential documents analyzed for this investigation are public. Among those 





Altsasua and Iruñea, the debate conclusions’ document Zutik Euskal Herria, and others. 
Among the documents produced by other agencies, the most important are the subsequent 
agreements of Batasuna with the forces that eventually formed the coalition EH-Bildu; the 
declaration of Brussels; the declaration of Gernika; and the declaration of the Aiete 
Conference. 
I also had access to the video records of the trial to the main leader of the Abertzale 
Left, Arnaldo Otegi, and four other members of the leadership in June and July 2011, where 
the defendants and some witnesses gave telling testimonies about the internal debate in the 
Abertzale Left. Finally, a few testimonies have been collected from interviews already 
published, especially an interview book with Otegi, who was in jail during the time in 
which I was conducting the research.62 
I am aware that many essential documents are not accessible yet. An insurgent 
group produces clandestine documentation that is only partially and gradually released over 
time. Political parties usually deal with non-public documents, and only some of this 
documentation will come out someday. Discretion is essential for international mediators. 
No documents have been released so far in relation with the exchange of messages 
facilitated by international mediators between ETA and the Spanish government. More 
clarifying documents for future researchers will become available as time passes.                
                                                          





2.3.5. Press research   
For the analysis of the information published by the press, I have selected twelve events 
for their significance in the process toward ETA’s end. I have analyzed the information 
delivered by the printed editions of seven selected newspapers, four of them Basque, and 
three of them published in Madrid and distributed all over Spain. Firstly, I have examined 
the contents of the headlines and informative stories about the chosen events in each paper, 
in order to contrast those contents published at the time with later findings. Secondly, I 
have evaluated the quality of the selected pieces of news following a methodology 
proposed and tested by Txema Ramírez de la Piscina and others.63 According to the authors 
of this pioneering method, “a piece of news is of quality when it satisfactorily fulfils a 
series of minimums related as much to the selection and elaboration processes of the news, 
as to the social contribution which the reported event makes to society.”64 For the purpose 
of testing each analysed piece of news, they have designed a methodology that establishes 
verifiable and quantifiable parameters for determining the quality of a specific item. This 
methodology includes data about both the format of the analysed item (technical, aesthetic 
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and functional aspects, among others), and about the selection and elaboration processes 
of the news, as well as its degree of social contribution. For this investigation I have 
discarded the section on the format quality, and I have only focused on the sections that 
examines the contents.  
Each information item can score 10 points at most. The analysis of each item is 
divided into three very different segments: Selection process (maximum of 2.5 points), 
elaboration (5) and the social contribution of the news (2.5). The selection process includes 
five elements, each one rated with a maximum of 0.5: mention of the news source; nature 
of the sources; factuality of the reported fact (event or statement); degree of currentness; 
and newsworthiness. The elaboration process includes five sections, each with a maximum 
score of one point: accuracy (correspondence between the headline and body of the item); 
depth (presence of the five Ws); presence of different perspectives within the item; 
contributions made by other informative elements (photographs, graphics, infographics, 
etc.); and correctness of journalistic language. Finally, the evaluation of social contribution 
includes further five sections, each rated with a maximum of 0.5 points: power watchdog; 
promotion of social debate; respect for human dignity; presence of cultural references from 
other countries; and the combating of social marginalisation. By adding up the scores from 
all these variables, a value of 0 to 10 is obtained for each news item. The score system used 
in this research to determine news quality is included in a code book elaborated by the 
authors of the methodology.65 For the evaluation of the contents, I have worked out a table 
                                                          





for each newspaper, and scored section by section all selected items of each paper, so that 
each paper got an average index quality.  
2.4. State of the art 
Given that the last stages of the process toward ETA’s end are very recent, scholars have 
only began to analyze them. Beyond a few analytical retrospectives and journalistic stories 
worked out right after ETA’s final announcement, the most rigorous contribution has been 
produced by Teresa Whitfield.66 Whitfield describes in a detailed narrative what she calls 
“the tortuous process toward ETA’s end.” Her analysis began with the identification of the 
roots of the Basque problem, and specially focuses on a meticulous narrative on the 
decisive decade of the 2000s and the events in 2011. In Whitfield’s interpretation, ETA’s 
decline and final decision is fundamentally due to three factors: the decimation of the 
armed organization by successful police action; the intensity of the judicial persecution 
against Batasuna and others associated to the Abertzale Left movement; and the rejection 
of ETA’s methods by Basque society. Whitfield stresses that there has not been a standard 
peace process, and that “an innovative kind of direct, but also ‘virtual’ peacemaking” built 
up by a “confusing plethora of international actors” was instrumental in the facilitation of 
ETA’s decision.67 Whitfield, who had close connections with some of the international 
actors involved in the Basque process, suggests some of the moves made by those agents, 
but she refrains from disclosing much from behind the scenes.68    
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 Most of the contributions released after ETA’s 2011 decision are written from a 
non-academic journalistic perspective. Some authors provide clues to clarify some facts 
that remained behind the scenes at the time, but more than that, they offer synthesis and 
analysis of the evolution of ETA until its definitive ceasefire. Luis R. Aizpeolea, for 
example, highlights ten milestones: 1) the dissolution of ETA political-military; 2) the 
French collaboration; 3) the Ajuria Enea agreement; 4) the Algiers negotiations; 5) the 
arrest of ETA leadership in Bidart;  6) the spirit of Ermua and the Lizarra-Garazi 
agreement; 7) the Anti-terrorist Pact and the Political Parties Law; 8) the dialogue in 
Geneva/Oslo and Loiola; 9) the battle between ETA and the Abertzale Left; 10) the Aiete 
conference and ETA’s final announcement. Aizpeolea contends that the end of ETA’s 
activity has been a result of a mixture of, on the one hand, a strong refusal to offer political 
concessions, and on the other hand, flexibility to open a dialogue of ‘peace for prisoners’ 
and to gain ground before the European countries and the Basque public opinion. Aizpeolea 
argues that all negotiation processes damaged ETA’s position and reinforced the Spanish 
government. According to Aizpeolea, the negotiation process in 2005-2007 was crucial 
because, despite its failure, it triggered the confrontation within the Abertzale Left and, 
eventually, the unilateral end of ETA’s activity.69 
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 Antoni Batista,70 who also produced a historic synthesis and an analysis of the 
gradual demise of ETA, also considers the end of ETA’s campaign as a consequence of a 
combination of police repression and political initiatives. Batista contends that it would not 
have occurred if Basque society had not turned its back to the armed group, if the police 
and the judicial system had not acted effectively, and if the Political Parties Law had not 
betrayed the rule of law “outlawing thousands of civilians.” Batista warns that “the 
strategists of the Spanish military intelligence” had concluded that they somehow needed 
ETA because it delegitimized separatism and, thus, made it unfeasible, while the absence 
of ETA’s violence could make Basque independence more feasible because of the 
disappearance of that delegitimizing factor. That is why, in Batista’s view, most of the 
Spanish rulers have been so reluctant to facilitate the consolidation of ETA’s end. 
Florencio Domínguez71 and Angeles Escrivá72 contribute to the knowledge of the 
last stages of ETA’s campaign with journalistic chronicles focused on accounts of the facts 
rather than on an analysis of the ending model. Both authors have privileged access to 
Spanish anti-terrorist sources. Domínguez devotes his most recent work to the intricacies 
within the armed group in the 2000s and until October 2011. He delivers a very detailed 
narrative of the crisis within the leadership of ETA in 2007-2008, based on ETA internal 
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documents seized by the French police. ETA’s internal crisis does not by itself explain the 
process toward the end of the Basque group, but it is one of many pieces of the puzzle. 
Domínguez regards the combined anti-terrorist action of the Spanish and French as a sole 
factor leading to the end of ETA’s armed activity, and dismisses the importance of other 
factors.73 
Angeles Escrivá also contends that ETA has been defeated by police and judicial 
action. ETA’s defeat began in the mid-2000s, she argues, immediately following the 
detention of its political chief Mikel Albisu in 2004. According to Escrivá, the Basque 
armed group was at that time submerged in an unprecedented operational crisis, the 
Abertzale Left banned, its social base aware of their isolation, and the international public 
opinion against them: “They lost the game. They began to be defeated.”74 Escrivá notes 
that two more recent police operations were crucial in forcing the end of ETA’s campaign: 
firstly, the arrest in January 2010 of some ETA militants who allegedly aimed to place a 
base in Portugal to carry out an offensive to counter the movements of the Abertzale Left; 
secondly, the detention of the alleged military chief of ETA, Mikel Karrera, in May 2010, 
because he was believed to oppose strongly the abandonment of the armed struggle. 
Other authors addressed the end of ETA before it happened. Jean-Pierre Massias, a 
political scientist, addressed the issue in a book produced shortly before the announcement 
of the definitive ceasefire, but at a time when he was aware that ETA was in its last stages.75 
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Massias contends that the resolution of a conflict such as the Basque case should not be 
limited to the cessation of violence, as it is “a fundamentally political conflict.”76 Jacques 
Massey, a journalist, released a detailed history on ETA right before the beginning of its 
end, in 2010.77 Massey contended that ETA was weaker inn 2010 than it had been since 
1992. In his conclusions, Massey mentioned as not very likely the possibility that Batasuna 
would demand ETA abandon the armed struggle. He showed a pessimistic view in the last 
sentence of the book: “Among Basque radicals, the minority has thus far managed to 
perpetuate the armed organization.”78  
Joseba Zulaika and Juan Aranzadi, both anthropologists, believed by the end of the 
1990s that the Basque group had initiated the journey toward its demise. Zulaika, who in 
his pioneering work on ETA’s violence in the 1970s tried to answer the question posed by 
a Basque woman—“but how can that be?”—when a local bus driver accused of being a 
police informer was killed by ETA,79 concluded in the early 2000s that the ‘culture of 
sacrifice’ which led a generation of Basques to engage with ETA had vanished.80 Zulaika 
contends that the end of the armed group is a consequence of the change of an era, in the 
sense that ETA’s sacrifice culture is out of tune in the “fetishist” Basque society of today, 
“in the post-Guggenheim Basque Country.” In Zulaika’s words, “there has been a break 
between two eras” and “this break provoked the ceasefire.” In his analysis of the ceasefire 
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of 1998, Zulaika saw it as a “self-eliminating” initiative: “to sacrifice the struggle itself, in 
order to be loyal with the cause of struggle.”81  
Juan Aranzadi’s premature reflection about ETA’s farewell82 shows that the factors 
that eventually brought the Basque group to an end were already visible a decade before. 
Aranzadi maintains that ETA’s armed violence lasted so long because, despite its military 
defeat, it got “an indubitable symbolic success,” as it managed to provoke “a regeneration 
of Basque nationalism and a reshaping of the Basque ethnicity.” The arrest of ETA’s 
leadership in 1992, Aranzadi argues, questioned the myth of invincibility of ETA by police 
action. Then, the armed group reacted by killing elected politicians and ‘socializing the 
suffering,” as of a consequence of which began “a progressive deterioration of the past 
symbolic efficacy” of its armed actions. In sum, in Aranzadi’s view, two factors led ETA 
and the Abertzale Left to question the continuation of armed strategy: one, the conviction 
that violence had ceased to produce political and symbolic benefits to national 
construction; two, the progressive weakening of the armed group, which would make 
possible its disarticulation by police action.83 
Emilio Lopez Adan, Beltza—an analyst of the evolution of ETA absent in most of 
bibliographies on the topic because he usually publishes in Basque—argues that the Basque 
group has mistakenly enlarged a model of struggle that had lapsed with the collapse of the 
socialist bloc and the gradual demise of the revolutionary guerrilla movements.84 In this 
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new context, ETA and the Abertzale Left assumed that the legitimacy for struggle was 
given by votes, not by the fairness of the revolutionary objectives. Once the revolutionary 
model became outdated, Lopez Adan argues, ETA was out of context. Moreover, when 
ETA tried to accelerate a negotiation with the ‘socialization of the suffering’ and the attacks 
against civilians, the Basque group progressively lost the social support that was necessary 
for its endurance.  
Many authors have studied the history of ETA and the Basque conflict, since the 
pioneering works by José María Garmendia about the origins and the first two decades of 
the history of the armed group,85 and by Gurutz Jauregui about the early evolution of its 
strategy and ideology.86 Pedro Ibarra completed and updated the analysis on ETA’s 
strategy,87 and many authors gave a continuation to the research on ETA’s general history, 
most remarkably Francisco Letamendia, who narrates ETA’s history within the wider 
context of a very detailed history of the Abertzale Left.88 Letamendia’s narrative ends in 
the early 1990s, soon after the failure of the negotiations in Algiers. The most recent 
comprehensive history of ETA has been produced by Iker Casanova.89 His account goes as 
late as 2008, so that his narrative includes some of the last stages of ETA’s historical 
journey. Casanova, a member of the Abertzale Left as he acknowledges in the 
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introduction,90 maintains that ETA is a product of a deep political conflict, and narrates its 
history accordingly, emphasizing the political dimension of the confrontation. What is also 
remarkable is the collective work on ETA history, worked out by authors with access to 
direct sources and internal documents of the armed group, published in eight volumes, 
which include testimonies of a number of ETA militants.91 Another contribution to the 
knowledge of the internal life of ETA is the eighteen-volume collection compiling internal 
documents of the Basque group from its foundation to the end of the 1970s. 92   
As for literature in English, John Sullivan has produced a history of ETA in which 
the numerous splits experienced by the Basque organization in its first decades are 
explained in detail.93 Cameron J. Watson focused his contribution on the origins of ETA 
in the 1950s, when a group of young nationalists, who disagreed with the main Basque 
nationalist party (PNV), founded the organization Ekin, which was to be the embryo of 
ETA.94 Robert P. Clark also offers a useful reference on the study of Basque nationalism 
and, especially, ETA. After having done research on Basque nationalism and the resistance 
during the period of the Franco dictatorship,95 and the history of the first two decades of 
ETA,96 Clark produced a detailed account of the negotiation attempts with ETA from the 
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1970s until the eve of the negotiations in Algiers, including the talks leading to the 
dissolution of the ETA political-military faction in the early 1980s.97 
Detailed accounts of some of the negotiation attempts involving ETA have been 
delivered mainly by journalists. The origins, development and failure of the negotiations 
in Algiers in 1989 have been narrated in detail by Alberto Pozas, who relied on sources of 
the Spanish government,98 and by Iñaki Egaña and Giovanni Giacopuzzi, who based their 
narrative on sources from within the Abertzale Left.99 The story of the unsuccessful 
attempts to reinitiate a dialogue process after Algiers has been accounted rigorously by 
Carlos Fonseca.100 After this, there is a vacuum. The intricacies of the Lizarra-Garazi peace 
process in 1998-1999 have not been researched as much as other dialogue processes 
involving ETA. There is a journalistic account based on information released by the press, 
published at the time of the ceasefire,101 and a journalistic analysis of the post-Lizarra 
political situation.102 Other than that, Ludger Mees provides an approximation to what 
happened and why the Lizarra-Garazi process failed in a section of his work on nationalism 
and violence.103 The genesis, development, and break-down of the peace process in 2005-
2007 have been recounted from the perspective of one of the parties by Jesús Eguiguren, a 
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negotiator on behalf of the Spanish government, co-authored by Luis R. Aizpeolea, a 
journalist.104 A story on the process constructed out of the versions of the three major 
protagonists of the political dialogue, the PSOE, the PNV and the Abertzale Left, is 
provided by my book Loiolako hegiak.105 
Two contributions on ETA’s victims were produced in the 2000s.106 Ignacio 
Sanchez-Cuenca has studied the evolution of the Basque group’s targeting, the relation 
between ETA’s activity and the political support of the Abertzale Left, and the parallels 
between the Basque group’s praxis and the IRA’s.107 Rogelio Alonso, who has studied the 
similarities and differences between the Basque and Irish cases, has focused lately on 
research on the effects of anti-terrorism policies confronting ETA.108 The evolution of the 
decisive anti-terrorism collaboration between the French and Spanish governments has 
been studied by Sagrario Morán.109 The sociological profile of ETA activists, and their 
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motivations to engage and disengage as militants of the organization have also been 
researched, especially by Fernando Reinares.110  
Some scholars have focused their research on the broader movement to which ETA 
belongs, i.e. the Abertzale Left or the MLNV (Basque Movement for National Liberation), 
from a variety of perspectives.111 They share a critical view of the MLNV. José Manuel 
Mata López, a political scientist, provides a systematic analysis of the discourse, 
organization, and expressions of the Basque radical nationalist movement, focused on the 
decade of the 1980s. He contends that ETA was the leading organization of the whole 
collective, and that the armed group determined through its praxis the route of the whole 
movement.112 Iñigo Bullain, in a more recent analysis of the origin, ideology, strategy, and 
organization of the movement, sustains that it is wrong to consider all of the MLNV to be 
part of ETA, but it is also a mistake to consider the organizations of the MLNV as separate 
from the armed group and its military campaign. He asserts that “all is MLNV” rather than 
“all is ETA.” He examines the MLNV as a movement who interpreted politics as a 
“patriotic-revolutionary war,” developed a political-military strategy, and organized itself 
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as a national liberation movement.113 The historians Gaizka Fernández Soldevilla and Raúl 
López Romo provide a research on the history of the Basque radical nationalism from its 
origins until 2011.114 José Artola analyses the ideology and praxis of the MLNV to contend 
that it is not a nationalist movement, but a revolutionary one.115 The political scientist Jesús 
Casquete produces a critical analysis of what he considers “the political religion” of the 
Abertzale Left. He argues that the cohesion and reproduction of the Basque radical 
nationalism is based, to a great extent, on a glorification of the martyrs.116 Izaskun Sáez de 
la Fuente Aldama, a political scientist, also emphasizes the liturgical dimension of the 
MLNV’s activity, whose ideology she considers “a religion of substitution.”117 As for the 
origins of the KAS (Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista), a key organization on the 
articulation of the MLNV as a coordinated movement, the first-hand testimony of its early 
period by Natxo Arregi is a meaningful narrative.118       
The case of ETA has not been examined by scholars on the end of terrorism yet. 
There is an evident lack of deep knowledge of the Basque group’s case, probably due to 
the shortage of sources in English. When Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki produced 
their book on the end of terrorist groups, ETA was still active, and they made no reference 
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to the Basque case except a single mention of ETA in the data base appendix.119 Leonard 
Weinberg published a book devoted to the end of terrorist groups in 2012, when ETA was 
involved in a process toward its end, but the Basque case is not taken as a base for his 
theories. He briefly mentions it as an example of organizations that had internal struggles 
between factions advocating for political solutions and factions willing to continue armed 
struggle.120 Audrey K. Cronin does not study the Basque case in detail either, but her few 
references to the case show that she had enough knowledge of ETA’s evolution to predict 
that its political wing “seemed to be moving toward normalization.”121  
In short, the case of ETA has been studied by numerous scholars whose 
contributions have been published mainly in Spanish. English-language scholars with no 
skills in Spanish have a serious handicap as they cannot access many direct sources and 
most of the indirect sources on the matter, a deficit shared with the Spanish researchers 
unable to understand Basque, as most of the documents produced by ETA and the 
Abertzale Left since the early 1990s are in Basque. The following chapters have been 
worked out based on sources produced either in Basque, Spanish, French and English, the 
languages in which most of the material referred to ETA have been released over time. 
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3. Historical background 
3.1. A question of power 
3.1.1. A political dispute 
ETA committed killings, bombings, kidnappings, and economic extortion during its long 
history, while violence was simultaneously used in the name of the counterterrorism by 
governments. The Basque armed organization has been officially labeled as a terrorist 
group by institutions such as the European Union and the US State Department.122 The 
dominant discourse in Spain argues that ETA is a pure terrorist problem to be dealt 
exclusively with counter-terrorist measures. According to this approach, crushing the 
insurgent group and putting their militants in jail would have solved the problem. Yet, the 
phenomenon of ETA cannot be understood without politics. 
ETA was born with the objective of fighting for independence from the Spanish 
and French states,123 and it early adopted socialism as its ideology. It has never ceased to 
claim a Basque independent and socialist state. Its actions were carried out in order to 
influence politics. ETA claims to be part of the Abertzale Left movement since the late 
1970s, and the implicit support offered by the movement has given the armed group an 
essential political oxygen. Although the adhesion to ETA and its methods within the 
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Abertzale Left community has not ever been unanimous, the significant amount of votes 
achieved by their political parties election after election has proved the political relevance 
of the issue. ETA would not have lasted as long as it lasted without the average of the 15 
percent of votes received by Herri Batasuna (HB), Euskal Herritarrok (EH), and Batasuna. 
Furthermore, the Spanish and French states’ approaches to confront ETA are also evidence 
of its political nature. For example, Basque prisoners have been treated with different 
standards in both penitentiary systems, most notably through their dispersion in prisons 
scattered all over the Spanish and French territories. In addition, civil organizations close 
to the Abertzale Left have been targeted by the Spanish judiciary in the sake of the fight 
against ETA. A purely criminal issue would not have needed such political measures.     
The existence of an unresolved dispute over the political status of the Basque 
territories is hardly questionable. On one hand, more than half of the Basques in the Spanish 
state usually vote for Basque nationalist parties, which advocate for a greater degree of 
self-government, for a right to determine for themselves their political status, or directly 
for independence. On the other hand, the Spanish legislation establishes Spain as an 
indivisible nation and forbids any referendum on secession. The major Spanish political 
parties refuse to reform these principles. Yet, the existence of a political conflict does not 
fully explain the existence of a group using violent methods. Each time that ETA 
committed an attack, the political spokespersons of the Abertzale Left argued that it was a 
consequence of the conflict, as if the conflict in dispute required those violent actions. A 
parallel dispute on the political status of Catalonia is underway not far from the Basque 





from Catalan nationalists, with the exception of the group Terra Lliure.124 The eventual end 
of ETA’s campaign without having first resolved the political conflict is also an indication 
that, although ETA’s armed campaign was a consequence of a political conflict, it was not 
a necessary consequence but a choice made by a collective group and by individuals, 
following a specific strategy.  
In sum, any serious attempt to understand ETA should take into account the 
complex political reality of the Basque Country and its intricate relationship with the 
Spanish and French states.      
3.1.2. A divided territory 
Basque territories are not sovereign. The larger and most populated part of the Basque land 
is within the boundaries of the Spanish state,125 nowadays structured in 17 autonomous 
bodies. The southern, or peninsular, Basque Country is divided into two of these 
autonomous bodies: the officially named Basque Autonomous Community, which includes 
the territories of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa; and the Foral Community of Navarre. Both 
autonomous bodies are run by their own governments, which are elected by their own 
parliament, and they retain their own fiscal systems with a capacity to collect taxes and 
manage public resources. The Basque Autonomous Community government has been 
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ruled by the PNV—sometimes independently and sometimes in alliance with other forces, 
since its inception in 1980—with the sole exception of the term 2009-2012, when it was 
run by the Basque branch of the Spanish socialist party (PSOE), in alliance with the Partido 
Popular (PP). The Basque regional parliament has always had a Basque nationalist 
majority, except in 2009-2012, as the banning of the Abertzale Left political parties enabled 
a majority to go to the pro-Spanish parties. The Basque regional parliament has approved 
over time several initiatives claiming a right for the Basques to determine their political 
status for themselves, 126 but the Spanish institutions and legislation have prevented them 
from being implemented. In Navarre, the regional government has been ruled by pro-
Spanish political parties, either by the right-wing UPN (Union of the Navarrese People) or, 
back in the 1980s, by the Navarrese branch of the PSOE. Basque nationalists have been a 
minority since the first elections in the late 1970s, although their support has recently 
increased to more than 25 percent of the vote.127 The Northern Basque Country, in contrast, 
is not recognized as a political entity within the highly centralized French state. The three 
Basque territories, Lapurdi, Lower Navarre and Zuberoa, are part of a larger entity, the 
department of the Atlantic Pyrenees, which is a part of Aquitaine, one of the 27 French 
administrative regions. Basque nationalists are a minority that only manages to get political 
representatives in local elections, as the majoritarian electoral system allows all important 
offices to go to the major French political parties. Basque nationalists’ electoral support in 
the late 2000s varied from eight percent of the vote obtained by the coalition Euskal Herria 
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Bai (EHB) in the 2007 French legislative elections to 15.8 percent of the combined vote 
achieved by EHB and the PNB, the French affiliate of the PNV, in the 2008 cantonal 
elections.128   
Controversy, tensions, and confrontation about the political relationship the 
Basques should maintain with the central authorities and about the level of self-governance 
they should enjoy are not a novelty in Basque political history. Conflict over competences 
and fights over power date back to the time in which the Spanish and French states did not 
exist as such. This dispute on competences and power is at the core of what is called the 
Basque question. 
3.1.3. Early political articulation 
The territories that later would inform what is now considered the Basque Country, Euskal 
Herria or Vasconia, experienced five centuries of Roman colonization, and lived under the 
constant influence of their diverse neighbors from then on. The myth of Vasconia nunquam 
concultata (never conquered) was long ago overcome by archeologic and linguistic 
evidence that the territories of the Western Pyrenees were colonized by the Romann. Yet, 
the Roman presence was very uneven territorially, and it allowed the configuration of what 
Koldo Larrañaga calls “authentic reservations,” which kept the language and the old 
customary law to a higher degree than areas under strong Roman influence, especially 
along the river Ebro.129 There is documented evidence pointing out that the inhabitants of 
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the Western Pyrenees sometimes confronted the Visigoths and others in the post-Roman 
period, and that Visigoth monarchs could not completely subdue them, with the exception 
of the Ebro area and other close territories.130 Over the post-Roman centuries, these 
territories swung among their powerful neighbors, sometimes looking for alliances, 
sometimes being subdued either willingly or by military force.131 Despite the diversity of 
the communities settled all over the territories known today as the Basque Country and the 
enormous dispersion of jurisdictional areas in that pre-state era, it seems certain that the 
Indo-European peoples who arrived at this land found “a certain Pyreneean cultural 
complex” already in place.132 During the Middle Ages, the diverse territories that would 
become the Basque Country gradually and slowly articulated within the monarchies of the 
Ancient Regime, not as a unitary entity, but each following its own way and rhythm. 
Despite this diversity, they did maintain a somehow common juridical personality, based 
on the old customary laws, which gave them a character that distinguished them from their 
surrounding territories.133      
Jimeno Jurío links the foundation of the kingdom of Pamplona at the beginning of 
the tenth century to the self-defense of the local lords, who sought a unitary military 
commander to face the pressure coming both from the north, by the Carolingians, and from 
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the south, by the Muslims. The emergence of the new kingdom, later known as the kingdom 
of Navarre, changed the geopolitics of the area. In the tenth century the kingdom achieved 
internal cohesion and expanded territorially. Under the rule of Sancho the Great in the 
eleventh century, the Western lands of Vasconia became part of the kingdom of Navarre, 
although maintaining their own powers.134 It was the only time when most of what we 
know as the Basque Country articulated as a unitary political entity under a single ruler. 
Nonetheless, the influence of the kingdom of Navarre over the Western Basque territories 
was not stable. The powerful kingdom south of the Basque land, Castile, was expanding 
its influence and territory and entered into competition with Navarre. The eleventh and 
twelfth centuries were a period of alternation of both kingdom’s influence over Araba, 
Gipuzkoa, and Bizkaia, which had fixed their territorial limits, as they are today, by the 
middle of the twelfth century.135 As for the territory names, the first mentions of Araba and 
Bizkaia date back to the end of the ninth century. Gipuzkoa was first named at the 
beginning of the eleventh century.136 In 1200, most parts of Araba and Gipuzkoa were 
definitively integrated into Castile through a combination of military conquest and 
negotiation with local rulers by King Alfonso VIII. Bizkaia was already under the influence 
and protection of the Castilian king, and this link became definitive in 1376, when the 
Castilian king Juan I took the title of Lord of Bizkaia.137 While Castile was emerging as a 
dominant power, Navarre entered a process of instability, decline, and disintegration, 
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which was completed in 1512 with its military conquest by Castile. In the context of 
internal conflict among Navarrese factions, the kings of Navarre Juan I and Catalina signed 
the Treaty of Bois (1512), which was promoted by the French king Louis XII, and engaged 
the kingdom of Navarre under his influence. Fernando, the king of Aragon and Castile, 
reacted with the support of some local factions by invading Navarre through military force. 
In 1515, the Cortes of Castile confirmed the definitive annexation of Navarre.138 There is 
a never ending controversy about the nature of the integration or annexation of Navarre 
into Castile. Authors such as Jaime Ignacio del Burgo139 contend that the integration was 
an agreed union, but it is widely accepted among historians that the annexation was carried 
out by force.140  
This annexation was just another step in the expansion of Castilian military 
domination. By that time, what would eventually become Spain had begun to take form. In 
1469, the marriage of the future ‘Catholic Monarchs,’ Isabel and Fernando, initiated the 
unification of the powerful kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. The unification was 
confirmed when the two monarchs were named queen and king of their kingdoms in 1479. 
The end of Al-Andalus in 1492, the mandatory Christianization of the remaining Muslims, 
and the expulsion of the Jews were other milestones on the consolidation of the new 
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kingdom. The Catholic Church was the driving force behind their unification and 
homogenization.  
Lower Navarre, north of the Pyrenees, fell also under Castilian control after the 
invasion of 1512. However, the Castilian crown failed to control this territory, and the 
kings of Navarre took it back with the support of the French crown. Since then, Lower 
Navarre was linked to the kingdom of France, although it enjoyed a particular status until 
the French revolution. Lapurdi and Zuberoa were once under the influence of the kingdom 
of Navarre, until the English-ruled Duchy of Aquitaine took control if them in the twelfth 
century. Old customary laws were formalized under English rule and were over time a 
source of conflict with the English crown. After three centuries of English rule, Lapurdi 
and Zuberoa fell under the control of the French crown when the English forces were 
beaten in 1449-51.141 
Once under what J.H. Elliot called composite monarchies,142 all Basque territories 
enjoyed their own financial, legal, and administrative structures for centuries, following 
their customary laws, the ‘fueros’ or ‘fors’. Each territory’s laws had their particularities, 
but all had in common a high degree of self-rule, materialized in the power of taxation and 
management of the public patrimony. The self-governance system in the continental 
Basque territories was in force until its abolition in 1789 after the French revolution. It was 
the end of any recognition of the peculiarity of the Basque land within the French state. 
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The new state was structured in eighty-three administrative départements, and the three 
Basque territories were diluted into the Basses-Pyrénées along with Béarn, despite the 
eloquent opposition of the representatives of Lapurdi in the National Assembly.143 
On the other side of the Pyrenees, the Basque legal system lasted almost another 
century, until it was abolished in 1877 after the last Carlist war.144 The abolition of the 
Basque assemblies was preceded by a long political public debate on the ‘foral question,’ 
“a political, legal, and administrative issue of whether or not the Basque Country was 
entitled by law to self-government.”145 This debate emerged at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, and invigorated after 1939, when the law of October 25 introduced the 
recognition of the foral law into the Spanish constitutional framework, after the end of the 
first Carlist war. This new law indicated that the foral system had to be amended to fit into 
the new Spanish constitutional framework. In 1841, Navarre lost its kingdom status 
through a law that substantially restricted its self-government.146 The assemblies of Araba, 
Bizkaia, and Gipuzkoa survived under a highly controversial political debate. In the context 
of that debate, an influential liberal movement supporting Basque self-governance had 
developed in the Basque Country, which aimed to adapt the old customary law to the new 
liberal framework. However, by the time the liberal forces of King Alfonso XII defeated 
the traditionalist forces in the last Carlist war in 1876, the defense of the ‘fueros’ had been 
portrayed as the cause of the traditionalists’ insurrection. In contrast with the view of the 
liberal foralists, Carlists regarded the ‘fueros’ as a preservation of the old regime. After 
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their military defeat, what they defended had to be abolished.147 On July 21, 1876, the 
Spanish Parliament ordered the abolition of the ‘fueros’ of the Vascongadas.148 The already 
diminished ‘fueros’ of Navarre were not abolished, but they were stripped of most their 
powers to fit in the new liberal regime.149 
Across Spain, the Carlist Wars were a conflict between traditionalists against 
liberals, but in the Basque Country, the defense of the ‘fueros’ was a key factor of the 
dispute. Some, like John Sullivan, saw the Carlist Wars as the real beginning of Basque 
nationalism.150 Others, like Stanley G. Payne, argue that, although Carlist Wars cannot be 
explained without taking foralism into account, the majority Basque support for Carlism 
may not be attributed to it pure and simple.151 In any case, there is a consensus to consider 
that the loss of the self-governance and the representative assemblies in 1877 had a decisive 
impact on the subsequent emergence of Basque nationalism. 
3.1.3. The emergence of Basque nationalism 
Sabino Arana is widely considered as the father of Basque nationalism, being the founder 
of the Basque Nationalist Party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), in 1895. He was 
the first one solemnly declaring, in a political sense, that the fatherland of the Basques was 
Euzkadi,152 i.e. the Basque Country. According to Javier Corcuera, it was only after Arana 
that some Basques believed they constituted a nation. Nevertheless, Arana was not the first 
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to speak of the Basque Country as a nation. In Corcuera’s view, the rapid spread of Arana’s 
ideas and the PNV can be only understood “in an environment ready to accept them, in an 
atmosphere in which Basque nationality and the possibility of independence were not taken 
as mad ideas but as a formulation of something deeply felt.”153  
 The first documented mention of the Basque term for the Basque Country, Euskal 
Herria, dates back to the fifteenth century. It was coined by Joan Perez Larrazaga, a writer 
from Araba, around 1564.154 It was hardly a personal invention, as a few years later a cleric 
and translator from Lapurdi, Joanes Leizarraga, used it in an introduction of a translation 
of the New Testament.155 Lazarraga wrote “eusquel erria,” and Leizarraga, “heuskal 
herria.” A century later, Pedro Axular, a writer and priest from Lapurdi, gave the term 
Euskal Herria the sense of the country where Basque is spoken, and he even listed the 
territories which are nowadays considered the Basque historical territories.156 By the early 
nineteenth century, the term Basque is associated with the concept of nation, in Juan 
Antonio Zamacola’s Historia de las naciones bascas (History of the Basque Nations), 
published in 1818, a book that served as a reference and inspiration for Sabino Arana.157 
Around the same period, Pedro Astarloa wrote, in Basque, a glorifying history of Basques: 
Antxinako euskaldunen alabantzak (Glories of the Ancient Basques). He concluded in his 
narrative that Basques are the active subjects of their own destiny and have always 
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struggled for God, their old laws and their language.158 Agosti Xaho,159 a writer and 
Republican politician from Zuberoa, called for Basque national unification and a Basque 
Federation, in various writings between 1836 and 1847. A controversial figure, he was also 
the creator of myths and legends of great success in historical-romantic literature.160 
Francisco Navarro Villoslada’s Amaya o los vascos en el siglo VIII (Amaya or the Basques 
in the eighth Century), published in 1879, also contributed to the shaping of a mythical 
Basque history.161   
Literatury expressions of the Basque identity went parallel to a political 
consciousness that was getting shaped fundamentally through the actual foral institutions 
run by a Basque elite who accumulated a long experience of management of public affairs. 
Agirreazkuenaga argues that the foral institutions and material elements of taxation and 
resources management were key issues in the conformation of the Basque political 
community and identity.162 A member of that Basque elite, Pedro Egaña, a liberal, used the 
term “Basque nationality” as early as 1839, and he caused a political commotion in the 
Spanish senate when he mentioned it again in 1864.163 It was a time when the concept of 
‘Basque people’ was commonly used in Basque publications. According to 
Agirreazkuenaga, “the Basque political elite embraced wholeheartedly the mid-nineteenth-
century discourse of Basque nationality,” although it was “a coexistence of a dual (Basque 
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and Spanish) patriotism.”164 It was a cultural and romantic nationalism, politically foralist, 
but it was not yet separatist.  
The context described above constituted what Corcuera regards as an environment 
ready to accept Sabino Arana’s discourse. Arana gave the Basque homeland a new name, 
Euzkadi; a new flag, the ikurriña; and an objective, secession from Spain. The foundation 
of Arana’s ideology was a reaction to a double crisis experienced by the Basque society: 
the disappearance of the traditional Basque Country as a result of industrialization and 
massive Spanish immigration, and the destruction of its foral institutions. As stressed by 
Corcuera, Arana’s ideology had a religious foundation—“his nationalism was justified by 
religion because the justification of Basque traditionalism was, to a large extent, 
religious”—and his nationalism was defined by race.165 Arana proposed a new doctrine 
when he published Bizkaya por su independencia in 1892, spread his proposal through the 
newspaper Bizkaitarra from 1893, created the Euzkeldun Batzokija—the first Basque 
nationalist association—with his first followers in 1894, and founded the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV) in 1895. Regarding his final goals, he achieved very little during 
his lifetime, but he left a vital inheritance: “An ideology and a mythos, together with the 
embryo of a political movement.”166 
The PNV experienced a profound transformation from the time of Arana to the 
Civil War period in 1936-39, while gradually becoming the Basque dominant party. A new 
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generation of leaders had moved the party from a traditionalist Catholic position to a 
Christian Democrat centrist approach.167 The speech made by their leader José Antonio 
Agirre168 when Basque autonomy was formally approved by the Spanish parliament in the 
early stages of the war, in September 1936, was in that sense meaningful. Agirre 
emphasized an “absolute identity” with democracy and pledged that Basque nationalism 
would remain “in its place until fascism is conquered.”169 This deep evolution and, above 
all, the willingness of the Republicans to negotiate and recognize a Basque autonomy 
pushed the PNV into the Republican side. 
3.1.4. The trauma of the war and Francoism  
The 1936 war, the defeat of the Republican side, and the subsequent repression during the 
dictatorship are regarded as key factors for the revival of Basque nationalism, although it 
should be noted that Basque nationalism was previously very strong, as elections’ results 
during the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1936) show.170 In wartime, the Basque 
government led by the nationalist Agirre ruled a part of the Basque territory nearly as if it 
were an independent state. This fact would become an iconic political symbol for future 
Basque nationalists, as the bombing of Gernika in April 26, 1936, would turn into the most 
tragic symbol of the suffering of Basques in the war.171 In addition, the brutal post-war 
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repression enhanced separatist sentiments in many Basque nationalists. As pointed out by 
Letamendia, “the law of the victor imposed terror on the occupied territory.”172 There is a 
problem to definitively certify the number of victims of the Civil War and the Francoism, 
as many killings were not recorded, and many documents are lost. According to Iñaki 
Egaña, “at least 6,018 Basques were executed by Francoism over the months and years 
after initiation of the coup d’état” in July 1936. It is estimated that around 45,000 Basques 
were imprisoned after the Francoist coup, and between 100,000 and 150,000 were 
exiled.173 Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia were officially named “traitor provinces” and, unlike 
Araba and Navarre, were disposed of the capacity to collect taxes regulated by an economic 
agreement with the State since 1877 to 1841.174 In addition, after 1939 any expression and 
symbol of Basque political or cultural particularism was “brutally persecuted.”175 The 
Basque language was forbidden in all public spheres, and Basque political and cultural 
symbols such as the flag, ikurriña, were banned. There was “a collective trauma and 
suffering, understood as a national suffering. Basques were stigmatized as Basques.”176 
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Franco’s dictatorship made Arana’s argument that Basques were under foreign occupation 
a reality.177 
Within this context of political and cultural repression, the outcome of World War 
II made Basque nationalists expect that the defeat of fascism would affect Spain too. The 
Basque government and the PNV collaborated with the US and British secret services, 
hoping that the allies would eventually overthrow Franco’s regime. They had bet almost 
all their cards on the defeat of fascism in Europe. Ludger Mees notes that the lehendakari, 
or Basque president, Agirre emphasized “on every possible occasion” that it was only a 
question of time before the dictator would be ousted by the Western countries.178 However, 
these expectations were not fulfilled. Franco had initially been isolated and boycotted by 
the leading states in the international arena, but the Cold War’s new strategic needs led the 
United Kingdom, first, and the United States, later, to view Spain as an ally against 
communism. The Eisenhower Administration made the decision to normalize relations 
with Spain in 1953, and in December 1955 Spain became a full member of the United 
Nations. The prospects of the Basque leaders faded away. This failure of PNV’s strategy 
based on diplomacy was behind the emergence of a younger generation of nationalists 
seeking a more aggressive response to the dictatorship.  
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3.2. An armed group to fight Francoism 
3.2.1. The foundation of ETA          
In the early 1950s, a small group of nationalist students, who were very critical of the 
political passiveness of the PNV, began to discuss the need for a more effective strategy 
from a nationalist perspective. They did not decide any name for the group, but they would 
be known after the name of their bulletin, Ekin. Two main differences separated these 
young nationalists from the PNV. Firstly, they wanted a progressive and non-Catholic 
organization. Secondly, they believed that action was urgently needed in the interior, i.e. 
the Basque territory under Franco’s rule. They felt that the defeat in the Civil War and the 
subsequent situation represented “the slow death of the Basque essence,” and they regarded 
it as “a life-or-death struggle for existence.”179 Those young activists regarded themselves 
as citizens of a country completely repressed by Franco’s regime, and they believed they 
had the duty to avoid the death of Basque identity. They were influenced by existentialism, 
an ethnic idea of Basqueness, the urgency to act to save a dying language, and an interest 
in the new anti-colonial struggles, such as the Jewish, Irish and Cypriot movements. Unlike 
the old PNV, they conceived “outright independence as the only real goal of Basque 
nationalism.”180 One of the founders stated that the driving force behind the new movement 
was “with no doubt patriotism, i.e. the living consciousness of national oppression, the 
fervent interest for everything Basque, the absolute discredit of Spanish politics, the ethnic 
idea of the Basque Country,” and “non-conformity and opposition to the passive policy of 
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our elders; don’t wait but act.”181 Another founder also contends that they shared a sense 
of the urgency for action: “Something had to be done!”182  
The members of Ekin devoted the early years of the organization to the study of the 
Basque history, politics, culture and language, as training for political activism. Despite 
their criticism of the PNV, they entered in contact with the old party with the aim of joining 
forces. They even agreed to merge with the PNV’s youth organization, Euzko Gaztedi 
(EGI), first in Gipuzkoa, in 1955, and later in Bizkaia, in 1957. Yet, the old party and the 
new movement had a very troublesome, and brief, relationship. Their ideological and 
strategic disagreements happened to be insurmountable and, after some failed meetings 
intended to save the union,183 the members coming from Ekin, already a majority in the 
joined organization Ekin-EGI, broke ties with the PNV to create a new separate 
organization.184  
There are two versions about the date of birth of ETA. Many scholars have long 
considered that it was founded on July 31, 1959, the day when its members sent an official 
letter to the exiled lehendakari Agirre announcing the foundation of the new organization. 
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However, based on direct testimonies by some of the founders,185 a collective work on 
ETA’s history stated that it was created in December 1958. Many scholars have accepted 
this version. According to one of the founders’ testimony, Iulen Madariaga, the name of 
the organization was decided in December 1958, and it appeared for the first time in a 
publication in January 1959.186 According to him, those seven persons participated in the 
meeting in which the foundation and the name of the new organization were decided: José 
María Benito del Valle, José Manuel Agirre, Mikel Barandiaran, José Luis Alvarez 
Enparantza Txillardegi, Rafael Albisu, Iñaki Larrañaga and Iulen Madariaga himself.187 
Casanova specifies that the meeting in which the name of ETA was adopted was held in 
Deba, a coastal town west of Donostia.188 Today’s ETA also considers 1958 as its founding 
date, according to a recent internal document.189   
ETA defined itself as a movement, not a party, and declared that its objective was 
the national liberation of the Basque Country. In the last internal bulletin published until 
the time of writing, Zutabe 113, ETA points out that the group was founded “to confront 
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the extreme repression and negation of the post-war dictatorship.”190 From the beginning, 
they took violence as a legitimate method to respond to what they considered Spanish 
occupation, but they did not commit any major violent action until 1961. They saw Sabino 
Arana as a father of Basque nationalism, but they rejected his idea of basing Basque identity 
on race. Instead, ETA took the Basque language as the main defining element. According 
to Zulaika, “the agonic perception of the imminent death of the Basque language” is a 
fundamental factor justifying the decision to promote the use of violence as “the 
preservation of the threatened Basque language and culture is presented as both a historical 
necessity and a moral imperative.”191 Letamendia summarizes the ideological components 
of the ETA founded by the Ekin militants in the following elements: a so-called historical 
regenerationism, in the sense of viewing the most relevant facts of the Basque history as 
landmarks in the long process of national liberation; the Basque language as a key element 
of national reconstruction; a “mythical-democratic conception” of the Basque character; 
rejection of the Church hierarchy and declaration of non-Catholic; a social program 
according to the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church; total independence of the Basque 
Country; a rejection of racism, which starts to be replaced by ethnism; national resistance 
as a public duty and as a personal moral imperative; a distinctions between patriotism and 
politics, regarding patriotism as a superior activity; the conception of ETA as a patriotic 
movement instead of a political organization; and an ideological anticommunism but an 
admiration of communists for their methods of action.192  
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3.2.2. Early evolution    
Iniatilly ETA was organized by six structures: Secretary (including publications); Groups 
(study, organization); Euskara (activity in favor of the Basque language); Legal Action 
(pseudo-legal mass actions); Propaganda; and Military actions.193 Although ETA 
considered that the Basque Country was occupied and oppressed by both Spain and France, 
they only intended to use violence against the Spanish regime, as a response to the 
dictatorship and its repression.194 In the beginning, they mostly engaged in propaganda and 
sabotage activities, such as murals and leaflets calling patriots to join the struggle, displays 
of Basque flags, and small explosive devices. 1961 was a year of an important increase of 
violence. On July 18 ETA tried to derail a train carrying veterans who were going to 
Donostia to celebrate the anniversary of the Alzamiento Nacional, the coup d’état of 1936. 
They prepared the action in a way to make sure that nobody would be hurt. Indeed, nobody 
was injured, and the train did not even derail.195 Franco’s regime arrested more than a 
hundred people, many of whom were tortured and imprisoned. The same day, the principal 
leaders of ETA196 crossed the border to exile in the northern Basque land.197  
The first killing by ETA and the first ETA martyr did not come until 1968, but the 
first killing related to the emergence of the Basque clandestine group did occur in 1961, 
four months earlier than the attempted derailment and the subsequent raid. On March 26, 
1961, the Spanish Civil Guard machine gunned a car wrongly believing that the militants 
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Iulen Madariaga, José Mari Benito del Valle, and Manu Agirre travelled in it. A 33 year-
old businessman, Javier Batarrita, was killed; one of his companions, José A. Ballesteros, 
was seriously injured, and paralyzed; a third traveler emerged unharmed.198 Therefore, 
although usually forgotten by official institutions, academia and the media, Batarrita was 
the first victim of the conflict after the founding of ETA. In contrast, the death of a 22 
month-old child, Begoña Urroz, has been wrongly considered by most of the Spanish media 
and even some official institutions as ETA’s first assassination.199 Yet, most scholars on 
ETA’s history have always contended that the bombings of a train station in Donostia, 
which killed Urroz, and other bombings in June 27, 1960,200 were not committed by ETA, 
but by the DRIL. A Galician-Portuguese left-wing organization, the DRIL made some 
military actions to confront the dictatorships of Portugal and Spain. Finally, official 
documents of Spanish Police definitively established that the author of the bombings of 
June 27, 1960, had been the DRIL, and not ETA.201     
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During the 1960s, an ideological and strategic evolution took place in ETA. At the 
first assembly in 1962, they defined themselves as the Basque Revolutionary Movement 
of National Liberation. They established as their final goals an independent, united and 
Basque-speaking country, and social liberation from a social democratic perspective. In the 
internal bulletin published right after the assembly, ETA made clear that they intended to 
use guns: “It is necessary to talk clearly. If we want national liberation for Euzkadi, we 
need the avenue of arms.”202 What Letamendia names “organizational elitism” was born. 
ETA regarded themselves as a minority who fought for the wellbeing of the entire society, 
whose actions would stimulate and move the mass.203 ETA’s strategic and ideological 
foundations were further clarified in the second and third assemblies, in 1963 and 1964, on 
a similar basis. At the fourth assembly, in 1965, there was a leftist shift in ETA’s position, 
as socialism was adopted as a fundamental ideological pillar.204 As for strategy, an open 
confrontational scenario for a general insurrection was regarded as unrealistic, and the 
armed struggle came to be understood in a more progressive way, as a process with the 
objective of self-determination. The tactic ‘action-repression-action’ was theoretically 
formulated in the resolutions of the fourth assembly.205 
The fifth assembly of 1967 is a milestone in ETA’s history. Under the theoretical 
guidance of José Antonio Etxebarrieta and with his brother Txabi Etxebarrieta as the 
chairman of the assembly, ETA defined itself as a socialist movement and its nationalism 
as revolutionary. After an intense internal debate, ETA established foundations for the 
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compatibility of both national and social liberation. Most of the founders coming from Ekin 
left the organization because they disagreed with the adoption of Marxist-Leninism as a 
doctrine.206 The ‘action-repression-action’ tactic, already approved in the previous 
assembly, but not put into practice yet for internal disagreements, was ratified in the fifth 
assembly. Regarding that first decade of ideological clarification, the current ETA 
underlines the idea that “national liberation and social liberation were regarded the two 
sides of the same coin,” and that El Pueblo Trabajador Vasco, the Basque Working People, 
was defined as “subject of the liberation.”207 Once the fifth assembly had put an end to the 
internal tensions and disagreements, with a split and few expulsions in the way,208 
everything was ready to activate the mechanism of ‘action-repression-action.’209 The 
context was also adequate. While ideology and strategy were evolving, ETA’s sabotage 
activities experienced an escalation, and Spanish repression also increased.  
3.2.3. Spiral of violence 
ETA committed the first killing and also produced its first martyr on the same day of 1968, 
June 7th. Two ETA militants travelling in a car were stopped by a Civil Guard. One of the 
activists, Txabi Etxebarrieta, shot and killed the agent, José Pardines. They escaped but, 
within hours, Etxebarrieta was caught and shot dead by Civil Guards. Less than two months 
later, ETA replied with its first planned assassination, killing Melitón Manzanas, a police 
officer with a reputation for being a brutal torturer. The Spanish government responded 
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with indiscriminate repression. They arrested hundreds, many of whom were tortured. The 
Spanish regime played its repressive role perfectly to feed the action-repression-action 
mechanism.210 There is a consensus on the importance of these events as a landmark of the 
beginning of the Basque modern armed conflict. According to Garmendia, “that day the 
history of the Basque Country changed forever.”211 Sullivan states that the repercussions 
of Etxebarrieta’s death were “greater than anyone could have imagined.”212 The violent 
repression provoked, on the one hand, the radicalization of ETA, and, on the other, the 
growth of the popular support for ETA. Jauregui points out that, from now on, ETA would 
be in “the indisputable center of the Basque people’s struggle,” and it would promote the 
increase of the Basque national consciousness.213 
 Although repression in the short term effectively fed the spiral of violence, it also 
very efficiently weakened ETA as an organization. After the arrest of almost the entire 
leadership and most of the militants, ETA was on the verge of being dismantled at the end 
of the decade.214 Yet, the Franco regime miscalculated the effects of their tough policy 
when sixteen members of ETA were tried and condemned, six of them to death, in 1970. 
The death sentences of the Burgos trial provoked a strong reaction, not only in the Basque 
Country, but also in Spain and Europe. Although the death sentences were eventually 
commuted, the trial became a catalyst for the Basque nationalist movement and, especially, 
for ETA. The convicted militants were viewed as heroes, and it provoked a significant 
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recruitment of activists. As a result, the Basque group became capable of engaging the 
Spanish security forces during the following years. The Burgos trial was, according to 
Sullivan, “undoubtedly the most crucial event in ETA’s history.” In his view, the popular 
backing of the armed group at the time showed that the important effect of ETA’s actions 
was “to provide heroes and martyrs to whom the people could rally.”215 Casanova stresses 
that the trial provoked ETA’s “biggest mobilization success of its history.”216  
 Three years later came ETA’s biggest operational success. In December 1973, a 
Basque cell killed the president of Franco’s government, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, 
supposedly the man who was appointed by Franco to be his successor. The killing of 
Carrero Blanco was, in Raymond Carr’s words, ETA’s “greatest coup” and it had a great 
influence on the outcome of Spanish history. The Basque group had struck “a stout blow 
against continuismo as represented by Carrero Blanco.”217 Payne qualifies the killing of 
Franco’s “chosen political successor” as “one of the most technically expert assassinations 
in modern history.”218 Furthermore, the killing came about in a period of tensions among 
factions within ETA, and it marked the hegemony of the military wing of the group and 
the militarist conception of the struggle.219 
Meanwhile, the history of the numerous splits in ETA was still on course. By 1970, 
it had split into two factions. ETA (VI), more leftist than nationalist, emerged as the 
majority organization. ETA (V), more nationalist and militarist, although a minority at the 
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time of the division, became gradually more attractive for Basque youth as a consequence 
of their intense activism. By the time a cell of ETA (V) killed Carrero Blanco, ETA (VI) 
had suffered a further split, and most of the organization joined a Trotskyist party, Liga 
Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR). 
The main ETA group was further divided, in 1974, into two new factions, in a split 
that gave birth to present-day ETA. ETA Political-Military, or ETA (pm), also known as 
the polimilis, had at the time more militants and a stronger organization, but ETA Military, 
or ETA (m), the milis, was the faction that would last longest.220 The main disagreement 
was about the relationship of the armed action with other fields of struggle. Since the fifth 
assembly, the Basque group was organized in four sections: the Political front, the 
Workers’ front, the Cultural front, and the Military front. The Military section, which 
would eventually form ETA (m), argued that the attempt to combine mass work and armed 
struggle within the same organization did not work and should be abandoned. They 
proposed that class struggle, political action, and cultural action should be carried out by 
organizations separated from the military structure. The militants who eventually formed 
ETA (pm) believed that all structures should work under a unique organization and 
direction. Those backing ETA (pm) ended up creating a working-class political party, 
Euskal Iraultzarako Alderdia (EIA), in 1976, which would be the driving force of the 
electoral coalition, Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE). The duty of the party and the coalition was to 
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work in the new political framework, with the armed group acting as a rearguard for the 
masses.  
Francisco Franco died in his own bed on November 20, 1975, almost two months 
after having approved the execution of two ETA militants by firing squad.221 With those 
executions, the regime gave further fuel to the legitimation of the violent response to state 
repression. The new head of state was King Juan Carlos de Borbón, who swore the 
principles of Franco’s National Movement when he was appointed crown prince by the 
Dictator. He had inherited an authoritarian regime which, among many other issues, had to 
face two armed groups under the same denomination, ETA, confronting the state with the 
support of a significant part of the Basque society. 
3.3. Continuation of the armed struggle in democracy 
3.3.1. Reform instead of rupture  
When Francisco Franco died and Juan Carlos de Borbón was crowned as the king of a new 
monarchy, it was not clear whether Spain would become a democracy. The king was the 
new head of state by the will of the defunct Dictator, and he was the chief of staff of the 
army too. In July 1976, the king got rid of the last president of the government appointed 
by Franco, Carlos Arias Navarro, and named a young politician, Adolfo Suárez, as head of 
the cabinet. He was the chief of the Francoist National Movement at the time and, therefore, 
had been in charge of the only legally organized political movement of the time, with which 
most of the provinces’ governors and city mayors were associated. However, as he 
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promptly made clear, Suarez was willing to lead, alongside with the king, a reform of the 
regime. Always under the pressure of the Francoist powers still in charge in most of the 
State structures, especially the military, the Spanish state moved toward a formal 
democracy, although there was some continuity with the previous regime. Anti-Francoism 
political prisoners were granted an amnesty in 1977, while the crimes committed by 
Francoists during the Dictatorship were never tried, not even investigated or clarified. In 
December 1976, the law for political reform promoted by Suárez was overwhelmingly 
approved across Spain, although all opposition political parties, still illegal, called for 
abstention. Only 22.6 percent abstained in Spain. Basques, nevertheless, gave the first 
evidence that the transition in their territory would be different. Abstention reached an 
average of 42.2 percent in the four territories: 54.8 percent in Gipuzkoa, 45.9 percent in 
Bizkaia, 26.4 percent in Navarre, and 23.5 percent in Araba.222 In 1977, from February to 
April, political pluralism was established through the legalization of the main parties in 
Spain. Finally, in June 1977, general elections were held to elect a parliament whose main 
task was laying out a new constitution. 
The Spanish elections were preceded by an intense debate in the Basque nationalist 
movement, especially among the leftist forces, including ETA (m) and ETA (pm). 
Discussions led to six summits among all Basque nationalist forces, including the 
clandestine groups, in Txiberta (also Xiberta or Chiberta), a hotel by the coast in Lapurdi, 
in April and May 1977. In those meetings, ETA (m) proposed not participating in the 
                                                          






Spanish elections because total amnesty was not granted yet. According to some versions, 
including the present-day ETA’s,223 the milis were prepared to lay down arms for good if 
all nationalist forces agreed to boycott elections.224 Yet, the PNV had already decided to 
take part, and ETA (pm) eventually called for participation too, which led the newly formed 
party EIA to participate within the coalition Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE). The line drawn in 
Txiberta separating the forces willing to take part in the democratic reform from those 
wanting a rupture would mark Basque politics for the next decades. Since then, Txiberta 
has been a symbol of the first lost opportunity for Basque nationalist united action. 
In Spain, Adolfo Suárez’s newly formed party, the conservative Unión de Centro 
Democrático (UCD), won elections, and Suárez was named president of the government. 
The socialist party led by Felipe Gonzalez, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 
became the main opposition party, well ahead of the communist party led by Santiago 
Carrillo, the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), and the right-wing Alianza Popular (AP) 
led by Franco’s former minister, Manuel Fraga. In the Basque Country, the Basque 
Nationalist Party, the PNV, won in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. The Spanish conservative party, 
UCD, won in Araba and Navarre. The PSOE, which came second in the four Basque 
territories, was the first Basque party overall with nine representatives. The PNV obtained 
eight seats and UCD, seven. EE had just one seat, in Gipuzkoa, as much as the AP in 
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Bizkaia.225 The Basque parties in the orbit of ETA (m) refused to participate and called for 
abstention. 
It is interesting to note that the election results in the Basque territories in 1977 
were not so different from the results in 1936 before the outbreak of the war, in spite of all 
the dramatic events experienced during the four decades between the two elections. Basque 
nationalists obtained nine seats in 1936 and, adding the EE representatives to the PNV 
ones, they had the same number in 1977. The pro-Spanish and anti-Republic right wing 
obtained eight seats in 1936, and the UCD (seven) and the AP (one) added together the 
same sum in 1977. The Popular Front and its allies achieved seven seats in 1936, and the 
PSOE had nine four decades later.226  
The 1977 election results came as a clarification of the Basque political map. On 
one hand, the constellation of diverse nationalist-revolutionary parties realized that the old 
party of Sabino Arana, regarded by many as a relic of the past, was still in the lead on the 
nationalist side. History counted, and it seemed that the PNV held its historical legitimacy. 
On the other hand, the Spanish major parties obtained overall more than half of the Basque 
votes, but they did not have a clear majority. The electoral tug of war between Basque 
nationalists and Spanish parties had just started. 
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3.3.2. An indivisible nation and two separate autonomous bodies 
Therefore, representatives of the major Basque political forces were present in the Spanish 
legislature when a new constitution was worked out and approved, first in the Congress 
and Senate, and then in a referendum in December 1978. Regarding national sovereignty 
and territorial rights, the Constitution established that Spanish territory is indivisible by 
any means, and that “nationalities and regions” have a right for a limited autonomous 
status. Hence, nations or nationalities such as Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, are 
unable to secede from Spain under the Constitution, never mind the will of the majority of 
their citizens. The three sections of the Constitution establishing those criteria are crystal 
clear:    
Section 1 (2). National sovereignty belongs to the Spanish people, from whom all 
State powers emanate. 
Section 2. The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, 
the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees 
the right to self-government227 of the nationalities and regions of which it is 
composed and the solidarity among them all.  
                                                          





Section 8. The mission of the Armed forces, comprising the Army, the Navy and 
the Air Force, is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, and to 
defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.228  
 In the constitutional debates previous to the approval of the text, the only 
representative of Basque leftist nationalism, Francisco Letamendia from EE, proposed to 
include the right for self-determination in the new framework. The motion obtained only 
five votes out of 350.229 The PSOE and the PCE had abandoned their traditional position 
in favor of federalism and the right for self-determination, and embraced the discourse of 
the indivisibility of the Spanish nation. Basque nationalists often recall the Spanish 
Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez shouting “Gora Euskadi Askatuta!”—a call for Basque 
national freedom—at a meeting in 1976,230 and the Basque Socialist leader José María 
Benegas carrying the banner in favor of the right for self-determination in 1978.231 
Although the inclusion of the right for self-determination was in accordance with the PNV 
doctrine, even the eight representatives of the Basque nationalist party voted against 
Letamendia’s proposal. Their goal at the time was to reach an agreement with the Spanish 
parties on the recognition of the historic rights of the Basque territories. Nevertheless, the 
provision suggested by the PNV was not approved. Basque historic rights were finally 
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included as proposed by the Spanish majority, subordinated to “the framework of the 
Constitution,” without the support of PNV. The Additional Provision One was approved 
as follows:        
The Constitution protects and respects the historic rights of the territories with 
traditional charters (fueros). The general updating of historic rights shall be carried 
out, where appropriate, within the framework of the Constitution and of the Statutes 
of Autonomy.232 
In a referendum held on December 6, 1978, the constitution was approved by a 
huge majority in Spain. With an abstention of 32.9 percent, the 88.5 percent of the voters 
said ‘yes.’ In the Basque Country the result was unsurprisingly different, as nationalist 
forces called either for abstention, such as the PNV and others, or for a negative vote, such 
as the forces in the ETA (m) orbit. The abstention in the four Basque territories reached an 
average of 51.2 percent; among the voters, a 71.8 percent voted affirmatively.233 Therefore, 
only 34.6 percent of the Basque census supported the legal foundation that would regulate 
the relations between the Spanish state and the peninsular Basques for the following 
decades. 
While the Constitution had been worked out in Madrid, in 1977 the Basque 
representatives of the Spanish Congress and Senate formed the Assembly of the Basque 
Members of Parliament, with the duty of discussing a future autonomous framework. 
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Socialists from Navarre did participate in that body, but the representatives of UCD of 
Navarre did not. When a Basque pre-autonomy regime was agreed upon, including a 
temporary cabinet led by a socialist, Ramón Rubial,234 Navarre did not integrate into it, 
because UCD had the majority among Navarrese representatives. Yet, a mechanism for 
integration was established, through which Navarre could become part of the Basque 
autonomy in the event of a majority of the Navarrese electorate deciding it in a referendum. 
That possibility seemed likely, taking into account that the Socialist party was at the time 
for the integration. However, socialists from Navarre soon changed their position.235 That 
political shift was firmly ratified in 1982 when they separated from the Basque branch of 
the PSOE, the Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE), and created their own branch, Partido 
Socialista de Navarra (PSN). ETA (m) and the Basque nationalist forces that opposed the 
political reform were strongly against the separation of the Basque territories, and the issue 
of Navarre would become one of the central issues of the conflict in the coming years.   
3.3.3. The making of the Abertzale Left 
While the new Spanish framework and the embryo for autonomy were being shaped, 
Basque political factions unwilling to participate in the reform were taking positions and 
acting accordingly. ETA (pm) and its political wing EIA initiated their road toward 
integration. They decided to participate in Spanish elections in 1977, and, subsequently, in 
the pre-autonomy debates and institutions, although the armed group continued its military 
activity for a few more years. In contrast, ETA (m) adopted an attitude of total opposition 
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to the new constitutional framework and the exclusion of Navarre from the Basque pre-
autonomy body. Previous to the approval of the new Constitution, ETA (m) fixed its 
position in a document titled “ETA on juancarlismo.”236 The document announced that 
ETA would continue to fight “against juancarlismo as they did against francoism,” arguing 
that the king Juan Carlos was a successor of Franco, and a rupture with the previous regime 
was necessary. The 1978 Constitution defining Spain as an indivisible nation and the 
partition of the Basque territories in the pre-autonomy status fueled ETA (m)’s rejection of 
the new system, and its willingness to challenge it through violence. While EIA and its 
associated coalition EE started to integrate into the new framework with the agreement of 
ETA (pm), a faction of the polimilis, the berezis, disagreed with their leadership’s 
approach. After great internal tensions, the dissidents ended up leaving ETA (pm) and 
joining the milis in 1977.237 At that time, ETA (m) intensified its campaign, firstly, because 
the reform of the political system was not satisfactory in their view; secondly, because the 
attempt for Basque nationalists’ united action failed in Txiberta; and thirdly, because the 
reunification with the berezis reinforced its ability to effectively carry out an aggressive 
campaign.  
ETA (m) was not alone in that total opposition to the reform. Numerous political 
organizations, which initiated the transition years competing against each other, started to 
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coordinate under a platform, KAS (Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista). KAS was created 
in 1975 as an anti-repressive platform launched by ETA (pm) and other minor groups;238 
later it turned into a forum of leftist nationalist forces including both ETAs. In 1976, the 
groups associated with the forum agreed on what will be known as the KAS Alternative. 
This platform established the minimum conditions to consider the political reform a 
democratic process. In the near future, it would point out under which conditions ETA 
would agree to end armed struggle. In that early version there were seven claims, among 
which there was a demand for the recognition of national sovereignty of the Basque 
Country, so that the Basque people could determine their status and create their own state 
in the future, and a short-run demand to establish a temporary autonomy statute for Araba, 
Gipuzkoa, Bizkaia, and Navarre. Since ETA (pm) was expelled in 1977,239 KAS became a 
coordinating body of the organizations whose main reference was ETA (m).240 In January 
1978, ETA had publicly presented a new version of the KAS Alternative, comprising five 
claims: amnesty for all Basque prisoners, legalization of all parties, withdrawal of the 
Spanish police forces, Madrid’s acceptance of the right for self-determination and the 
inclusion of Navarre within the Basque autonomy statute, and improvement of basic living 
conditions for the working class.241 
Parallel to the evolution of KAS as an instrument of what was to be called the 
Abertzale  Left or the MLNV (Basque Movement for National Liberation),242 political 
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parties in the orbit of ETA (m) started to get together in order to form a united electoral 
coalition. The attitude to boycott elections had evolved toward a position of competing in 
elections but refusing to participate in the institutions, with the exception of the local 
councils, which were considered legitimate. In April 1978, four leftist parties formed the 
coalition HB: the old ANV (Acción Nacionalista Vasca), the social-democrat ESB (Euskal 
Sozialista Biltzarrea), the Marxist HASI (Herri Alderdi Sozialista Iraultzailea), and the 
worker party LAIA (Langile Abertzale Iraultzaileen Alderdia). Since the day of its public 
presentation, HB became the indisputable electoral reference of the political movement 
close to ETA (m), already in total opposition to the political spectrum organized around 
ETA (pm), EIA and EE. HB took part in the Spanish general elections in March 1979 
without hiding his strategic harmony with ETA (m),243 and obtained 172,110 votes, 13.8 
percent of the electorate of the four Basque territories. EE, still backing ETA (pm), had 
85,677 votes, 6.8 percent of the electorate.244 
3.3.4. A single ETA 
A new statute of autonomy was approved in 1979. It gave the three western provinces a 
high degree of self-government, including the power to collect taxes and to manage public 
resources, in a context of deep economic crisis. The Basque Government was in charge of 
the health system and, to a great extent, of education. A Basque police was formed under 
the political control of the regional government, but it had to comply with the orders of the 
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Spanish judiciary, still under Madrid control. The new autonomy did not change ETA (m) 
and HB’s position regarding the political reform. The first project of the statute was worked 
out by the Assembly of Basque Members of Parliament elected in the 1977 Spanish 
elections. That project was substantially changed during the regulatory negotiations with a 
committee of the Spanish Congress and Senate. When negotiations reached a deadlock, an 
agreement between the Spanish president, Adolfo Suárez, and the leader of the PNV, 
Carlos Garaikoetxea, led to a new legal text. The statute is known as the Statute of Gernika, 
as the Basque deputies agreed upon the first project in the symbolic town of Bizkaia. But 
ETA always would refer to it as the “Statute of the Moncloa,” as the actual text voted in 
referendum was agreed on by Suárez and Garaikoetxea in the residence of the Spanish 
Prime minister, La Moncloa.  
All significant parties but HB and the Spanish right-wing AP supported the project 
and called for a ‘yes’ in the referendum held on October 25, 1979. HB called for “active 
abstention” and AP for a negative vote. The statute was approved by a big majority. The 
abstention rate was high (41.1 percent), but not enough to question its popular support. 
With a participation of 58.9 percent of the census, 94.6 percent voted affirmatively and 5.4 
percent negatively.245 Nevertheless, ETA (m) and HB never recognized any legitimacy to 
the new statute, as it is subordinated to a constitution regarded as illegitimate. However, 
HB decided to compete in the 1980 elections to the Basque parliament, although they 
announced that they would not occupy their seats, if elected. The PNV won elections, with 
                                                          







38.1 percent of the vote and twenty-five representatives, and Carlos Garaikoetxea was 
named lehendakari. HB came second, with 16.6 percent of the vote and eleven seats, well 
ahead of PSE-PSOE (14.2 percent, nine seats), EE (9.8 percent, six seats) and UCD (8.5 
percent, six seats).246 ETA (m) openly asked their supporters to vote for HB, and HB 
candidates never distanced themselves from ETA (m). Thus, it was assumed that their 
voters were backing to some extent ETA’s armed struggle, although not all individuals 
voting for HB would accept that assumption. For the next two decades, HB would always 
obtain the support of at least 14.7 percent and at most 18.3 percent in the elections for the 
Basque parliament.247 
In Navarre, a separate autonomy statute was established in 1982248 with the 
opposition of all Basque nationalist forces and the consensus of UPN, UCD and PSN. It 
was approved through a special procedure which did not need any referendum, after having 
been negotiated and voted on as an organic law in the Spanish parliament. In the first vote 
after the establishment of the statute, in May 1983, the PSN won elections (35.9 percent of 
the vote and twenty seats out of fifty). HB was the fourth party overall and first among 
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Basque nationalists (10.6 percent, six seats), and PNV came next (6.9 percent, three 
seats).249      
Contrary to ETA (m), the faction of ETA (pm) in line with EIA accelerated its road 
toward dissolution after the establishment of the Basque autonomy. With their political 
representatives working in the new democratic institutions, the violent campaign including 
kidnapping UCD politicians was hard to justify. Internal disagreements and tensions arose 
again, and, finally, the expected split took place in the eighth Assembly, in February 1982. 
The faction in harmony with EIA, known as ETA (VII), announced its dissolution and 
started a process of negotiated reinsertion managed by EE political leaders Juan María 
Bandrés and Mario Onaindia, and the Spanish Home minister Juan José Rosón. The faction 
later known as ETA (VIII) declared its determination to carry on the armed campaign. It 
would not last long as an organization.250 After two years of some actions and great tension 
with the former companions of ETA (VII), in February 1984 ETA (VIII) announced its 
integration in ETA (m), since then the only organization claiming the acronym.251 
By the time the milis became the sole ETA, it was not the only Basque insurgent 
organization. An anti-hierarchy armed group, the Comandos Autonomos Anticapitalistas 
(CAA) operated from 1977 to 1986. Some of their activists came from LAIA-EZ, a splinter 
group of LAIA, one of the founder parties of HB; and others from the bereziak, as they 
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were not prepared to integrate into ETA (m) because of their hierarchical structure.252 
CAA’s most notorious action was the killing of the Basque socialist leader Enrique Casas 
in February 1984, at a time when ETA (m) and HB were publicly opposed to killing 
representatives of the political parties.253      
The diverse factions of ETA and the CAA did not carry out any armed attacks in 
Iparralde, the northern Basque Country under French sovereignty. Other groups did. 
Iparretarrak (IK) was created in 1973, mostly influenced by the emergence of ETA, and 
defined itself as a “Basque socialist organization for national liberation.” Two other groups, 
Euskal Zuzentasuna and Hordago, also emerged in the 1970s, but did not last long.254 IK 
operated only in the northern Basque territory, and mostly carried out attacks and sabotages 
on touristic, economic and institutional places. However, the killing of two French 
policemen in Baigorri (Lapurdi) in March 1982 had controversially been regarded as an IK 
action, although the organization denied responsibility at the time. In addition, IK 
recognized that they had been involved in a confrontation with French gendarmes at Leon 
(Landes) in August 1983, as a consequence of which an agent was killed, and an IK militant 
disappeared and never appeared again. ETA and IK were strategically opposed, because 
ETA was against any armed struggle in the continental Basque Country, as they needed 
the territory as a rearguard for their militants and network. The armed activity of IK 
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declined in the 1990s, and they carried out their last actions, a few sabotages, in 2000. They 
never announced their end.255      
3.4. Negotiation on the horizon 
3.4.1. War of attrition  
In the late 1970s and through the 1980s, ETA developed a strategy of attrition with the 
objective of forcing a political negotiation with the Spanish state. Previously, they followed 
two different strategies. Firstly, from its foundation to 1965, ETA had a more theoretical 
than real strategy for a revolutionary war. Secondly, theoretically from 1965 and in practice 
from 1967, ETA tried to overthrow the system activating and feeding the ‘action-
repression-action’ spiral, which was supposed to provoke a general insurrection. Once the 
limits of that strategy became evident, ETA shifted to a tactic of attrition for negotiation. 
That strategic change began in 1974, when ETA acknowledged that a military victory over 
the Spanish state was not a realistic approach. It was more specifically formulated in 1978, 
and started to become a real possibility in the mid-1980s.256 
According to Letamendia, ETA pointed out for the first time in 1978 that the 
achievement of the KAS Alternative program was a condition for a ceasefire. This 
conditioned offer of a ceasefire was a “total novelty” in ETA’s history.257 Nevertheless, 
ETA did not regard negotiation as urgent. In fact, representatives of the Spanish state 
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contacted both ETAs as early as the end of 1976 offering some negotiations in exchange 
for a ceasefire. ETA (pm) initiated a process of contacts which would eventually come to 
fruition years later. ETA (m), in contrast, rejected all offers of negotiations.258 In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, ETA (m) considered that it was not a time for negotiation, but for 
total armed action in order to cause an unmanageable attrition in the Spanish state. ETA 
(m) believed that it had enough capacity and enough social support to destabilize the state 
and force them to accept the KAS Alternative, whose implementation would eventually 
need a negotiation.  
ETA increased its campaign since 1978. They showed a great capacity of 
destabilization and carried out more deadly attacks than ever in the early 1980s. ETA killed 
ten people before 1973, and nineteen in 1974, the year of the split between ETA (m) and 
ETA (pm). The milis killed thirty-five people in the next three years, between 1975 and 
1977. Then it started the great offensive, with sixty killings in 1978, sixty-five in 1979, and 
eighty-two in 1980, which would be the peak in ETA’s history. ETA (m) killed an average 
of thirty-four people yearly between 1981 and 1988. As for ETA (pm), they killed nine 
people from 1975 to 1978, ten in 1979, and five in 1980. The last surviving faction of the 
polimilis, the ETA (VIII), killed two people in 1983. As for the CAA, they killed 32 people 
from 1978 to 1984, with a peak of nine in 1980.259 
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As for the deceased Basque militants, 32 members of ETA and other Basque 
groups260 died from 1968 to 1977, either in clashes with police, during attacks carried out 
by them or, in the case of Jon Paredes ‘Txiki’ and Angel Otaegi in 1975, by firing squad. 
From 1978 to 1988, ETA and other minor Basque groups such as CAA and IK lost 95 
activists, either in clashes with police, in attacks by state-sponsored paramilitary groups, 
when handling explosives carried by them, while in detention or in prison, and under other 
circumstances.261  
3.4.2. Violence by the state  
Intense violence came from the Spanish state and other agencies too. Sources notably differ 
on the number of state victims, but some significant data has been consistently 
accredited.262 Torture of detainees was a systematic practice of the Spanish police forces 
under Francoism, but it did not stop after a political reform that left the police and military 
intact. In addition, the renewed anti-terrorism legislation enabled the police interrogators 
to hold ETA suspects in incommunicado detention for days. There is not verified data about 
torture cases from before the end of the 1980s, but researchers on torture have estimated 
that more than five thousand Basques alleged torture between 1960 and 1977. As for the 
period between 1978 and 1988, around three thousand arrested people alleged having been 
tortured by Spanish forces. From then on, the figures are not estimative but based on data: 
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900 testimonies of torture between 1989 and 1999, and 733 between 2000 and 2012.263 
According to a 2008 report by the Basque government, six persons died while in the hands 
of the Spanish police forces in incommunicado detention: one in 1975, 1979, 1981, 1985, 
and two in 1993. Three others died right after being released, two in 1970 and one in 
1982.264 Spanish authorities have long argued that ETA members have orders to 
systematically allege torture. However, many of those who alleged torture are not members 
of the armed organization and, significantly, ETA members have almost never alleged 
torture when arrested in France. In addition, international bodies such as the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture of the United Nations and Amnesty International have given 
credibility to many torture allegations and have repeatedly asked Spanish authorities to 
revoke the legislation enabling incommunicado detention.     
Police repression under the dictatorship had been fierce and, to a great extent, 
indiscriminate. Beyond the huge number of arrests, at least thirty-eight Basque people died 
by the Spanish police forces at check-points, demonstrations and other circumstances from 
1969 until the first democratic elections in 1977. Things did not change under the 
democratically elected governments. From 1978 to 1988, at least twenty-nine further 
Basque citizens were killed as a consequence of Spanish police actions.265  
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While the police forces acted under the umbrella of the law, some paramilitary 
groups with suspected ties to elements of the anti-terrorism state agencies committed 
continuous attacks against ETA militants and Basque political activists in both sides of the 
border. In the transition years run by Adolfo Suárez, the Batallón Vasco Español (BVE) 
and other paramilitary groups claimed the killing of thirty-four people from 1975 to 1981, 
twenty-four of them in the southern Basque Country and ten in the northern territories.266 
Paddy Woodworth, along with many others, argues that the Spanish government’s police 
services were behind the actions of the BVE and other right-wing minor paramilitary 
groups,267 but political responsibilities of this first stage of what was called the ‘dirty war’ 
were never clarified. 
 1982 was a game changing year for Spanish politics when the socialist leader 
Felipe Gonzalez took office. A year earlier, in February 1981, in a context of violence and 
destabilization in which ETA’s campaign was one of the main factors, some old regime 
militaries attempted a coup d’état. It did not succeed.268 However, right after the attempt, 
the decentralization process of the state had a setback. The autonomy communities saw 
their powers further limited through the Organic Law for the Harmonization of the 
Autonomy Process (LOAPA) in July, which is considered by many as a direct consequence 
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of the coup d’état attempt.269 When the PSOE won elections in October 1982, many 
regarded it as a consolidation of the new democratic regime.  
The Gonzalez cabinet took a tough stance against ETA. Following a contra-
insurgency agenda named Plan ZEN (Plan for the Special Northern Zone), the government 
increased police operations and involved some special military forces in the war on ETA.270 
Regarding torture allegations, things did not change with the socialist government. Many 
Basques claimed to have been tortured while in incommunicado detention. Adolfo Suárez 
was still the president of the Spanish government when the ETA member Joxe Arregi was 
tortured to death in February 1981, but the socialist party had already ruled for three years 
when, in December 1985, the dead body of a man arrested by the Civil Guard, Mikel 
Zabaltza, appeared in the Bidasoa river. The official version said that the detainee tried to 
escape and eventually drowned in the river. All evidence, however, suggested that he was 
killed while being interrogated by Civil Guards. Zabaltza was arrested as a suspected ETA 
member, but he was not.  
Political responsibilities on torture have never been clarified, unlike on the ‘dirty 
war’ under socialist rule. As it would later be judicially proven, a second stage of the ‘dirty 
war’ against ETA and the Abertzale Left was organized and sponsored by top officers of 
the Spanish Government Home Ministry and some prominent Basque socialist leaders such 
as the president of the socialist party in Bizkaia at the time, Ricardo Garcia Damborenea.271 
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Squads known as Antiterrorist Liberation Groups (GAL) carried out deadly attacks against 
refugees in the northern Basque territories and some prominent members of the Abertzale 
Left in the south. Government-sponsored paramilitaries were not novelties in the Basque 
scenario, but the GAL was a step forward in terms of organization and strategy.272 Between 
1983 and 1987, mercenaries of the GAL, paid with money coming from the secret funds 
of the Spanish government, committed thirty-eight attacks and killed twenty-seven people, 
most of them Basque militants in French territory.273 Besides mercenaries, Spanish Civil 
Guards also operated in the ‘dirty war,’ as they did in the infamously well-known case of 
the kidnapping, torture and killing of ETA militants Joxean Lasa and Joxi Zabala in 
1983.274    
According to many, including the best-known GAL member, the former police 
officer José Amedo,275 the goal of the GAL was not only to weaken ETA and its movement, 
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but also to force the French government to collaborate with Spanish authorities in 
repressing ETA refugees and dismantling what was called the sanctuary of ETA in the 
northern Basque Country. Sagrario Morán contends that the GAL was instrumental in the 
implication of France in the fight against ETA.276 Whatever the influence of the GAL 
campaign on it, the objective of involving the French state in the fight against ETA was 
fulfilled. In 1984, French authorities started to extradite Basque militants to Spain. 
Regarding the objective of weakening ETA, the GAL failed. On the contrary, the state-
sponsored paramilitary violence, along with the numerous allegations of torture, helped 
ETA legitimize its campaign as a reactive violence, and helped enhance internal cohesion 
within the Abertzale Left. Woodworth agrees that the GAL might have had a decisive role 
in dismantling ETA’s sanctuary north of the Pyrenees, but “if the GAL’s chief motivation 
was to put an end to ETA, (…) they failed miserably.” According to Woodworth, ETA’s 
political support remained solid, “undoubtedly bolstered by the black image the GAL 
campaign had given to young Spanish democracy in many Basques’ eyes.”277 
The GAL, the cases of torture, and the large amounts of detainees, usually among 
people in the orbit of the Abertzale Left, gave cohesion to this political community and 
arguments to regard ETA’s violence as a legitimate response.278 As put by Teresa 
Whitfield, ETA “found a narrative that helped justify the continuation of its armed struggle 
in the measures used against it.”279 According to Ruiz de Olabuenaga, HB formed a 
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“minority of fear,” as its followers were afraid of being spied on, arrested, or tortured. In 
this regard, they developed a sense of “real personal or collective risk” and saw the use of 
violence as “a legitimate defense.”280  
3.4.3. An armed vanguard on the offensive 
ETA was the principle reference and the driving force of the MLNV, the Basque Movement 
for National Liberation. The conception of ETA as an armed vanguard of the movement 
was first theorized in 1978. In that document, the armed struggle was regarded as the 
“maximum expression of the political struggle.”281 Over time, the pyramidal structure of 
the movement with ETA at the top was reasserted and fastened. The document KAS Bloque 
Dirigente, approved in September 1983, was to be a guideline for years in the MLNV. It 
stated that the KAS was an instrument of “political delegation” with the duty of co-
participating in the leadership of the movement, with ETA as the vanguard.282 In practical 
terms, it meant that the clandestine group was the one making strategic decisions. Five 
organizations were members of KAS in 1983: a political party, HASI; a movement with 
the aim of coordinating social movements, ASK (Abertzale Sozialista Komiteak); a trade 
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union, LAB (Langile Abertzale Batasuna); a youth movement, Jarrai; and a clandestine 
group, ETA.283 A representation of the “women from KAS” was nominally established.284 
KAS experienced a crisis when the leadership of HASI tried to turn the party into 
the leading organization of the MLNV. The leading position of ETA was reinforced when 
the leaders of HASI lost the internal fight and were expelled from the party in 1988.285 Four 
years later, HASI disappeared, and its remaining members became militants of KAS, which 
by the time was not a coordination body any more, but a political organization with its own 
militants and organs, namely KAS Nacional, KAS Técnico, KAS Herrialde and KAS 
Local.286 HB was not part of the KAS as an organization. It was regarded by the KAS as 
an institutional tool and the electoral expression of the Abertzale Left, which was supposed 
to follow the strategic directions adopted by the leading bloc of the movement. In the 
1980s, when negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government were the strategic 
priority for the MLNV, HB’s main duty was to promote the negotiation as a tool to resolve 
the conflict.              
ETA’s duty was to put pressure on the state with the objective of forcing a 
negotiation. Over the 1980s, ETA’s methods evolved into attacks involving higher risk for 
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civilian casualties. Devices under cars belonging to military or police sometimes killed or 
wounded family members of the targeted persons. Car bombs were increasingly used over 
the 1980s, which often caused non-targeted civilian victims, as at the supermarket Hipercor 
in Barcelona in June 1987.287 ETA acknowledged the Hipercor fatal error in a statement, 
and the outcome of the bombing “provoked a real commotion in the Abertzale Left.”288 
However, public critics of ETA from within the movement were rare exceptions. The 
pyramidal structure of the MLNV with ETA as a vanguard and KAS as a leading bloc made 
it difficult the emergence of any dissident voice.  
In any case, the persistence of ETA’s violence and the evolution of its tactics did 
not cause any significant loss of popular support for HB over the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, a 
big sector of Basque society was slowly but progressively showing its opposition to ETA 
more and more openly. The first big demonstration against ETA’s violence took place in 
October 1978 as an initiative of the PNV. The huge manifestation after the kidnapping and 
killing of José María Ryan in February 1981 is regarded as the first big mobilization against 
a specific action of ETA. The kidnapping and killing of the military Alberto Martin Barrios 
by ETA (VIII) in October 1983 also provoked a massive protest in Bilbao. However, those 
three big mobilizations were exceptions. Basque society was somehow accustomed to 
ETA’s frequent attacks. Killings of individuals were not always front-page news in the 
1980s. By the late 1980s, some pacifist groups had started to call for mobilization to 
denounce ETA’s actions. Gesto por la Paz was founded in 1986 as a coordination body of 
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some local groups which had started organizing gatherings against ETA’s actions.289 At 
the time, it was a minority with little impact on society.290    
3.4.4. First attempt: Algiers 
In this context of confrontation and violence, the Spanish government sent some messages 
to ETA in 1984 to show a willingness to talk, but these early contacts were not fruitful.291 
While carrying out an aggressive military campaign, ETA progressively theorized about a 
negotiated settlement, as they were aware that the balance of forces with the Spanish state 
was by far unfavorable for the Basque group regarding any possibility of military victory. 
For its part, the Spanish government was willing to combine counter-insurgency policies 
and ‘dirty war’ with an attempt to enhance the end of ETA’s campaign through talks. In 
July 1986, the main leader of ETA Txomin Iturbe was arrested in Lapurdi, transferred to 
Gabon, and then deported to Algeria. In Algeria, Iturbe received several Spanish emissaries 
who told him that the government would be willing to open negotiations if a ceasefire was 
declared. Iturbe died accidentally in February 1987, and another high ranking deported 
member of ETA, Eugenio Etxebeste, Antxon, was moved from Ecuador to Algeria for the 
purpose of continuing contacts.  
After some secret conversations, in January 1989, ETA announced a unilateral 
fifteen-day ceasefire, followed by a bilateral two-month ceasefire agreed on with the 
Spanish government in order to enable further talks. By that time, the Spanish government 
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had secured the support of most of the Spanish and Basque political parties for their 
dialogue with ETA. Previous to the opening of conversations in Algiers, the PSOE 
promoted a political agreement, first, among the main Spanish political parties and, then, 
among the parties with representation in the Basque parliament, with the exception of HB, 
which was called the Ajuria Enea pact.292 Later, the political parties in Navarre signed a 
similar agreement. The short-term purpose of the Ajuria Enea pact was to support the 
government’s attempt to end ETA’s campaign through dialogue. According to the pact, it 
was legitimate to talk with ETA about the end of the armed activity and its consequences, 
but not to negotiate politically.293 The second purpose of the pact, although not expressly 
acknowledged in its text, was to isolate politically the Abertzale Left, especially its political 
coalition HB.    
From January to March 1989, representatives of ETA and the Spanish government 
held five meetings in Algiers, with the official mediation of the Algerian Government. 
After the fifth meeting, ETA announced in a statement that the two parties had agreed to 
advance from “conversations” to “negotiations,” and that three ETA prominent prisoners 
would join the negotiating team. According to ETA’s version, the two sides agreed that the 
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Basque armed group would maintain the ceasefire for a further three months, and the 
Spanish government would declare its willingness to “achieve a negotiated political 
solution.” Yet, the Government only declared that they were prepared to “achieve an agreed 
and definitive solution.” ETA believed that the Government made that modification to strip 
the process of its political dimension. The armed group responded with a first ultimatum 
giving a twenty-four-hour deadline to the Government to rectify, and a second ultimatum 
amplifying it a further seventy-two hours. That was the end of it. ETA announced in April 
4, 1989, that it would resume its armed struggle.294 
Later it became known that there were disagreements between ETA’s leadership in 
the northern Basque Country, who had a tough position, and the negotiators in Algiers, 
who were more open to compromise. In any case, over time all sides have acknowledged 
that there was not any real chance for the talks to succeed. The Government officials who 
took part in the conversations and the Home minister who directed them, José Luis 
Corcuera, have recognized that they were not prepared to negotiate about political issues 
with ETA, but only about issues related to prisoners, refugees, militants in hiding, etc. In 
addition, they have acknowledged that they did not engage in those talks expecting to reach 
any agreement, but hoping to show the world, especially France and the European Union, 
that the Spanish government did try to settle the conflict and ETA was not prepared to 
compromise. Finally, they have stated that they were convinced that a failure of the 
negotiations and a resumption of the armed activity would damage the armed group much 
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more than the government, who had the political support of all the opposition, including 
the leading Basque party PNV.295 
Meanwhile, the ETA of the 1980s would never accept an agreement limited to 
prisoners and other ‘technical’ issues. The armed group would only stop forever in 
exchange of some significant political advancement toward the implement of the KAS 
Alternative or the recognition of the right for self-determination. ETA and the Abertzale 
Left later developed an auto-critical discourse regarding the Algiers process, arguing that 
the movement was not sufficiently prepared to face that process, and that it was mistakenly 
taken as an all or nothing bet instead of the first step of a progressive process.296 Currently 
ETA, reflecting on the Algiers process, recognizes that “it has to be acknowledged that 
there was not enough maturity [on our side].”297 In any case, although ETA lost the battle 
of the public opinion after the failure of the process, the fact that the Spanish government 
recognized ETA’s representatives as negotiators was regarded as a partial symbolic 
victory. 
There were some short-term consequences for ETA deportees and prisoners too.  
The militants who gathered in Algeria for the last few years were expelled: six were 
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deported to the Dominican Republic, ten to Cabo Verde, and eleven to Venezuela.298 
Moreover, the prisoners of ETA, more than five hundred at the time, were dispersed from 
a few prisons in which they were concentrated to dozens of prisons all over Spain.299 It was 
the beginning of a policy of prisoner dispersion implemented first by Spain but soon 
followed by France, which would endure more than two decades. It was still in force as 
late as October 2014. 
3.4.5. Bidart, a tipping point 
Despite the failure of the Algiers attempt, ETA did not abandon the negotiation strategy. 
With the Barcelona Olympic Games and the Seville World Exposition in 1992 on the 
horizon, the Spanish state would be under the scope of the whole world, and the Basque 
group had the confidence to put enough pressure on the government to force a negotiation. 
Not everyone in the Abertzale Left agreed with the continuation of the strategy. In 
the aftermath of the Algiers failure, some leaders of HB questioned the strategy of ETA 
and the MLNV, and asked for an end of the armed struggle. Iñaki Esnaola, a senior HB 
leader in the 1980s and a close friend of the deceased ETA leader Txomin Iturbe, was 
involved in an attempt to open an alternative channel for negotiation. Esnaola wanted a 
veteran member of ETA, José Luis Arrieta, Azkoiti, also very close to Iturbe, to get 
involved in a process toward the end of ETA’s campaign. Esnaola’s attempt did not 
succeed.300 He left the coalition in 1991, or was expelled as he claims,301 after being 
                                                          
298 Carlos Fonseca, Negociar con ETA. Del proceso de Argel de Felipe Gonzalez a la paz dialogada de 
Rodriguez Zapatero (Madrid: Temas de Hoy: 2006), 19-28. 
299 Iker Casanova, Medio siglo, 352-354. 
300 Fonseca, Negociar, 213-268. 





accused by ETA of trying to provoke a split. Months later, in 1992, the two times elected 
member of the European Parliament Txema Montero was expelled from the coalition. He 
had nothing to do with Esnaola’s move, but the Ruling Council of HB decided that Montero 
put himself out of the coalition when he advocated for an end of ETA’s armed struggle and 
for the legitimacy of the Basque autonomous statute in a press article.302 Both dissidents 
retired from the first line of politics. The internal debate carried out within the Abertzale 
Left at the time, the process named Urrats Berri, proved that those critical voices were not 
alone, although they were a minority. According to Letamendia, a proposition stating that 
ETA’s actions were damaging the Abertzale Left obtained the support of the fourteen 
percent of the participants in the debate, and another motion which stressed that the 
indiscriminate nature of some of ETA’s attacks caused contradictions within the movement 
had the support of the seventeen percent.303    
All in all, ETA resumed and intensified its campaign. After killing eighteen people 
in 1989 and twenty-five in 1990,304 ETA carried out 137 armed attacks and killed forty-
four people in 1991 in a renewed offensive to force talks.305 However, things did not 
develop as planned. The arrests of three top leaders of ETA in Bidart (Lapurdi) in March 
1992, along with other subsequent important police operations, neutralized the whole 
strategy of the Basque group. The arrests at Bidart are a milestone and a symbol in ETA’s 
history. The organization needed years to reorganize and establish a relatively stable 
leadership. ETA would never be the same although it would recover part of its capacity. 
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After Bidart, the military defeat of the Basque armed group seemed more feasible than ever 
before. ETA saw itself forced to question a strategy solely based on military attrition for 
an eventual negotiation. 
The chief negotiator of ETA in Algiers, Eugenio Etxebeste, wrote a telling report 
from the Dominican Republic after the Bidart arrests. In this internal report directed to the 
leadership of the organization, Etxebeste questioned the viability of the armed struggle 
under the existing conditions, and underlined that they needed to avoid a political defeat as 
a consequence of a military defeat.306 The police seized the document and, moreover, Juan 
María Atutxa, the Home Minister of the Basque government, sent copies of the report to 
all ETA prisoners, more than five hundred at the time. There were prisoners who 
substantially agreed with Etxebeste’s reflections,307 but they appeared to be a minority. The 
two other ETA negotiators at Algiers, Belen Gonzalez and Iñaki Arakama, then in Santo 
Domingo with Etxebeste, also wrote a report each and both questioned some military 
tactics, because they caused civilian victims and decreased social support for the armed 
struggle.308 
Meanwhile, the pursuit of negotiation was still in force. Etxebeste, in Santo 
Domingo under Dominican military control, was appointed by ETA as his interlocutor for 
further contacts and talks. Over the years, he was contacted by Spanish government 
messengers, by Basque political actors, and by international mediators, but they never 
                                                          
306 Eugenio Etxebeste, “Contribución a la autocrítica y a un debate necesario,” April 19, 1992, unpublished 
manuscript. 
307 Author interview, Antton López Ruiz ‘Kubati,’ Zarautz (Gipuzkoa), December 10, 2013. 





arrived to re-activate any negotiation. Some initiatives made significant progress, 
especially an attempt with the mediation of the Nobel Peace Price laureate Adolfo Perez 
Esquivel, which was only frustrated when the right-wing Popular Party came to power in 
1996.309 
3.4.6. The socialization of the conflict 
While mediators and interlocutors were trying to put pieces together for a process that 
would not eventually come, the MLNV and ETA made some moves in the early and mid-
1990s. A novelty in an internal debate in HB was that a group proposed an alternative 
programmatic document (titled Iratzar) critical of ETA, but the text proposed by the 
leadership (Oldartzen) was approved by a large majority.310 The approved document 
reinstated the usual position about ETA that its struggle was legitimate; that HB’s main 
duty was to create “favorable conditions for political negotiation;” and that it was up to 
ETA to decide whether there were conditions to declare a truce to facilitate negotiations.311 
The document Oldartzen also reflected that the MLNV strategy moved from a line solely 
relying on the negotiation goal to a line combining the objective of negotiation with a 
national building process. It meant that the movement would not be waiting for the magic 
moment of direct negotiations on independence, but it would work in all sectors to build a 
Basque nation.312  
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Right after the approval of the document Oldartzen, ETA made a major move. In 
January 1995, a militant of the Basque group shot dead the Basque parliamentarian, deputy 
mayor of Donostia, and leader of the PP in Gipuzkoa, Gregorio Ordoñez. A few months 
later, ETA tried to kill José María Aznar, the main leader of the PP in Spain, at the time a 
contender for the presidency of the government. ETA had decided to attack representatives 
of political parties with the objective of accelerating negotiations. The times when ETA 
(m) and HB denounced the killing of the socialist Enrique Casas by the CAA in 1984 were 
over. When in February 1996 ETA killed the socialist Fernando Múgica in Donostia, a 
local leader of the PSOE and a brother of a former Justice Minister in the Spanish 
government, the armed group proved that the members of PSOE were also regarded as 
targets. 
It is said that HB ratified a policy of “socialization of the suffering” through the 
approval of Oldartzen. The MLNV put into practice a strategy to provoke a violent 
atmosphere so that the consequences of the conflict were suffered not only by the members 
of the MLNV and the Spanish state agents, but by all society. Consequently, they expected 
that society would urge the government to negotiate in order to end that state of violence. 
ETA’s decision to attack political representatives is considered part of this strategy. The 
term “socialization of the suffering” does not appear in the document Oldartzen, but the 
idea of “socialization of the consequences of the conflict” was used by HB spokespersons 
at the time.313 
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A strategy of street violence was put into practice by young militants of the 
Abertzale Left before the approval of Oldartzen, in the early 1990s, but there was an 
escalation in the level of violence in the 1990s. According to Rui Pereira, the authors of 
street violent actions started using Molotov cocktails in 1995.314 ATMs, buses, trash 
containers and other facilities were attacked with incendiary homemade bombs by young 
militants, who were not members of ETA. This low-level violence complemented ETA’s 
deadly violence. The report Oldartzen gave legitimacy to street violence as “an expression 
of the political struggle of our people.”315   
In April 1995, in the same communiqué which claimed responsibility for the 
attempt to kill Aznar, ETA made public what was called the Democratic Alternative, which 
came to replace the KAS Alternative as a guideline for negotiation. It was another major 
shift in ETA’s position. The novelty was that ETA proposed two different forums for 
negotiation. On the one side, ETA and the Spanish government should negotiate in order 
to agree the recognition of the right for self-determination and “territorial unity.” On the 
other, the Basque Country’s specific political status was to be negotiated and agreed 
between Basque actors, such as institutions, political parties, trade unions, and social 
movements, and approved by Basque society.316 For the first time, ETA suggested an 
acceptance of a democratic logic: the armed group’s duty was to achieve the recognition 
                                                          
todos estamos a bordo,” in Rui Pereira, La Guerra desconocida de los vascos (Tafalla: Txalaparta 2001), 
263,   
314 Pereira, Guerra, 261. 
315 “Oldartzen,” cited in Mees, Nationalism, 77. 
316 ETA, “Euskadi Ta Askatasunaren Agiria Euskal Herriari,” April 20, 1995. English version of the 





to the right for self-determination, but the new political framework was to be decided by 
the majority of Basques.  
The evolution of ETA and the Abertzale Left was also related to the deep changes 
in the international context. The era of anti-colonialist wars and revolutionary guerrillas 
was coming to an end, and the collapse of the socialist bloc and the end of the cold war 
required the revolutionary movements all over the world to re-think their position. Juan 
Aranzadi argues the fall of the Berlin wall and the generalized crisis of the revolutionary 
thinking provoked that ETA and the Abertzale Left progressively abandoned socialism and 
finally “converted to democracy.”317 According to López Adan, that was a major shift in 
the way the Abertzale Left used to give legitimacy to armed struggle. He contends that in 
a classic revolutionary view, the foundation of the legitimacy for the struggle was the 
principles, i.e. the right to confront oppression and injustice. But, now, if the legitimacy is 
given by votes, the ideological building sustaining the armed vanguard is called into 
question.318     
3.4.7. ‘Demócratas’ and ‘violentos’ 
Basque society’s attitude toward ETA was significantly changing even before the insurgent 
group started to attack political representatives. On the one side, after the collapse of the 
Algiers negotiations, the Ajuria Enea pact turned into a highly influential political factor. 
The pact successfully promoted a discourse of dividing the society in two sides: 
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‘demócratas’ (democrats) and ‘violentos’ (those supporting violence).319 Parallel to that, 
the groups which began to mobilize against ETA in the 1980s were gaining momentum, 
mostly around the movement Gesto por la Paz. In ideological harmony with the Ajuria 
Enea pact, Gesto por la Paz started to promote local gatherings to protest the following day 
of every violent attack. 
When ETA carried out longterm kidnappings of Basque businessmen over the 
1990s,320 a strong protest movement was activated by Gesto por la Paz, with the support of 
the parties of the Ajuria Enea pact. The blue ribbon, a symbol to demand the freedom of 
the captives, became a symbol of opposition to ETA. Weekly local gatherings showed 
continuously an active opposition to ETA.321 The MLNV reacted by organizing counter-
gatherings in front of the Gesto por la Paz protests with the slogan of “Free Basque 
Country”, as a contrast to the slogans asking for the realease of the captives. Tensions grew 
high during those face-to-face mobilizations, with people from the same town or 
neighborhood confronting each other. The street protests were no longer a quasi-monopoly 
of the MLNV. 
In this conflictive context, the PP won general elections in Spain in 1996. The new 
president José María Aznar appointed Jaime Mayor Oreja, a hard-liner veteran in the 
Basque arena, as the new Home minister. The first thing he did was to cut all channels for 
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secret contacts with ETA, a clear sign that he did not intend to engage in any dialogue. 
Right from the beginning of their term, Aznar and Mayor Oreja had the opportunity to 
prove the toughness of their policy, as ETA had held captive the prison officer José Antonio 
Ortega Lara captive since January 1996. The armed group demanded the end of the 
dispersion of ETA prisoners as a condition to free Ortega Lara.322 The prison officer 
seemed sentenced to death. The tough line of Mayor Oreja prevailed in the Aznar cabinet, 
and the calls to ETA to liberate their captive were in vain. In the end, the Spanish Civil 
Guard freed Ortega Lara on July 1, 1997 in Arrasate (Gipuzkoa), and arrested his four 
captors. The prison officer had completed 532 days enclosed in a tiny subterranean cabin. 
It was the longest kidnapping in ETA’s history. The images of Ortega Lara right after 
having been freed were appalling. The cruelty of his long enclosure was visible in his 
skeletal figure.  
ETA reacted very fast. Nine days after Ortega Lara’s release, on July 10, a PP town 
councilor, Miguel Angel Blanco, was kidnapped in his hometown Ermua (Bizkaia). ETA 
gave forty-eight hours to the Spanish government to relocate Basque prisoners in Basque 
jails. The Spanish government stood firm in its position. Huge demonstrations took place 
all over Spain and, especially, in the Basque Country. A wave of indignation against ETA 
and the MLNV took the streets. For the first time, the Basque police protected the 
headquarters and social centers of the Abertzale Left from protesters. The massive 
mobilizations asking ETA not to kill Blanco did not succeed. Blanco was shot dead by his 
captors. 
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3.5. Looking for an end 
3.5.1. A re-alignment of politics  
The day after the murder of Blanco, on July 13, 1997, the lehendakari Ardanza read an 
extremely harsh statement against ETA and, especially, against HB, in the name of all 
Ajuria Enea pact parties. He solemnly stated that ETA had an accomplice “named HB,” 
that the persons leading this coalition were “behind the decision of the crime,” and that, 
from then on, they would not share with HB any political initiative, “not matter how 
legitimate it is.”323 Fourteen months later, Ardanza’s political party, the PNV, and HB 
signed a political agreement, along with other nationalist and leftist parties, trade unions 
and other associations which shared the objective to seek a resolution through dialogue. 
Four days later, ETA announced its first ever indefinite ceasefire to facilitate a political 
process. How was that quick transition possible? How did the situation change from a 
scenario in which ETA and HB felt more isolated than ever to a new context in which all 
nationalist forces plus some leftist forces were able to share a path toward peace? Many 
factors need to be taken into account to understand that deep shift. Most of these factors 
started to take shape much earlier than the big events linked to the kidnapping and killing 
of the young councilor from Ermua. 
The first factor is related to state policies. Parallel to the takeover of the ‘hawkish’ 
PP in the Spanish government, the judiciary, most notably a judge of the Audiencia 
Nacional, Baltasar Garzón, moved toward a new approach regarding ETA and the MLNV. 
                                                          






After HB had promoted ETA’s Democratic Alternative during the electoral campaign in 
1996, all 23 members of the HB leadership were prosecuted for helping ETA through the 
diffusion of its alternative. They were eventually tried in the Supreme Court and sentenced 
each to seven and a half years of prison in December 1998. All were imprisoned, and a 
new whole Ruling Council took their place, with a then unknown Arnaldo Otegi as the 
main spokesperson. The Constitutional Court finally reversed the sentence against the HB 
old leadership in July 1999, and all were freed. Yet, the new leadership remained in charge, 
and only a few of the old leaders were re-incorporated to the Ruling Council. 
Regardless of the final decision of the Constitutional Court, the temporary 
imprisonment of HB leaders was a milestone toward a new judicial approach regarding the 
MLNV. From then on, Garzón started to develop a theory to argue that organizations and 
individuals of the MLNV were to be considered members of ETA, even though they were 
not organically part of the armed group nor they did not take part or help in any violent 
action. The political context created by the PP in power was totally favorable to this new 
approach, and the pioneer theory of Garzón was followed by the mainstream of the Spanish 
judiciary. The political isolation of the MLNV after the huge reaction of the Basque and 
Spanish society against the killing of Blanco, which was known as the Spirit of Ermua, 
further facilitated the judicial offensive against the Abertzale Left. In May 1998, Garzón 
ordered the closure of several enterprises allegedly linked to the KAS, and arrested eleven 
people. In July 1998, the daily newspaper Egin, which played a fundamental role as a 
cohesive tool of the Abertzale Left,324 was shut down by the Spanish police following 
                                                          





Garzón’s orders; thirteen people were arrested. In November 1998, Garzón banned KAS 
and prosecuted twenty-three supposed members. More police operations were soon to 
come. Moreover, calls for the illegalization of HB increased. The strategy of combining 
armed struggle with political and social action was becoming much more difficult for the 
MLNV. Furthermore, the Aznar cabinet ratified the breaking-off of any dialogue option by 
bringing ETA negotiators, led by Eugenio Etxebeste, from the Dominican Republican to 
Spain in September 1997. The contact channel that had been more or less open since 
Algiers was definitively closed off.  
The second factor is related to the rise of a new political space. The radical 
polarization of Basque politics pictured by both the Ajuria Enea pact parties and the 
Abertzale Left was not a real reflection of Basque society. The Ajuria Enea discourse 
divided Basque parties and even Basque society between ‘demócratas’ and ‘violentos.’ The 
MLNV used to draw the same division line, only changing the terminology: a movement 
for Basque freedom in opposition to a coalition of forces maintaining the status quo and 
defending Spanish interests. Nonetheless, there was room between these two opposing 
positions. Elkarri, a movement offering mediation and promoting dialogue to achieve a 
settlement, was founded in 1992 by some people close to the Abertzale Left. Its creation 
was regarded with suspicion by most of the parties because of the political origin of the 
founders. But Elkarri soon proved that they were prepared to distance themselves from 
ETA, and even denounce its violence. They were never able to mobilize big crowds, but 
they were effective in promoting dialogue among parties, and in bringing out a new 





as their objective, and different but complementary views. The core foundation of Gesto 
por la Paz was the total rejection of the use of violence in any circumstances from an ethical 
perspective. Elkarri’s view was more political. Their main purpose was the promotion of a 
process of dialogue to resolve the conflict. Both discourses and praxis “played an important 
role in the process of consciousness-raising.”325 Elkarri became part of what was known as 
the ‘third space.’  
The main builders of the ‘third space’ were the leading Basque trade union, the 
nationalist ELA (Eusko Langile Askasuna), and the trade union of the Abertzale Left, LAB. 
ELA, historically linked to the PNV but an autonomous union after its re-foundation in the 
late 1970s, was still viewed as a union close to the old nationalist party. In 1979, ELA 
called for a ‘yes’ in the referendum for the Basque statute, and throughout the 1980s their 
major allies had been the Basque branches of the Spanish unions, the socialist UGT (Unión 
General de Trabajadores) and the former communist CCOO (Comisiones Obreras). In the 
early 1990s, ELA started a discrete dialogue with LAB, the trade union linked to the 
MLNV, which led to some joint statements and actions from 1993. ELA had already 
arrived at the conclusion that the current Basque autonomy had proved too limited, and a 
new political status was needed.326 Meanwhile, the leadership of the PNV, the ruling party 
of the Basque government since its establishment in 1980, was to a great extent dissatisfied 
with the development of the Basque statute. The Spanish government, whatever party was 
in office, had refused to devolve some powers regarded as crucial by Basque nationalists. 
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A member of the PNV leadership, Juan María Ollora, theorized a new approach both on 
self-governance and conflict resolution,327 which was assumed by the main leader of the 
party, Xabier Arzalluz. While the dialogue between ELA and LAB was going forward, and 
the PNV was evolving toward a new strategy, the leadership of ELA decided that it was 
the right time to state their new critical view about the current framework of autonomy in 
a public event. In October 1997, the general-secretary of ELA solemnly declared in the 
symbolic town of Gernika that “the Statute had died,” while also ratifying their traditional 
position on ETA: “ETA is unwanted and hinders.” The great novelty was that 
representatives of the leadership of LAB and HB were present, along with members of the 
leadership of the PNV, Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) and a faction of IU (Izquierda Unida); 
Elkarri was also in Gernika. 
The third factor is linked to the crisis of the Ajuria Enea pact. The Pact entered a 
serious crisis in the mid-1990s. On the one side, since Mayor Oreja took the leadership of 
the Basque PP and was its representative in the Pact meetings, the PP only assumed one of 
the two main guidelines of the agreement, namely the isolation of those labeled as 
‘violentos.’ He opposed the other main foundation, which was the assumption that there 
was a political conflict, and dialogue was a valid tool to try to resolve it. On the other side, 
the PNV reached the conclusion that the Pact had been effective as a tool to shape a 
‘Democratic Bloc’ opposing ETA and the Abertzale Left, but not effective at all in 
resolving the violent phenomenon arising from the conflict. In this context of 
disagreements regarding the function of the Pact, the lehendakari Ardanza proposed a 
                                                          





novel peace proposal to all signatories. According to the plan, in the event of a ceasefire 
the Basque political parties, including HB, would start a negotiation with the objective of 
reaching a consensus on a new political framework. The Spanish state would be 
represented by the Basque branches of the Spanish political parties. Therefore, the Spanish 
institutions would assume what Basque parties agreed on. There would be a negotiation 
between Spanish and Basque institutions and parties about the incorporation of the 
agreement in the legal framework. Finally, a referendum would be held in the Basque 
Country. In short, it was a political dialogue proposal in which ETA did not have any role 
other than to facilitate it through a ceasefire. And the Spanish parties and institutions were 
asked to accept what Basque representatives would settle. The PP radically rejected the 
proposal, and the PSE-EE328 eventually opposed it too, although in more moderate terms. 
That disagreement was the definitive burial of the Ajuria Enea pact.329 The PNV felt free 
to try a new strategy.330  
The fourth factor is linked to the Irish peace process. After the decline of 
revolutionary guerrillas all over the world, ETA had fewer international references. ETA 
would be a unique and isolated phenomenon in Western societies if not for the emergence 
of a new IRA in the 1970s and its persistence in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, a 
peace process developed in Ireland over the 1990s and, in April 1998, a settlement was 
signed in Stormont. The Good Friday Agreement established the foundations for a peaceful 
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settlement for the conflict regarding the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. It was 
signed by both British and Irish governments and all significant political parties of 
Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein and the political wings of loyalist paramilitaries. The 
IRA later gave their approval to the agreement. The Republican Army called for a ceasefire 
in August 1994, which was broken in February 1996, but the second ceasefire, called in 
July 1997, seemed definitive.331 
Basque actors were closely following the evolution of the Irish events, with HB in 
constant contact with Sinn Fein. The apparent success of the process was having a great 
impact on Basque politics. In February 1998, HB invited all political parties, trade unions 
and other associations to participate in a forum to discuss the lessons of the Irish process, 
regarding a possible application to the Basque situation.332 The same actors who were 
present in the act called by ELA in Gernika accepted the invitation, and the Ireland Forum 
was created. By that time, the leadership of the PNV had had some secret contacts with 
HB. Right before the members of the old Ruling Council were about to be imprisoned, a 
prominent leader of HB, Rufi Etxeberria, had told Joseba Egibar, a member of the PNV 
leadership, that the Abertzale Left was about to initiate a new strategy which sought a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict. Etxeberria told Egibar they were aware that they were 
about to be imprisoned, but a new leadership was ready to promote a new strategy.333 The 
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invitation to participate in the forum about Ireland was the first evidence of the move 
privately advanced by Etxeberria to Egibar. 
3.5.2. Second attempt: Lizarra-Garazi 
In this context of a realignment of political alliances, and a rapprochement among Basque 
nationalist forces, ETA sent an invitation for a secret meeting to the PNV and EA in July 
1998. Representatives of the two parties met the same day with two representatives of ETA, 
who proposed they sign an agreement in exchange for a ceasefire. In that proposal, ETA 
asked the two parties to engage in a joint strategy to create a sole and sovereign institution 
for the whole Basque Country. In addition, the armed group demanded they end any 
cooperation with the PSOE and PP. Back home, the PNV and EA negotiators, who had met 
separately with the ETA delegation, agreed to a joint reply. They signed the agreement, but 
added a note on the front page pointing out that some nuances were made on the other side 
of the sheet. In those clarifications, PNV and EA made some exceptions to ETA’s demand 
to not make agreements with pro-Spanish parties. Besides, they tried to reinforce the nature 
of the ceasefire offered by ETA, adding that the ceasefire meant respect for the human right 
for all persons, as ETA had stated in the first page of the proposal that the truce would 
exclude “operations of supply” and self-defense.334 Soon after, PNV handed in another text 
to ETA with further clarifications about their interpretation of the agreement. ETA did not 
reply to any of the additions. The armed group understood that the PNV and EA had agreed 
to their original proposal. ETA itself, as explained later in an internal document, did not 
                                                          





accept the additions made by the two parties.335 In sum, PNV, EA and ETA signed an 
agreement which was differently regarded by each party. ETA considered only the front-
page text, and both the PNV and EA conditioned the front-page content to the acceptance 
of an attachment on the other side of the sheet. In addition, the PNV and EA were supposed 
to develop the agreement in the political arena hand in hand with HB, which was absent in 
the secret agreement.336 
Meanwhile, contacts in the Forum of Ireland accelerated toward a public political 
agreement, as some participants such as the PNV, EA, and HB knew what was happening 
behind the scenes. On September 12, 1998, all Basque nationalist parties and trade unions, 
along with other parties and actors agreeing with the idea of a multiparty dialogue process 
to resolve the conflict during “a permanent ceasefire of all expression of violence,” 
solemnly signed an agreement in Lizarra (Navarre)—Estella, in Spanish. The text of the 
agreement was previously agreed on, word by word, between the PNV and HB.337 When 
four days later ETA announced an “indefinite ceasefire,” many understood that the truce 
was somehow a consequence of the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement.338 Nevertheless, the 
ceasefire was a direct consequence of the secret agreement signed with the PNV and EA 
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in August. According to ETA, the ceasefire statement was the “precise answer” to PNV 
and EA’s last communications.339 The ceasefire was qualified as “indefinite” in ETA’s 
public statement, but the secret agreement specified that it would be reviewed every four 
months. The future of the ceasefire depended, according to the public statement, “on the 
events and steps in the near future.” According to the secret tripartite agreement, it would 
depend on whether PNV and EA would fulfill the agreement in ETA’s view.  
The Spanish government reacted with great reluctance. The Home minister Mayor 
Oreja despised the ceasefire qualifying it as a “tregua trampa,” or trap truce. On November 
3, 1998 president Aznar declared that he had allowed opening contacts with the “Basque 
Liberation Movement.” In December, the government made a timid move transferring 21 
prisoners from the Canary Islands and the African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla to jails in 
the Peninsula. In May 1999, a meeting between Aznar’s three representatives and three 
ETA delegates took place in Vevey (Switzerland), with a Basque bishop, Juan María 
Uriarte, as mediator. The minutes of the meeting made by ETA were evidence that there 
was no real ground to advance. They arranged a second meeting which never took place.340 
The hawkish minister Mayor Oreja and the negotiation team appointed by Aznar341 had an 
intense conflict regarding the possible moves that the government could make to fuel the 
process. One of the negotiators, Pedro Arriola, presented a plan to transfer about five 
hundred prisoners to jails closer to the Basque Country, while the Home minister Mayor 
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Oreja proposed to move just sixty-three. When Aznar asked Mayor Oreja to consider 
Arriola’s proposal, he replied he would resign in that event. Mayor Oreja’s view prevailed 
and, ultimately, they transferred 103 prisoners,342 although not all of them to prisons closer 
to the Basque Country.343      
The main game, however, was not between ETA and the Spanish Government, but 
among the Basque political actors themselves, including the clandestine group. The 
Lizarra-Garazi Agreement and ETA’s ceasefire had deeply changed the Basque political 
scenario. The divisive line was no longer separating ‘demócratas’ from ‘violentos,’ but the 
so-called constitutionalists from Basque nationalists (with some leftist associates). The 
first elections after the ceasefire, the vote for the Basque parliament in October 1998, 
showed that the Abertzale Left—now Euskal Herritarrok after some minor forces allied 
with HB—was reinforced in the new situation. They were the third force in the legislature 
with 17.9 percent of the votes and fourteen seats out of seventy-five, behind the PNV (28 
percent, twenty-one seats) and the PP (20.1 percent and sixteen), just ahead of the PSE-EE 
(17.6 and fourteen).344 However, the outcome of the post-elections’ negotiations was more 
novel than the result itself. The Abertzale Left, which historically had rejected the Basque 
autonomous institutions as illegitimate, signed an agreement with the PNV and EA, and 
voted for the PNV candidate Juan José Ibarretxe as a new lehendakari. In January 1999, 
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all endorsers of the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement participated, together for the first time in 
history, in a giant demonstration against the dispersion of the ETA (and other civil 
organizations) prisoners. In February 1999, six-hundred Basque local councilors met in 
Iruñea—Pamplona, in Spanish—to discuss the setting-up of an Assembly of Basque 
Municipalities of the whole Basque Country, to be later called Udalbiltza, in accordance 
with what was agreed on in the PNV-EA-ETA agreement. The red alert switched on for 
the so-called constitutionalists. ETA’s ceasefire enabled an unprecedented joint strategy 
among Basque nationalists. Yet, difficulties were soon to emerge. 
After the first four months of ceasefire, ETA sent a letter to the PNV and EA to let 
them know that they decided to renew the ceasefire for a further four months. After that 
period, ETA sent another letter warning that their pact was in suspension, as they 
considered the PNV and EA were not fulfilling their part, and were delaying the 
development of the initiatives planned in the agreement. Called by ETA, the three sides 
secretly met in July 1999. The representatives of the clandestine group proposed a new 
agreement with a plan to call elections in all Basque territories, including Navarre and the 
territories under French rule, in order to initiate a new constitutional process to replace the 
current autonomous framework. The PNV and EA did not accept the proposal, arguing that 
it was unrealistic and utopian. Moreover, they showed disagreement with the fact that HB, 
or EH, was not participating in their secret talks. The PNV sent a written answer to ETA 
in September, confirming their negative response, and proposing further contacts to try to 
save the process. According to ETA, EA did not send any written reply.345 On September 
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18, 1999, the constitutive assembly of Udalbiltza took place in Bilbao, with the 
participation of almost two thousand councilors of all the parties supporting the process. It 
was too late. ETA had already made its decision. At the end of November, 1999, the armed 
group announced that the ceasefire was over. 
3.5.3. The beginning of the end 
Joseba Sarrionandia—a well-known writer and an ETA member who had been in exile 
since he escaped from prison in 1985—wrote from his hideaway, when the ceasefire was 
still in force, that the halt was ETA’s “nicest and most effective action” for a long time. 
Sarrionandia was not a dissident. He was a disciplined member of the collective of ETA’s 
exiles. He argued that the armed group had shown “exceptional humility and honesty when 
it gave the leading role to the people and removed itself from the central stage.”346  On 
January 21, 2000, ETA was back on the central stage, when it killed a Spanish military 
man, Pedro Antonio Blanco, in Madrid. EH did not show any disagreement about the 
killing and, as a consequence, the lehendakari Ibarretxe put the institutional agreement 
with EH on hold. In February, ETA killed Fernando Buesa—the PSE-EE spokesperson in 
the Basque parliament, a former vice-president and Education minister in the Basque 
government, and the leader of the PSE-EE in Araba—and his escort, Jorge Díaz, a member 
of the Basque police. The Lizarra-Garazi agreement was definitively buried, and Basque 
politics experienced an extreme polarization and confrontation between Basque 
nationalists, who were accused of being ETA’s accomplices, and the so-called 
constitutionalist forces, led by the PP and the PSE-EE. In April, ETA made public the 
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secret agreement with the PNV and EA, who denied the existence of such pact, with the 
argument that the armed group did not accept their amendments to the alleged agreement.  
Beyond the general disappointment because of the return of violence, the collapse 
of the Lizarra-Garazi process provoked a great political frustration in Basque nationalists, 
especially in the rank and files of the Abertzale Left. For the first time in history, they had 
experienced how a relatively long period of ceasefire had made possible unprecedented 
alliances and unity of action. They had been politically stronger than ever. They felt they 
were making significant progress in a national building process with initiatives such as 
Udalbiltza. In sum, they intuited that the non-violent political confrontation with the 
Spanish state could be a more effective long-term avenue to fight for sovereignty. When 
ETA ended the ceasefire, as Aiartza and Zabalo highlight, it generated “a great shock” 
among the social base of the Abertzale Left, for whom “it became very difficult” to 
understand the strategic direction.347 ETA’s lack of patience was highly criticized by all 
nationalist forces, including some of Euskal Herritarrok.  
In that context of illusion and hope, what made ETA act so impatiently? Why did 
the Lizarra-Garazi process not work? The PNV had ruled the Basque autonomy since its 
establishment in 1980, sometimes alone and sometimes in coalition with other parties, 
mainly with PSE-EE. By the mid-1990s, the leadership of the PNV took a critical view on 
the lack of further powers’ devolution from the Spanish government, and aimed to advance 
toward greater self-governance. However, the PNV by no means was prepared to risk the 
autonomous powers managed mainly by them. When the armed group proposed the 1998 
                                                          





agreement, PNV entered that hazardous terrain with a priority to end ETA’s violence. In 
contrast, the insurgent group had national building as a priority, not a peace process, and 
wanted the PNV and EA to act accordingly. Within the PNV, pro-independence factions 
have always coexisted with more conservative factions, who were very reluctant with what 
they regarded as a too adventurous direction. In that context, the local elections held in 
June 1999 confirmed that the cessation of ETA violence was giving political dividends to 
the Abertzale Left. They came up to 19.9 percent of the vote in the Basque autonomous 
area, and obtained more local seats than any other force because of their strength in small 
towns. The PNV did not get any peace dividend. They came down to 23.1 percent of the 
vote.348 Those results could have reinforced the hesitation about the new strategy in the 
most conservative faction within the PNV. That is the interpretation of ETA and the 
Abertzale Left. In ETA’s view, after a few fruitful initiatives such as the joint mobilization 
for prisoners in January 1999 and the first step toward the setting-up of Udalbiltza in 
February 1999, the PNV (and EA) stopped working in that direction and let the process 
“rot.”349 Nonetheless, the PNV and EA actively participated in the eventual foundation of 
Udalbiltza in September 1999, but by that time ETA was in another stage, offering a new 
agreement regarded as unrealistic by the PNV and EA. While the leadership of the PNV 
had difficulties—or was unwilling—to fulfill the first secret agreement, ETA went further 
and demanded much more. It was too much for an institutional party like the PNV, so 
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attached to the current autonomous framework, as they were asked to get rid of the existing 
institutions. 
What about the Abertzale Left? The absence of HB or EH in the secret agreement 
triggering the ceasefire and the process was highly significant. The old scheme in which 
ETA made the big strategic decisions and HB adapted to it was in force. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s the MLNV and the KAS expressly acknowledged in their documents that ETA 
was the vanguard of the movement. Since the mid-1990s, the judicial persecution of the 
entire MLNV made their internal structure more opaque, and ETA was not any more 
publicly recognized as a vanguard. The developments of the events in the Lizarra-Garazi 
process made clear who was in command in the Abertzale Left. Moreover, it is significant 
that HB promoted the Forum of Ireland as a first step for a peace process, with the priority 
to find a way out to the armed confrontation, following the Irish model. In contrast, ETA 
wanted to promote a national building process, not a peace process, in a relative 
contradiction with the priority of HB.350 Aiartza and Zabalo highlight this disagreement as 
one of the factors of the Lizarra-Garazi Agreement failure: “There were also internal 
problems arising from the lack of a sufficiently unified interpretation about the initiatives 
to be followed—should the Abertzale Left advocate for a ‘peace process’, or a ‘national 
building process’?”351 When ETA broke the ceasefire, the leaders of HB, such as Arnaldo 
Otegi, and LAB, such as Rafa Diez, were now silent. Otegi has later suggested that they 
also regarded ETA’s proposal for all-Basque Country national elections as unrealistic. 
Political actors who worked with them during the process said they knew that these 
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prominent leaders of the Abertzale Left disagreed with such an outcome of the peace 
process. Yet, ETA was organizationally strong and still had great prestige within the 
movement. None of the senior political leaders dared to disagree in public. 
3.5.4. The influence of dissidence  
Some others did disagree in public. Since the expelling of Esnaola and Montero in the early 
1990s, few voices within HB criticized ETA. In 1995, the chief of the HB city councilors 
group in Donostia, Begoña Garmendia, strongly denounced the killing of the PP councilor 
Ordoñez, and resigned. Yet, the most notable dissidences came from the prisons. The 
former chief of the political apparatus of ETA arrested in Bidart, José Luis Alvarez 
Santacristina, Txelis, publicly criticized ETA and the MLNV in strategic terms, in a 10-
page-long text dated in August 1997, a month after the killing of Blanco. He had gone 
through a religious conversion, and it was known that he was critical of ETA since long 
before, but on this occasion he developed his view in an extensive article, also signed by 
four other well-known prisoners.352 In June 1998, right before the Lizarra-Garazi process, 
some of the prisoners who subscribed the Txelis’ letter, along with other prisoners, 
published another article in 1998, linking the Irish and the Basque processes. Carmen 
Gisasola, a former member of the ETA leadership, and Joseba Urrosolo, a very well-known 
prisoner because of his activist-record, were among the seventeen signatories.353 It was not 
such an open criticism to ETA, but for some of the endorsers that letter was the first step 
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of an eventual detachment from the armed group. A few years later, in 2004, a letter signed 
by the former ETA leader arrested in Bidart, Pako Mujika Garmendia, and four other 
notorious prisoners bluntly criticized ETA’s military strategy on the grounds that it had 
ceased to be effective and, hence, it had to be abandoned. It was an internal letter directed 
to their organization leadership, but it was leaked to the media.354  
When ETA broke the ceasefire, buried the Lizarra-Garazi process, and initiated an 
aggressive offensive especially targeting members of the PP and PSOE, some dissidents in 
the political arena started to organize. While an internal debate and the re-formation of 
their political party was taking place within the Abertzale Left, the dissidents publicly 
criticized ETA and demanded a renewal of the ceasefire. They lost the internal battle. 
Batasuna emerged in 2001 as a new political party replacing HB and EH, and the critics 
formed a new pro-independence leftist party, Aralar, which would publicly reject ETA. For 
the first time, the political party of the Abertzale Left, now Batasuna, decided to operate in 
the northern Basque Country as well, where in the late 1990s leftist nationalists had merged 
into a united coalition, Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB), after years of division.355 The 
foundation of Batasuna, in combination with the persistence of ETA’s violence, provoked 
a split in the French side too: the majority of AB militants refused to join forces with 
Batasuna as a consequence of their position on armed struggle.356 From then on, Aralar and 
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AB became new references of a “third space” that was seriously weakened since the 
traumatic end of the Lizarra-Garazi process.  
The view about armed struggle had also changed for those who remained loyal to 
the Abertzale Left movement and continued to regard ETA as their main reference. As 
Aiartza and Zabalo point out, before the Lizarra-Garazi ceasefire, the rank and file of the 
Abertzale Left “had believed that armed struggle would continue until some minimum 
rights were recognized.” The ceasefire “put the armed struggle in a different light, that is, 
as a choice, not an essential requirement.”357 
2.5.5. The tumultuous early 2000s 
The years following the collapse of the Lizarra-Garazi process were extremely tumultuous. 
ETA launched a very aggressive campaign especially targeting politicians from the PP and 
PSOE. They also targeted Basque police, judges, and journalists, along with Spanish 
police, civil guards and the military. Between 2000 and 2003, ETA killed forty-eight 
people, thirty-eight of them during 2000 and 2001. Among the deaths, there were six 
members of the PP, six of the PSOE, one of the UPN, two persons related to the media, 
two related to the judiciary, and five Basque police agents.  Hundreds of Basques were 
forced to protect themselves with bodyguards. ETA indeed managed socializing the 
consequences of the conflict. 
The PP obtained an absolute majority in 2000. The PSOE elected a new leader after 
elections, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, who was eager to show that he could be a 
                                                          





statesman also facing terrorism. As the opposition leader, he proposed an anti-terrorism 
pact tio Aznar. The Agreement for the Liberties and against the Terrorism was signed in 
December 2000 by most of the parties with representation in the Spanish parliament, but 
not by any Basque nationalist representative. Soon after, the international atmosphere 
became very favorable for anti-terrorism policies. The 9/11 attacks in 2001 changed 
international anti-terrorism perspectives. Terrorists, no matter their origin or motivation, 
became a global enemy. International cooperation to counter ETA became more effective. 
The justification of policies that could once be regarded as a violation of human rights or 
political and civil rights were now more easily justified in the international arena.  
Inspired by the new agreement, a reformed Political Parties Law was approved in 
June 2002. It was an ad hoc law to ban Batasuna on the grounds of its alleged political 
complicity with ETA. The law was approved by a large majority in the Spanish parliament 
(304 in favor, 16 against), but it would not be approved if voted in the Basque parliament. 
After a hearing in the Supreme Court, Batasuna and its two antecedents, HB and EH, were 
outlawed in March 2003.358 Since then, Batasuna would be legal in the French side but 
illegal in the Spanish state. However, Batasuna made an important decision for the near 
future: despite the banning, they would not go underground, and they would try to act as if 
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they were a legal party. The ruling of the Supreme Court included a provision forbidding 
the reorganization of Batasuna under another name. Most of the electoral platforms 
promoted by the Abertzale Left under other denominations were subsequently nullified.359 
Furthermore, before the Supreme Court banned the party through administrative 
procedure, judge Garzón had already closed Batasuna’s headquarters and offices, and 
prosecuted its leaders under criminal law. He accused them of being members of ETA, not 
because he found that they participated or collaborated in violent activities, but because 
they were members of a party allegedly subordinated to the armed group. Many other 
organizations and their members were also prosecuted at the beginning of the decade, such 
as the youth movements Jarrai, Haika, and Segi; the alleged substitute of KAS, Ekin; an 
association dealing with international relations, Xaki; the prisoners’ solidarity 
organizations Gestoras pro Amnistia and Askatasuna. All these associations were outlawed 
after trials, and many of their members sentenced to prison. Some other organizations were 
temporarily suspended, their members arrested and some of them imprisoned, but they 
were later absolved. That was the case of the Joxemi Zumalabe Foundation, Udalbiltza and 
Euskaldunon Egunkaria cases.  
Basque institutional politics was also in turmoil at the beginning of the 2000s. After 
the Lizarra-Garazi process failure and the subsequent offensive of ETA, the Basque 
moderate nationalists were under fire by the constitutionalist forces because of their recent 
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alliance with the Abertzale Left. The Basque branches of the PP and PSOE allied and, with 
the former Spanish Home minister Jaime Mayor Oreja as the PP candidate for lehendakari, 
they carried out an aggressive electoral campaign to overthrow Basque nationalists from 
the regional government. The elections of May 2001 turned into a great victory for the 
PNV-EA coalition candidate, Juan José Ibarretxe, who got 604,000 votes, more than any 
other lehendakari candidate ever. It was a failure for Mayor Oreja and the PP-PSE alliance, 
but also for the Abertzale Left, at the time still legal, which obtained only seven seats (10.1 
percent of the vote), after having achieved fourteen (17.9 percent) in 1998, with the 
ceasefire in force. The split with Aralar was still to come, but many who voted for EH in 
1998 turned their back on the Abertzale Left in 2001 with ETA on the offensive. The armed 
group itself acknowledges that the Abertzale Left lacked a “common interpretation” on the 
end of the Lizarra-Garazi process and the subsequent ETA’s offensive and, “without 
[internal] cohesion,” went into crisis, “as the bad results in the elections of the Basque 
autonomous community evidenced.”360 
Since then, the lehendakari Ibarretxe initiated a strategy based on claiming the right 
of the Basques to determine their political status. He proposed in 2003 a new statute for 
the three western provinces, in which the most controversial section was the one 
acknowledging the right for self-determination.361 The new statute was approved by the 
Basque parliament in December 2004 by a narrow difference, thanks to the last-minute 
surprising partial support of Batasuna.362 According to the constitutional procedure, a 
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negotiation about the new statute had to be held between the Spanish and Basque 
legislatures, but the Spanish Congress—with the two majority parties, PP and PSOE, 
voting together—refused to negotiate. When Ibarretxe was re-elected in 2005, he made a 
second attempt at promoting a referendum with a ballot with two questions. The first 
question was about a peace process in the event that ETA showed its willingness to lay 
down arms. The second one was about a political dialogue to agree upon a procedure to 
enable Basques to determine their political status. In June 2008, the Basque parliament 
approved a law to hold a referendum, but the Spanish Constitutional Court invalidated it, 
because it was against the Spanish Constitution’s provisions on the indivisibility of the 
nation.363 The game was over.364 
2.5.6. Getting ready for a new process      
In 2001, while ETA was carrying out attacks of great impact and the Spanish state had 
initiated the procedures to ban all structures of the Abertzale Left, some others were trying 
to find a way out of the conflict. The main leader of Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegi, and a leader 
of the PSE-EE, Jesús Eguiguren, secretly started to meet in a remote farmhouse near 
Elgoibar, the hometown of Otegi, an inland town of Gipuzkoa. As the Aznar cabinet was 
against any process of dialogue and the PP had an absolute majority in the Spanish 
Congress, there were no conditions to reactivate any peace process. Nevertheless, Otegi 
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and Eguiguren discussed a methodology for an eventual peace process in a future of 
different political coordinates.365 
Those conditions started to emerge when Zapatero surprisingly won elections on 
March 14, 2004, three days after the Madrid bombings by jihadists. The PP cabinet made 
ETA responsible for the attacks despite the lack of evidence, in an obvious attempt to hide 
links between the bombings and the Aznar support for the Iraq invasion led by the Bush 
administration. The manipulation became evident and, contrary to what all polls earlier 
predicted, the PSOE came back to power after eight years. Eguiguren reported to Zapatero 
about the contacts with Otegi. Parallel to the Eguiguren-Otegi dialogue, ETA opened a 
communication channel with an international mediation agency, the Center Henri Dunant 
(HD) for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2003, in an attempt to prepare a road for an eventual 
peace process.366 In August 2004, soon after Zapatero came to office, ETA sent him a letter, 
proposing to engage in a peace process with him. 
In November, Batasuna made a move. In a solemn act at the velodrome of Anoeta 
in Donostia, they declared that the end of the violent conflict was a priority for the 
Abertzale Left. They made the declaration of Anoeta public,367 which was to replace ETA’s 
Democratic Alternative as the peace guideline of the Abertzale Left. Batasuna proposed a 
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two-track dialogue process, in which ETA and the Spanish government would only discuss 
‘technical’ issues such as prisoners, militants in hiding, and disarmament. Political issues 
would be discussed exclusively by Basque political representatives. For the first time, at 
least in theoretical terms, even the Abertzale Left put ETA out of any negotiation about 
political status. It was also significant that Batasuna, and not ETA, was the author of the 
new guideline of the movement. Obviously, the secret talks between Otegi and Eguiguren 
were not unrelated to all that. It also required, as revealed by Whitfield, “a long process of 
consultation with ETA.”368  
The next important move was the approval by the Spanish parliament of a provision 
allowing the Zapatero cabinet to talk with ETA, in the event that the Basque group clearly 
showed a will to lay down arms, and under the principle that any negotiation about political 
status should be carried out among the legitimate political parties, not with ETA. The text 
approved by the Spanish parliament in May 2005 was identical to section 10 of the Ajuria 
Enea pact of 1988, which at the time was signed by the PP too. However, the context and 
the parties had evolved, and the PP opposed the proposition. It was the beginning of the 
end of the Anti-Terrorism Pact. 
In this context, the Spanish Supreme Court outlawed an electoral platform, Aukera 
Guztiak, promoted by the Abertzale Left in the Basque regional elections in 2005, but the 
attorney general did not ask to outlaw another list with candidates of the Abertzale Left 
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under the umbrella of an unknown communist party, EHAK (Euskal Herrietako Alderdi 
Komunista), which went supposedly unnoticed. The Abertzale Left, whose political party 
was banned, would have a political representation in the Basque parliament for the next 
four years, although their representatives would not be their leaders, but unknown 
individuals secretly prepared to follow the instructions of the outlawed party. 
The last killings by ETA in that period were committed in May 2003. After they 
killed two Spanish policemen in Zangotza (Navarre)—Sangüesa, in Spanish—with a bomb 
placed under their car, ETA did not carry out any more killings. Moreover, the armed group 
had declared some partial ceasefires as a signal of commitment to an eventual process. 
They announced in February 2004 a ceasefire limited to Catalonia. On June 18, 2005, they 
announced that they would not attack any more political representatives. 
3.5.7. Third attempt: from Geneva to Loiola 
Three days later, on June 21, 2005 the president of the PSE-EE, Jesús Eguiguren, met a 
representative of ETA, Josu Urrutikoetxea, widely known by his nickname Josu Ternera, 
under the mediation of the Center HD, in Geneva. After several meetings in the following 
two weeks, they reached a draft of an agreement for a ‘road map.’ When they met again in 
November in Oslo, they ratified the agreement on a methodology and conditions for a peace 
process. As proposed by Batasuna in the Anoeta declaration, Eguiguren and Urrutikoetxea 
agreed on a two-track methodology, in which ETA would be out of the political 
negotiations. The insurgent group would declare a permanent ceasefire to enable 
negotiations, and the Spanish government would solemnly declare that the Spanish 





status. In addition, the Spanish government would try to avoid arrests and would facilitate 
the political participation of the Abertzale Left, although Eguiguren warned that the 
government could not order the judges not to act against law breakers. All talks and the 
agreement were obviously secret, and the Center HD guarded the sole copy of the deal. 
ETA called a ceasefire in March 2006. President Zapatero made a statement in June 
2006, declaring that the Spanish institutions would accept whatever the Basques would 
decide, “under the legal norms and procedures.” Batasuna welcomed Zapatero’s statement 
as a historic step, “a democratic victory” for the Basque people. ETA had a very different 
perspective on Zapatero’s statement. At the time, it was not known that ETA and Batasuna 
had such different views about the process and, at this particular moment, about Zapatero’s 
words. Later on, ETA pointed out that Zapatero did not fulfill the Oslo deal, that he changed 
the agreed statement because he added some mentions to the Spanish Constitution, the 
Basque statute, and the Political Parties law.369 According to Otegi, their different views 
on Zapatero’s statement were evidence that ETA and Batasuna were not the same.370 
“First peace and then politics” was a motto first pronounced by the president of the 
PNV, Josu Jon Imaz, and often repeated by Zapatero. They first wanted to ratify the end of 
ETA through the so-called technical negotiations and, once the armed group was not 
conditioning the political scenario, then to activate political negotiations among Basque 
forces about a new settlement. In contrast, ETA and the Abertzale Left preferred it the other 
way around: first politics, and then peace. In other words, they wanted first to make sure 
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that the political framework would change, and then ratify the end of the armed struggle. 
In fact, although Zapatero had publicly announced the initiation of talks with ETA when 
he made his statement in June 2006, ETA rejected formal negotiations on the grounds that 
the government was not fulfilling their part of the Oslo deal. They held some meetings in 
which each part complained about the other part attitude, but never started negotiations 
about the agreed agenda. Actually, some ETA members had been arrested, members of the 
Abertzale Left were still being prosecuted and their events banned. In August, ETA 
declared in a communiqué that the process was in crisis and that ETA would “respond” if 
the Spanish state kept on “attacking the Basque Country.”371 
In this context of crisis and confusion, Otegi convinced the leaders of the PNV and 
the PSE-EE to start with politics, without having to wait for peace, as Zapatero and Imaz 
wanted. The three parties held secret meetings from September to November 2006 in 
Loiola, a religious site filled with symbolism between Azpeitia and Azkoitia in 
Gipuzkoa.372 They aimed for a political pre-agreement on the foundations for a new status 
in order to overcome the peace process’ crisis. Three out of the four major Basque political 
parties were involved, with the PP absent, but they would be able to implement what would 
be agreed upon, at least in the parliament of the Basque autonomous region, and, depending 
on the electoral results, in the parliament of Navarre. After eleven meetings, they did agree 
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on a draft. They basically made a double deal. On the one side, nationalists accepted that 
all changes would be done within the current institutional framework and following the 
procedures of the law. On the other, the constitutionalists accepted that any political project 
should have the actual chance to be implemented if the majority of the Basques wanted 
that, and that the Spanish institutions should respect that will. The draft did not expressly 
say that independence was among those projects, but it was implied. Regarding 
territoriality, they agreed to promote a body to coordinate Basque autonomy and Navarre 
in some limited competences, but with the possibility for further powers. 
When they agreed on the draft on October 31, they planned to ratify it the following 
meeting, once each party had approved the document in their respective decision bodies. 
But all went wrong at the next meeting, on November 8. Batasuna representatives brought 
a proposal to change the draft. They wanted the two other parties to engage in a political 
operation to approve a four-province statute within two years. It meant that the PSE-EE, 
along with their comrades of the PSN in Navarre, should modify their position regarding 
territoriality, given that they supported the current framework of two separate autonomous 
bodies. PSE-EE was not prepared to accept Batasuna’s proposal. The PNV also rejected it, 
because they were not prepared to dismantle the current autonomous institutions, and 
because they were against forcing the socialists to accept territorial unity in that way. They 
held two other meetings, in vain. On November 15, they left Loiola empty handed, for 
good.  
What happened between October 31 and November 8 within the Abertzale Left? 





ruling council. The members of the PSE-EE seemed to ratify the draft in coordination with 
the leadership in Madrid, usually in the person of the Home minister, Alfredo Perez 
Rubalcaba, later to become the leader of the PSOE replacing Zapatero. Yet, Ares later 
disagreed with Eguiguren’s version, and contends that the socialists wanted to add some 
substantial amendments to the draft as well.373 The representatives of Batasuna, however, 
did not have to share the decision only with their comrades of the Ruling Council of 
Batasuna, where the draft approved by Otegi, Etxeberria and Arantza Santesteban would 
be easily ratified. The representatives of Batasuna needed the other organizations of the 
Abertzale Left, including ETA, to agree upon it.  
As a consequence of the judicial prosecution of the civil organizations of the 
Abertzale Left, the coordination structures of the movement were not as public as in the 
1980s, when they openly recognized that several organizations of the MLNV coordinated 
with ETA under KAS. Nevertheless, in the 2000s there was a coordination body of the civil 
organizations of the Abertzale Left. In an internal document about the evolution of their 
organizational model,374 it is explained that, after the disappearance of the KAS, part of 
their militants created Ekin as “a structure of political dynamization.” Ekin did not define 
itself as a party “but it was close to a model of vanguard-party or vanguard-instrument of 
political direction.” According to this document, “a shared direction space” with 
representatives of the organizations of the Abertzale Left was created to develop “this task 
of direction-dynamization.” In an absence of more specific documents or recorded 
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accounts, I have to rely on off-the-record explanations375 to conclude that there was a 
structure in which five organizations shared their views and coordinated their strategies: 
the party Batasuna, the trade union LAB, the prisoners solidarity organization Askatasuna, 
the youth organization Segi, and Ekin, which, according to a ruling by the Audiencia 
Nacional, was the liaison between ETA and the Abertzale Left organizations.376 The draft 
agreed upon in Loiola was not good enough for some of the organizations of the 
coordination body, and, according to Otegi’s later account, it was not good enough for 
ETA. Nevertheless, Otegi argues that ETA’s position was not “the main reason” not to sign 
the draft, but the fact that signing the settlement could seriously damage the internal 
cohesion of the Abertzale Left, because there were “divergent positions” regarding the 
document.377 Those disagreements made the representatives of Batasuna propose changes 
on the draft in which they did not believe.  
Later on, both Batasuna and ETA have recognized in diverse documents that they 
entered the peace process with different views. ETA acknowledged in 2012 that the 
Abertzale Left did not have “enough cohesion and convergence” in the initiation, 
development, and breaking up of the process: “The diverse interpretations about the 
process and about the strategy to develop it turned evident.”378 A Batasuna document, in 
October 2009, also stated that there were different points of view about the process within 
the movement: “For some, the ceasefire initiative was premature (…) because there was 
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not clarification of the path to be followed”, and “for others, the ceasefire had to be 
definitive;” according to those wanting a definitive ceasefire, the process had to be 
sustained “on the social initiative and the leadership of Batasuna” rather than “on ETA and 
the factual leadership of the armed struggle.”379 That was, indeed, the key factor of the 
controversy: who should be in charge, Batasuna or ETA.   
Just in case there was any doubt about it, while Batasuna was trying to restart what 
was left in Loiola, ETA set off a powerful bomb in a terminal of Barajas, the Madrid airport, 
in December 2006, without having previously announced the end of the ceasefire. The 
militants who placed the van bomb in a parking garage of the airport made several calls 
warning about the coming blast. The security services tried to empty the zone before the 
explosion, but two men sleeping within their cars went unnoticed and were killed by the 
blast. It was the first time in history that ETA carried out an attack while a ceasefire was 
on. The leadership of Batasuna was indignant. They did not make any public statement 
clearly expressing their disagreement and anger, but they did it privately, and they 
suggested it publicly. 
In reflections made a posteriori, leaders of Batasuna point out that the bomb in 
Barajas was the straw that broke the camel’s back. According to Otegi, the bombing of 
Barajas with the ceasefire in force provoked “perplexity” in those “educated in the history 
of the culture of the Abertzale Left,” because “it broke ETA’s historical position in this 
issue.” He believes that it placed the Abertzale Left “not in the fringe of the precipice but 
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falling into it.”380 After the bombing, Batasuna publicly asked ETA to hold the ceasefire. 
ETA stated that the ceasefire was on, but they would “respond” again if the Spanish 
government continued “attacking the Basque Country.”381 The Spanish government 
declared that the process was over. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the leverage of some 
international agents such us the cabinet of Tony Blair, Zapatero agreed to make a last 
attempt at negotiations. They held a two-track meeting in Geneva in May 2007: around one 
table, Batasuna and PSE-EE face to face, and around another table, the Spanish 
Government and ETA, with the mediation of international facilitators led by the Center 
HD at both tables. They met during four days, but the lack of trust between the two sides 
was by then complete. Nothing could be done to save the process. In June 5, 2007, ETA 
announced the end of the ceasefire. 
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4. Narratives from the actors (2007-2011) 
4.1. The aftermath of a failed process 
4.1.1. A leadership in jail  
On May 22, 2007 Arnaldo Otegi and Rufi Etxeberria were traveling back home by train, 
knowing that the peace process had totally collapsed, that ETA’s ceasefire was about to be 
broken. They were seeing the city of Paris in the distance when Etxeberria said: “This 
model of negotiation and strategy is over.” According to Otegi, Etxeberria’s sentence was 
a sort of inauguration of a strategic debate in the Abertzale Left.382  
On June 6, ETA announced the end of the ceasefire. Only two days later, the 
Spanish Supreme Court ordered that Otegi, the main leader of the outlawed Batasuna, be 
jailed. He was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment because he took part in December 
2003 in an event honoring a late leader of ETA, José Miguel Beñarain, Argala, killed in 
1978 by the Spanish death squads of the Batallón Vasco Español (BVE).383 Otegi was 
sentenced in April 2006, he appealed it, and was waiting for the ruling since then. Not 
surprisingly, the ratification of the sentence came only after the end of ETA ceasefire. 
When I interviewed Otegi in 2009, he acknowledged that his imprisonment was to a great 
extent a relief. He had worked to build the 2005-2007 peace process since the beginning of 
the decade. He engaged in some fruitful negotiations with his political rivals, but he had 
lost an internal fight which led the Abertzale Left to miss a chance for a way out of the 
conflict. Now, he needed time to reflect on what had happened, and what should be done 
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next. The rest of the members of Batasuna’s leadership remained free only for a few further 
months. In October 2007, 23 members of Batasuna were arrested, most of them members 
of the leadership, including Rufi Etxeberria.       
Otegi was the undisputed leader of Batasuna and the best-known leading member 
of the whole Abertzale Left. Involved in ETA (pm), Otegi went into hiding in 1977, when 
he was 19. He was a member of the faction that eventually joined the milis in 1984. 
Arrested in 1987, he was sentenced to six years of imprisonment for a kidnapping, absolved 
from two other accusations of abduction, and released in 1993 after having served his 
sentence. He obtained a degree in Philosophy while in prison. As an HB candidate, he was 
elected member of the Basque parliament in 1995.384 When the whole Ruling Council of 
HB was imprisoned in 1997, he was named one of the two spokespersons of the new 
leadership, alongside Joseba Permach. By the time he signed the Lizarra-Garazi agreement 
in 1998 in the name of Batasuna right after the Good Friday Agreement in Belfast, he was 
referred to by many as the “Basque Gerry Adams.” Since then, Otegi has been the most 
prominent leader of a generation of veteran politicians in the Abertzale Left. Rufi 
Etxeberria, who was one of Otegi’s partners in the negotiation of Loiola, was also 
imprisoned in 1981, in connection with ETA, and served two years. Since 1988 he was a 
member of the Ruling Council of HB. He was among the leaders imprisoned in 1997, and 
he is the only one, among them, who has endured in the leadership of the Abertzale Left’s 
political party over the decade of the 2000s.  
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The preventive incarceration of the leadership of Batasuna in 2007 left the political 
party of the Abertzale Left with no ability to properly discuss the outcome of the failed 
peace process and the near future strategy. Batasuna was an illegal political party since 
2002, but it always managed to hold their network and maintain political activity. Yet, the 
arrest of almost the whole leadership in 2007 left Batasuna in its worst condition since its 
foundation. Younger unexperienced leaders replaced the jailed ones in a state of 
disorientation within the Abertzale Left after the internally controversial outcome of the 
peace process. Etxeberria contends that the aftermath of the 2007 arrests was a period of 
“confusion” within the movement, a period with no clear strategy and no ability to clarify 
the strategy because of the State repression. The Abertzale Left acted “by inertia.”385 The 
incarcerated members of the leadership of Batasuna were dispersed, as were all prisoners 
of ETA and other Basque organizations. Otegi, with no colleagues of Batasuna beside him 
in Donostia prison, elaborated “a dense document” arguing for “a change of strategy and 
cycle” that he directed “to whom it might concern in the exterior.”386 When he refers to “a 
change of strategy and cycle” he surely meant the end of armed struggle. Among the 
external agencies to whom he sent the document was probably the leadership of ETA. By 
the time Otegi left prison after having served his sentence in August 2008, those whom 
Otegi believed were “concerned” knew what he stood for.  
4.1.2. Assembly and division in ETA 
After the break-up of the ceasefire in 1999, ETA initiated a strong offensive with a number 
of politically shocking killings. After the break-up of the ceasefire in 2007, everything was 
                                                          
385 Author interview, Rufi Etxeberria, Oiartzun, July 1, 2011. 





different. Spanish and French police forces seized more than two hundred kilos of 
explosives from ETA in three operations, and arrested three suspected members of a cell 
before ETA could carry out its first attack. ETA set off a small device on July 25 in Izaba 
(Nafarroa), close to the French border, right after the Tour de France passed through. ETA 
carried out six further attacks with explosives the next six months, which caused material 
damages. In December 2007, two Spanish civil guards were killed by ETA members in 
Capbreton, France. ETA never committed any attack in France until then. It was not 
premeditated. Apparently, some members of ETA realized that two Spanish anti-terrorist 
undercover agents were beside them in a café. They shot them dead in the parking lot, in 
an improvised attack. On March 7, 2008, nine months after the resumption of its armed 
activity, ETA committed its first planned killing. Isaias Carrasco, a member of the PSE-
EE, was not even a town councilor, but a former town councilor of Arrasate (Gipuzkoa). 
He worked as a freeway toll collector. As he did not have a public position nor any current 
responsibility in his party, he did not have any bodyguard. He was an easy target. No news 
about disagreements over the killing from the Abertzale Left came out, but it provoked 
“moments of great tension” within the movement, according to a later testimony by 
Otegi.387 Two days after the assassination of Carrasco, the PSOE won general elections, 
and Zapatero was reelected president. The PSE-EE got the best results in the Basque 
Autonomy ever. They were the first Basque force with 38.1 percent of the votes and nine 
seats out of eighteen; the PNV came second with six seats (27.1 percent), and the PP third, 
with three seats (18.5 percent). Adding the results of Navarre where the Socialists obtained 
                                                          





two out of five seats, they had eleven of the twenty-one Basque seats for the Spanish 
Congress.388 The Abertzale Left, illegal and disenfranchised, did not participate.      
Parallel to the resumption of the violent campaign, ETA held a so-called assembly 
to discuss strategy for the near future. ETA’s assemblies are no longer through gathering, 
but through document sharing. The last document sharing assembly of ETA was held in 
2002, two years after the Lizarra-Garazi process collapsed. Whereas the assembly of 2007 
was initiated with a strategic document proposed by the political office of the executive 
committee, a serious controversy broke out within the leadership of the group. According 
to a later document of ETA, the organization had “a deep internal crisis” from the end of 
2007 to the end of 2008.389 I have not had access to any document or direct testimony about 
this crisis. Diverse sources of the Abertzale Left asserted that the crisis was real and serious 
and, regardless of some inaccuracies, the scarce information published by journalists is 
close to what really occurred. The most detailed account has been provided by Florencio 
Domínguez, based on some internal documents of ETA seized by the police.390 The 
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following is a summary of the account by Domínguez. After the arrest of ETA’s logistic 
chief, Juan Cruz Maiza, in July 2007, the executive committee was formed by five 
members, who had been having serious disagreements in the recent past. In fact, the 
leadership was divided in two factions. On the one side, Javier López Peña, Thierry, Igor 
Suberbiola,391 and Ainhoa Ozaeta were in charge of the political, communicational, 
economical and international apparatus; on the other, Garikoitz Aspiazu, Txeroki, and 
Mikel Karrera, Ata, were in charge of the military and logistic structures. The 
disagreements appeared to be mainly about organizational issues such as management of 
the resources, more than about ideological or strategic issues. Internal controversy led to a 
serious fight for control in December 2007, when a meeting of the executive committee 
intensified the dissensions. In January 2008 Karrera wrote a very critical letter with serious 
accusations against his three rivals in the leadership. Subsequently, there were attempts at 
mutual expulsions, and a struggle to attract internal support by each faction. The crisis was 
at its peak when the French police ‘solved’ it in May 2008 by arresting López Peña, Ozaeta 
and Suberbiola, along with the former member of the Basque parliament Jon Salaberria, in 
a flat in Bordeaux. After the arrests, Karrera and Aspiazu took control of the organization, 
named a militant of their faction, Aitor Eliazaran, chief of the political apparatus, and 
formed a ‘conflict committee’ who eventually decided to expel the three former members 
of the executive committee now in prison.392 ETA later acknowledged that the crisis 
damaged the group’s credibility within the cadres of the Abertzale Left who had knowledge 
of the internal whereabouts: “In addition to the internal serious consequences, that crisis 
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had an evident influence in the engagement and confidence with the Organization within 
the Abertzale Left.”393 
Despite the internal crisis, the assembly of ETA went on. The framework document 
was worked out by the trio eventually arrested in Bordeaux. The provisional conclusions 
of the debate to be voted on were also written and distributed by them. They passed three 
documents to vote on. Firstly, the report backed by the leadership proposed the 
continuation of the armed struggle;394 along with that document, they passed several 
amendments to be voted on, which were additions or partial modification proposals. 
Secondly, there was a document proposing an escalation in the violent campaign. Finally, 
there was a document proposing the end of armed struggle. The official report was 
approved by a clear majority. The document proposing an escalation achieved less support 
than the one proposing a cessation.395 According to Domínguez, the document proposing 
the end of the armed activity obtained only from 10 to 13 percent of the vote.396  
The approved document stated that some changes were to be done in their armed 
strategy to overcome what they acknowledged as an “operational-military crisis.” The 
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armed group asserted that it was imperative to escape “from the action scheme into which 
the enemy has gotten us” and look for “new spaces” to carry out armed actions. Regarding 
the sense of the armed campaign, the document pointed out that they would have to have 
the ability to “condition the political situation”, and “provoke turbulences.” The armed 
actions should seek the following political objectives: to put in evidence that there is a 
conflict; to show that there is a “radical resistance”; to destabilize the Spanish state; to 
avoid the stabilizing of the political-judicial framework; to increase the confrontation 
between the Basque Country and the Spanish state; to reinforce the need for political 
change; to confront repression and to press those backing repression; to protect the 
motherland; to defend the “popular sector’s claims;” to amplify the international attention 
toward the Basque conflict. In the same document, ETA listed who their potential targets 
would be: “those denying the rights of the Basque Country and its citizens;” “those 
politically responsible for the lack of democratic freedom and for the repression;” the 
Spanish Army and Police forces; the prison administration rulers and officers; “those 
responsible for destroying the mother land;” “those attacking the Basque language, the 
Basque education system”; the Spanish institutions “aiming to divide the Basque Country;” 
the energetic, hydraulic, symbolical, touristic and communicational infrastructure of the 
Spanish state;  Spanish economic power and interests; Spanish media and ideology 
institutions”; “informers, traitors, collaborators, drug dealers and fascist militants;” the 
businessperson and “rich persons” rejecting to pay “the Basque Revolutionary Tax” to 
ETA.397     
                                                          





The arrests of Bordeaux took place while ETA militants were in the process of 
voting on the reports and the amendments. Therefore, the process had to be concluded by 
the factions which had just taken control of the organization. After the vote, the new 
political apparatus wrote the definitive document of conclusions, adding the partial 
amendments approved in the vote.398 The new document had a slight but meaningful 
difference to the previous one. It stated that a long armed confrontation was to come. The 
logic of that perspective of a long cycle of armed struggle was that they believed that there 
was not any chance for a short-term negotiation process and, therefore, the armed activity 
of ETA had to create new conditions to force the state to negotiate. It was the old scheme 
of the war of attrition that ETA had adopted in the late 1970s, and kept since then. 
According to Domínguez, 80.5 percent of the militants voted in favor of the final 
document of the debate, and 15.5 percent voted against.399 The debate, however, never 
ended. Along with the document with the definitive conclusions, the newly established 
leadership shared three other documents for discussion. One considered the possibility of 
carrying out armed struggle in France as well. Another document questioned their position 
regarding the PNV. The third one was about the model of an eventual process for conflict 
resolution, the so-called democratic process.400 The discussion of these three documents 
did not develop as expected by the leadership. An internal debate within the whole 
Abertzale Left was about to condition, and to turn over, ETA’s assembly conclusions.                 
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4.1.3. The questioning of a strategy 
By the time Otegi was released on August 31, 2008, ETA had killed one further person, a 
Spanish civil guard on May 14 in Legutio (Araba), the second premeditated killing since 
the remission of the ceasefire in June 2007, and committed some attacks with explosive 
devices. More importantly, the internal assembly of ETA had concluded that a long cycle 
of armed confrontation was ahead. The conclusions of ETA’s debate were not public, but 
the leaders of Batasuna had news about it.401 Furthermore, in a communiqué published on 
August 16, 2008,402 ETA declared something astonishing for some leaders of the Abertzale 
Left: “The Basque Movement for National Liberation will not spend a single ounce of 
strength looking for a place in this foreign legality. (...) The struggle is the only way.” 
Foreign legality refers to autonomous institutions and struggle, in that context, meant 
armed struggle. Further down, ETA made “a special call to Basque youth to engage in the 
struggle.” That was a renewed declaration of war, and a solemn disdain of electoral politics. 
Some structures of the Abertzale Left, such as the barely re-organized Batasuna—led by 
younger militants now—and Ekin, approved in September a programmatic document each 
in consistency with what ETA just decided, i.e. political programs to adapt the Abertzale 
Left to a long period of armed conflict.403 
Otegi regarded that approved strategy as suicidal.404 He avoided making any public 
statement in his first months of freedom. According to him, he spent this period talking to 
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members of the Abertzale Left to test their opinion on the situation. He concluded that 
many comrades from diverse generations shared his views. Thus, he started to promote a 
reflection within the movement.405 He discretely reappeared on November 18 as a lecturer 
in a seminar in Donostia.406 For the first time, he brought out a concept that was to be 
repeated often since then: the necessity of “an effective strategy.” That was the concept 
chosen by Otegi to promote a debate about the armed struggle, a taboo within the Abertzale 
Left, without explicitly mentioning it. The next move was not as discrete. Otegi was 
interviewed by the newspaper Gara. Now he said much louder what he had whispered two 
weeks earlier: “The Abertzale Left needs to build an effective strategy.”407 Otegi was still 
speaking in his name but was acting in harmony with a group that regarded themselves as 
representatives of Batasuna. In this context, they were about to give a press conference in 
the name of the Abertzale Left in the anniversary of the Spanish Constitution, on December 
6.408 However, ETA had something to say. 
On December 3, 2008, ETA killed Ignacio Uria, a Basque businessman, in Loiola, 
a few hundred yards from the place where the failed political negotiations took place in 
2006. Uria was one of the owners of a building enterprise engaged in the construction of 
the Basque high speed rail infrastructure, which was regarded as a target by ETA on 
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ecological grounds. Moreover, Uria had refused to pay to ETA the so-called revolutionary 
tax. He was shot dead for both reasons, the armed group explained in its communiqué 
claiming responsibility for the killing. Uria happened to be a moderate nationalist, close to 
the PNV. Azpeitia, the municipality to which Loiola belongs, was exceptionally ruled by 
the Abertzale Left in coalition with the more moderate nationalists of EA.409 It was a 
political novelty, a kind of experiment, which could not last after the murder of Uria. The 
mayor did not denounce the killing, EA removed its support from him, and a member of 
the PNV was elected as a new mayor. The killing of Uria provoked “great tensions” within 
the Abertzale Left, although they did not come out publicly.410 The press conference 
scheduled for December 6 was cancelled, and the group led by Otegi limited themselves to 
releasing a written statement proposing a strategic debate to enable the joining of pro-
sovereignty forces.411  
In this context, the directions of the different organizations of the Abertzale Left 
decided to start a debate on strategy in December 2008. A later report by Batasuna about 
the internal debate specifically stresses that “absolutely all leaderships” of the Abertzale 
Left organizations agreed to initiate a debate.412 When Batasuna states that the debate 
started in “absolutely all leaderships,” it means that it includes the leadership of ETA, along 
with Ekin, LAB, Segi and the pro-amnesty movement.413 A later report by ETA also 
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explains that a debate to question the whole strategy was initiated at the end 2008 “in 
diverse direction organs of the Abertzale Left.”414 Therefore, there is not controversy about 
the beginning of an agreed process to debate about strategy, which included the armed 
campaign of ETA. 
In January, Otegi was not the only public voice asking for a change of strategy. 
Firstly, Otegi was interviewed by three journalists in a public event at a big auditorium in 
Donostia, in which he reiterated the same message.415 Three days later, on January 21, a 
prominent prisoner of ETA, Jon Salaberria, called for “a change of cycle” while being tried 
in Paris.416 Salaberria, who was arrested along with three top leaders of ETA in Bordeaux, 
was not only a former member of the Basque parliament, but a former prominent member 
of Ekin. He even gave press conferences as a representative of Ekin when this political 
organization was not yet banned. Hence, he was seen as a man with ascendancy in Ekin, 
whose direction was reluctant to accept the strategy shift proposed by Batasuna. Only two 
days later, two prominent members of the Abertzale Left were interviewed in Gara on the 
anniversary of the 1989 Algiers negotiations. Eugenio Etxebeste, Antxon—ETA’s chief 
negotiator in 1989—and Rafa Diez—an adviser of ETA at Algiers, secretary general of the 
trade union LAB for twelve years (1996-2008), and an elected member of Parliament in 
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the name of HB several times in the 1980s and 1990s—delivered a clear message: “We 
need to transition from the era of ‘resisting is winning’ to the era of ‘convincing is 
winning.’”417 The old guard of the Abertzale Left backed Otegi in his attempt to guide a 
radical change in the movement.   
Finally, in March 2009, a group claiming to represent the entire Abertzale Left led 
by Otegi418 gave a press conference to solemnly declare that the pro-independence 
movement needed to join forces, and share a new strategy.419 For the general public it 
looked nothing more than a press conference in consistency with Otegi’s recent statements. 
Yet, internally, it was the initiation of a serious confrontation between the faction agreeing 
with ETA’s approved strategy of the continuation of a war of attrition, and the faction 
regarding that strategy suicidal and seeking the end of violence to facilitate a joining of 
forces with other nationalists. 
4.1.4. Chances of new alliances 
Ideologically speaking, Aralar in the south and AB in the north were the political parties 
closest to the Abertzale Left. In fact, both claimed to be part of the abertzale left, viewed 
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as a broad sociological spectrum of left-wing nationalists. Yet, Aralar was a splinter of 
Batasuna, and Batasuna a splinter of AB. Their relationship in the 2000s was all but 
friendly. When Otegi began talking about the necessity of joining forces with other left-
wing nationalists, in the short term he was not thinking on Aralar and AB, but on EA. A 
splinter of the PNV in 1986 led by the former lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea, EA was 
an ally of the PNV in the 1990s and the early 2000s. They co-participated in several Basque 
government coalitions and, with Ibarretxe as a candidate, they ran for elections in a 
coalition with PNV. That coalition, however, was being questioned by a faction of the party 
for a long time. In August 2006, the faction against the coalition with the PNV won a 
crucial vote at the executive committee, although the president of EA, Begoña Errazti,420 
supported maintaining the alliance. Thus, EA ran alone in the 2007 local elections. That 
was a tipping point in EA’s strategy.421 In December 2007, the party assembly elected a 
new leader, Unai Ziarreta, to replace Errazti. It was a sign that the faction questioning the 
PNV alliance took control of the party. They still were partners of the Ibarretxe cabinet, 
and were backing the lehendakari in his referendum strategy. Nonetheless, Ziarreta 
explains, by that time they did not rely on the PNV direction. They concluded that the PNV 
leadership was not really backing Ibarretxe, and that the PNV strategy would not reach far. 
Actually, Ibarretxe’s strategy of confrontation with the Spanish state had internal 
consequences in the PNV. The president of the party, Josu Jon Imaz,422 did not agree with 
Ibarretxe’s strategy on the grounds that it was too aggressive, and decided not to run to 
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renew his mandate. Iñigo Urkullu was named president of the party in January 2008. 
Theoretically, he backed Ibarretxe in his duel with the state. Yet, in the view of EA, as 
Ziarreta now explains, the PNV did not have “a real will to put in place an actual process 
for sovereignty.”423 When the Spanish Constitutional Court banned the referendum in 
September 2008, nothing but a symbolic gathering was organized as a protest. The pro-
sovereignty strategy of Ibarretxe just vanished. 
By that time, top leaders of EA were discretely working on a different direction. 
They considered to test the chances for collaboration with the Abertzale Left. In March 
2008, when EA obtained poor electoral results and lost its only representative in the 
Spanish Congress, the leadership decided to try new avenues. In the summer of 2008, the 
president of EA, Ziarreta, secretly visited Otegi in prison. As Otegi was about to be 
released, the EA president suggested the possibility of an alliance to him. The imprisoned 
leader of the Abertzale Left liked the idea. The EA leader also paid a visit to two other 
members of the leadership of Batasuna in another prison because he had a personal 
relationship with them, and proposed the same idea.424 
One day in September, a few days after having been released, Otegi showed up at 
the headquarters of EA in Bilbao to see Ziarreta. Otegi wanted to keep track of what they 
left pending in their discussion in the prison. They established a meeting timetable, and 
started to meet regularly and secretly in Gatika, a small town in Bizkaia. Ziarreta concluded 
from those meetings that the political leaders of the Abertzale Left sincerely wanted to end 
                                                          






the political-military strategy but, very importantly, that they wanted to make the move 
only when the whole movement was ready to change course. It was a priority for them not 
to provoke any split in the move. Three or four members of each party usually participated 
in the meetings, although sometimes Ziarreta and Otegi met face to face. They started to 
exchange documents with the possibility of an electoral alliance on the horizon, always 
provided by EA that any coalition could only be implemented in a context of a cessation 
of ETA’s violence. Elections for the Basque parliament were coming in the spring of 2009. 
They started to see a chance for a convergence, although the persistence of ETA’s violence 
and the banning of Batasuna were important obstacles. In the midst of these conversations, 
ETA killed Ignacio Uria in Loiola. “That was a shock,” says Ziarreta. The Abertzale Left 
did not make any public statement disapproving of it. The EA leader cut off all contacts 
with Otegi for a short while, although they eventually restarted talks again. 
In that context, Ziarreta received a message from ETA proposing a meeting. 
Ziarreta, along with another member of the leadership of EA, Rafa Larreina, met two 
representatives of ETA somewhere in France. According to Ziarreta’s account, the leaders 
of EA basically told the representatives of ETA that they would only join forces with the 
Abertzale Left if ETA ceased its campaign. The spokespersons of ETA did not clarify what 
their intentions were in that regard.425 Nevertheless, EA offered to the outlawed Batasuna 
to include some so-called ‘independent candidates,’ secretly named by Batasuna, in their 
lists for Basque parliament elections. Batasuna refused. Meanwhile, there were some 
rumors that Batasuna would ask their followers to vote for EA candidates. Otegi published 






an article to deny the rumor, which annoyed Ziarreta, as he believed that some ambiguity 
would help them.426 
The elections for the Basque parliament in March 2009 turned into a disaster for 
the Abertzale Left and EA in particular, and for Basque nationalists in general. For the 
Abertzale Left, because for the first time in history they could not participate by any means 
in the elections. They presented two different lists of candidates, D3M (Democracy Three 
Millions) and Askatasuna (Liberty), but both were invalidated on the grounds that they 
were a continuation of the banned Batasuna. For EA, it was a great setback. They obtained 
only one seat, abruptly confirming a declining support base.427 The party entered into a 
deep crisis and went through ideological and strategic clarification. Ziarreta took 
responsibility for the electoral failure, and resigned. The faction of the party more willing 
to ally with the PNV left the party. When the Assembly of the party elected a new 
leadership led by Pello Urizar in June 2009, they also approved a program confirming the 
path initiated by Ziarreta. Definitely, EA continued being prepared to join forces with the 
Abertzale Left if there was a cessation in ETA’s violence.      
4.1.5. A socialist lehendakari  
The PNV candidate Ibarretxe won Basque elections in terms of votes and seats (38.6 
percent of the vote and thirty seats out of seventy-five), but he was not renamed 
lehendakari. With the Abertzale Left out of the parliament and with a sole representative 
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of EA, the rise of Aralar (four seats) was not enough for a nationalist majority. For the first 
time in the Basque autonomic history, the major Spanish parties had a majority in the 
Parliament. The PSE-EE (30.7 percent and twenty-five seats) and the PP (14.1 percent and 
thirteen seats)428 joined forces and the socialist Patxi López became lehendakari. Ibarretxe 
left the parliament and the front line of politics. Right after the deal between PSE-EE and 
PP was announced, but even before Patxi López took office, ETA declared that the 
members of the new Basque government would be “priority targets” of the armed group.429 
It was the first time that ETA directly threatened all members of a Basque government. A 
new era was about to start.  
The PSOE and the PP were not in good terms in the Spanish political arena, but 
things were different in the Basque arena. The anti-terrorism harmony between the PSOE 
and the PP broke up in 2005, when the Zapatero government got involved in secret 
negotiations with ETA behind the PP’s back. The anti-terrorism pact signed in 2001, which 
brought among other measures the banning of Batasuna, was not valid anymore. According 
to the PP analysis of the time, ETA and the Abertzale Left were extremely weakened in 
2004 as a consequence of police action against the armed group and the banning of the 
Abertzale Left organizations. They believed that the anti-terrorism pact between the PP 
and the PSOE had been highly effective and, accordingly, that it was the path to follow 
until the military defeat of ETA and the political defeat of the Abertzale Left. The 
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engagement of Zapatero in a peace process was viewed by the PP as a betrayal to their 
pact, and as a big mistake because it gave oxygen to ETA and the Abertzale Left. The PP 
chose to make a very aggressive opposition to Zapatero while the 2005-2007 process was 
on. The PP and the victims associations, most notably the AVT (Terrorism Victims’ 
Association), confronted the peace process on the grounds that the government was giving 
in to blackmail by ETA, and was betraying the victims, as the leader of the PP Rajoy once 
reproached Zapatero from the tribune of the Congress.430 Huge demonstrations organized 
by the AVT and backed by the PP were held in the city center of Madrid to denounce the 
so-called surrender process. Zapatero had to manage the peace process of 2005-2007 with 
almost half of the parliament, most of the Spanish media organizations, and almost all 
victim organizations against him.  
However, the very aggressive campaign against Zapatero and the failure of the 
peace process did not put the PP in power, as Zapatero beat Rajoy for the second time in 
the 2008 elections. After the second defeat of Rajoy, the far right-wing faction of the PP 
unsuccessfully attempted to replace Rajoy for a hardliner. Even the leader of the Basque 
PP, María San Gil, challenged Rajoy because she regarded him as too soft in the Basque 
case. She miscalculated her strength, and eventually resigned. After San Gil’s resignation 
in 2008, a new generation of leaders in the Basque PP emerged, with Antonio Basagoiti as 
the main leader, and Iñaki Oyarzabal as number two. These new leaders were in harmony 
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with Rajoy regarding the Basque issue: against any attempt to negotiate, but aware that 
something could be done with politics to facilitate the end of ETA.  
 According to Oyarzabal, since 2008 the Basque PP tried building a new discourse. 
They were very critical of Zapatero’s policies, as they believed that the peace process of 
2005-2007 delayed the end of ETA, which otherwise would have come earlier and with a 
much weaker Abertzale Left. “We have lived all this with uneasiness because we saw that 
the end of ETA would bring a very powerful Abertzale Left, because they were giving 
them political oxygen and strengthening Otegi’s leadership. That hurt us.”431 The matter, 
according to the PP, was not only to end ETA, but to weaken the Abertzale Left. However, 
they were aware that the aggressive discourse of the Spanish PP was not understood in the 
Basque society, which was looking forward to a peaceful scenario. Rajoy, the chief of the 
opposition at the time, was backing his party’s new approach in the Basque Country. 
This shift made the PSE-PP alliance possible, and the socialist Patxi López was 
elected lehendakari in 2009. Since then, the Basque branches of the PSOE and the PP have 
had a fluid communication in policies regarding ETA. Rodolfo Ares was named Home 
minister of the regional government. Accordingly, he was the top chief of the regional 
police, and he was in charge of all Basque government policies related to ETA. Oyarzabal 
and Ares met every week to update information and strategy. According to Oyarzabal, the 
PSOE shifted their policy toward a more inflexible position regarding the Abertzale Left 
with Ares as a chief of the Ertzaintza, the Basque regional police. “There was a 180 degree 
                                                          





shift in the socialist party in 2009 and 2010.” The PP was satisfied because, according to 
their view, the Basque autonomous institutions were committed to policies to weaken ETA 
and the Abertzale Left.432  
As a matter of fact, Ares tried to make a difference confronting the Abertzale Left 
in a new field: the symbols. He ordered the removal from public space of pictures of 
prisoners from ETA and other organizations and banners claiming their transfer to prison 
in the Basque Country. The Basque police, the Ertzaintza, removed pictures from both 
indoor social places and outdoor public places. Demonstrators carrying pictures of 
prisoners were prosecuted. According to Rodolfo Ares, the objective of that policy was to 
confront ETA in all fields, not only in security.  It was, Ares says, “a policy of ethical, 
political and social de-legitimization.” The new government took away “spaces of 
impunity,” argues Ares, and weakened “Batasuna’s world.” As a consequence, in Ares’ 
words, the Abertzale Left concluded that they had to break away from their past and accept 
the legality, if they wanted to be back in politics.433 The ‘zero tolerance’ policy promoted 
by Ares with the PP support relatively achieved removing symbols in solidarity with the 
prisoners, but demonstration claiming their rights and asking to transfer them to Basque 
prisons did not stop at all. Now, the demonstrators carried posters with the silhouette of the 
prisoners instead of their pictures. 
Ares’ policy was in total harmony with the Spanish political ambience regarding 
the Basque issue, reinforced after the end of the last peace process. Dialogue as a tool for 
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conflict resolution was aggressively demonized much earlier than the failure of the 2005-
2007 process. In fact, one of the main obstacles for Zapatero’s attempt was the Spanish 
mainstream position regarding the Basque problem, contrary to any constructive approach, 
fueled by the PP, the Madrid media outlets, and ETA victims’ major associations. As 
rightly explained by Whitfield, in the aftermath of the previous 1998-1999 “a hardline 
against terrorism, the championing of victims and a defence of the constitution” provided 
ground for “a familiar form of Spanish nationalism,” in a context where “hatred of ETA 
represented one of the few unifying features of [the Spanish] public life.”434 In this political 
environment, Zapatero’s attempt to facilitate ETA’s end through a dialogue process in 
2005-2007 was fiercely criticized from the beginning. When it failed, dialogue was 
demonized to such an extent that the former lehendakari Ibarretxe, the new lehendakari 
López, and the hardliner regional Home minister Ares were prosecuted for meeting with 
Batasuna leaders in the course of the peace process. Although the case was eventually 
dismissed in January 2009, it showed the “unrealistic and at times hysterical sensitivity 
around the question of dialogue.” In that environment, argues Whitfield, “any admission 
that ‘one day’ there might be a need for talks, even if current circumstances rendered them 
impossible, was immediately jumped upon.”435 
The Spanish Home minister, Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, expressed the PSOE 
government’s new position of non-dialogue by warning Batasuna and ETA, again and 
again during 2009 and 2010, that they had to make a choice: “Either bombs or ballots.” It 
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was not the first time that the Spanish government publicly denied any chance of dialogue 
with ETA, but this time it seemed different. Eguiguren, who had always championed for 
dialogue, acknowledged by 2009 that chances for dialogue had vanished after the collapse 
of the last process, and the only gateway for ETA was a unilateral decision: “In the future 
there will not be any other way than: ‘stop, period.’ Nobody will enter a process in order 
to talk with ETA.”436 
A further factor drove the Abertzale Left to believe that the choice graphically 
expressed by Rubalcaba was real, that bombs and ballots would not be compatible 
anymore. In June 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ratified the banning of 
Batasuna.437 The Abertzale Left had dealt with the Spanish court’s banning for seven years. 
They had attempted to compete in elections through different cover lists, sometimes with 
success, sometimes in vain. However, the judicial circle had not been close until the 
Strasbourg court issued its ruling. Now, it seemed certain that the Abertzale Left could not 
have a legal political party unless ETA stopped or, otherwise, the Abertzale Left rejected 
the armed group. Otegi publicly acknowledged that the ruling was “a catastrophe” for the 
Abertzale Left.438      
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4.2. The internal debate 
4.2.1. The armed struggle in question 
By the time all organizations of the Abertzale Left decided to initiate a general strategic 
debate, it was clear that there were two main incompatible positions within the movement. 
The two factions agreed that they should seek a joining of nationalist forces. However, the 
leadership of Batasuna, among others, believed that the armed struggle was incompatible 
with the objective of allying with other pro-independence forces, because these other 
parties had sustained, and showed, that they were not prepared to collaborate with the 
Abertzale Left with ETA active. In contrast, the leadership of ETA and Ekin, among others, 
contended that an adapted armed struggle could be compatible with a joint political action 
with other nationalists. This faction regarded ETA’s campaign as a necessary tool to force 
the Spanish state to negotiate a way out from the conflict. The other faction believed that 
experience had proven that this negotiation model did not work, and that ETA and the 
Abertzale Left should start a unilateral process to end the armed confrontation.439 
There was also a controversy about what should be discussed in that debate; 
basically, whether the civil organizations within the Abertzale Left had anything to say 
about what ETA should do. The traditional position of the movement had been that all 
questions regarding military strategy were an exclusive competence of the armed group. 
Now, the faction aiming for a strategic shift was questioning that too. “Although it was 
evident that the decision about armed struggle should be made by the organization 
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practicing it,” Otegi later said, “it was our duty to state our position regarding the political-
military strategy,” because that affected the whole strategy. They wanted a debate “with 
no taboos.”440 The traditional organizational model of the movement was evidently at 
stake. ETA was not regarded as their vanguard anymore by an important faction. A letter 
allegedly sent by ETA to the coordination body of the Abertzale Left in June 2008 clearly 
reproached the Batasuna leaders for making decisions “outside of the decision organs.” 
Batasuna had supported a left-wing all-Spain platform in the European elections, in a move 
to overcome their political ostracism and show electoral strength.441 According to ETA’s 
letter, the decision organs of the Abertzale Left did not determine to support that list of 
candidates. “Where are the decisions being made? Is someone developing a [strategic] line 
outside of the leadership?” Regarding the internal debate of the Abertzale Left, ETA was 
clearly limiting its scope. It stated that the “deep and exact designs of the Democratic 
Process,” which refers to a conflict resolution process sought by the Abertzale Left, “are 
defined by ETA; and by ETA with those in charge in the Abertzale Left. (…) The leaders 
and organs of the Abertzale Left should not have to discuss the high definition levels of the 
Democratic Process.”442 The leadership of Batasuna did not agree at all. In a later report 
about the internal crisis, they stated that “the Popular Unity [referring to Batasuna] is the 
main organ of discussion and decision of the Abertzale Left social base;” and that “it is 
wrong to believe that what is decided in a certain closed organ has to be accepted in all 
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organizations and structures [of the movement].” That was a substantial and decisive 
change of perspective in the history of the Abertzale Left. In a later self-critical report by 
ETA, the armed group states that, “whereas the leadership model of the Abertzale Left was 
in question, we went forward with that model, instead of adapting and facing the reasons 
(…).”443 In summary, the great novelty of the internal debate of 2009 was that the Abertzale 
Left as a whole entered a strategic discussion including the convenience or inconvenience 
of continuing armed struggle by ETA, a taboo, until then, outside the organs of the armed 
group. According to Etxeberria, “it was the first time in the history of the Abertzale Left 
that the social bases [of the Abertzale Left] took a position regarding the strategy developed 
by ETA.”444 
4.2.2. A discussion process with incidents 
In its first stage, the debate was restricted to “the leaderships and certain groups of 
militants,” according to a later report by Batasuna leadership. At the time, the main civil 
organizations of the Abertzale Left had a coordinating body, in which two members of 
each five organizations regularly met, namely Batasuna, Ekin, LAB, Segi and Askatasuna. 
When Batasuna refers to “the leaderships” of the movements, it very probably refers to 
these five organizations’ decision organs. Among the “certain groups of militants” there 
were some groups of former prisoners of ETA. The discussion did not spread to the whole 
social base until October, when a framework document was distributed to the rank and file.  
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 In this stage of restricted debate, a serious crisis broke out in late spring or early 
summer among the top organs of the Abertzale Left. A representation of the coordination 
body of the civil organizations of the Abertzale Left met a delegation of ETA to let them 
know the whereabouts of the debate. The ETA delegation disagreed with the terms and the 
model of the debate and, in that restricted bilateral meeting, the attendants decided that the 
debate should be canceled. When the civil organizations were told of that decision, the 
representatives of Batasuna openly disagreed, and announced that they would continue 
with the debate within the structures of Batasuna. Thus, the coordination body of the 
Abertzale Left lost its functionality, and it was the leadership of Batasuna who promoted 
and coordinated the debate.445 Consequently, the Batasuna leaders worked out a draft of a 
framework document advocating for a strategic shift, which would eventually become the 
document to be debated by its social base. 
This document, known as Argitzen,446 did not specifically and openly propose the 
end of armed struggle. It is a program for a so-called “Democratic Process,” through which 
the Abertzale Left aimed to change the political framework to enable Basques to determine 
their political status. The document asserts that the only guarantees for the development of 
that process are “the accumulation of strength, the change of balance of forces, and national 
building.” The document does not mention ETA or armed struggle as a guarantee of the 
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process, or as a means to develop their strategy. That omission hinted they were proposing 
the end of ETA’s armed campaign.447 It seems it was too early to state everything openly.  
Meanwhile, members of Ekin—or ETA, according to some sources448—wrote an 
alternative document for debate, Mugarri, in which they openly advocated for the 
complementarity of all kinds of means, including armed struggle. In section 6.6., titled 
“Integral Strategy,” the document Mugarri states the following: “The 50-year-old struggle 
of the Abertzale Left” has been based on a political-military strategy; armed struggle has 
played an instrumental role in “creating new conditions, placing new landmarks, taking 
steps in the liberation struggle,” and “confronting State repression;” in the present-day 
political stage “the role of armed struggle is crucial too.”449 In early October, the leadership 
of Batasuna had the official framework almost ready to be distributed, with only a few 
details left. Mugarri was also ready, though.       
Whereas the Abertzale Left was debating about the overall strategy, ETA continued 
to carry on its armed campaign in 2009. ETA committed nine attacks and killed two people 
in 2007, and it committed 34 attacks and killed four people in 2008. In a later document, 
ETA self-critically acknowledged that, after the resumption of armed struggle, ETA was 
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not able “to develop a permanent armed campaign,” despite some “qualitative actions.”450 
ETA continued its campaign in 2009 with some bombings, but it did not kill anybody the 
first five months, while the debate within the Abertzale Left was beginning. However, the 
insurgent group engaged in a new offensive in the summer, killing a member of the Spanish 
police—Eduardo Puelles—in Arrigorriaga (Bizkaia) on June 19, and two civil guards—
Diego Salvá and Carlos Sáenz de Tejada—on July 31 in the island of Majorca, close to the 
summer residence of the Spanish king. ETA committed eleven other attacks with explosive 
devices from January to August, but the most devastating of all of them, a powerful bomb 
attack on the headquarters of the Civil Guard in Burgos, was also in July, only a few days 
before the killing of two guards in Majorca. The armed group stressed that in the summer 
of 2009, “in the middle of the debate [of the Abertzale Left],” ETA “carried out important 
continued attacks” so that the organization showed a “strong position,” which caused “an 
increase of confidence within our base.”451   
 ETA’s offensive in the summer of 2009 was a critical moment for the debate within 
the Abertzale Left. The drafts of the two programmatic documents were already being 
discussed among the members of the directions of the diverse organizations. The leadership 
of ETA had already made internally clear that they did not agree with the debate which 
questioned their strategy. ETA acted as if the political-military strategy was not in question, 
knowing that those attacks could provoke a fallback in the debate. According to Otegi, “the 
assassination of Puelles and others gave us a message on ETA’s position about the 
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continuation of the political-military strategy, which was contrary to our position. It was a 
worrying symptom.”452 Iñigo Iruin, a prominent lawyer of the Abertzale Left, and a former 
member of the leadership of HB, stated in his conclusions in a later trial against Otegi and 
others that ETA tried “to condition the debate” through the attacks in the summer of 2009: 
“They aimed to demonstrate that an effective political-military strategy was possible.”453 
Historically, ETA had factually resolved some internal debates and controversies through 
military actions. This time, they did not provoke such a thing. On the contrary, ETA was 
told by the promoters of the debate that they were going forward no matter the 
consequences.454  
4.2.3. A debate fueled by the arrest of the promoters 
On October 13, 2009, when the promoters of the debate were about to distribute the report 
Argitzen among their constituency, the judge of the Audiencia Nacional, Baltasar Garzón, 
ordered the arrest of Arnaldo Otegi, Rafa Diez, Rufi Etxeberria and seven other supposed 
members of  the leadership of Batasuna. They were accused of trying to reconstruct the 
Ruling Council of Batasuna under ETA’s instructions. Etxeberria was freed after three days 
because he had been held in pretrial detention until a month earlier, and could hardly be 
accused of organizing anything. Four others were also freed, but Otegi, Diez, along with 
three younger leaders, Arkaitz Rodriguez, Miren Zabaleta and Sonia Jacinto, were jailed.  
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 Why did the judge Baltasar Garzon order the arrest of the key persons who were 
trying to reverse ETA’s determination of continuing armed struggle right in the middle of 
a crucial moment of the debate, when they were about to spread the discussion to the rank 
and file? There is a politically correct answer to that question, namely that the justice is 
independent of the executive power, and that a judge investigating terrorism affairs found 
enough evidence to conclude that Otegi and his comrades were acting under ETA’s 
direction. That is the answer of Rodolfo Ares, Home minister of the Basque government at 
the time, when asked about the political motivation for the arrests of Otegi and his 
colleagues: “[The arrests] have to be interpreted from the judicial perspective that there 
were some pending cases and the justice acted” accordingly.455 Judges can act 
independently, or not. The police theoretically act following a judge’s orders when working 
in a specific case, but the police forces’ top political officer is the Spanish Home minister. 
The police anti-terrorism policy is led by the government. When the intelligence services 
of the police believe they have enough evidence to prosecute somebody, they will ask a 
judge in the Audiencia Nacional to order to act accordingly, arresting people or searching 
places. Therefore, the government can easily enable police operations against terrorism 
suspects, although the last order needs to come from a judge. 
 The leaders of Batasuna arrested in October 2009 do not have a fixed interpretation 
about the motivation for their arrest. They have no doubts that the Spanish Home Ministry 
led by the socialist Rubalcaba was behind the arrests. Yet, they see two possibilities 
regarding the motivations. First hypothesis: the Government had enough information to 
                                                          





know that they were really trying to put an end to the political-military strategy; therefore, 
they did not want the Abertzale Left to conclude the process in good order and condition, 
because a very strong pro-independence movement could emerge from that. Second 
hypothesis: the Government knew they were promoting an internal debate, but they did not 
believe they were willing to reverse ETA’s determination to maintain armed strategy but, 
instead, they were just trying to adapt their strategy; hence, they decided to put more 
pressure on the Abertzale Left.456  
 If the purpose of the arrests was to sabotage the debate, they achieved the contrary. 
The arrests accelerated the debate. According to Otegi, they started to distribute the report 
Argitzen through internal channels just a few hours before their arrest.457 A week later, 
what was supposed to be an internal document to be discussed through internal channels, 
the report Argitzen, was put online by the daily newspaper Gara.458 Four weeks later, on 
November 8, 2009, the five imprisoned leaders of Batasuna made an open letter public 
stating that they believed that only political means were to be used by the Abertzale Left. 
Although they did not expressly assert that armed strategy should be abandoned, they used 
for the first time the concept “exclusively” when referring to political means, meaning that 
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military action did not have any place in the new political era.459 On November 14, about 
a hundred people claiming to be a broad representation of the whole Abertzale Left460 gave 
a press conference to make a solemn statement, what was to be known as the declaration 
of Altsasu,461 named after the town of Navarre where the event took place. Simultaneously, 
representatives of the Abertzale Left presented the same statement in Venice, Italy, in order 
to add an international dimension to the move.  
 Through the declaration of Altsasu the Abertzale Left made public seven principles 
which they considered should be the foundations for the so-called Democratic Process. 
Among these seven principles, the last proclaimed a commitment for the “Mitchell 
principles,” which were the basic rules agreed on in Ireland in the 1990s for a dialogue 
process based on the proposal of the American senator George Mitchell. According to these 
principles, all involved in negotiations had to affirm their commitment “to democratic and 
exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues”; “to renounce for themselves, and 
to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course 
or the outcome of all-party negotiations”; and “to agree to abide by the terms of any 
agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively 
peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may 
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disagree.”462 The text of the declaration of Altsasu did not specify what the ‘Mitchel 
principles’ meant, but the adoption of those principles was a landmark in the Abertzale 
Left’s history, as it was the first time that they publicly expressed a renunciation of the use 
of armed struggle. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the ‘Mitchell principles’ into the 
declaration of Altsasu provoked a serious controversy within the Abertzale Left.   
Some of the people who took part in the presentation internally complained that 
they did not know the statement would go so far regarding the renunciation of arms. Some 
of these complaints arose in the very moment of the presentation in Altsasu.463 Later on, 
there were internal critics arguing that the group of Altsasu did not represent the whole 
Abertzale Left. It was true, as the faction promoting the report Mugarri did not agree with 
what was said in Altsasu. According to Otegi, the declaration read on November 14 was 
already written by the time they were arrested.464 However, the plan was to announce the 
commitment to the ‘Mitchell principles’ once the internal debate was over, and the social 
base had approved the program. Rufi Etxeberria and the few who remained in charge of 
the debate decided that, after the arrests of October, everything should be accelerated. That 
is why they included the ‘Mitchell principles’ at that early stage of the debate, to make 
clear what they were proposing to the base.465 A later internal report by Batasuna about the 
crisis acknowledges that there were some internal critics about the Altsasu declaration 
because “it conditioned and directed the debate.” Batasuna answers to the critics that the 
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Abertzale Left had to act politically while the debate was going forward, that it could not 
stay inactive until the debate clarified “everything.”466  
Now, with the report Argitzen available online, with the open letter of the five 
imprisoned leaders of Batasuna claiming the exclusivity of political means, and a numerous 
group of different generations of the Abertzale Left assuming the ‘Mitchell principles’ in 
a solemn declaration, the rank and file knew what Otegi and Batasuna meant when they 
were urging for a change of cycle toward an effective strategy. The next few months they 
gathered in local meetings to discuss the programmatic document proposing the historical 
shift.     
4.2.4. The Gara factor 
The newspaper Egin had been instrumental in the making of the Abertzale Left movement. 
Founded through popular funding in 1977, it started as a pro-independence left-wing 
publication. Soon after, at the end of 1978, when the political movements coming from 
ETA (pm) and ETA (m) took opposite political directions, an internal fight for control took 
place in the newspaper, as a consequence of which it became a publication in harmony 
with ETA (m), KAS and HB. Since then, Egin had been an important tool for cohesion 
within the Abertzale Left. It was one of the key elements to mitigate very effectively the 
influence of dissidents within the movement over time. They were usually ignored by Egin, 
if not attacked or discredited. Egin had always been on the side of those advocating for a 
political-military strategy. 
                                                          





 Soon after Egin was shut down under the orders of the judge Baltasar Garzon in 
July 1998, a new paper was created through popular funding as a reaction to the closure. 
Gara was created as a new publication with no links to Egin, but it practically replaced it. 
Overall, it inherited Egin readers, and took a line in harmony with the Abertzale Left. ETA 
usually sent its communiqués to Gara and, often, also to Egunkaria, the only Basque 
language newspaper, later to be replaced by Berria, which would also be recipient of 
ETA’s communiqués. There was a period when ETA sent its communiqués to the Basque 
public radio and television network (EITB) as well. Representatives of ETA were from 
time to time interviewed in Gara, less often in Egunkaria (or Berria), and a few times on 
the Basque public television.  
 In the aftermath of the ceasefire breakup in 2007, the management and staff of Gara 
were aware of the controversies within the Abertzale Left. They had news of the 
conclusions of ETA’s 2007-2008 assembly, and they knew what some leaders of Batasuna 
thought about that strategy. According to Iñaki Altuna, a prominent member of Gara’s 
staff at the time, they did not formally decide that Gara should support and promote those 
claiming a strategic shift. 
We built our editorial line on the foundation of our information. We made our 
interpretation of the last steps [of the Abertzale Left]. We perceived that the 
prevailing idea was that a long cycle [of armed confrontation] had to come, and we 
believed that it made no sense. That scared us.467  
                                                          





According to Altuna, that was an opinion or feeling shared by the editor, some 
members of the staff, and the political correspondents. A few articles in Gara suggested 
the need of a change even before Otegi started to publicly propose it. In the beginning, they 
did it in the weekly pages devoted to contents in Basque, Gaur8, as its audience and 
repercussion is smaller outside their readers’ community. It was still between the lines, but 
there was some significant questioning, taking into account that it was Gara. As early as 
October 2008, Altuna signed an editorializing article questioning whether “we have entered 
a long stage of pure confrontation” or whether there still was a chance to work on a 
resolution.468 It might not be significant for an average reader, but internally, a well-known 
member of the staff of Gara was questioning the latest resolutions of ETA. In November 
2008, the same author stated that the Abertzale Left should assume some commitments to 
enable a long-term joining of pro-independence forces; those “commitments,” it was 
implied, were related to an eventual cessation of violence.469 Altuna believes that the 
discrete contribution of Gara in that early stage was to break some taboos of the Abertzale 
Left, such as the inevitability of the armed struggle. He argues that facing a debate 
expressly questioning the continuation of armed struggle would not be feasible in the 
Abertzale Left. In this regard, he believes that Otegi had hit the mark with his approach of 
                                                          
468 Iñaki Altuna, “Gatazkak bere horretan dirau,” Gaur8, Gara, October 11, 2008, accessed September 1, 
2014, 
http://www.gaur8.info/edukiak/20081011/100672/Gatazkak-bere-horretan-dirau  
469 Iñaki Altuna, “Burujabetzaren aldeko poloa dela eta ez dela,” Gaur8, Gara, November 29, 2008, 






the debate, as he proposed to discuss about the effectiveness of the overall strategy of the 
Abertzale Left.470  
When Otegi came back to public sphere, Gara turned into his main messenger. 
After Otegi and his colleagues were arrested in October 2009, Gara became an active agent 
spreading their report Argitzen. It published numerous leading editorials interpreting for 
their readers what that report meant, and what the arrested leaders were standing for.471 
Yet, always through a terminology which avoided expressly stating that it meant the 
abandoning of armed struggle. They did not stress what they were abandoning, but what 
they were adopting: exclusively political means. According to Altuna, the motivation of 
Gara was not to support a faction of the debate and exclude the other, but to display the 
political meaning of the debate in a key moment in which the leadership of the Abertzale 
Left had been arrested and the rank and file were in need of information about what was 
going on.472 Iñaki Soto, the chief of the Opinion section at the time and editor of Gara since 
January 2011, believes that his newspaper made a great contribution, because ”we put in 
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place a clear perspective on the debate within the Abertzale Left and, to some extent, 
because some thesis which we defended through leading editorials and information, went 
forward.” Soto asserts that Gara does not make politics, “but we helped to bring this 
political scenario through journalism.”473     
 Gara readers continued having news of ETA’s stance as well. Beside the 
publication of the usual communiqués, representatives of the armed group were 
interviewed in May 2009. When the interviewer asked them about the press conference in 
March 2009 by Otegi and some others, in which they stressed the need for an effective 
strategy, ETA spokespersons asserted that they also were reflecting on “an effective 
political-military strategy.”474 Two months after the declaration of Altsasu, in January 
2010, an ETA communiqué stated that “the Abertzale Left has talked,” and ETA assumed 
what was said. It could be interpreted that ETA had decided to assume the contents of the 
Altsasu declaration, which would mean the end of their violent campaign, but that was not 
the point yet. Further in the communiqué, ETA explained that the time for “the Democratic 
Process” with no violence proposed by the Abertzale Left had not arrived yet; that only 
“the struggle” could create the conditions to eventually enter the exclusively political 
process aimed for by the Abertzale Left.475 The internal controversy was far from ending.          
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4.2.5. Confusion within the prisons 
The discussion among the rank and file took place from October 2009 to February 2010 
through local assemblies organized by Batasuna. According to Batasuna design, the only 
framework document to be discussed was Argitzen. However, there were some attempts of 
bringing the report Mugarri to the local assemblies’ debates. Moreover, according to 
Batasuna, some members of Ekin managed to cancel some local assemblies on the grounds 
that the debate was not properly approached since Argitzen was the only report to discuss. 
Those deeds triggered another crisis, which was apparently resolved when Ekin distributed 
a self-criticizing circular among those concerned.476 Despite those incidents, the debate on 
the Abertzale Left ranks took place, and the proposals compiled in Argitzen were backed 
by a great majority, according to the promoters.477     
 Nevertheless, not all members of the Abertzale Left were discussing the report 
worked out by the leadership of Batasuna. The prisoners, more than seven hundred at the 
time, received instead the Mugarri report. According to a later account by Batasuna, the 
prisoners were told by some lawyers acting as representatives of the prisoners collective 
that the debate outside was limited to Batasuna, the political party, but the real document 
for debate for the whole movement was Mugarri, which aimed for a continuation of armed 
struggle. Most of the prisoners of ETA and other organizations are part of an organism 
called Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (EPPK). These prisoners could belong to 
ETA, Batasuna, Segi, Ekin and others, but they all had in common being members of 
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EPPK, with the exception of some dissidents. Therefore, all prisoners had a unique voice, 
regardless of their membership outside. EPPK had named some prisoners as their 
spokespersons, and some mediators such as former prisoners and lawyers as their 
representatives outside.478 In the context of the controversy on the reports to be discussed, 
representatives of Batasuna and EPPK had some bilateral meetings. 
A meeting took place in December 2009, and another one in January 2010. The 
minutes taken by the EPPK representatives in those meeting show that, behind all 
controversies, there was a deep disagreement on the model of the leadership of the 
Abertzale Left. The representatives of EPPK regarded Mugarri as the report approved by 
the coordination body of the Abertzale Left, and Argitzen as the document approved only 
by Batasuna. For those reasons, they published Mugarri in the internal bulletin of the 
collective, and not Argitzen. They also regarded the declaration of Altsasu as a Batasuna 
initiative performed without the knowledge of the rest of the organizations represented in 
the coordination body, namely Segi, Ekin, LAB and Askatasuna. They reproached 
Batasuna for not participating in the coordination body. Batasuna replied that one of their 
representatives in the coordination body “was expelled,” and the other one was imprisoned. 
Furthermore, Batasuna argued that the model of coordination and decision-taking was not 
valid anymore, and that they had already proposed a different one. The EPPK 
representatives answered wondering whether Batasuna did not take part because they were 
afraid of not having the support of the coordination body for the new strategy. There was 
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also a controversy regarding the open letter published by Otegi and his four associates after 
having been imprisoned. The EPPK representatives stressed that prisoners, as members of 
their collective, are not supposed to make public statements on their own, and that the 
publication of the open letter was unacceptable.479  
In summary, the internal situation of the Abertzale Left at the end of 2009 and the 
beginning of 2010 was confusing. Batasuna, as a representative of the social base of the 
Abertzale Left, was acting out of the usual coordination body, because they regarded that 
direction model as not valid anymore. There was a clash between the legitimacy of the 
social support of Batasuna and the internal procedures of the Abertzale Left, in which 
Batasuna was supposed to share the strategic decisions with other organizations. The 
leadership of Batasuna decided to go forward without the approval of the coordination 
body, because they believed that that body was not a reflection of what the majority of the 
social base stood for. In fact, they promoted the debate despite the initial opposition of 
some organizations such as ETA to demonstrate that their constituency agreed with them. 
In summary, Batasuna seems to have acted autonomously at least in three occasions: when 
they decided to base the debate on the report Argitzen; when they presented publicly the 
Altsasu Declaration; and when the five prisoners of Batasuna published an open letter 
without the okay of the prisoners’ collective direction.  
After those meetings with the outside representatives of the EPPK, the leadership 
of Batasuna decided to send a letter to the spokespersons of the prisoners collective inside 
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the jails. It was an exceptional move regarding the Abertzale Left’s procedures. It was a 
very meaningful letter, as it synthesized Batasuna’s view regarding the internal 
controversy. In the letter, Batasuna reproached some members of Ekin trying to block the 
debate on Argitzen. Batasuna regarded that behavior as nothing less than a seed for a split. 
They also criticized the attitude of those who had been suggesting that the approved report 
be Mugarri, regardless of the debate in the rank and file. Batasuna argued that the whole 
social base was the main decision body of the Abertzale Left. As the letter was written in 
February 2010, the leadership of Batasuna felt in condition to state that the majority of the 
Abertzale Left had supported the strategy shift, “beyond any doubt.” Regarding the open 
letter of Otegi and the four others, Batasuna urged the EPPK spokespersons to understand 
that they had to manage their “political assets” to develop their strategy.        
ETA’s view seemed in harmony with the representatives of EPPK regarding 
Batasuna’s moves in the internal debate. The armed group, in a later retrospective 
document, stated that Batasuna gave irreversible steps toward a new strategy when the 
debate was not over yet, limiting the chances for other approaches. “When the change of 
strategy was being discussed, and the first meaningful steps were publicly given (…), the 
Organization was unable to reply, unable to make a deep reflection and with its chances to 
influence limited.”480   
Otegi and his four colleagues were not the only ones to be arrested among those 
involved in the debate. On November 24, 2009, thirty-four alleged members of the banned 
                                                          






youth organization Segi were arrested, and thirty-one of them subsequently imprisoned, in 
the biggest single police operation against Basque militants since the end of the 1980s.481 
Many of the detainees alleged having been tortured.482 They were not accused of having 
any link with ETA actions, but being members of a civil organization supposedly following 
orders of the armed group.483 On April 14, 2010, ten people accused of being the liaison 
between the ETA and its prisoners were arrested, and five of them later imprisoned. Three 
of them were lawyers. On September 14, 2010, nine alleged members of the leadership of 
Ekin were arrested and jailed. According to the accusation pointed out by the judge, the 
members of Ekin were “the political commissars of ETA who maintain orthodoxy within 
the Abertzale Left.”484 Two years before this police operation, in August 2008, five other 
supposed members of Ekin had also been arrested. 
In summary, the Spanish judiciary was attacking two of the organizations which, 
supposedly, were reluctant of the turnaround promoted by Batasuna. Not everything could 
be explained through the political will of the government, as the ultimate decisions were 
made by judges of the Audiencia Nacional, but many political actors interpreted all those 
arrests from a political perspective. According to most of the voices of the Abertzale Left, 
the Zapatero government was trying to provoke a split. Arresting Otegi and his group, they 
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aimed to block the debate and make it difficult for the Abertzale Left to arise strengthened 
from the debate. Arresting the alleged leaders of Segi and Ekin, they aimed for the 
discontents to break from Batasuna, as the detentions could be further arguments to respond 
to the state through violent means. Both Eugenio Etxebeste and Rufi Etxeberria believe 
that the State was trying to provoke a split or, at least, to weaken the Abertzale Left as 
much as possible.485  
There is evidence suggesting that a split was a real risk within the Abertzale Left 
over 2009 and the beginning of 2010, but there is no evidence implying that any faction 
made any move toward it. The opposing leaderships of the different organizations within 
the Abertzale Left managed to channel the disagreements and remain united, although the 
internal cohesion was damaged for a long time.  
4.2.6. The conclusion of the debate 
The leadership of Batasuna considered the debate concluded with the approval of the 
resolution Zutik Euskal Herria in February 2010.486 According to Otegi, that resolution 
was “a contract of political guarantee offered unconditionally by the Abertzale Left to the 
entire Basque people” to assure that “its new political commitment is definitive and 
irreversible.”487 Zutik Euskal Herria, a five-page resolution, does not expressly assert that 
the armed struggle or the political-military strategy should be abandoned. The concepts 
armed struggle or political-military strategy are not even mentioned. However, the idea 
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was clearly implied in the whole document, especially in some paragraphs. For instance, 
the document asserts that “the only tools” of the Abertzale Left would be “mass struggle, 
institutional struggle, ideological struggle, change of the balance of forces, and seeking 
international backing;” and that the “only guarantee will be popular backing.” Furthermore, 
it states that the “Democratic Process” toward a change of the political framework should 
develop “with no violence at all” and under the ‘Mitchell principles.’488 There was not any 
place for doubt. Zutik Euskal Herria was the document certifying that the social base of 
the Abertzale Left supported the abandonment of the political-military strategy carried on 
for decades. On February 21, Rufi Etxeberria argued in a newspaper interview that the 
decision taken by the majority of the social base of the Abertzale Left affected all 
organizations of the movement, including ETA. It was the first time that a leader of 
Batasuna made such a claim to ETA publicly.489 
 The Basque insurgent group had not carried out any attack since August 2009, but, 
according to a later ETA acknowledgement, the decision to temporarily stop the armed 
campaign was not taken until the very month of the conclusion of the debate in the 
Abertzale Left ranks, in February 2010. 490 Thus, ETA did not conduct any attacks between 
August 2009 and February 2010 not because they decided not to, but for other operational 
reasons. Police repression was one of them. The Spanish and French police forces had 
performed many successful operations against ETA members and infrastructure since 
2007. They had arrested several members who were supposedly on their way to carry out 
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attacks, and had arrested almost the whole leadership. After having detained three of the 
leaders in May 2008 at Bordeaux, the French police arrested the supposed chief of the 
military structure Garikoitz Aspiazu in November 2008. Aitzol Iriondo, the alleged 
substitute of Aspiazu, was arrested in December 2008. Jurdan Martitegi, who supposedly 
replaced Iriondo, was arrested in April 2009. In August 2009, ETA was able to show 
strength through the attacks in Majorca, but that month was also a period of serious 
operational setbacks. The French police arrested three supposed members of ETA and, 
subsequently, found and seized a dozen explosive caches within only a week, with 900 
kilos of material to build explosives.491 Aitor Eliazaran, the alleged new political chief of 
ETA, was arrested in October 2009. By the end of 2009, only one member of the ETA 
leadership who resumed armed struggle in 2007, Mikel Karrera, was out of prison.   
It seems that as late as January 2010 ETA had plans to carry on with its armed 
campaign. On January 9, the Spanish Civil Guard seized a van with ETA explosives and 
guns in a Spanish town close to the border with Portugal, and soon after two suspected 
ETA members were arrested in Portuguese territory. According to police and judicial 
sources quoted by the media, ETA tried to establish a base in Portugal, and intended to use 
the seized explosives to carry on an attack to the KIO Towers in Madrid. According to an 
anonymous document posted on a web run by dissidents of the Abertzale Left, the armed 
group decided to commit a big explosive attack in Madrid as a response to the Altsasu 
declaration, with the objective to reverse the outcome of the debate within the Abertzale 
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Left. Only the arrest of the activists supposed to perform the attack prevented ETA from 
intervening in the final stage of the debate, according to this version.492 Domínguez also 
contends that the plans to carry out an attack in Madrid from the Portugal base was to be a 
reaction to the Altsasu declaration.493 This version is somewhat compatible with the 
account of the Spanish Home minister after the arrests in Portugal. Rubalcaba said that they 
intended to bring about an imminent attack using 300 kilos of explosives.494 However, 
another possible interpretation of the attempted attack is that ETA would have wanted to 
show strength before declaring a halt.   
On March 16, 2010, once ETA secretly decided to stop their armed campaign for a 
while, a fortuitous confrontation between some militants and some French gendarmes took 
place near Paris, in Dammarie-les-Lys. A gendarme, Jean-Serge Nerin, was killed. In the 
aftermath, a public written statement in the name of the Abertzale Left argued that the fact 
that the attack was not planned did not mean it was not a “serious” incident, and demanded 
ETA to take “clear and certain compromises” to sustain “the process.”495 That was the last 
killing of ETA. That was also the first time the Abertzale Left reproached an ETA killing 
publicly. 
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The last news on supposed ETA attack plans is a confusing story on an attempt 
against the lehendakari of the time, the socialist Patxi López, as late as in June 2010. After 
the arrest of four suspected members of ETA who were held in incommunicado detention 
and eventually alleged having been tortured, most of the media published news that the 
arrested militants confessed to their police interrogators that they had planned to carry out 
an attack against López in June 2010. A novelty was that the Abertzale Left’s new political 
party, Sortu, gave, to some extent, credibility to the leaked news, as they publicly disagreed 
with the supposed plans against López.496 Later on, ETA recalled that they had decided to 
stop their campaign in February 2010, that “all prepared actions were cancelled,” and that 
the Spanish government knew that. ETA’s statement does not necessarily imply that the 
plan against López never did exist, but, if it ever existed, it was cancelled in February. In 
addition, without mentioning any specific organization, they asked Basque political and 
social organizations to act with prudence, responsibility, and with respect of those tortured 
when dealing with news spread by the Spanish government.497  
4.3. Pressure over ETA 
4.3.1. International leverage 
Basque organizations have long tried to get international agencies involved in the Basque 
peace effort. In the mid and late-1990s, several international actors and agencies tried to 
mediate between ETA and the Spanish government, but all attempts were unsuccessful. In 
the mid-1990s, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, accepted the 
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proposition by a member of Batasuna to act as a mediator, but the initiative vanished when 
the PP came to power in 1996.498 Elkarri got in contact with the Carter Foundation through 
the Center for Basque Studies at the University of Nevada, Reno, also in the mid-1990s. 
Harry Barnes of the Carter Foundation got initially involved, held a few meetings with 
Eugenio Etxebeste in Santo Domingo, but the Aznar cabinet disabled that avenue when the 
ETA negotiator was extradited to Spain.499 According to Etxebeste, before Aznar took 
office in 1996 there was a chance for a “powerful” option to open a dialogue process in “a 
Nordic country.500 Once the PP was in power, another initiative promoted by Harry Barnes 
of the Carter Foundation involved the Italian religious community of San Egidio. They met 
with both ETA and the Spanish Home minister Jaime Mayor Oreja, but the PP government 
was not interested at all.501  
Elkarri, among others, had tried to involve many other agencies, and even top level 
international organizations such as agencies under the United Nations, European Union, 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), and some embassies, 
but the results were always poor. According to Jonan Fernandez, at the time it was very 
difficult to get international help because they saw that the situation was not ripe. “When 
the situation is very green, you get the help of a person of good will such as Harry Barnes, 
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or the engagement of Perez Esquivel, or the people from San Egidio, but nothing more. We 
knocked on many doors. All the doors.” Fernandez believes that the decade of 2000 has 
been different in this regard. “The international agents have seen that the situation was ripe, 
that there would be changes. They saw the green light, and that’s when they got 
involved.”502 
 In the failed peace process in 2005-2007 the Center Henri Dunant (HD) for 
Humanitarian Dialogue located in Geneva was heavily involved in mediating between ETA 
and the Spanish Government. The Center HD is an independent organization with private 
and public funding. In 2012, its projects were funded among others by the United Nations, 
the European Union and the governments of Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Liechtenstein, 
Singapore, and the United Kingdom.503 Besides the Center HD, other important agencies 
participated as facilitators in those negotiations, such as the Norway government, the 
British government, and the Irish political party Sinn Fein.504 Once the negotiations broke 
up and the peace process collapsed, the international facilitators did not have anywhere to 
mediate, but some of them remained aware of the Basque conflict developments. 
As early as August 2007, only two months after the official breaking up of ETA’s 
ceasefire, the South African lawyer Brian Currin met some Batasuna representatives in 
Donostia. Currin had been involved in the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
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Commission and later in the Sentence Review Commission in Northern Ireland. He first 
got in contact with Batasuna in 2003. When he re-entered the Basque scenario in 2007 
meeting Batasuna members, he wanted to know what the situation was like after the 
collapse of the peace process, and offered his disposition to help in finding a way out of 
violence, if there was any chance.505 Soon after, they held a second meeting in Gasteiz—
Vitoria, in Spanish. This time Raymond Kendall, a former Interpol secretary-general 
(1985-2001), came with Currin. More unidentified people participated in the first and 
second meeting. Currin and Kendall did not directly participate in the 2007 negotiations, 
but they were aware of what happened, and they were close to the facilitators who were in 
Geneva. At the time, their main aim was to restart what was left in Geneva in May 2007. 
Then, almost the entire leadership of Batasuna was arrested, but some representatives of 
Batasuna still free kept in touch with the international facilitators.  
By the time the debate within the Abertzale Left started in 2009, Currin was in 
constant contact with some members of Batasuna. Among other initiatives, Currin made a 
report for Batasuna about how to become a legal party, always based on his experience in 
the South African process. Currin was helping Batasuna to work out a strategy to overcome 
the blockade of the process. In the summer of 2008, Currin got a letter with a signature and 
anagram of ETA, asking to abandon any action related to the Basque case. After a while, 
he received a letter from ETA denying the authorship of the first letter and asking him to 
continue with his labor. A hypothesis is that a faction of ETA sent the first letter to Currin 
during the internal crisis of the armed group, and later on the leadership of ETA rectified. 
                                                          





Another hypothesis suggested by sources close to the Abertzale Left is that the Spanish 
secret service sent the first letter.506 In October 2009, right after the arrests of Otegi and 
others, when the Abertzale Left had just started to spread the debate to its rank and file, 
Currin got in contact with Lokarri, the heir of Elkarri.507 He asked Lokarri to organize a 
conference because he wanted to present what he had been working out with Batasuna.508 
On October 28, 2009, Currin gave a conference in Donostia with a double message: the 
Abertzale Left is fully committed to exclusively political means, and Batasuna should be 
legalized in order to facilitate the transition.509 All went well. It was the beginning of a long 
and fruitful relationship between Currin and Lokarri.  
Paul Rios, the chairman of Lokarri, became the right hand of Currin. When the 
South African lawyer started to work with the outlawed Batasuna a few years earlier, he 
found out that the communication channels between the Abertzale Left and the rest of the 
parties were almost broken after the end of the peace process in 2007. Then, he tried to 
open those channels, usually with Rios as a facilitator. To some extent, they became a kind 
of ambassador for Batasuna within a political environment in which the Abertzale Left had 
little credibility, even though Lokarri itself did not have any fluent relationship with the 
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outlawed party at all.510 Rufi Etxeberria acknowledged that one of the most important 
contributions of the international actors such as Currin was to give credibility to their move: 
“It helped a lot.”511 Currin had had meetings with all Basque political parties but the right-
wing Popular Party, which refused all invitations to meet. The South African facilitator had 
regular meetings with members of the Basque branch of the Spanish PSOE, which were 
ruling the Basque government since May 2009, although he did not directly met with senior 
members of the Spanish government led by Zapatero.  
 Aware of the difficulties of Batasuna to convince ETA, the reluctance of Zapatero’s 
government to engage in a new process, and the deficit of credibility of the Abertzale Left, 
Currin proposed to promote a statement backed by international personalities to fuel the 
incipient process. The declaration of Brussels was presented on March 29, 2010, just a 
month after the conclusion of the internal debate promoted by Batasuna in the Abertzale 
Left social base. The statement was short and direct. The signatories welcomed the “new 
public commitment of the Basque Pro-independence (Abertzale) Left to ‘exclusively 
political and democratic’ means and a ‘total absence of violence’ to attain its political 
goals;” they appealed to ETA “to support this commitment by declaring a permanent, fully 
verified ceasefire;” and declared that “such a declaration appropriately responded to by 
[Spanish] Government would permit new political and democratic efforts to advance, 
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differences to be resolved and lasting peace attained.”512 Among the twenty endorsers there 
were four Nobel Prize laureates, namely Betty Williams, John Hume, Desmond Tutu, and 
Frederik de Klerk; the former president of Ireland Mary Robinson; the former Irish Prime 
Minister Albert Reynolds; and the Nelson Mandela Foundation. 
 The Brussels declaration had the virtue of offering Batasuna an argument to appeal 
to ETA. Now, Batasuna could argue that ‘the international community” had demanded a 
definitive ceasefire from ETA as part of a conflict resolution attempt. As stressed by 
Whitfield, “this offered ETA, when it chose to move, the possibility of doing so without 
appearing to cede to demands from Madrid.”513   
4.3.2. The Iruñea declaration 
Batasuna did not organize any public event to present the resolution Zutik Euskal Herria 
to society right after its approval. Later on, in April 2010, they solemnly presented a new 
statement based on the approved resolution in Iruñea in the name of the Abertzale Left. 
Moreover, they gave a further step in their incremental strategy to demand ETA to stop. In 
the Iruñea declaration, the Abertzale Left fully supported the Brussels declaration and 
asked ETA to fulfill their demands, which meant that the Abertzale Left was indirectly 
asking the armed group to declare a “permanent fully verifiable ceasefire.” The Iruñea 
declaration also stated, a few weeks after the fortuitous clash near Paris and the consequent 
killing of a gendarme, that the violence of ETA, along with the repression of the State, 
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detract the chances for solutions and strengthened “the blockade.”514 More than a hundred 
members of the Abertzale Left participated in the presentation, including well-known 
leaders of Batasuna and LAB. However, not everybody was present. Prior to the 
presentation of the statement, Ekin sent a letter to the leadership of Batasuna expressing 
their opposition to the declaration, in which the Abertzale Left was about to ask ETA to 
assume the Brussels declaration. According to a later report by Batasuna, in its 
argumentation Ekin obviated the fact that the contents of the declaration were backed by 
the social base of the Abertzale Left.515 
 On May 20, 2010, Mikel Karrera was arrested by the French police. He was the last 
member of the leadership that experienced the internal crisis in 2007 and 2008 and, parallel 
to it, guided an internal assembly which concluded that a long cycle of armed struggle was 
to come. By the time Karrera was imprisoned, the conclusions of that ETA assembly were 
fully in question. As late as the beginning of 2010 ETA seemed to be trying to resume its 
armed campaign. Right afterward, in February 2010, the armed group secretly decided to 
stop their armed campaign. Later on ETA gave the following explanation regarding the 
non-public halt: it was the first stage of a step-by-step decision “in the context of the debate 
of the Abertzale Left;” the organization aimed to fuel “the political process;” if they did 
not make the decision public, it was because they wanted to put the focus on “the political 
and social organizations which were taking steps.”516 
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In short, ETA decided to take some time to decide how to readapt their strategic 
decisions to the recent moves of the Abertzale Left, namely the conclusion of the debate, 
and the public demands to ETA by their political leaders with the support of some 
international personalities. The decision of stopping armed actions in February could mean 
that the armed group was about to follow the steps of the political movement, but the 
disagreement expressed by Ekin regarding the Iruñea declaration evidenced that all was 
not set. 
 4.3.3. Credibility of the move 
Whereas the social base was discussing the end of political-military strategy, and the 
leaders of Batasuna were making public their commitment to exclusively political means 
through various  public appearances, the Spanish and Basque governments’ Home 
ministers, both members of the PSOE, were warning that ETA was about to commit a big 
attack or carry out a kidnapping. The Spanish Home minister Rubalcaba did it on December 
28, 2009. The Basque Home minister Rodolfo Ares declared on February 19, 2010, that, 
according to all evidence, ETA was not getting ready for abandoning armed activity, but 
for the contrary.517 The Spanish Home Secretary of State Antonio Camacho insisted, as 
late as April 4, 2010, that ETA was about to carry out a kidnapping.518 According to a later 
account by ETA, the Spanish government knew at the time that the Basque group had 
decided to stop armed attacks.519 In Whitfield’s words, “the government knew from 
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international interlocutors that it had been in ‘a technical halt’ from the end of February.”520 
In sum, the PSOE and its Basque branch the PSE-EE were publicly questioning all 
credibility of the strategic move of the Abertzale Left, and were warning the society about 
the imminence of ETA actions, although they supposedly knew there would not be any. 
Privately, the message of the socialist leaders was that they did not trust the 
Abertzale Left. Ares, the Basque government Home minister at the time, had a meeting 
with the president of EA, Pello Urizar, to discuss the movements within the Abertzale Left 
and ETA, taking into account that Urizar’s political party was in good harmony with 
Batasuna. According to Urizar, Ares told him that the social base of the Abertzale Left 
sincerely wanted ETA to abandon violence, but he did not trust the leadership. According 
to Urizar, Ares told him they believed that the leadership would not eventually change 
strategy, because they did not want or because they would not be able to overcome ETA’s 
will.521 According to Ares, what he told Urizar was that the Abertzale Left was making 
decisions not “for ethical and democratic convictions” but for tactical conveniences. 
Therefore, Ares stressed to Urizar that it was necessary to act prudently and be very 
demanding with the Abertzale Left, “so that they walk the path they needed to walk.”522 
Paul Rios of Lokarri recounts that representatives of the socialist party at the time, who 
had meetings with Currin, did not believe that the outcome of the internal debate within 
the Abertzale Left would be the end of ETA’s violence.523 The socialists had direct 
information about the internal debate through their contacts with representatives of 
                                                          
520 Whitfield, Endgame, 225. 
521 Author interview, Pello Urizar, Gasteiz, July 26, 2011.   
522 Author interview, Ares. 





Batasuna, but also about ETA through the police intelligent services and the international 
facilitators.     
 In April, things changed substantially. Less than an hour after the presentation of 
the Iruñea declaration, Rios received a telephone call from the Zapatero office. They 
wanted him to send a copy of the Iruñea declaration right away. From then on, Rios 
perceived that the Spanish and Basque governments, and the socialist party started to 
believe that Batasuna was serious, and that its leaders were winning the internal struggle. 
Rios himself and his organization, Lokarri, gave more importance to the Iruñea declaration 
in April than to the Zutik Euskal Herria resolution released in February. He explains that 
the terminology of the resolution was more internally oriented, with no express mention of 
a rejection to violence, and the declaration of Iruñea was much clearer in this regard, as it 
expressly regarded ETA’s violence negatively. “We said after Iruñea: ‘Surely there will 
not be any more attacks [by ETA].’”524 
4.3.4. New alliances 
EA, the Basque nationalist party with which Batasuna had discussed a possibility to join 
forces, conducted its own internal strategic debate in summer 2009. A new leadership led 
by Pello Urizar was prepared to pursue an alliance with the Abertzale Left in the event of 
a cessation of ETA. Yet, it took a time to ratify this strategy among their rank and file, 
before resuming their contacts with Batasuna. In autumn 2009, when they were about to 
announce that they aimed to promote a joint action of pro-independence forces, the group 






of Otegi was arrested. It delayed EA’s move but did not change its strategy. In November, 
a week after the Altsasu declaration, EA made public a manifesto to break officially with 
the PNV and initiate collaboration with left-wing nationalist forces.525 Urizar stated in the 
presentation that everybody had to know that the joining of forces and the political-military 
strategy were incompatible. 
In December 2009, when the debate within the social base of the Abertzale Left 
was at its peak, the leaders of EA and representatives of Batasuna started to meet regularly 
with the goal of reaching a strategic agreement. The meetings were private.526 In the first 
encounter, EA asked Batasuna whether they were to abandon definitively the political-
military strategy. According to Urizar, they answered that they believed ETA would follow 
their decisions but, at the time, they could not guarantee it. However, they guaranteed that, 
in the event of a resumption of ETA’s attacks, the Abertzale Left would reject them 
publicly in consistency with the will of the social base.527 That was good enough for EA. 
In the same meeting, Batasuna wanted to make sure that EA was totally committed to a 
pro-independence strategy. EA replied that they undoubtedly were. Once they trusted each 
other, the exchange of documents to agree upon a program worked well, and it was not so 
difficult to find a common ground.528 
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Six months after the re-initiation of the conversations, in June 2010, EA and 
Batasuna529 publicly signed a strategic agreement.530 That was a major change in the 
Basque political scenario. EA, a social-democrat party founded by Carlos Garaikoetxea, 
the president of the Basque government established right after the approval of the Basque 
statute, a signatory party of the Ajuria Enea pact in the 1980s, had allied with Batasuna, 
the heir of HB, a left-wing party which opposed the Basque statute and supported ETA’s 
campaign to challenge the legal framework. It was a milestone in the deep transformation 
of both parties. EA was not regarded as the sister party of PNV anymore, and Batasuna 
took another decisive step not to be regarded as a political wing of a political-military 
movement. 
Seven months later, the strategic alliance between EA and Batasuna attracted a new 
member. On January 16, 2011, a non-nationalist left-wing minor party, Alternatiba, joined 
EA and Batasuna and signed another agreement with them.531 Alternatiba is a split of the 
Basque branch of the Spanish left-wing federation Izquierda Unida, Ezker Batua,532 which 
was also a signatory party of the Ajuria Enea Pact in the 1980s and 1990s. Their 
contribution to the alliance was more qualitative than quantitative, as a minor left-wing 
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party with a communist tradition. They do not regard themselves as nationalists, but they 
always were advocates of the right for self-determination. 
According to Oskar Matute, the main leader of Alternatiba, when they reached the 
agreement they did not have any guarantee that ETA would eventually decide to lay down 
arms. Yet, they perceived that Alternatiba could facilitate it, in the sense that they were 
helping Batasuna to demonstrate to ETA that their strategy was working. “In the case of 
Alternatiba, if the Abertzale Left was able to reach even non-nationalist sectors, we were 
also saying to ETA that, without violence, their growing potentiality is much bigger than 
what they imagined.”533 However, by the time Alternatiba signed the tripartite agreement 
in January 2011, there were already very significant hints suggesting that the armed group 
was in its way to abandon military strategy.   
4.3.5. The Gernika declaration and a permanent ceasefire 
On September 5, 2010, ETA made its own move. The armed group made public the 
technical halt decided in February, announcing that they had decided, “some months ago,” 
to stop “offensive attacks.”534 The September communiqué was not a sign of a definitive 
decision either, but it was a sign that ETA would most probably follow the path indicated 
by the Abertzale Left, but not without conditions. There were a few hints. On September 
26, a long interview with ETA representatives was published in Gara. Their message was 
that ETA was prepared to abandon armed activity but only if proper conditions were 
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created. They argued that they would not “deactivate armed struggle” if a “resolution of 
the conflict as a whole” was not initiated. Regarding the debate of the Abertzale Left, they 
specified that ETA regarded it as a debate of the “people’s unity,” referring to Batasuna, 
and that ETA had its “own perspective.” Regarding the conclusions report of the debate, 
Zutik Euskal Herria, the spokespersons of the armed group said that they did not agree on 
them word-for-word, but that they agreed on the political strategy outlined by the 
document.535 In sum, ETA had actually halted its campaign, but it had warned that it did 
not agree on stopping forever yet.   
After the September announcement, the signatories of the Brussels Declaration 
were back in the middle of the Basque political scenario. The Basque media wanted to 
know how they responded to the ETA announcement. Currin and the Brussels Declaration 
signers decided to select a restricted and functional group, to be named International 
Contact Group (ICG), with a mandate “to expedite, facilitate and enable the achievement 
of political normalization in the Basque Country.”536 Other international mediators, who 
were in stand-by since 2007, started to move too, without any public announcement at all. 
The Center HD never closed their channels to contact ETA, and they were ready to act if 
there was any need to enable contacts between ETA and other agents. Jonathan Powell, 
who also participated in the 2007 negotiations, was ready to help. 
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Three weeks after ETA’s unsatisfactory announcement, the Basque forces in 
harmony with a dialogue-based model for conflict resolution made another move. Once the 
EA-Batasuna agreement was done in June, they promoted a sort of Basque version of the 
Brussels declaration. They worked out a draft for a framework document for a conflict 
resolution process, and proposed it to Basque parties and other social organisms. All 
nationalist parties but PNV agreed,537 along with other social organizations, some of them 
part of the Abertzale Left, such as the trade union LAB and the pro-Amnesty Movement.538 
The document was to be known as the declaration of Gernika. The document demanded 
ETA declare a ceasefire, as the Brussels declaration did, but it went even further. They 
asked ETA that the ceasefire should be “a sign of the will to abandon definitively the armed 
activity.” The endorsers of the declaration also demanded the Spanish government to 
reverse the banning of Batasuna, to end the dispersion of prisoners, and other claims. 
Furthermore, they proposed a model of resolution process, based in two negotiation tracks: 
one for the Basque political parties to agree on a new framework, and the other for ETA 
and the governments to deal with the consequences of the conflict.539 
The contents of the Gernika declaration were easy to assume by the PNV, but they 
decided not to participate, and to develop their own strategy for peace away from Batasuna. 
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According to Andoni Ortuzar, then president of the party in Bizkaia and later president of 
the executive committee,540 the PNV regarded the Gernika declaration as an instrument of 
the Abertzale Left: “They knew that they had all our support if they went in the right 
direction, we were demonstrating it to them in our back-and-forth contacts, but they asked 
us to applaud them. They do not deserve applauses; the penitence was theirs, the via crucis 
was theirs.”541 ELA, the main Basque trade union, also decided not to sign the Gernika 
declaration, although they presumably agreed with all the contents as well.  
Unlike the PNV, the Gernika signatories did not have much leverage regarding the 
Spanish government. In contrast, with Batasuna, LAB, the pro-Amnesty Movement, the 
students union Ikasle Abertzaleak, the feminist organization Bilgune Feminista, the 
association against torture TAT (Torturaren Aurkako Taldeak), and the prisoner families 
association Etxerat among the signatories, the claim to ETA had much more leverage. First 
through the Brussels declaration, now through the Gernika declaration, the Abertzale Left 
was publicly asking ETA to stop. However, some organizations of the Abertzale Left were 
missing, such as Ekin and the youth movement Segi, although it did not have to be 
necessarily significant, as their status as outlawed organizations could be an explanation of 
the absence too. Because of the banning, Batasuna had signed as “Abertzale Left” and 
Askatasuna as “pro-Amnesty Movement.” The EPPK, the prisoners’ collective, was also 
notably missing. The debate within the prisons was, understandably, slower. Some 
dissident prisoners, however, intended to sign the declaration as an organized group named 
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“Prisoners Engaged to an Irreversible Peace Process,” but they could not. According to one 
of these prisoners, a former member of the leadership of ETA in the 1980s, Carmen 
Gisasola, they were asked to wait until the ‘official’ collective made their decision so that 
all prisoners could sign at once. However, when a year later the EPPK publicly agreed with 
the document,542 they were not told to join, and they did not get any answer when they 
asked again to be recognized as signers of the declaration.543      
At the time of the Gernika declaration, in September 2010, ETA had not made any 
definitive decision yet, in spite of its recent announcement of a temporary halt. Then, it 
seems that they opened a new debate which did not involve all militants because of its 
urgency. In that debate, the leadership of ETA proposed to respond positively to the 
Brussels and Gernika declarations, which would mean to announce a ceasefire as a sign for 
a definitive end. According to Domínguez, who seems to have access to the document 
proposed by the ETA leadership, this restricted debate took place in November and 
December 2010 with the participation of about 30 selected militants. The proposal to put 
ETA’s “political-historical capital” under the service of “the new political phase,” which 
would end armed struggle, was ratified.544 As a consequence, ETA declared “a permanent 
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and general ceasefire” which would be verifiable by the international community on 
January 10, 2011.545 
It did not specifically state that it was a unilateral truce, but all evidence showed 
that it was. In addition to “permanent,” ETA had stated that the cessation was “general.” 
Currin made the translation for the general public: the term general, according to his 
interpretation, meant that ETA even renounced economic extortion as an income resource, 
a novelty in the history of the group’s ceasefires.546 ETA did not assert, as asked by the 
Gernika declaration, that the ceasefire was “a sign of the will to abandon definitively the 
armed activity,” but it has fulfilled the Brussels and Gernika declaration’s main 
requirement, a permanent ceasefire. Moreover, ETA had mentioned both declarations in 
the communiqué, suggesting that it was in harmony with both demands.  
After the January declaration, ETA’s position seemed to be ambivalent. On the one 
hand, they were prepared to lay down arms forever, but on the other, they still wanted some 
kind of guarantee that the Spanish government would engage in some talks to deal with the 
so-called ‘technical’ issues, such as prisoners or disarmament. For that, they needed some 
sort of communication with the Zapatero government, which for a long time did not show 
any receptivity to these claims. However, the moves in the Abertzale Left and ETA had 
reinvigorated the international actors who had been waiting for such a scenario, and the 
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Spanish government position evolved toward a more receptive approach.547 Much work 
was ahead.          
4.4. A year of contacts 
4.4.1. The PNV and Zapatero engagement   
The socialist Zapatero was the Spanish government president when ETA declared a 
permanent ceasefire in January 2011. He knew that ending ETA while he was in office was 
a feasible goal. He would not give up the chance of going down in history as the president 
who achieved the long pursued objective of ending ETA. Yet, the hardline anti-terrorist 
discourse and the demonization of any attempt of dialogue with ETA or the Abertzale Left 
were dominant in Spanish public life, especially after the failure of the 2005-2007 peace 
process. In December 2010, for instance, Zapatero received a document signed by almost 
all ETA’s victim organizations proposing a “model for the end of ETA without impunity” 
and asking him to renounce any attempt of dialogue.548 It was just a reflection of the 
dominant approach in Spain. It was a difficult context for any initiative to facilitate through 
dialogue the end of ETA’s campaign. Moreover, the countdown for Zapatero’s term had 
already started.  
He had been reelected in March 2008 and, if he had the ability to complete the term, 
he would be the head of the government until spring of 2012. It seemed difficult. In the 
midst of an economic crisis which Zapatero did not properly predict or manage, the 
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president was down in all polls. Furthermore, he did not have an absolute majority in 
Congress. The PSOE had 169 seats out of 350, which meant that the government usually 
needed the support of seven other members of parliament to approve its initiatives. In this 
context, the PNV’s six seats in the Congress had an extremely high value. 
According to Andoni Ortuzar, Zapatero sent some signals to the PNV so that the 
Basque nationalists knew that he was prepared to help a process toward the end of ETA 
discretely. Zapatero wanted the PNV support for that. With his popularity going down 
because of the economic crisis, a satisfactory end of ETA’s violence could be an important 
political merit for Zapatero himself and his political party. In Ortuzar’s view, Zapatero saw 
the ETA issue more as an opportunity than as a problem. The PNV had its own information 
regarding the internal debate within the Abertzale Left, through direct contacts with senior 
members of the movement, and through other intelligence resources. They knew that 
nothing was definitively done, but they believed that the leadership of Batasuna was serious 
in the effort to end political-military strategy. The PNV had doubts regarding the support 
requested by Zapatero, the place the PNV could have in the game, and the merits they could 
earn in the case of success. The increasingly weak position of Zapatero was also a source 
of hesitancy. “What shall we do with this man? Shall we maintain him alive?” wondered 
the PNV leadership. In Ortuzar’s words, the leadership of PNV had to answer those 
questions when Zapatero started to show a willingness to act regarding the Basque issue. 
The PNV talked about this matter with their interlocutors of the Abertzale Left. They 
learned that the Abertzale Left wanted Zapatero to survive until the end of the term. The 





term and, therefore, have as much time as possible to design and feed a process toward the 
end of ETA. In the end, the PNV decided to back Zapatero in the Congress, and facilitated 
the continuation of his government in exchange for two compromises: first, a development 
of the powers of the Basque statute; second, progress in the process toward peace.549 Since 
the summer of 2009, Zapatero usually had the six PNV votes. He only needed one more 
vote for the absolute majority, which was easy to get from other minor regional or 
nationalist forces, usually from the two representatives of a coalition from the Canary 
Islands, Coalición Canaria (CC).  
 Once he had secured enough parliamentary support to go on, and once he learned 
that ETA would be willing to abandon its armed activity if the government engaged in 
some kind of contacts, Zapatero opened channels with the international mediators who 
were already in place, ready to enable communication between the government and ETA. 
The leaderships of the PSE-EE and Batasuna did not ever totally break their 
communication channel. As the internal debate of the Abertzale Left was going forward, 
they had no difficulties re-starting their direct contacts, with no need for mediators. The 
contact with ETA, however, had to be through mediators. The members of the Center HD 
and the former chief of the Tony Blair cabinet, Jonathan Powell, were to be the trusted 
messengers. The Center HD was dealing with ETA since the beginning of the 2000 decade, 
and Powell was a trustful mediator for the Spanish government since he had been the 
cabinet chief under Tony Blair. These international mediators had concluded that a process 
of direct dialogue was not feasible, and that the only way to go forward would be to open 
                                                          





a channel for indirect communication. As a standard model of conflict resolution was not 
possible, they were prepared to try an unusual one, what Whitfield labels as “virtual 
peacemaking.” 550   
4.4.2. Toward legalization  
The leadership of the outlawed Batasuna took a decisive step in February 2011, a month 
after the ceasefire declaration. They presented the charter of Sortu, a new political party. 
In this charter, ETA’s violence was expressly and clearly rejected. They even predicted the 
expulsion of the affiliates of Sortu who would not comply with the principle of the rejection 
of violence as a political tool. The promoters of the new party were members of the 
outlawed Batasuna. In an event organized by Lokarri, the charter was made public by two 
prominent members of the Abertzale Left: Rufi Etxeberria, regarded as the main Batasuna 
leader since the incarceration of Otegi; and Iñigo Iruin, a lawyer, a former member of the 
HB leadership, and regarded as one of the architects of the new strategy. On the one side, 
the Spanish courts could argue that Sortu was evidently a continuation of the banned 
Batasuna because of the political trajectory of their promoters, but, on the other, the 
rejection of armed struggle and, particularly, of ETA was unequivocal. 
The right-wing opposition of the PP, backed by a very powerful conservative media 
of Madrid, argued that ETA and the Abertzale Left were cheating the Spanish authorities 
in order to sneak into the local elections in May 2011. They also suggested that the Spanish 
government led by Zapatero was facilitating their re-entry in the legal institutions. Under 
                                                          





high political pressure, the Zapatero government decided to play hard and not enable the 
inscription of Sortu as a new legal party. The final decision was to be taken by the courts, 
but it was the competence of the government or the attorney general to initiate a case 
against Sortu. Both the government lawyer and the attorney general challenged the legal 
inscription of Sortu, on the grounds that it was a continuation of Batasuna. The Supreme 
Court ruled against the new party on March 30, 2011.551 Nine justices supported the 
rejection, while seven considered that Sortu should be accepted. The next logical step by 
the promoters would be to appeal to the Constitutional Court, but they did not. They 
decided to wait for a better political environment to appeal to the highest court. Sortu would 
be unable to participate in the local elections in May. It was an important setback for the 
promoters of the exclusively political strategy, as they could not argue to their constituency 
that politics was working at the time. ETA had declared a unilateral permanent ceasefire, 
the new party had rejected the use of violence and, even so, they were prevented from 
participating in elections.  
Yet, the presentation of the charter of Sortu had a good impact overall. The 
Abertzale Left had accustomed the political actors and the public to an opaque and cryptic 
language when addressing the issue of violence and ETA. This time, they had rejected the 
use of violence with unexpected clarity. Paul Rios of Lokarri was astonished: “I thought: 
‘What we are hearing here cannot be true.’ (…) Our people left the event as saying: ‘We 
have been working for twenty years to make this happen, and it just happened!’ We left 
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with a feeling of ‘mission accomplished.’”552 The clarity of the words of the presentation 
of Sortu marked a milestone in the recuperation of the credibility of the Abertzale Left 
leaders, even for the members of the socialist party. They publicly acted against the 
legalization of the new party, but privately welcomed the charter of Sortu, as Rodolfo Ares 
recognizes now: “The presentation of Sortu was very important. (…) It was probably the 
most convincing and clearest decision of this world [the Abertzale Left] to demonstrate 
their unequivocal commitment for politics.”553 It had been decisive in the view of the PNV 
as well, to the extent that Joseba Egibar believes that it marked the end of ETA: “Formally, 
it was the most important decision of the Abertzale Left. It meant the end of ETA. I told 
them: ‘It is you who have signed the end of ETA.’”554     
According to Rufi Etxeberria, they aimed to reverse the discourse of the Spanish 
government about the insufficiency of the Abertzale Left’s steps. “They were caught by 
total surprise with our approach. It had a great impact in the Basque society. It was evident 
that the Abertzale Left was in another stage.” According to Etxeberria, they were making 
an investment for the near future. “If Sortu was not going to be legalized, at least the 
presentation of Sortu had to leave a sediment for the next time. (…) We prepared the 
society for the next step. [After Sortu’s charter presentation] The society wanted us in 
elections.”555 Both Etxeberria and Eugenio Etxebeste recognize that the clarity of the 
rejection of the use of political violence provoked some internal tensions within their 
constituency in the short-term. However, according to them, most of their social base 
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understood the sense of that controversial move, which basically was to overcome the 
banning of their political party.556     
The Abertzale Left wanted Sortu to be legalized, but the banning did not catch them 
by surprise. For that case, they had a plan B in conjunction with their new allies, EA and 
Alternatiba. The agreements, first with EA, and then with Alternatiba, were a solid 
foundation for an electoral coalition. The ceasefire announced by ETA in January and the 
contents of the charter of Sortu presented in February were enough of a guarantee for EA 
and Alternatiba regarding the Abertzale Left’s rejection of violence. Nevertheless, Sortu 
had not been accepted in the political arena. An official coalition with the Abertzale Left 
was discarded. The chosen formula was a coalition between EA and Alternatiba, with some 
so-called independents in their lists. They could not say publicly that the independents were 
going to be selected by the Abertzale Left among people who did not previously participate 
in elections,557 but it was widely known. All candidates in the lists of Bildu were required 
by the coalition to sign a personal commitment of rejection of violence. Bildu presented a 
candidate lists for the Parliament of Navarre, the three provincial legislatives of Araba, 
Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, and about 250 town councils.     
4.4.3. The judicial arena 
Again, the final decision was a competence of the courts, but it was the government’s 
power to challenge, or not, the legality of Bildu. The PNV, principle ally of Zapatero at the 
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time, solemnly warned the government that they would remove their support if Bildu was 
contested in court. As a first step, the government asked the police and civil guard 
intelligence services to examine Bildu’s lists. Both the police and the civil guards 
concluded that the outlawed Batasuna was involved in Bildu. Hence, the government’s 
lawyer and attorney general presented a case against Bildu. The Supreme Court had always 
taken into consideration the government lawyer’s and attorney general’s requests to ban 
parties allegedly linked to ETA. The Bildu case was special, considering that two legal 
parties that had always rejected ETA were also involved. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
justices acted as expected, and invalidated all Bildu slates.558 The invalidation of Bildu was 
appealed to the Constitutional Court, who had just a few days to release a ruling. 
 Eleven members of the Constitutional Court were to decide whether Bildu could 
participate in elections or not. These magistrates were elected by the Spanish parliament, 
usually as a consequence of negotiations between the two major parties, the PSOE and the 
PP. Thus, the balance of forces in the parliament had a reflection in the balance of forces 
in the Constitutional Court, although the magistrates are theoretically independent. When 
the Bildu case arrived at the Court, seven magistrates were considered progressive because 
they had been proposed by the PSOE, and four were regarded as conservative, as they had 
been proposed by the PP. 
The political context counted too. PP was radically against the legalization of Bildu, 
and suggested that the government would be responsible if the Constitutional Court 
                                                          






reversed the banning. The main victims association, the Asociación de Víctimas del 
Terrorismo (AVT), fueled by powerful conservative media organizations, was fiercely 
against any process to facilitate the end of ETA, and against the electoral participation of 
Bildu. In fact, the AVT had organized a huge demonstration in Madrid on April 9, 2011, 
under the slogan “For the defeat of terrorism: ETA out of elections,” which was backed by 
the PP and turned into a mobilization against Zapatero.559 The PSOE government had 
promoted the impugnation of Bildu and, accordingly, they had acted as if they wanted to 
invalidate Bildu’s slates. Yet, they did not advocate for their illegalization in their public 
statements. Furthermore, leading members of the PSE-EE had discretely suggested that 
Bildu should be legalized. The PNV had warned that they would remove their 
parliamentary support from the Zapatero government in the Spanish Congress if Bildu were 
put out of the electoral game. In general, most of the Basque political parties and agencies 
were in favor of the validation of Bildu’s lists.    
 There was a behind-the-scenes context too. ETA was in contact with some 
international facilitators, and had informed them what conditions they were asking for 
turning the permanent ceasefire into a definitive cessation. The issue of the political 
banning of the Abertzale Left was also on the table. By that time, ETA had assumed that a 
classic negotiation process was not feasible. Their decision would have to be unilateral in 
general terms. However, they were asking for some gestures and compromises from the 
other side so to make sure there was a willingness to initiate some talks after the definitive 
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cessation. The validation of Bildu could be one important signal. International facilitators 
were also having secret contacts with the Spanish government officials, and had already 
informed them about ETA’s view regarding the importance of some gestures in order to 
facilitate a definitive cessation.560 There were more secret moves, such as the intense 
telephone contacts between the leader of the PNV, Urkullu, and both the president of the 
Spanish government, Zapatero, and the Home minister, Rubalcaba.561 Senior members of 
Bildu and Lokarri received a message from Urkullu in the interim of the judgment by the 
Supreme Court and the ruling by the Constitutional Court, suggesting to them that good 
news was to come.562 On May 5, 2011, the Spanish Constitutional Court reversed the 
Supreme Court’s decision and allowed Bildu to participate in elections, on the grounds that 
its candidates had sufficiently accredited their rejection of ETA’s violence.563 Six 
magistrates voted for the validation of Bildu, and five voted against.    
Most involved political actors believe that Zapatero’s will was a crucial factor for 
the validation of Bildu, and the pressure coming from some agencies of the Basque 
Country, most notably from the PNV, was also instrumental. Ortuzar stresses that the PNV 
gave “an ultimatum to Zapatero,” and the president “in extremis” managed to achieve what 
they needed. According to the PNV leader, in the previous days and hours of the decision, 
the PNV had  continued updated information about how many magistrates were in favor 
and how many against.564 Paul Rios does not know to what extent the PNV’s pressure was 
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decisive, but he is certain that, regarding the whole process, “it was lucky that the PNV had 
the privileged position it had at the time.”565 On May 4, on the eve of the decision by the 
Constitutional Court, a representation of Bildu including Urizar and Matute had a meeting 
with the leadership of the PNV. At the meeting, Urkullu explained to them in detail some 
of the contacts he had with Zapatero and Rubalcaba. Urkullu told them that he expected a 
decision in favor of Bildu.566 Rufi Etxeberria acknowledges that the PNV might have had 
influenced the government and, indirectly, the court. However, he contends that it was not 
only the PNV, but many other Basque actors, such as “economical agencies,” probably 
referring among others to Confebask, the influential Basque association of 
businesspersons. “Besides the political organizations, there are many entities with a great 
leverage. Those entities took a position in favor of the legalization of Bildu, and they put 
pressure on Madrid.”567    
Adela Asua was one of the eleven members of the Constitutional Court who 
decided about Bildu.568 She voted in favor of the validation of Bildu, because she regarded 
the evidences about the supposed links between the coalition and ETA inconsistent. The 
debate in the courtroom was strictly juridical, she contends, and the final decision could 
have fallen on any of the sides. She denies that there was any direct political influence in 
their decision. “At least, nobody called me. Nobody could even think on calling me. I 
believe nobody called anyone. In the court, we do not act following telephone calls.” At 
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the time, she heard that the leader of the PNV, Urkullu, tried to talk to the president of the 
Constitutional Court, Pascual Sala; but she believed that they did not get to talk.569 
Joaquín Giménez is a member of the Spanish Supreme Court, usually critical of the 
conservative majority of the court, and also critical of the first-instance decision to 
invalidate Bildu.570 “I believe that this tribunal was wrong in the Bildu case. Clearly 
wrong.” Regarding the governmental influence on the Constitutional Court to reverse the 
Supreme judgment, he considered it “a simplification.” He acknowledges that pressure 
exists, “of course,” that he has been pressured as a judge, but he stresses that a judge needs 
to overcome the pressure. According to Giménez, a judge hardly gets a telephone call from 
the government, but the “environmental pressure” is always strong whenever a case has 
relevance in politics or the media. “The judicial action takes place in a pressured field. It 
is usually indirect pressure, but being indirect does not mean it does not influence.”571 
Javier Gómez Bermúdez is a prominent judge of the Audiencia Nacional, the 
special court for terrorism, drugs and organized crime issues in Spain.572 As a judge of the 
Audiencia Nacional, he has been in charge of many investigations and trials against ETA 
members. He has his own explanations about the legalization of Bildu by the Constitutional 
Court. According to Gómez Bermúdez, the president of the Constitutional Court at the 
time, Pascual Sala, had a great influence on the members of the court. “He is a very smart 
person and he listened to everybody. But, does it mean that he was influenced by politicians 
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to make a certain decision? Absolutely not.” Gómez Bermúdez contends that the president 
Sala “is a statesman,” considered “all things a Constitutional Court, which is not a justice 
court, should take into account,” and acted accordingly. “As he is a man of extraordinary 
prestige, he influenced other magistrates.”573 
Jaime Mayor Oreja, a Spanish Home minister in the Aznar cabinet from 1996 to 
2001, sees the issue of the independence of the justice from the other side of the table. Very 
critical of Zapatero, and also critical of the position of his own party, Mayor Oreja directly 
blames the government for having allowed “ETA,” for Bildu, to return to institutions. 
Based on his experience as a Home minister, he asserts that Zapatero government could 
prevent the Constitutional Court from legalizing Bildu. He also states that the legalization 
of Bildu is linked to the supposed contacts between ETA and the Spanish government. 
According to Mayor Oreja, a government president or a minister do not need to make any 
telephone call to suggest directions. “When a government makes a decision, it produces a 
brutal expansive force. The president of the government does not need to call the president 
of the Constitutional Court. But the expansive force of the process made the court decide 
in harmony with the government.” In Mayor Oreja’s words, it is not a coercion, but “just 
an environment, an atmosphere; it is like a flow that carries you away.”574  
4.4.4. Reluctant actors 
The legalization of Bildu turned into a big political scandal, fueled by the PP, some major 
victims associations, and the powerful conservative media. The message of the right wing 
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opposition was that ETA was allowed to participate in elections, and that Zapatero had the 
main responsibility. Moreover, some media carried out a campaign against the six 
magistrates who voted to legalize Bildu, publishing their names and pictures in their front 
pages and blaming them for the returning of ETA to the democratic institutions. The 
narrative about a peace process in which the socialist government was giving up 
concessions to ETA and its accomplices was reinvigorated.  
 The PP was divided. The leadership of the party, including the leadership in the 
Basque Country, was not on good terms with the AVT and its aggressive discourse. Yet, 
they took advantage of the Constitutional Court ruling in favor of Bildu to blame Zapatero. 
According to Oyarzabal, the legalization of Bildu was a mistake because it would be good 
to maintain the Abertzale Left out of the institutions “for a while more” in order to debilitate 
them even more, as they would be away of the local power and the institutional money. 
When he refers to a mistake, he means a mistake of the PSOE, because he believes that the 
Zapatero government could “obviously” avoid Bildu’s legalization. He thinks that Zapatero 
enabled the participation of Bildu in elections because that step would have guaranteed 
“what eventually came in October,” meaning the definitive cessation of ETA. The Basque 
PP was still backing the socialist Patxi López as lehendakari, although their relationship 
had gradually deteriorated. In Oyarzabal’s view, things started to change at the end of 2010. 
When the Zapatero government started to move behind the scenes and behind the PP’s 
back, there still was a direct and fluent communication between Ares and Oyarzabal. Yet, 
Ares did not tell everything to Oyarzabal. “The only thing they told us is that it [the end of 





wanted to end as soon as possible, and we argued that the problem was not ‘when’ but 
‘how.’” Oyarzabal argues that the Abertzale Left could not emerge as a powerful 
movement after the end of ETA. “You should avoid an end in which they got political 
oxygen.”575 
The other faction of the PP, critical of Mariano Rajoy and the Basque leadership, 
was in harmony with the aggressive approach of the AVT. The legalization of Bildu was 
an unacceptable concession.  According to Mayor Oreja, it was one more step within a 
process of conflict resolution which is “a second part of an agreement between ETA and 
the Spanish socialism, between ETA and Zapatero.”576 According to the view of Mayor 
Oreja and those of his faction within the PP, the emergence of Bildu as a legal coalition 
and his share of power in Basque local and provincial institutions is a sign that ETA, far 
for being defeated, is emerging victorious as a consequence of the Zapatero government’s 
concessions, which are not opposed with enough aggressiveness by Rajoy’s PP.  
 Beyond the AVT, which is the main organization of ETA victims, there is an 
umbrella institution for all victims associations, the Foundation of Terrorism Victims 
(FVT). The members of the board of the FVT are representatives of the public 
administration, the victims associations and some sponsors. Maite Pagazaurtundua was the 
president of the FVT from 2005 to 2012.577 As long as she was the president of the FVT, 
she did not publicly state her opinion on the government management of the process of 
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ETA’s end, as she represented different associations with different views. However, now 
she makes clear that she was in total disagreement with the negotiation process in 2005-
2007—“it was a betrayal and a trap”—and she is against any measures other than police 
repression against ETA and political banning of the Abertzale Left. Pagazaurtundua sees 
“weakness” in Zapatero’s policies and PSE-EE’s stance. “I think that they weakened as a 
consequence of the [ETA] harassment. They accepted things that they did not accept before 
being harassed. Then, is violence effective? Absolutely.”  
 Pagazaurtundua believes that ETA was at its weakest in 2003 and 2004; ETA was 
about to be defeated by police repression and the whole political strategy of the Abertzale 
Left was also on the verge of absolute collapse. Nevertheless, after the peace process in 
2005-2007 and the recent events leading to the end of ETA, “the overall strategy of the 
Abertzale Left has been saved.” In Pagazaurtundua’s view, the Abertzale Left strategy is 
not legitimate, cannot be accepted as long as they do not make a self-criticism, because “it 
is rotten,” as it has been based on violence and harassment of their political rivals. She 
believes that the victims need to challenge their political strategy because the victims were 
used as instruments by ETA and its movement for their political goals. “Terrorism uses 
human life as an instrument. An attack is an act of propaganda (…) to provoke an impact 
on society.” Therefore, the victim’s duel is not only private, but also political, “because 
you have been an instrument to influence the society,” and now the victims need to counter 
it to complete their grief. According to her argument, the victims’ grief cannot be complete 
if the state gives concessions to ETA and facilitates the survival of the political project. 





Pagazaurtundua believes, as much as the spokespersons of the major victims associations, 
that the legalization of Bildu was evidence that an agreed process was being developed to 
enable the integration of the Abertzale Left in politics, as one of the concessions in 
exchange for the end of ETA’s violence. She intuits that many unacceptable things were 
happening behind the scenes since 2010, that the government was saying one thing but 
doing another, and the opposition party, the PP, was looking away.578  
4.4.5. New political avenues 
Polls predicted relatively good results for Bildu, but not as good as they eventually 
happened to be. They were the second most voted force in local elections in the four Basque 
provinces behind the PNV. Bildu got 25.4 percent of the vote in the Basque autonomous 
community local elections, and 11.6 percent in Navarre; overall, the new coalition got 22.3 
percent of the vote. As a consequence of their strength in small rural towns, Bildu got more 
local seats than anyone else: 1,128 city councilors.579 Since then, more than a hundred 
municipalities were ruled by Bildu mayors, one of them being the capital city of Gipuzkoa, 
Donostia. Bildu also obtained the majority of the provincial legislature of Gipuzkoa, and 
appointed their candidate president of the provincial executive, the Diputación. The 
Abertzale Left never before had that institutional power. Although the successful results 
and the institutional power were to be shared with two other parties, EA and Alternatiba, 
the Abertzale Left was clearly the driving force of the coalition. 
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 The advocates of exclusive political means were highly reinforced within the 
Abertzale Left. They had a double argument. First, although the new party Sortu was 
prevented from entering politics, Bildu was allowed to participate in elections, which 
meant that the other side was giving some space for political work. Second, the Basque 
society had electorally rewarded their strategic shift and, now, Bildu was in a position to 
compete for the hegemony in Basque politics. The strategy of accumulation of forces to 
attract the majority of the Basque society toward a pro-independence position was feasible 
in the light of the recent results. Bildu was an alternative for the autonomous government, 
with a strength that the Abertzale Left with an active ETA never would have had. Any 
chance of challenging the results of the internal debate within the Abertzale Left was over. 
The results of the local elections were the end point of the internal dispute. Whereas Bildu 
results were a victory of ETA in the view of the right-wing opposition and the major victims 
associations, from the perspective of the internal struggle within the Abertzale Left it was 
an uncontestable victory of the faction who challenged the continuation of ETA’s armed 
activity. In a later internal document, ETA acknowledged that the results obtained by Bildu 
in May 2011 ratified the new political strategy and put a new inflection point in the 
evolution of the pro-independence movement.580 
Regarding the electoral success of Bildu, Arnaldo Otegi pointed out from the prison 
that the voters endorsed the Abertzale Left commitment to peace and its ability to achieve 
agreements with others. In his view, Bildu’s results put the pro-independence movement 
                                                          






in a position to compete “to be a hegemonic force.”581 Otegi himself started to be widely 
regarded as a real contender for the presidency of the Basque government. Being a prisoner 
was preventing him from participating in daily political life, but being a political prisoner 
who was unfairly kept in prison in the view of many Basques was increasing his electoral 
potential for the future. Arnaldo Otegi, Rafa Diez, Miren Zabaleta, Sonia Jacinto and 
Arkaitz Rodriguez were judged in June and July, 2011, in the Audiencia Nacional. They 
were accused of trying to re-organize the leadership of the banned political party Batasuna 
under the direction of ETA. The defendants and their lawyers contended in the trial that, 
on the contrary, they promoted an internal debate in order to reverse ETA’s determination 
to resume armed struggle. By the time the trial was held, they were in a condition to argue 
that they had succeeded, and that what happened from the time of their arrest to the time 
of their trial had confirmed their account, and denied the narrative of the accussers. 
Nevertheless, the jury ruled against the defendants and sentenced them to prison. Otegi and 
Diez were sentenced to ten years of prison and ten years of disqualification from public 
office on the grounds that they were members of the leadership of ETA, and the three others 
were sentenced to eight years of prison on the grounds of being members of ETA. Otegi 
was out of institutional politics for ten years, unless a higher court reversed the sentence. 
Later on, the Supreme Court reduced Otegi and Diez’s prison sentences to six and a half 
years, but confirmed the ten-year disqualification from public office.582  
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The electoral strategy of joining forces went on after the success of Bildu. The three 
parties of Bildu initiated conversations with Aralar, who split from Batasuna in the 
beginning of the 2000s. The electoral scenario of the southern Basque Country was going 
toward a clarification and simplification after the cessation of ETA’s violence, the 
reorganizing of the Abertzale Left, and the joining of so-far dispersed pro-independence 
forces. Bildu emerged to occupy the nationalist space left of the PNV, and Aralar was in 
danger of becoming a marginal force. Besides, the main cause of Aralar’s split in 2000, 
ETA’s violence, was about to disappear.  
Patxi Zabaleta, the main leader of the party since its foundation, was also a founder 
member of HB in the late 1970s. As a leading member of HB in Navarre, he advocated for 
the end of the armed struggle since the 1980s. His disagreement became more notorious in 
the mid-1990s, when he publicly disagreed with the killing of elected politicians, and he 
ended up leading the splinter group Aralar. Zabaleta contends that within the Abertzale 
Left there have always been “two souls.” On the one side, there are those who believe in 
the preeminence of politics and the necessity of ending the armed struggle through a 
dignified way; on the other, there are the advocates for armed struggle and armed vanguard. 
In the evolution of the Abertzale Left, Zabaleta perceived that, when one of the two souls 
was reinforced, the other had to adapt. That is his explanation of the periods of intense 
armed campaigns and subsequent peace processes: when the faction in charge reached a 
dead point, the other faction recovered its position. When Zabaleta and the founders of 
Aralar decided to leave Batasuna, many members also advocating for the end of the armed 





remain in the movement so that the abandonment of the armed struggle could be promoted 
and eventually agreed on from inside. The founders of Aralar, in contrast, believed that it 
was time “to act courageously” and demonstrate that another way was feasible. It was 
costly in terms of personal relationships and personal comfort. Members of Aralar were 
called “vultures” in stickers and posters of some organizations of the Abertzale Left. 
The discourse of Aralar had always been that they wanted to re-found “a new, civil 
and broad Abertzale Left.” The conditions for a new, civil and broader Abertzale Left 
seemed to have arrived in 2011, when Aralar engaged in negotiations with the forces of 
Bildu. Nevertheless, the short but intense history of a bad relationship between Batasuna 
and Aralar provoked internal difficulties in the latter. Some prominent leaders and many 
affiliates left the party in disagreement with the majority who decided to join the new pro-
independence coalition. According to Zabaleta, “a big majority” agreed with the decision 
to join Batasuna, EA and Alternatiba for electoral purposes. Yet, he points out that all 
“personal difficulties” to take this step were understandable, given the recent past.583 The 
strategic agreement among the four forces was signed in September 2011. This pact 
finished the convergence of all left-wing pro-independence forces. The next electoral stops 
were the general election in Spain in November, 2011, and Basque regional vote in October 
2012.584 
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Things were also changing in the specific political scenario of Navarre. The right-
wing political party which has ruled the government of Navarre since 1996, Union del 
Pueblo Navarro (UPN), strongly defends the status quo of Navarre as a separate 
autonomous body, refuses to have any institutional link with the Basque autonomous 
community, denies the Basqueness of Navarre, and claims a separate Navarrese identity as 
a Spanish region.  Regarding anti-terrorism policies, UPN has always been in harmony 
with the PP. They opposed any negotiations with ETA, especially if the issue of Navarre 
was on the table, like in Loiola in 2006 and Geneva in 2007, and they were against any 
political process to facilitate the end of ETA. 
Miguel Sanz, president of the regional government of Navarre from 1996 to 2011, 
recalls that the PSOE was hiding information and denying that the issue of Navarre was 
being discussed in the 2005-2007 process. The president of the government of Navarre sent 
some letters to Zapatero asking for clarifications, but, according to Sanz, he never received 
any answer.585 In that context, UPN called a demonstration in March 2007 to claim that the 
status of Navarre was not negotiable and to denounce the management of the process by 
Zapatero; the PP backed the mobilization. In May 2007, UPN, led by Miguel Sanz, won 
regional elections but did not obtain an absolute majority. The socialist candidate Fernando 
Puras initiated negotiations with the Basque nationalist coalition Nafarroa Bai, which 
included Aralar, EA and PNV, but not the Abertzale Left, whose party was banned. At the 
time of elections, ETA was still in ceasefire. By the time the PSN reached an agreement 
with Basque nationalists in August 2007 to form an alternative government and drive the 
                                                          





UPN to opposition, the peace process had vanished, and ETA’s violence was back. The 
executive committee of PSN ratified the agreement with Nafarroa Bai, but the federal 
leadership of the PSOE in Madrid reversed that decision and ordered the PSN lawmakers 
to abstain and enable the re-election of the candidate of the UPN. Sanz is aware that he 
could have been displaced from office in the event of a success of the peace process.  
Four years later, after the elections in May 2011, Miguel Sanz was replaced by a 
party colleague, Yolanda Barcina, as the president of the government in Navarre. Yet, 
regardless of the continuation of UPN’s hegemony, the absence of ETA’s violence has 
enabled a change in the political scenario in Navarre too. The Abertzale Left was back in 
the regional parliament through Bildu. The new nationalist coalition got only seven seats 
out of fifty seats (13.3 percent of the vote), but a more moderate nationalist coalition, 
Nafarroa Bai, got eight seats (15.4 percent), four of which were for Aralar, now an ally of 
Bildu. Basque nationalists never in history obtained so many lawmakers in the parliament 
of Navarre. That is a great concern for Sanz and the UPN, because there is a constitutional 
provision which predicts an institutional way for the integration of Navarre in the Basque 
autonomous community, in the event of a majority wishing it so: “In Navarre there is an 
institutional avenue to achieve one of the goals of ETA”—warns Sanz. He argues that it 
would be unacceptable if a referendum is held while ETA is active, but he could not object 
if it is done following the rules of politics, without any threat of ETA. “Obviously, I would 
vote against, because I am a defender of the foral regime of Navarre.”586 






A convergence of nationalist forces and a kind of political reconciliation took place 
in the northern Basque Country too, in the territories within the French state, as a 
consequence of the process toward ETA’s end. Basque nationalists north of the Pyrenees 
had had their own process to end armed struggle. Some minor armed organizations 
disappeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s after a few attacks,587 and Iparretarrak (IK) 
lasted from the 1970s to the beginning of the 2000s, although the intensity of their 
campaign greatly declined after the mid-1990s. When the so far dispersed left-wing 
nationalist parties of the northern Basque Country joined forces in the coalition 
Abertzaleen Batasuna (AB) in 1988. AB was among the signatories of the Lizarra-Garazi 
agreement. After the collapse of the peace process and the re-foundation of the Abertzale 
Left’s political party, Batasuna, a minority of AB affiliates joined the new Batasuna, while 
the majority remained in AB with a critical position regarding ETA’s return. Those years 
AB and Batasuna had a very bad relationship and ran for elections separately. According 
to a member of the leadership of AB, Jakes Bortairu, “it was hard” because there was not 
space for both formations.588 
In the context of the 2005-2007 peace process, all nationalist forces engaged in 
negotiations to form a broad coalition, but the Barajas attack in December 2006 made the 
moderate PNB (Parti Nationalist Basque), the northern branch of the PNV, leave the 
coalition project. Despite ETA’s reappearance, EA, Batasuna and AB agreed to run in a 
united list in 2007, Euskal Herria Bai (EH Bai). EA and AB had some internal tensions 
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because some factions did not want to join Batasuna with ETA active, but the majorities 
within both parties agreed. When ETA officially broke the ceasefire and, especially, when 
the socialist Isaias Carrasco was killed in March 2008, AB was at the verge of breaking the 
coalition with Batasuna, but the faction in favor of remaining in the coalition prevailed by 
a little. AB had two souls two. The majority wanted to maintain the unity among 
nationalists, whereas the minority wanted to break with a party not-critical if ETA. 
According to Bortairu, who was in favor of maintaining the coalition, by that time they 
were aware that members of the Batasuna leadership were internally working to abandon 
political-military strategy. They believed that AB could help them: “If we take another way 
we weakened them and strengthened the others [who advocated for the continuation of 
armed struggle]. Let’s continue with the coalition EH Bai, so that we give them political 
oxygen, as much as we give it to ourselves.” However, in the event that the armed campaign 
of ETA would have lasted more than it did, Bortairu believed that tensions within the 
coalition would become unmanageable, and AB would end up abandoning Batasuna.589 In 
this context, the factions most favorable for joining forces in both parties started to meet 
regularly in order to mutually reinforce their factions. “We started working out what could 
be done by each side to reinforce the position of the other in their party.” As the faction 
aiming to abandon armed strategy was prevailing in Batasuna, the coalition EH Bai 
survived, and a commitment for further joint action was later agreed on.590 
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Moreover, the new political situation in which ETA’s violence was no longer a 
factor of disturbance, some new political initiatives turned feasible in the northern Basque 
Country as well. The political scenario on the French side differed totally with the situation 
on the Spanish side. The end of ETA’s violence did not put the nationalist forces in a 
situation to compete for political hegemony. They are still a minority with no short-term 
perspective to become a majority. However, the absence of ETA’s violence has facilitated 
communication between Basque nationalists and French parties’ representatives. A few 
years ago, nationalists were almost alone in their claim for an administrative recognition 
of the Basque territories. In November 2012, a majority of the Council of Elected 
Officials591 claimed the official establishment of a Basque territorial collectivity within the 
French state. According to Bortairu, that shift of the French parties would be impossible 
without the disappearance of the ETA factor. “No doubt that, in the northern Basque 
Country, we noticed that a knot has been untied.”592 The opening of new political avenues 
was also evident in the northern Basque Country. The humble political progress toward a 
recognition of a Basque political institution was another proof of it. 
In summary, political conditions for Basque pro-independence nationalists had 
clearly improved by 2011. In the Basque autonomous community, Bildu emerged as a 
political alternative with a capacity to compete for hegemony and access to regional power. 
In Navarre, Basque nationalists were becoming stronger, and chances for alliances with 
non-nationalist forces such as the socialist party became more feasible. In addition, in a 
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longer term, some chances for a change in the legal framework toward an institutional 
coordination with the western Basque territories could arise. In the northern Basque 
Country, the claim for an institutional recognition of the Basque territories was getting 
more support from non-nationalist factions in the new situation. 
4.5. Crunch time  
4.5.1. On the track 
In April, 2011 ETA released a new issue of the bulletin Zutabe, which was sent to some 
media outlets. In Zutabe 113 the armed group offered an explanation of the sense of the 
January ceasefire. According to ETA’s arguments, the January ceasefire was not a 
consequence of a defeat by the police. The armed group was not forced by the Abertzale 
Left to stop. It was not a move directed to enable the Abertzale Left to participate in 
elections. ETA’s ceasefire was a response to a decision “to take decisive and irreversible 
steps in a liberation process based on conditions offered by the political situation.” 
According to ETA, two factors influenced their approach. One, “the conditions created and 
the achievements made by the Basque Movement of National Liberation.” Two, it became 
evident that the Spanish Constitution and the Basque Statute cannot satisfy the Basque 
Country political needs. Based on that, ETA contended, two political conditions had been 
created: the right of the Basques to determine their political future had been socialized, and 
people wanted the political conflict to be solved through dialogue. In this context, the 
liberation process had a risk to be blocked; there was a risk for the political conditions 
created by years of fighting to be rotten. The Abertzale Left had the ability to interpret 





upturn the situation. In addition, the Abertzale Left advocated for a “Democratic Process” 
in order to enable a conflict resolution and to change the legal framework. “ETA’s initiative 
[the ceasefire] is framed within this reflection.” 
ETA’s cessation had two recipients, according to the text on the ceasefire in Zutabe 
113. On the one side, the Basque society. In this regard, the cessation had the objective of 
“backing, stabilizing and reinforcing all moves to implement political and social change, 
and to increase political confrontation with the states.” On the other, the international 
community. In this regard, the objective was to reinforce the involvement and the reference 
of the international community in the resolution of the political conflict so that their 
pressure could wear out the blocking stance of the states. Regardless of the credibility of 
ETA’s narrative, the message of the new issue of the internal bulletin was that a process 
from a temporary cessation to a definitive one was in progress. The whole content was in 
consistence with what the Abertzale Left and the signatories of the Gernika and Brussels 
declarations had asked. There also was a specific paragraph stressing that the ceasefire of 
ETA was a reflection of their “clear compromise to overcome the armed confrontation.”593 
 The unusual strong reaction of the Abertzale Left to a shooting incident on April 9, 
2011 in the central region of France confirmed that they would oppose any step back in 
their transition toward the abandonment of armed struggle. After two ETA suspect 
members seriously injured a gendarme in an impromptu shooting incident, a press note 
released in the name of the Abertzale Left described the incident as “incomprehensible and 
                                                          





unacceptable,” and “incompatible with the ceasefire commitments taken by ETA;” 
moreover, it demanded ETA to ratify the ceasefire commitments and to take measures in 
order to avoid such incidents.594        The following day “the promoters of Sortu” released 
their own statement to assert their “unequivocal and ethical rejection” of all forms of 
violence “including that of ETA.”595    
ETA was prepared to follow what the Abertzale Left social base had determined, 
and what the Gernika and Brussels endorsers had demanded, but not in exchange for 
nothing. The armed group was aware that any chance for a negotiation process with the 
Spanish government was out of the question. Instead, ETA sought a commitment from the 
government that some dialogue to deal with the consequences of the conflict would take 
place after the definitive cessation. The Spanish government and the socialist party knew 
this through the international facilitators and the interlocutors of the Abertzale Left. 
By that time, the Spanish government had a full reassurance that the Basque group’s 
ceasefire was genuine. However, president Zapatero was not in the best position to manage 
such a sensitive issue in a Spanish political environment aggressively opposite to any 
political facilitation of the end of ETA. Since Zapatero announced in April that he was not 
running for re-election, he significantly lost authority within his party and, to a great extent, 
was in political isolation. In July, the economic crisis and his political isolation forced 
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Zapatero to call for early elections in November. The support of the PNV and other minor 
parties became useless. According to Ortuzar, “in the end it was his own party who 
abandoned him. It was not us. (…) His party told him: it is over; you are dead, and you will 
kill us all.”596 Suddenly, ETA’s time limit to announce a definitive end during Zapatero’s 
term had shortened a half year. All polls were anticipating a clear victory of the PP. All 
indicators were predicting that a government led by Mariano Rajoy would not enable the 
labor of the international actors, and would not be receptive to their proposals to enable an 
end of ETA. The main pressure, once again, was on ETA. 
4.5.2. Verification and facilitation  
The January ceasefire was labeled by ETA as “verifiable,” following the Brussels and 
Gernika declarations’ demand. From then on, the verification of the ceasefire by 
international actors was up for the public debate. The Spanish government’s official 
position was that there was no need for any international commission, as the Spanish 
security forces could do the job. In March, ETA declared in a communiqué that it was 
prepared to accept “an informal mechanism of verification,” and suggested that an 
international commission should be created.597 Brian Currin and others were already 
working on it. They contacted some personalities such as Ram Manikkalingam, director of 
the Dialogue Advisory Group, previously involved in the resolution processes of Sri Lanka, 
Iraq and Northern Ireland, and proposed setting up a verification body for the Basque case. 
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Manikkalingam and the rest of the candidates for the verification group talked with 
the actors involved before deciding to engage in the process. In their contacts with Basque 
institutions, political parties and other agencies, they concluded that the commission would 
be welcomed. They contacted ETA too. According to Manikkalingam, they wanted to 
make sure that the ceasefire was unilateral and without any condition, that regardless of the 
policies of the Spanish government the armed group would hold it. The contacts with ETA 
were initiated in the spring or summer of 2011. The first contacts were indirect, and later 
on they had direct meetings with the leadership of ETA. The conclusion of the preliminary 
contacts was that the commitment of ETA to a permanent and general ceasefire was 
serious. Regarding the Spanish government, the future members of the verification 
commission informed them through different channels what they intended to do, and they 
understood that the government did not object.598 In September 2011, the International 
Verification Commission (IVC) was established and publicly presented.599 According to a 
statement released on the occasion of its presentation, the IVC’s creation responded “to the 
request made by different elements of Basque society to members of the Commission to 
create a mechanism to verify the ceasefire.” The Commission stated that their objective 
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was “to contribute to the verification of ETA’s ceasefire through a serious and rigorous 
process.”600 Once the IVC was officially established, and they engaged in the verification 
process, they did not make any other public statement until January 2012, when they 
concluded that ETA was fulfilling their ceasefire obligations.601 Although the strict 
mandate of the IVC was to verify the fulfillment of the ceasefire, the commission became 
a further international agency acting as a facilitator of the process toward the end of ETA, 
along with others who were already in action, such as the International Contact Group 
(ICG) led by Brian Currin, the Center Henri Dunant (HD) and Jonathan Powell.602 
In July 2011, Zapatero received a message from ETA through international 
facilitators that it wanted to agree upon a road map to advance toward a definitive 
cessation.603 Then, a mechanism of virtual peacemaking started to work. Aware that a 
direct dialogue was not feasible, the international mediators put in place an innovative 
methodology. They would facilitate the exchange of proposals between the two parties. 
They would hold meetings with each of the parties separately. Out of the conclusions of 
the separate meetings, they would work out a document compiling what they regarded as 
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agreements. The document would not be signed, but just showed to each part. From a given 
time, senior members of the Spanish government were ready to meet directly with some 
international mediators, but the secrecy of the meetings was always a high priority. 
According to a source of the Abertzale Left, the representatives of the government even 
avoided touching the documents presented by the mediators to not leave any fingerprints 
on them.604 Obviously, time was crucial. Zapatero’s early call for elections had restricted 
the already limited time.   
The exchange of messages among different actors including ETA and the Spanish 
government accelerated after the announcement of early elections. At this stage of the 
contacts, in summer 2011, ETA was asking for tangible compromises, whereas the Spanish 
government was only prepared to show a vague disposition for a dialogue once ETA 
announced a definitive cessation. In mid-August, the ICG believed to have reliable 
information that a deal was almost done. They contacted Lokarri, and suggested starting 
preparations for a conference to be held on September 15. The idea had its origin in an 
eventually frustrated conference planned by the negotiators in the event of a settlement in 
Loiola 2006. This time, the project was to hold a conference before ETA’s public 
announcement of the definitive cessation, in the event of a success of the indirect dialogue 
already in place. The ICG’s suggestion to Lokarri that the planned conference would be 
hold in mid-September meant that all was set. Yet, in early September the ICG got news 
denying previous information, and noting that there was not any agreement. From then on, 
contradictory news went back and forth among actors very close to the contacts. In those 
                                                          





moments of confusion, sources close to the ICG got more optimistic news than sources 
close to the Abertzale Left, which were warning of the difficulties.605 At some point at the 
end of the summer, Lokarri was definitively asked to organize a conference by mid-
October. The green light definitively went on. 
There are no available documents to verify whether any deal between ETA and the 
Spanish government was reached through the facilitation of international mediators. There 
is no documented or recorded evidence of any acknowledgement by the Spanish 
government that they took any commitment regarding the process toward the end of ETA. 
However, there are substantial hints suggesting that there were contacts, and what some 
actors regarded as a ‘road map’ was agreed upon. In a later interview published in 
November 2011, ETA acknowledged that it has not had any direct contact with the Spanish 
government, but they had had “a mutual knowledge.” In addition, the ETA interviewees 
pointed out that there was not any resolution settlement, but they had been drawing “a 
sequence of the steps that should be taken” toward a solution process, “composing a kind 
of road map.”606 ETA spoke much clearer in March 2013, when in a communiqué it 
asserted that the Spanish government had agreed to open a dialogue with ETA to deal with 
the consequences of the conflict, once ETA made definitive its cessation.607 
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ETA’s version is consistent with the account by various sources, some linked to the 
Abertzale Left, and others to the mediators. According to some of these sources, after some 
international facilitators held several separate meetings with ETA representatives and the 
Spanish government officials, the mediators wrote down some conclusions. In that 
document, the mediators pointed out the common ground reached by both sides from their 
point of view. Basically, the facilitators wrote what the Spanish government was prepared 
to do in the event of an unconditional definitive cessation of ETA’s armed activity. 
According to these sources, the Spanish government had agreed to open a dialogue with 
ETA representatives after a definitive cessation to deal with the so-called technical issues 
such as the disarmament, the prisoners and militants in hiding. The Spanish government 
even managed to engage the government of Norway to provide a framework for dialogue 
on Norwegian soil. Teresa Whitfield, a researcher on the end of ETA and also an adviser 
of the Center HD, confirms that the government of Norway offered “its disposition to host 
the political leadership of ETA,” and that it did it so “at the request of the Spanish 
government.”608 Whitfield’s sources also acknowledged the existence of “a confidential 
road map” which had played a critical role in getting ETA to the end of its armed activity. 
In fact, “the existence of a ‘road map’ of sorts helped explain the rapid acceleration of 
developments in late September.”609    
Furthermore, the Spanish government had told the facilitators that they were 
prepared to make some moves regarding prisoners, such as the release of some with serious 
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sickness and the transfer of some others to jails closer to the Basque Country. The 
legalization of Sortu, at the time still outlawed, was also on the table. The government 
could not promise any legalization, but could pledge that they would do everything in its 
power. In the very likely event that the PP won elections and Mariano Rajoy took office, 
the government led by Zapatero promised to let the new rulers know what was agreed on 
with the international facilitators. The organization of an international conference prior to 
ETA’s announcement was also in the agreed ‘road map.’ The Spanish government would 
not endorse the conference nor participate directly, but they would enable the participation 
of international personalities and some representatives of the Basque branch of the socialist 
party. Once ETA understood that a definitive and unconditional cessation of all violence 
would lead to direct dialogue with the Spanish government representatives, they informed 
the international mediators that they were prepared to take the step.610     
4.5.3. A confirmation from the prisons 
On September 25, 2011, the Collective of Basque Political Prisoners (EPPK) officially 
signed the Gernika declaration in the one-year anniversary event, through some former 
prisoners acting as their representatives.611 Endorsing the Gernika declaration meant 
demanding the ETA lay down arms, and the EPPK finally did it. Once the prisoners’ 
collective backed the new strategy, nothing could prevent ETA from making the final 
decision. The strategic debate within the prisons did not follow the guidelines outside. In 
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the context of the confrontation between the two debate reports, Argitzen and Mugarri, in 
the early stages of the debate only Mugarri was distributed among the prisoners, while 
Argitzen was debated among the rank and file outside. A few months were enough for the 
proposal of the abandonment of arms to make its way in the social base, as the debate 
initiated in October 2009 officially finalized in February 2010. At that time, a delegation 
of Batasuna was still arguing with outside representatives of EPPK (January 2010), to the 
extent that the leadership of Batasuna sent a clarification letter to the inside representatives 
of EPPK in February 2010. Regardless of the difficulties of verifying information on 
prisons’ life, what is clear is that the debate inside the prisons was far from ending when 
the conclusions of the debate among the social base were officially announced. When the 
EPPK released a statement backing the Gernika declaration, it could be interpreted that the 
debate within the Abertzale Left was, finally, really over. 
 Antton López Ruiz, Kubati, a well-known former ETA activist, was in jail when 
the debate about the abandonment of armed struggle was at stake.612 According to López 
Ruiz, the debate within the prisons was much slower “for many reasons,” but especially 
because the dispersion of the prisoners in so many jails made the debate technically 
difficult. “It would be easier if we were all together. According to social psychology, 
flexible opinions are more likely in groups, when there are many people debating. The 
smaller the group, the more inflexible the decisions.” He believes that, “given the 
circumstances, the collective has behaved very maturely.”613 Juan Mari Olano, who served 
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a ten-year sentence for being a member of Askatasuna, an association working on the 
prisoners’ issue, was also in jail at the time of the debate. He was released in May 2014. In 
an interview with Berria, he provided two reasons for the delayed support of EPPK to the 
new strategy. On the one side, the prisoners discussed “in very bad conditions,” as “the 
prison officers and civil guards looked for papers within the prison as if they were weapons 
of massive destruction.” On the other, the prisoners considered it a mistake “to take steps 
to respond to supposed urgencies,” and faced the debate “with calm,” discussing everything 
“in depth,” and consulting with the actors outside.614 Jokin Urain was also in prison during 
the debate.615 He very often experienced “a great impotence” because of the philosophy 
about unilateralism, after so many years pursuing a negotiation.  
The unilateralism can have effectiveness outside, where practical politics is taking 
place. We got city councilors, mayors. However, inside the prisons, all this is far 
away. Inside the prisons what you see is that everything continues to be the same. 
Inside, you might think that unilateralism is taking us nowhere.616 
Urain recognizes that the prisoners’ collective endorsed the Gernika declaration 
because “it was not possible to continue out of it. If you see that a process, although 
unilateral, needs to be taken forward, you also need to be there. If you see that your sea, 
your pool, goes that way, you cannot go in the opposite direction.” According to Urain, 
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there were arguments among prisoners, “there are many who disagree,” but “inside the 
prisons we made it with more normality than it is said.”617  
  Carmen Gisasola was in jail when the prisoners of ETA and EPPK were carrying 
out their internal debate, but she was neither a prisoner of ETA nor a member of EPPK 
anymore. She was expelled from ETA because of her public dissension, and she decided 
to leave the collective in 2008.618 Gisasola internally advocated for an end of the armed 
struggle for a long time, and publicly since the late 1990s. According to her, many prisoners 
agreed with her views but only a few made public their dissidence. She believes that later 
facts have confirmed that. “Those tried in the Bateragune case [Arnaldo Otegi and four 
more], when decided to end armed struggle, knew very well what prisoners thought, and 
knew that they would not have any problem there.”619 
 Filipe Bidart was a prisoner from 1987 to 2007. He was a member of the collective 
EPPK as a Basque militant, but not an ETA prisoner. He was the main leader of the armed 
separatist organization Iparretarrak (IK), which operated in the northern Basque Country. 
As a prisoner of IK, he participated in the debate about the future of armed struggle carried 
out by his organization in the late 1990s. He was a privileged witness of the debate within 
the prisons until 2007. What he perceived at the time was that most of the prisoners were 
aware that the political-military strategy had no future, but there were two visions regarding 
the resolution. On the one side, there were those who did not see which strategy would 
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replace the old one. They were afraid of a vacuum after the abandonment of armed struggle, 
and that “all achieved” would vanish. For these prisoners, a continuation of the armed 
campaign was the best choice, as long as a strong alternative was not in place. On the other 
side, there were those “with more courage,” who advocated for a change arguing that the 
people and the movement should be trusted, and the fight would continue through other 
means. Bidart contends that the decision was made very late. “It has been a great waste of 
time,” but he believes that the majority of prisoners were not reluctant of the final 
decision.620   
    Eugenio Etxebeste, a former chief negotiator of ETA in 1989 and a prisoner from 
1997 to 2004, states that the collective of prisoners EPPK needed more time because “it is 
a heavyweight.” According to him, “the collective is an elephant and the debate, with the 
additional difficulties produced by the dispersion, had enormous technical difficulties. It is 
true that there are different opinions, but the majority endorsed the change of strategy.” In 
his view, what is meaningful is that the collective gained importance as a political subject: 
“ETA does not speak in the name of the prisoners collective. (…) The collective starts 
having its own authority, its own role.”621 The fact is that the announcement of the 
prisoners’ collective was regarded as the confirmation that the final decision was about to 
come.  
 The next and penultimate step taken by the organizations of the Abertzale Left was 
the dissolution of Ekin. This organization, according to some rulings of Spanish courts, 
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had acted as a liaison between ETA and the rest of the organizations in the Abertzale Left. 
Two anonymous representatives of the last leadership of Ekin were quoted in the 
newspaper Gara on October 1, 2011 as announcing that they had carried out an internal 
debate since the spring of 2011, and had decided to dissolve the organization as a 
consequence of the strategic shift of the Abertzale Left.622 At the beginning of October 
2011, only ETA was left.  
4.5.4. International embrace 
By the time Lokarri began organizing the logistics for a conference in October, the 
international mediators involved in the contacts had a double guarantee. First, the Spanish 
government would not object to its organization, although they would not endorse it 
publicly. Second, ETA would subsequently fulfill what the participants would demand, i.e. 
a definitive cessation of their armed campaign.623 With those guarantees, the promoters of 
the conference were able to attract Kofi Annan, a former secretary general of the United 
Nations; along with Bertie Ahern, former Prime Minister of Ireland; 
Gro Harlem Bruntland, former Prime Minister of Norway; Pierre Joxe, former Home 
Secretary and Defence Minister of the French Republic and former president of the socialist 
group in the National Assembly; Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein; and Jonathan Powell, 
Downing Street Chief of Staff under British Prime Minister Tony Blair. They all went in 
person to Donostia to take part in an event officially named the International Conference 
                                                          









to Promote the Resolution of the Conflict in the Basque Country, and widely known as the 
Conference of Aiete, named after the palace where the meeting took place on October 17. 
The Spanish government did not welcome the conference, did not send any representatives, 
but did not make any negative statement either. However, the fact that such personalities 
agreed to participate was an evident sign of an official green light. 
Ramón Jauregui was the minister of the Presidency in Zapatero’s cabinet at the 
time, but he acknowledges that he did not have direct information about what his 
government was doing behind the scenes to facilitate the end of ETA. “I do not know this 
part [of the story], but I want to believe that all this [the conference of Aiete] would not 
have taken place without, at least, our acquiescence.”624 The president of the PSE-EE, Jesús 
Eguiguren, is more than explicit in this regard: “It [the conference] was negotiated. 
Zapatero negotiated it with Kofi Annan.”625 The presidency in the PSE-EE is more 
honorary than executive, and by that time Eguiguren had a heterodox approach within his 
political party, not in harmony with the leadership. Rodolfo Ares, in contrast, was in total 
harmony. He was Home minister of the Basque government and, at the same time, a 
member of the federal leadership of the PSOE and a close collaborator of the Spanish Home 
minister Rubalcaba. Although he was not the main leader of the PSE-EE, he was the best 
informed member of the leadership of the Basque socialist party on the issue.  
We facilitated that Aiete could take place. (…) Aiete is a kind of platform to 
facilitate ETA’s decision. That is why it is allowed or enabled the attendance of 
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some international personalities. Everybody can understand that some of the 
personalities who were in Aiete would not be there if the incumbent government 
would radically oppose it.626 
In fact, Ares had a publicized meeting with Kofi Annan in the headquarters of the 
Basque government prior to the conference. In addition, the Basque branch of the PSOE 
sent two representatives to the conference. Yet, according to Eguiguren, the initial plan of 
the socialist party was to not send any delegation. The leadership of the PSE-EE decided 
not to participate in the conference, but Eguiguren himself said he was attending: “All our 
life fighting for peace and now that the time has arrived, I will not go? (…) I contended 
that Patxi [López] had to open the conference. What an opportunity Patxi lost!” In the end, 
Eguiguren and another socialist leader, the mayor of Ermua Carlos Totorika, represented 
the PSE-EE in the conference. The lehendakari, Patxi López, did not cancel a scheduled 
trade trip to the United States, and he happened to be overseas when Kofi Annan and the 
other international personalities met in Donostia. As a consequence, in terms of protocol, 
the absence of the socialist lehendakari gave the Gipuzkoa provincial president and the 
Donosita mayor, both members of EH Bildu, the privilege of welcoming Annan and all 
international personalities. Among the parties with representation in all Basque territories, 
only the PP, UPyD and UPN were missing in Aiete. All Basque nationalist parties and all 
left-wing significant parties were present, along with many other Basque associations. It 
was remarkable that all political parties in the northern Basque Country had representatives 
in Aiete, including the right-wing party of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, UMP, the 
                                                          





centrist Modem, the socialist PS, the Green party, and, of course, the Basque nationalist 
coalition AB. The conference was officially organized by Lokarri and five other 
organizations from abroad.627   
The participants held a closed-door meeting for three hours where each delegation 
had a turn to speak. There had not been any debate, but a sequence of speeches. Annan’s 
speech was later released. He clarified that he went to Donostia “on the invitation of various 
individuals and non-governmental groups,” and that he was there “in a personal capacity”, 
“in the name of peace and friendship.”628 Afterward, the six international personalities met 
separately with the assistance of some other facilitators such as Currin, and released a 
statement. It was not said whether any agency other than the six personalities participated 
in the elaboration and negotiation of the statement to be read. Most of the participants 
learned about the contents when the statement was publicly read by Bertie Ahern. Through 
the declaration, the six signers asked for a definitive cessation from ETA and, once the 
cessation was made, they urged the Spanish and French governments to engage in talks 
with ETA to deal with “the consequences of the conflict.” The entire declaration consisted 
of an introduction and the following five recommendations:629     
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1.- We call upon ETA to make a public declaration of the definitive cessation of all 
armed action and to request talks with the governments of Spain and France to 
address exclusively the consequences of the conflict. 
2.- If such a declaration is made we urge the governments of Spain and France to 
welcome it and agree to talks exclusively to deal with the consequences of the 
conflict. 
3.- We urge that major steps be taken to promote reconciliation, recognize, 
compensate and assist all victims, recognize the harm that has been done and seek 
to heal personal and social wounds. 
4.- In our experience of resolving conflicts there are often other issues that, if 
addressed, can assist in the attainment of lasting peace. We suggest that non-violent 
actors and political representatives meet and discuss political and other related 
issues, in consultation with the citizenry, that could contribute to a new era without 
conflict. In our experience third party observers or facilitators help such dialogue. 
Here, such dialogue could also be assisted by international facilitators, if that were 
desired by those involved. 
5.- We are willing to form a committee to follow up these recommendations. 
The Abertzale Left fully endorsed the declaration of Aiete in a press conference the 





Aiete Declaration: the former president of the United States Jimmy Carter, the former 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the US Senator George Mitchell.630  
The conference had not been a real peace conference. As put by Whitfield, it had 
included “an element of theatre.”631 But it was what was needed to trigger ETA’s final 
decision: an international recognition of the political dimension of the conflict in which to 
frame ETA’s decision to lay down arms. There were no negotiations, but there was a 
demand for dialogue. It worked.  
The Zapatero government knew in advance that a definitive statement by ETA 
would be released on Thursday, October 20. A French socialist senator who attended the 
Aiete Conference, Frédérique Espagnac, met the Spanish Home minister Rubalcaba on 
October 19. According to Espagnac, Rubalcaba assured them that ETA’s expected 
statement would be released the next day.632 Rubalcaba was right. On October 20, 2011, a 
video file and a written statement by ETA arrived at a few selected media organizations: 
The New York Times, BBC, Le Journal du Pays Basque, Gara and Berria. The content was 
embargoed until 7 pm.  
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4.5.5. The big decision 
The office of the editor of Berria is attached to the main newsroom at the headquarters in 
Andoain (Gipuzkoa). Anyone working in the newsroom, which has a capacity of about 60 
people, can see who goes in and out of the editor’s office, and what the people inside do, 
as there is only a glass wall between the office and the main room. When in the early 
afternoon of October 20, the editor came out and discretely called a few journalists to his 
office, namely members of the staff and some correspondents of the Political section, a 
murmur was heard in the newsroom. After the Aiete declaration, everybody was waiting 
for news from ETA. To see members of the staff and Politics reporters called into the office 
of the editor could have meant that the awaited communiqué could had finally arrived. 
Once into the office, we saw a short video filed in a pen-drive, in which one of the three 
sitting masked persons read a statement announcing the definitive end of the armed activity 
of ETA. Once we watched the video file, we carefully read the written statement compiled 
in the same pen-drive. It was not exactly the same text as the one read in the video, but 
almost the same, with just some additions with no importance. The statement was read in 
Basque and Spanish in the video file; the written statement had four versions: Basque, 
Spanish, French and English. It was a few hours before 7 pm, and we all were supposed to 
keep the secret until then. Right after, our colleagues in the newsroom did not need to ask 
anything to guess what was happening. The frenetic activity in the Politics section was 
evident enough. The editor made some selected telephone calls to inform whom he 
believed should be told. Over time, rumors started to spread, and telephone calls from other 





rumors. A few minutes before the scheduled time, the big news was released in Berria’s 
and Gara’s webpages.  
 ETA had put an end to more than forty years of an armed campaign. The cessation 
was definitive, and the decision was unilateral. The insurgent group urged the Spanish and 
French government to engage in negotiation on the consequences of the conflict, but the 
decision to end did not depend on those negotiations. ETA had entirely fulfilled what the 
endorsers of the Aiete declaration had demanded three days earlier. The written declaration 
of ETA announced the following:633 
ETA, socialist revolutionary Basque organisation of national liberation, desires 
through this declaration to announce its decision: 
ETA considers that the international conference held recently in the Euskal Herria 
[Basque Country] is an initiative of great political transcendence. The agreed 
resolution brings together the ingredients for an integrated solution to the conflict 
and has the support of large sectors of Basque society and the international 
community. 
In Euskal Herria, a new political age is opening. We face a historic opportunity to 
obtain a just and democratic solution to the age-old political conflict. 
                                                          






Faced with violence and repression, dialogue and agreement must characterise the 
new age. The recognition of Euskal Herria and respect for popular will must prevail 
over any imposition. This is the will of the majority of Basque citizens. 
The struggle of many years has created this opportunity. It has not been an easy 
road. The rawness of the struggle has claimed many companions forever. Others 
are suffering jail or exile. To these our recognition and heartfelt homage. From here 
on, the road will not be easy either. Facing the imposition which still remains, every 
step, every achievement, will be fruit of the effort and struggle of Basque citizens. 
Throughout the years Euskal Herria has accumulated the experience and strength 
necessary to tackle this road and it also has the determination to do it. 
It is time to look to the future with hope, it is also time to act with responsibility 
and valour. 
Because of all this, ETA has decided on the definitive cessation of its armed 
activity. ETA makes a call to the governments of Spain and France to open a 
process of direct dialogue which has as its aim the resolution of the consequences 
of the conflict and thus the conclusion of the armed conflict. With this historic 
declaration, ETA demonstrates its clear, firm and definitive purpose. 
ETA finally calls on Basque society to get involved in this process until peace and 





Long live the free Euskal Herria, Long live Basque socialism, no rest until 
independence and socialism.  
The time period of this research ends on October 20, 2011. However, some 
subsequent developments helps to understand what really happened before ETA’s 
announcement of the definitive end of its armed campaign. Only one hour after the release 
of the big news, the president Zapatero made a statement to stress “the extraordinary 
importance of the announcement that ETA has just made public.” He did not say anything 
about the request to the Spanish and French government to engage in negotiations. He 
merely noted that it would be the duty of the new government emerging from the elections 
to be held next month to manage the new situation.634 It seemed only reasonable to leave 
the management of the post-cessation process in the hands of the coming government, but 
behind the scenes, Zapatero’s words did not sound good at all in the ears of the people 
aware of the road map supposedly agreed upon through international facilitators. 
The leader of the PP, Mariano Rajoy, would very likely become the next president 
of the government according to all polls. In his reaction, he said three times that it was 
“good news,” and he stressed that it was positive because the announcement was produced 
“with no political concessions.”635 The qualification by Rajoy of the definitive end of 
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ETA’s campaign as good news was not an obvious assertment with no political meaning. 
On the contrary, it was very meaningful because some prominent members of his own 
party, the spokespersons of the principle victims associations, and some powerful right-
wing media outlets located in Madrid regarded ETA’s decision as a cheat, and did not 
believe that it occurred without political concessions. Indeed, they contended that some 
concessions were already made such as the legalization of the coalition Bildu, which in 
their view represented the return of ETA to institutions.  
ETA’s announcement caught the Basque government president, Patxi López, off 
guard, in the United States. The miscalculation forced him to video-record an official 
response to ETA’s announcement while he was travelling on a train from Washington to 
New York. The lehendakari López stated that ETA had confirmed its defeat because it laid 
down arms without having achieved its objectives. He stressed that the society “did not 
owe and does not owe” anything to ETA, and “we will not pay them anything” in exchange 
for their decision to abandon arms.636  
The day after ETA’s announcement, the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
a close political ally of Zapatero, published an Op-Ed article in The New York Times printed 
edition, which meant that the article was produced the very day of ETA’s announcement 
at the latest. Blair argued that, once ETA had unilaterally ceased its campaign, talks were 
“necessary to assure the dissolution of ETA as a military force.” According to Blair’s 
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reasoning, “governments must also recognize the need to ‘talk to their enemies.’ Firm 
security pressure on terrorists must be coupled with offering them a way out when they 
realize that they cannot win by violence”.637 
 The day after ETA’s announcement I interviewed Brian Currin, who was in 
Pretoria, South Africa, for my newspaper Berria. The conversation was conducted by 
phone. He was aware that the interview was not for long-term research, but for a next-day 
paper. He had to measure his words carefully. Answering my questions, Currin said that 
he did not only wish that the Spanish and French governments would respond positively to 
ETA’s request for talks, but he expected that. Regarding the Spanish government, he said 
that he expected the Zapatero cabinet to take some quick steps before elections in 
November, and that the subsequent government emerging from November elections would 
follow the path initiated by the current government. Currin argued that the reactions by 
both Zapatero and Rajoy to the ETA announcement were a good signal. I contended in one 
of my questions that Tony Blair would not have argued that talks between the Spanish 
government and ETA were necessary without Zapatero’s agreement, and Currin responded 
that my interpretation was correct in his view. He added that the nature of the personalities 
who took part in the Aiete Conference also proved that the event had the approval of the 
Spanish government. Currin concluded that the Spanish government would hardly refuse 
to talk to ETA after such personalities’ request. 638 
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 Currin’s observations and expectations of the time were consistent with what some 
anonymous sources contend now about a secret and non-signed agreement between the 
Spanish government and ETA. According to these sources, the Spanish government even 
agreed to release some prisoners with grave illness before the Aiete Conference, but they 
failed to fulfill this supposed commitment. According to a source close to the Abertzale 
Left, only two days after ETA’s announcement an official delegation of ETA was in Oslo 
under the protection of the Norwegian government, waiting for representatives of the 
Spanish to contact them, according to what had been secretly agreed on, and following the 
Aiete Declaration proposals. 
However, Zapatero seemed to have decided not to make any move as elections were 
coming in only a month. The international mediators involved in the Basque peace effort 
expected that Zapatero’s government would establish a contact with the ETA delegation in 
Oslo, and would take some steps to release ill prisoners and transfer some prisoners to jails 
close to the Basque Country, despite the awareness that a single month gave a very narrow 
margin for any action.639 Yet, Zapatero acted strictly according to his statement, i.e. that 
the management of the new situation would be a responsibility of the new government. 
Ramón Jauregui, minister of the Presidency in Zapatero’s cabinet at the time, gives an 
explanation of that inaction: 
Why [did we not do anything]? Because our government was over. Democratic 
rules do not allow to make such decisions. The announcement [of ETA] came in 
                                                          





the midst of the electoral campaign.  (…) Once defeated, a government must subject 
to consultation with the winning party on any important decision. (…) It was not 
possible to do anything, and I believe we did not have any intention and any 
commitment to do anything.640 
 As expected, the leader of the PP Mariano Rajoy won elections in November. He 
was named president of the government in December 2011. On January 10, 2012, the new 
Home minister Jorge Fernández Díaz had a two-hour-long private meeting with the former 
president Zapatero. News reporting that the meeting was fully devoted to a disclosure of 
information about all the steps taken by the government to facilitate the end of ETA’s 
campaign, including the establishment of a framework for dialogue in Oslo with the 
acquiescence of the government of Norway, was never denied.641 However, the Rajoy 
government never made any significant move to fulfill what Zapatero’s government had 
supposedly agreed on with the international facilitators and, indirectly, with ETA. Rajoy’s 
official approach has been that the government is not supposed to do anything until the 
total disarmament and dissolution of ETA. In March 2013, after some unconfirmed news 
reporting that ETA’s delegation had been expelled from Norway after having waited there 
for months, the armed group published a statement confirming the news, disclosing some 
information about an agreed establishment of a negotiation framework, and denouncing 
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that the Spanish government was failing to fulfill their commitments. According to ETA’s 
communiqué: 
- The formation of ETA’s delegation and the creation of the dialogue table, was a 
result of the commitments taken by the Spanish government and ETA, before 
ETA’s decision and under the protection of certain international actors. Its aim was 
to set the agenda for the resolution of the consequences of the conflict through 
dialogue and negotiation. ETA has fulfilled all its commitments on that road-map. 
Meanwhile, Spain’s Government has not fulfilled them and, to the astonishment of 
all involved international actors, renounced to all its commitments after the 
announcement of ETA’s decision. (…). 
- The Spanish government formed after the November 2011 elections was informed 
about all the developments on the resolution process from the very beginning. The 
Spanish Government knew well that the dialogue space to address the consequences 
of the conflict was ready and that ETA had the commitment to carry it to the end. 
(…) 
- ETA has also informed the French government about its commitment and has 
presented specific and courageous proposals and offers to promote the 
opportunities for the resolution process. The French government, despite 
recognising the strength of the proposals, has decided to align with the Spanish 
Government’s stubborn lack of willingness, leaving any steps in the hands of the 





- ETA usually deals with the issues related to the negotiation front with due 
discretion. However, faced with leaks and intoxication which only aim to damage 
the process, ETA has seen the need of giving clarifications, for Basque citizens to 
have direct knowledge of these facts.642 
Testimonies by the Basque PP leader Iñaki Oyarzabal on the matter does not 
confirm all ETA’s claims, but his account is fully compatible with what the armed group 
revealed in March 2013. Besides being the secretary general of the Basque branch of the 
PP, Oyarzabal was a member of the executive committee of the Spanish PP. Oyarzabal 
acknowledges that, as far as he knows, there was an exchange of messages between ETA 
and the Zapatero’s cabinet in 2011; the legalization of Bildu has to be understood in that 
context, and Zapatero shared all information on the matter with the Home minister of 
Rajoy’s cabinet in December 2011. 
In the beginning of 2012 they started to get in touch with us, saying that we needed 
to talk. The Government says it was not going to Oslo. (…) The new government 
maintained some of the officials of Rubalcaba at the Home Ministry so that there 
was some continuity. The government did not totally break with the previous 
government policy, but was not committed to the previous government. The 
government did not ever pledge to maintain Oslo. We said that very clearly. That 
was said to ETA. We said that to whom we have to say. We said: ‘The government 
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will not sit down at Oslo.’ They said: ‘It is not necessary to have political 
concessions; we only need to sit down.’ We said: ‘No, the problem is that the 
government cannot sit down there.’ They offered disarmament gestures and these 
kinds of things so that the government sat down around a table. What they needed 
was to legitimize themselves sitting down around the table with the PP government. 
And the government did not give them that. They spent almost a year in Oslo, 
without assuming that we were not going to Oslo.643 
Jaime Mayor Oreja, a Home minister under Aznar, believes that there is “a conflict 
resolution process,” agreed upon between Zapatero and ETA, in place. According to Mayor 
Oreja, in the early and mid-2000s Zapatero and ETA tried to implement a “negotiation 
process.” After its collapse, they agreed on “a conflict resolution process” which led to the 
announcement of ETA in October 2011. The legalization of Bildu and the organization of 
the Aiete Conference were part of that resolution process, according to the former minister, 
who is very critical of the current management of the end of ETA by the government led 
by his party. “How is the current government [of the PP] participating [in this process]? I 
do not know. I do not care to know and I do not want to say, because it will not do me any 
good.”644 Maite Pagazaurtundua, a prominent member of ETA’s victims associations, does 
not believe that ETA’s decision was unilateral.  
I do not know what they agreed on, but I know: something did happen. And it seems 
that the members of the PP accepted that, or they looked away. What happened? 
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With the legalization [of Bildu] and some other criteria they created a general 
framework, because many things happened and all were very meaningful, all in the 
same direction. (…) There is a choreography. It is not as ugly as in 2005, but I do 
not like it at all.”645   
Asked whether the Zapatero government somehow agreed on a dialogue scenario 
through international facilitators with ETA, Rodolfo Ares denies it: “No.” However, he 
acknowledges there was some indirect communication. 
There were people from the international arena who maintained an open channel 
with ETA. These people sent messages informing that ETA would be willing to 
initiate a path toward a decision to abandon terrorism. Therefore, in that message 
exchange we verified that it could certainly be the way, and we consider that they 
would have the necessity of a conference such as Aiete because it could be a sort 
of platform that could facilitate them to make that decision. That is why we enabled 
Aiete.646   
 Ortuzar, leader of the PNV, has information about the role of the international 
facilitators and the contacts with ETA to facilitate the definitive cessation, although he only 
suggest at them. 
The Abertzale Left had its own channel with Zapatero. There were some 
agreements. A while ago, they [the Abertzale Left] complained that the change of 
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government prevented the commitments and the moves that were supposed to be 
made from being fulfilled. I believe it had to do with ill prisoners and some 
transfers. We know that Rubalcaba had a file with each of the prisoners—how each 
was regarded, what treatment each could have.”647 
The conference of Aiete needs to be regarded in the same context, according to Ortuzar: 
There was not any negotiation with the powers of the state, there was not amnesty… 
So, they [the Abertzale Left] needed some water to swallow all this [the definitive 
cessation]. What? An international recognition. It is to say: you do not sit down 
with a three-star general of the Spanish Army, but you sit down with Kofi Annan. 
(…) You have your peace conference.648   
 Eugenio Etxebeste has for sure privileged information from the Abertzale Left. He 
asserts that there were some “commitments” between Zapatero and ETA. “There were not 
signed commitments, but commitments showing willingness to international mediators; 
reasoned and reasonable commitments about dialogue scenarios,” such as Aiete and Oslo. 
He believes that Zapatero engaged personally but was not backed by his own party, his 
own cabinet, and the state.  
Zapatero made a personal gamble. He tried to weave an irreversible cobweb. That 
was his intention: to leave a sediment that would be difficult for his succesors to 
remove. That’s why legalization came, and Oslo. I mean, he did not engage in the 
                                                          






contents’ resolution, but he did engage in creating scenarios. In addition, there was 
a minimum commitment by the PP that they would endorse the continuation of 
what Zapatero did. A commitment that the subsequent president would respect what 
the previous did. It was said that there was a personal relationship between Zapatero 
and Rajoy. But it happened like always. The government-management 
commitments were overcome by the state-management commitments. (...) The 
state did not agree with what Zapatero was doing. (...) A person [Zapatero] had 
wanted to make history as a statesman, but he did not have the backing of either his 
party and the state.649         
 There is little doubt that ETA and the Spanish government agreed on some 
commitments through indirect dialogue in 2011. Actors from the PSOE, the PP, the PNV, 
and the Abertzale Left believe that the legalization of Bildu, the Aiete Conference, and the 
establishment of an ETA delegation in Oslo were consequences of those commitments. 
The coalition Bildu could participate in elections because the Spanish Constitutional Court 
reversed by a 6-5 majority the previous judgment by the Supreme Court. It was not a 
government decision. However, the government could have promised to international 
facilitators that the executive would do all in their power to facilitate that outcome. The 
Spanish government did not officially take part in the Aiete Conference, but all 
interviewees that had been asked on the matter interpret that such an event with such 
participants could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the government. In 
addition, a testimony by a French senator suggests that the Spanish Home minister knew 
                                                          





in advance the specific day of ETA’s announcement. Regarding the establishment of an 
ETA delegation in Oslo, the armed group itself alleged that an agreed dialogue space was 
dismantled because the Spanish and French government did not engage in talks. Some 
interviewees from the Abertzale Left and the PP, with knowledge on the matter, had 
expressly confirmed that a delegation of ETA had been waiting for the Spanish government 
to initiate a dialogue in Oslo. 
In sum, the definitive end of ETA’s armed activity had not been a consequence of 
any political negotiations, but a peacebuilding effort—based on multilateral dialogue 
which eventually enabled an ambiguous non-signed agreement between the Spanish 
government and the Basque insurgent group—had facilitated the implementation of ETA’s 






5. Narratives from the media (2007-2011) 
5.1. The communicative construction of ETA 
1980 was the deadliest year regarding ETA’s attacks. The Basque group killed almost a 
hundred people that year. The first month, ETA killed eight people in eight different 
attacks. A businessman on January 5th, a retired Civil Guard on 9th, a military man on 
10th, a Civil Guard on 14th, a salesman on 19th, a bar proprietor on 23th, another civilian 
on 25th, and a policeman on January 27th. Not all attacks were big news in the newspapers 
of the time. Depending on the circumstances and the profile of the victims, some of the 
attacks were a small piece of news in the front pages.650 All attacks were reported with 
surgical descriptive style: what happened, where, when, and how.651 Three decades later, 
when ETA committed its last killings on July 30, 2009, the attack was the only news of the 
front pages of most of the Basque and Spanish newspapers, and all publications devoted 
several full pages to the event. The contents and style of most of the pieces were very far 
from the descriptive nature of the pieces in the 1980s. The evil of the killers and the 
complicity of their political supporters were remarked not only in the opinion pages. 
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tiros el dueño de un bar en Baracaldo” (Egin, January 1, 1980); “Dos encapuchados asesinan al enterrador 
de Vergara” (El Diario Vasco, January 26, 1980); “Patrulla de Policía, ametrallada” (La Hoja del Lunes, 





The news coverage on ETA and the Basque conflict have evolved over time in 
connection to the evolution of the political context. The publication of information on 
attacks committed by rebel armed groups has universally provoked doubts given that the 
perpetrators usually carry out such attacks with propagandistic purposes, seeking media 
coverage of their actions. The armed groups purposely provoke events in order to produce 
news. In the case of ETA, the idea that the media should silence information on its attacks 
emerged from the political sphere in the 1970s, but it was widely rejected in the name of 
the protection of the right to information.652 Since silence of the media was not feasible 
and ETA’s campaign had an important propagandistic component, political authorities 
encouraged the media outlets to agree and maintain a common information policy in 
accordance with the fight against terrorism. 
The first attempts to homogenize the information policy arose in 1983, when the 
Spanish government led by the socialist Felipe Gonzalez proposed the media outlets to 
follow some criteria in accordance with the anti-terrorist policies,653 but those 
recommendations would not been followed at the time.654 In 1985, the Basque Parliament 
approved a Decalogue aiming to improve the fight against ETA, in which it asked the media 
to collaborate “spreading the values of mutual respect, tolerance, and the rejection of 
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violence and terrorism.”655 When the Ajuria Enea Pact was signed in 1988, the 
“information professionals” were mentioned among the actors with responsibility in the 
process of pacification.656 The divisive line between ‘demócratas’ and ‘violentos’ had a 
direct reflection in the coverage of events related to the Basque conflict. Most of the media 
adopted an active role in harmony with the Ajuria Enea Pact philosophy. A specific study 
on the reflection of the Ajuria Enea Pact on the media concluded that the information 
outlets reinforced the discourse dividing the Basque society between “a democratic 
majority and a violent minority.” The authors of this research contend that Basque 
journalism overall did not offer an independent interpretation of the reality and, rather than 
contributing with a discourse for a distention, mainly acted in harmony with the dynamics 
of polarization.657  
Antoni Batista examined “the journalistic construction of ETA” during the Ajuria 
Enea Pact period, based on the analysis of 960 pieces published in the Spanish media from 
1987 and 1997. He concluded that, overall, basic principles of journalism were sacrificed 
in the information about ETA in order to construct a specific discourse about the Basque 
group. Batista concluded that the following narrative could be inferred from the 
information about ETA published by the mainstream Spanish media from 1987 to 1997: 
the Basque conflict is provoked by a gang of criminals who are immersed in serious internal 
divisions and are being crashed by great police successes and, therefore, will demise in a 
                                                          
655 Armentia and Caminos, “Press and terrorism,” 150-151. 
656 Ibid., 150-151. 
657 Jose Inazio Armentia et al., Ajuria Enea Ituna mezubideetan: Bakerako bidea ala aztoramen iturria? 





reasonable period of time.658 In short, during the period studied by Batista the Spanish 
mainstream media adopted a belligerent attitude toward ETA and what they considered 
their supporters, and shaped the conflict as an issue of criminality. 
That belligerent stance would significantly increase in a later period. Armentia and 
Caminos observed an important change in the media coverage of ETA attacks right after 
the killing of the PP councilman Miguel Angel Blanco in July 1997. Based on the analysis 
of the coverage of ETA killings during 1990, 2000, and 2009 in four newspapers,659 they 
concluded that the kidnapping and killing of the PP councilor provoked a turning point in 
the nature of the information on ETA’s actions. From 1997 onward the mainstream media 
developed the awareness that they could play an essential role against ETA, and that reports 
on their activity had to be an effective anti-terrorism instrument.660 That change was 
reflected in a considerable increase in the number of pages devoted to the attacks, as well 
as in a bigger space given to them on the front pages. Moreover, interpretative titling 
replaced the more descriptive style of the past, and graphic material showing the havoc 
caused by the attacks was increasingly used.661 The principles of this belligerent 
informative policy against terrorism were made explicit in a document approved by the 
board of directors of the Spanish public television and radio network, Radio Television 
Española (RTVE), in January 2002. This document recommended the media leaders and 
reporters to establish “appropriate self-monitoring of information” when dealing with 
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information related to terrorist activities, “particularly in the case of a clash between the 
freedoms and right of citizens to be informed, and the respect for judicial and police 
proceedings required by the legal system.”662 The board of RTVE warns that “the aseptic 
coverage supposedly equidistant between terrorists and democrats provoked an effect 
contrary to objectivity.”663  
Idoyaga and Ramírez de la Piscina called “mediatic anti-terrorism” this dominant 
reporting model more engaged with counterterrorism policies than with the principles of 
journalism. Based on the analysis of the front pages and the leading editorials of eleven 
newspapers from September 1998 to March 2000,664 they concluded that the dominant 
approach in the mainstream media at the end of the 1990s had the following features: 
limitless vehemence in the explanations, shameless partiality when characterizing actors, 
and reckless disregard when analyzing the problem. They noted that this “mediatic anti-
terrorism” dominant in the Spanish media subordinate the editorial policy and journalist 
activity to the raison d’état and to the state policies. According to Idoyaga and Ramírez de 
la Piscina, this “mediatic anti-terrorism” was reflected in the following attitudes: their main 
source of the information regarding the Basque conflict was the government, and they very 
often turned into propagandists of the government theory about the reality; they did not 
cover information which could damage the position of the government in their fight against 
ETA; they denied the existence of any political problem and, furthermore, they identified 
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Basque nationalists’ claims with terrorism, and Spanish Constitution with democracy.665 
As pointed by Idoyaga and Ramírez de la Piscina, the informative belligerency against 
ETA turned into belligerency against Basque nationalism, especially after the process of 
Lizarra-Garazi in the late 1990s. 
A study of the media coverage on the Basque conflict by the Catalonian press at 
the late 1990s and early 2000s showed that there was a significant shift in the perspective 
offered by the press after the process of Lizarra-Garazi (1998-1999). According to Xicoy, 
contrary to what happened in the two previous decades, from the late 1990s the news on 
the Basque conflict were more about politics than about violence, even during the ETA 
offensive in the early 2000s. The Basque nationalists’ attempt of a joint strategy was behind 
that shift on the media coverage.666 A research on the media coverage on the Ibarretxe in 
2001-2006 provides in its conclusions a telling distinctions among the newspapers 
published in the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Madrid. While the studied Basque 
newspapers (Deia, El Correo, and Gara) acknowledge the existence of a political conflict 
and the need for political measures for its resolution, the Catalan newspapers (El Periódico 
and La Vanguardia) present the existence of a conflict of competencies in the whole State, 
and the Madrid press (El País and ABC) deny the existence of any political conflict.667 
Mathieu Crettenand, who researched the press role in the Basque conflict during the years 
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of the Ibarretxe plan and the 2005-2007 peace process, concluded that media outlets and 
journalists are actors of the conflict rather than story tellers of the facts of the conflict. 
According to Crettenand, the extreme polarization of the political debate heavily influence 
the newspapers’ contents: “Identity anchorages and ETA’s violence bring the journalists 
to practice their profession according to the dictates of political parties engaged in the 
conflict.”668    
Iñaki Egaña and Giovanni Giacopuzzi note that the 9/11 attacks in 2001 were a 
turning point in the widening of the concept of terrorism and, consequently, in the 
communication and political trend promoted by Spanish institutions and media 
organizations to identify “the enemy.”669 They contend that not only ETA was treated as 
“the enemy,” but also the Basque education system, the Basque language, finance 
institutions, church hierarchy, etc.  According to Egaña and Giacopuzzi, the end of ETA’s 
violent activity has not stopped this “model of construction of the enemy.” ETA does not 
act since October 2011, but Egaña and Giacopuzzi note that the Spanish institutions and 
media outlets still need an enemy, and they need to continue constructing it. Accordingly, 
the Spanish authorities and the mainstream media have continued to spread the idea that 
the armed conflict with ETA is still active. 670   
That could be one of the keys to understand the media coverage of the event 
analyzed in this section. ETA has gradually disappeared from the Basque and Spanish 
political scenario, but some media have resisted acknowledging this significant change. 
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The once belligerency against ETA has turned into a belligerency against the political 
actors who share the main objective of the armed group, the independence of the Basque 
Country. 
5.2. Press coverage of the ending process 
5.2.1. Sample selection for the study 
Following the methodology already explained in section 2.3.5., I have analyzed the 
information pieces of the printed editions of seven newspapers about twelve selected events 
during the period studied in this research, from 2007 to 2011. Four of the newspapers are 
published in the Basque Country: El Correo, Deia, Gara, and Berria. Three of the 
newspapers are published in Madrid: El País, El Mundo, and ABC.  
El Correo is the best-selling daily newspaper in the Basque Country. Founded in 
1910 under the name El Pueblo Vasco, it merged with El Correo Español in 1938, and 
finally adopted the name of El Correo. It belongs to the group Vocento, which has a total 
of thirteen Spanish newspapers, most of them of regional scope. El Correo is a conservative 
newspaper, monarchist, advocate of the Spanish constitutional system and critical of 
Basque nationalism. According to the OJD,671 El Correo had an average circulation of 
82,943 copies in 2013.672 As for the number of readers, the survey company CIES 
estimated that it had an average of 465,000 readers the same year.673 El Correo is the best-
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selling newspaper in Araba and Bizkaia, and it also has an edition for the western part of 
Gipuzkoa. 
Deia was founded in 1977 promoted by prominent members of the Basque 
Nationalist Party (PNV). It is considered a publication close to this political party. Presently 
Deia is edited and distributed mainly in Bizkaia. Deia belongs to Grupo Noticias, which 
publishes three other newspapers for Araba, Gipuzkoa, and Navarre.674 Deia had an 
average distribution of 14,203 copies in 2013 according to OJD, and an estimation of 
105,000 readers by CIES. 
Gara was founded in 1999 financed by popular subscription triggered by the 
judicial shut down of the newspaper Egin in July 1997 for its alleged affinity with ETA. 
Gara came to occupy the vacuum left by Egin. It is published in Donostia and distributed 
in all the Basque Country. Gara chose not to be audited by OJD. In 2013, CIES estimated 
that Gara had an average of 104,000 readers. 
Berria is the only daily newspaper published entirely in Basque. It was founded in 
June 2003 after the judicial closure of Egunkaria in February 2003. Egunkaria was founded 
in 1990 promoted by a plural platform of the Basque society and financed by popular 
subscription. Berria was founded by the staff and workers of Egunkaria, and occupied the 
same sociological space. Berria’s main headquarters is in Andoain (Gipuzkoa), and it is 
                                                          





distributed in all the Basque Country. It is not audited by the OJD. CIES estimated that 
Berria had an average of 63,000 readers in 2013. 
 El País, El Mundo, and ABC are the best-selling general information newspapers 
in Spain. All three are published in Madrid and distributed in all Spain. El País was founded 
in 1976 and quickly became the best-selling general information newspaper in Spain. El 
País is considered a center-left oriented newspaper. In 2013, El País had an average 
circulation of 359.809 copies in Spain, according to the OJD, and an estimation of 89,000 
readers in the four Basque territories. 
El Mundo was founded in 1989 and, although it was center-left oriented in its 
origins, evolved toward center-right positions since the mid-1990s. In 2013, El Mundo had 
an average circulation of 248,463 copies in Spain, and CIES estimated it had an average of 
38,000 readers in the Basque territories.  
Founded in 1903, ABC is one of the oldest newspapers in Spain. Since 2001 ABC 
belongs to the Grupo Vocento. It is a conservative, monarchist newspaper, close to the 
political positions of the PP. In 2013, it had an average circulation of 198,347 copies in 
Spain.   
In this study, the main pieces on twelve selected events of the researched period in 
each of the seven chosen newspapers have been analyzed. These events have been selected 
for their importance and influence on the development of the process toward the end of 





1- A press conference by Arnaldo Otegi and 13 other members of the Abertzale 
Left on March 16, 2009. That was the first press briefing of Otegi since he left 
the prison in August 2008.  
2- The attack by ETA in Majorca on July 30, 2009, in which two Spanish Civil 
Guards were killed. That was the last premeditated deadly attack of the Basque 
group.   
3- The arrest of Otegi and other members of the leadership of Batasuna on October 
13, 2009, when they had just started to distribute the report with their strategic 
proposal to be debated within the social base of the Abertzale Left.   
4- The release of the document with the conclusions of the internal debate of the 
Abertzale Left on February 16, 2010. 
5- The killing of the French gendarme in a clash with ETA members in Paris on 
March 16, 2010. It was the last killing by the Basque group.    
6-  The announcement by ETA on September 5, 2010 of the decision of ceasing 
all “offensive attacks.” It was considered a temporary and ambiguous halt, as 
the armed group did specify that it was a ceasefire.  
7- The announcement of a “permanent, verifiable and general ceasefire” by ETA 
on January 10, 2011 as requested by the endorsers of the Brussels and Gernika 
declarations. 
8- The presentation of the charter of a new political party, Sortu, on February 7, 
2011 in which the Abertzale Left publicly manifested a rejection to the use of 





9- The seizure of 850 kilograms of explosives in a farm house of an alleged 
member of ETA, arrested on April 12, 2011 in Legorreta (Gipuzkoa).  
10- The decision by the Spanish Constitutional Court on May 5, 2011 to allow the 
coalition Bildu to participate in local and regional elections. 
11- The international conference in Donostia with the participation of Kofi Annan 
and other prominent political figures, on October 17, 2011, where they 
demanded ETA to end its armed activity and the Spanish and French 
government to engage in a process. 
12- The announcement by ETA on October 20, 2011 of the definitive cessation of 
its armed activity. 
5.2.2. The contents of the news 
5.2.2.1. The starting point of the internal fight 
According to later accounts by the involved actors, the press conference on March 16, 2009 
by Arnaldo Otegi and other members of the Abertzale Left was the visualization of the 
beginning of an internal struggle within the Abertzale Left. Some discussions among some 
cadres had already started, but the real debate on divergent strategic reports were about to 
come. At that point, Otegi and his associates wanted to make public that they were willing 
to adopt “an effective strategy,” with no more clarifications. That conference was 
especially significant because, since Otegi was released in August 2008, it was the first 
time that he appeared speaking in the name of the Abertzale Left, surrounded by prominent 





Gara highlighted that fact. This newspaper remarked several times that the group 
who gave the conference was a “broad” and “agglutinant” representation of the “plurality” 
of the “whole” Abertzale Left, formed by members of “diverse generations of militants.” 
Nevertheless, Gara did not give any hint about the internal process which was about to 
kick off. The information was limited to what Otegi said, and the spokesperson disguised 
his real proposal for an internal debate with an external call to other pro-independence 
forces to discuss and agree an “effective strategy.” Gara highlighted the importance of the 
conference because of their representativeness, but it did not disclose the real, and at the 
time hidden context of the briefing.675 Berria and El Correo also remarked that Otegi was 
surrounded by significant members of the Abertzale Left. Berria limited the information 
to what was said in the conference without providing any additional context, and remarking 
the call for a strategic debate to all pro-independence forces.676 El Correo shaped Otegi’s 
message as an effort of the Abertzale Left to return to political arena after the regional 
elections in which they could not participate, and concluded that there was not anything 
new in his discourse— “Otegi used the same rhetoric as in previous processes.”677 Deia 
focused its information on the announcement of Otegi that they would initiate contacts with 
some Basque nationalist forces, but excluding the PNV.678 The newspapers edited in 
Madrid did not give much importance to the press conference. El País, El Mundo and ABC 
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briefly reported that Otegi proposed to form a united front of Basque nationalists, and all 
three included the reply of the leader of Aralar, Patxi Zabaleta, who argued that the end of 
ETA’s violence was a condition for that unity.679  
In summary, none of the analyzed newspapers gave their readers any clue about the 
real context of Otegi’s move. The leader of Batasuna shaped its call for an effective strategy 
in a context of an intended collaboration with other pro-independence forces, and not in a 
context of a need to change the Abertzale Left’s strategy, as he later explained it should 
have been understood. It was too soon for Otegi to talk clearly, and even sooner for the 
press to report about what was happening behind the scenes. 
5.2.2.2. The last premeditated killings by ETA 
ETA killed two Spanish civil guards exploding a bomb placed under their car in the island 
of Majorca, a holiday resort of the Spanish royal family, on July 30, 2009. Two days earlier, 
ETA exploded a powerful bomb and provoked important damages in the headquarters of 
the Civil Guard in Burgos. Now we know that it was the last premeditated killing by ETA, 
but at the time there was not any indication that the campaign of the Basque group was 
ending. The internal debate about the continuation of the armed struggle within the 
Abertzale Left, at the time limited to some cadres, was already taking place, and ETA´s 
attacks were likely to condition that debate, but the media was not aware of it yet. 
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In fact, some newspapers framed the attack in Majorca as another step of a big 
offensive by ETA. ABC remarked that ETA intensified its offensive to force another 
negotiation.680 El País stressed that ETA was in full offensive, and also noticed that they 
were able to do it after their leadership was recently and subsequently crashed.681 Deia 
pointed out that ETA “confirmed its insane offensive” with the attack in Majorca.682 El 
Correo headline was that ETA was challenging the State.683 El Mundo and Gara remarked 
the capacity showed by ETA. El Mundo highlighted that the attack was committed in the 
island of Majorca, titling in the front page that ETA showed “its assassin power in the 
summer resort of the King.”684 Gara noted that it was the second attack against the Spanish 
Civil Guard in 34 hours, and that the attack in Majorca caused an aerial and maritime 
blockade.685 Berria, in contrast, chose a descriptive headline: ETA killed two civil guards 
in Majorca, bombing their car.686 
Reading the news of the time, nothing was indicative that the killings were the final 
deadly attack of the Basque group. On the contrary, the media seemed to have elements to 
interpret that it was part of a sustained offensive of the armed group. Some of them might 
have had information on the conclusions of the ETA assembly in favor of the continuation 
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of armed struggle to force a negotiation, and it would be only logic to conclude that the 
attacks in Burgos and Majorca were part of it. The publicly known political context did not 
give any hint indicating that the questioning of the armed struggle within the Abertzale 
Left had advanced as much as had already done behind the scenes. The Basque and the 
Spanish media, like the society, were expecting a continuation of ETA’s actions.      
5.2.2.3. The arrest of the leadership of Batasuna 
Arnaldo Otegi, Rafa Díez and the rest of the members of the Abertzale Left arrested on 
October 13, 2009 explained in their public trial that, at the time of the police operation, 
they were organizing an internal debate, which eventually led the Abertzale Left to end 
their political-military strategy. In fact, the very day of their arrests they had just started 
distributing among the social base the strategic report which advocated for an end to armed 
struggle. Nevertheless, the judge of the Audiencia Nacional who ordered the detentions, 
Baltasar Garzón, accused Otegi and his affiliates of re-organizing the leadership of the 
outlawed Batasuna under ETA’s orders. 
The newspapers edited in Madrid assumed the version coming from the Audiencia 
Nacional and the Spanish government, who confirmed the narrative about the re-
organization of the leadership of Batasuna. ABC headline was that the police avoided the 
re-organization of Batasuna, and that the detainees were serving ETA strategy.687 El 
Mundo688 and El País stressed that the “new” leadership of the outlawed Batasuna was 
                                                          
687 D. Martínez and J. Pagola, “La Policía aborta la reorganización de HB en la sede de LAB y caen Otegi y 
Usabiaga,”ABC, October 14, 2009, 18. 
688 Angeles Escrivá, “La Policía detiene a la nueva Mesa de Batasuna en la sede del sindicato LAB,” El 





arrested. El País explained that the judge Garzón prevented “the last attempt” to unite “the 
scattered remains” of the Abertzale Left, and that they were following ETA’s instructions, 
“according to sources of the investigation.”689 El Correo also assumed the narrative 
provided by judicial sources, asserting that the Police prevented the re-foundation of 
Batasuna.690 Deia went further and disclosed information about Otegi’s “discrete activity” 
in order to return to legal politics through “an explicit disassociation from violence,” but 
adding that the police operation was a consequence of the failure of Otegi to drive the 
Abertzale Left to the abandonment of armed struggle. The headline of the main piece was 
very telling: “The State retires the old guard of Batasuna after having noticed they failed 
in face of ETA.”691 Gara reacted to the police operation disclosing some information about 
the internal debate within the Abertzale Left. In the front-page headline, it asserted that the 
Spanish government provoked the detentions in order to abort “the political initiative of 
the Abertzale Left.”692 Inside, the political correspondent Iñaki Iriondo explained that a 
deep internal debate, “without taboos,” was taking place in the Abertzale Left, and that it 
was about to produce its fruits.693 Berria did not assume the judicial version that the 
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detainees were re-organizing the leadership of Batasuna as true, and shaped the arrests as 
“an attack” against the Abertzale Left.694 
In sum, the arrest of the promoters of the internal debate within the Abertzale Left 
triggered the release of information hidden until then. Some of the media, most notably 
Deia among the newspapers studied here, disclosed information about a supposedly failed 
attempt of Otegi and those arrested with him to force the abandonment of political-military 
strategy. According to this information, Otegi and his group lost the internal battle, and 
once the Spanish authorities arrived at that conclusion, decided to arrest them. Now that 
the outcome of the internal process within the Abertzale Left is known, it seems that the 
first part of that information was true (they wanted to led a strategic shift), but the second 
part was untrue (they lost the internal struggle). In contrast, Gara began a gradual disclose 
of the information about the internal debate, including the online publication of the 
strategic report promoted by the detainees. Berria also gave credibility to the narrative of 
a deep internal debate promoted by the detainees that was taking place in the Abertzale 
Left, although it did not provide as much information as Gara.                
5.2.2.4. The end of the internal debate 
A press release in the name of the Abertzale Left announced the end of the internal debate 
on February 15, 2010, and provided the media a summary of the conclusions. The 
newspapers Gara and Berria had access to the entire document compiling the conclusions, 
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and both published it in full. Both newspapers gave great importance to the event. It was 
the main headline of the two front pages, and both devoted four full pages to the issue. It 
seems that they understood that the conclusions of the internal debate of the Abertzale Left 
were a game changer in Basque politics, because the social base of the movement decided 
to abandon the political-military strategy, which should eventually mean the end of ETA’s 
armed struggle. Nevertheless, none of the two newspapers specifically asserted it in the 
headlines, or in the narrative of the main pieces of the news. Using the same terminology 
of the document, Gara highlighted that the Abertzale Left assemblies ratified that “the 
unique instruments and guarantee to advance” were “the political struggle and the popular 
support.”695 Which meant that armed struggle was not an instrument or guarantee anymore, 
but the newspaper did not dare to assert it expressly. Similarly, Berria headline was that 
the Abertzale Left would put “all struggle means” to serve “the accumulation of forces;” 
the two subtitles of the front page clarified that they decided that “the only instruments” in 
the “the democratic process” would be “mass struggle, institutional struggle, and 
ideological struggle,” and that the Abertzale Left committed itself to “exclusively political 
and democratic means.”696 The only express mention to the abandonment of armed struggle 
came in the fourth paragraph of an additional analytical piece signed by a political 
correspondent, Pello Urzelai.697 
                                                          
695 “Las asambleas de Batasuna ratifican que los únicos instrumentos y garantía de avance son la lucha 
política y el apoyo popular,” Gara, February 16, 2010, 1; Iñaki Iriondo, “La izquierda abertzale reafirma su 
estrategia exclusivamente política y la necesidad de un partido legal,” Gara, February 16, 2010, 2. 
696 Pello Urzelai, “Borroka molde guztiak indar metaketaren mesedetan jarriko ditu ezker abertzaleak,” 
Berria, February 16, 2010, 2. 





 The rest of the newspapers reported on the conclusion of the debate from a critical 
and skeptical perspective. Deia highlighted that the Abertzale Left concluded their debate 
“without an express disassociation from ETA.”698 Similarly, El Correo noted that they 
ratified their commitment for political means, “but without mentioning ETA.”699 El País’ 
headline was that the Abertzale Left “concluded where it started,” meaning that the 
conclusions of the debate where already announced at the beginning of the debate, and they 
still did not make any demand on ETA.700 El Mundo suggested that the supposed 
commitment for political means came late, emphasizing that the Abertzale Left appealed 
“now” to non-violence.701 ABC did not even devote any headline to the event, and included 
a few lines in a piece about some arrests of suspect collaborators of the Basque armed 
group, which proved “ETA’s plans to continue killing.”702   
 None of the analyzed newspapers provided their readers the real sense of the event. 
The two newspapers who gave credibility to the conclusions of the Abertzale Left failed to 
translate the euphemistic terminology of the Abertzale Left stressing in their headlines that 
the social base of the Abertzale Left had supported the proposal to abandon armed struggle. 
It might be too soon for the Abertzale Left to write it down in their documents, but it should 
not be for the newspapers. The rest of the newspapers failed to understand, or to 
acknowledge, the importance of the move of the Abertzale Left, and they emphasized the 
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absence of any express requirement to ETA, when what was instrumental was the obvious 
implicit decision. 
5.2.2.5. The killing of a gendarme 
Members of ETA killed a gendarme, Jean-Serge Nerin, on March 16, 2010, near Paris. It 
was the first time in history that the Basque group killed a French policeman. It was not a 
premeditated attack, but a clash triggered when French agents faced some ETA members 
who were trying to commit a car robbery. It was a month after the Abertzale Left had 
announced that their social base supported the end of armed struggle, and more than seven 
months after ETA committed its last killings in Spain.  
 None of the analyzed newspapers questioned the authorship of ETA. Gara and 
Berria reported that a French policeman died in shootout with ETA members,703 and the 
rest of the newspapers asserted that ETA murdered a French policeman. All noted that it 
was the first time that the Basque group killed a French public agent, but only those 
published in Madrid suggested that it could mean a change in ETA’s criterion of not 
committing attacks in France. El País, El Mundo and ABC agreed on the mention of “a 
qualitative leap” in ETA’s praxis.704 El Mundo even pointed out that it meant “an explicit 
challenge to the French state,” and ABC stressed that it was a turning point. 
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 Basque newspapers reacted with prudence to the killing of the gendarme Nerin. 
Gara and Berria chose to stress that the police officer died as a consequence of gunfire in 
a context of a shootout, suggesting that it was unintended and, therefore, ETA was not 
challenging the conclusions of the internal debate of the Abertzale Left. Deia and El Correo 
neither suggested that it could mean the armed group had decided to continue their armed 
campaign.705 Only the newspapers edited in Madrid, especially El Mundo and ABC, 
suggested that the killing of the gendarme might have been the starting point of a new 
policy of committing attacks even in French territory.             
5.2.2.6. Halt of offensive attacks 
ETA announced on September 5, 2010 that they had decided to cease “offensive armed 
attacks” several months ago. Five months earlier, international personalities required ETA 
a “permanent, verifiable and unilateral ceasefire” through what was known as the Brussels 
declaration. Soon after, the political leadership of the Abertzale Left had endorsed the 
Brussels declaration. However, the videotaped declaration sent by ETA to the BBC and 
Gara did not expressly mention the word “ceasefire.” It was just a halt of “offensive armed 
attacks,” which sounded like a temporary decision, far from the permanency asked by 
international actors and the Abertzale Left. 
 Gara, one of the recipients of the videotaped declaration, and Berria treated the 
event as if it was the expected ceasefire. They emphasized the fact that ETA had decided 
to cease its actions, and did not note that the armed group did not entirely comply yet what 
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the Abertzale Left and many others had already demanded.706 The rest of the newspapers 
acted more reluctantly, to different degrees. Deia highlighted that ETA decided not to 
commit more attacks “but maintained the uncertainty about the end of violence.”707 El 
Correo headline was that ETA announced a cessation but ignored the petition of a 
verifiable ceasefire.708 El País highlighted in the front-page headline that the government 
and the political parties regarded as “insufficient” to ETA’s announcement.709 El Mundo 
stressed that ETA “refused” to declare the ceasefire “required by Batasuna.”710 ABC went 
further and qualified as “false” the cessation, and argued that its objective was enabling the 
participation of the Abertzale Left in elections.711 
 In sum, there were three different approaches regarding the ambiguous ceasefire of 
September 2010. Gara and Berria only highlighted the positive side of the announcement 
of ETA without expressing any reluctance because it did not match what the Brussels 
declaration and the Abertzale Left had demanded. El Correo, Deia, and El País remarked 
the insufficiency of a step forward. El Mundo and ABC presented the information from an 
exclusively negative perspective, as if the announced cessation was bad news. 
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5.2.2.7. The permanent ceasefire 
ETA announced on January 10, 2011 what was required by the Brussels declaration and, 
later at the end of September, by the Gernika declaration: a permanent and verifiable 
ceasefire. Precisely, some media had reproached four months earlier that the Basque group 
did not fulfill the demands of the Brussels declaration as they only announced a halt of 
offensive attacks instead of declaring a permanent ceasefire. Now that ETA had declared 
a ceasefire, the same media did not give ETA any credibility. 
ABC’s front page was devoted to the pictures of the twelve people killed by ETA 
from 2006, with the following headline: “Twelve reasons not to believe ETA.” The inside 
headline regarded the truce as “trap” and “trick,” and the author argued that the 
communiqué had disappointed Batasuna because the ceasefire declaration did not 
expressly mention any intention to end the armed struggle for good.712 El Mundo did not 
go so far, as this newspaper recognized in a subtitle that ETA’s move facilitated Batasuna’s 
strategy. However, the main headline stressed that ETA “dramatized another truce” in 
order “to sneak into elections.” In the inside pages’ headline El Mundo remarked that ETA 
announced a ceasefire “under political conditions,” which was not truthful.713 In contrast, 
El País highlighted the positive side of the news, suggesting that the Basque group’s move 
went in the right direction: “ETA made another step toward its end.”714 None of the Basque 
newspapers were as negative as El Mundo and ABC. Nevertheless, El Correo and Deia 
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showed some reluctance when reporting about the ceasefire. El Correo, instead of devoting 
the main headline of the front page to report the ceasefire, used it to reply to ETA: “The 
Basque Country demands the end of ETA.” Inside, the headline was more informative –it 
said that ETA amplified its truce “but failed to declare it definitive.”715 Deia acknowledged 
it was “a step,” but specified it was not “the step.”716 Berria and Gara, in consistence with 
the credibility given to ETA until then, gave full credibility to the permanent ceasefire 
declared in January 2011.717      
By January 2011, there were many hints to believe that ETA’s move was credible. 
The Abertzale Left publicly demanded from ETA a cessation as the first step for a 
definitive end, which did never happen before. Unlike the halt announced in September 
2010, the ceasefire declared in January 2011 fulfilled all conditions demanded by the 
Brussels and Gernika declarations and, with them, the Abertzale Left. Most of the media 
understood that. A few newspapers such as El Mundo and ABC preferred to ignore all 
evidence, and continued to treat as bad news ETA’s ceasefire. 
5.2.2.8. Rejection of violence by Sortu 
Leaders of the former Batasuna presented on February 7, 2011 the charter of a new political 
party, Sortu. The founding statutes of the new party expressly rejected not only the use of 
violence with political purposes, but specifically the violence of ETA, if the Basque group 
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used it again. They did not condemn ETA’s past actions, but they showed a willingness to 
denounce them in the future, if needed.  
 All analyzed newspapers were consistent with their insofar approach reporting the 
news in connection with the end of ETA’s violence. ABC asserted in the front-page 
headline that “Batasuna” did not condemn ETA. Reading the main headline, it seemed that 
nothing had changed. In the inside headline, however, the reader of ABC could perceive 
that there was something new: “The ‘new’ Batasuna claims to have broken with ETA, but 
it does not condemn it.”718 El Mundo remarked that “the proetarras”719 said “now” that it 
will denounce ETA’s attacks in the future, but did not take responsibility of the past 
violence.720 El País and all the Basque newspapers analyzed here acknowledged and 
remarked the novelty of the move. El País noted in the front page that Batasuna re-invented 
itself by rejecting ETA’s violence.721 Unlike in previous events, El Correo and Deia 
showed no reluctance when reporting on the presentation of the charter of Sortu. El Correo 
remarked in the front page that the Abertzale Left, “for the first time in history,” rejected 
“all violence of ETA.”722 Similarly, Deia reported that the Abertzale Left made “the step,” 
and that had broken with their past.723 Berria stressed the more substantial novelty of the 
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event, and its headline highlighted the rejection of violence by the new party.724 In contrast, 
Gara chose to suggest why the promoters of Sortu went so far in their rejection of ETA, in 
a headline directed to the social base of the Abertzale Left, who might have been surprised 
or uncomfortable with a so-radical rejection of the use of political violence. Front-page 
headline: “The Abertzale Left does not leave any chance to the banning [of political 
parties]”. Inside headline: “The Abertzale Left leaves without juridical arguments the 
banners [of political parties].”725 
 The coverage of the presentation of the charter of Sortu showed a change in some 
of the media. Gradually, the process of the Abertzale Left and ETA toward the 
abandonment of the political-military strategy was gaining credibility. For the first time, 
El País, El Correo, and Deia reported about an announcement of the Abertzale Left without 
adding any ‘but’ in the headlines. The perspective chosen by Gara was also telling. This 
time they preferred to remark the tactical motivations of the Abertzale Left in a pedagogic 
headline to comfort the readers who might be disappointed with the public rejection of 
ETA’s violence.             
5.2.2.9. A seizure of explosives 
The Spanish Civil Guard arrested two brothers and seized 850 kilos of explosives in their 
family farm on April 12, 2011 in Legorreta, a small town in Gipuzkoa. It was one of the 
biggest amounts of explosives seized to ETA. It was three months since the Basque group 
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had declared a “permanent” ceasefire, and two months since the new party of the Abertzale 
Left, Sortu, had announced that it would reject ETA’s violence, if occurred. One of the 
brothers was freed with no charges after three days of detention, and the other was 
imprisoned. 
 Most of the media reported on the seizure of the explosives as if ETA was active. 
ABC went further than any other. It stressed in the headline that ETA was keeping a 
thousand kilos of explosives “in order to kill when they break up the ceasefire.” According 
to ABC’s narrative, the fact that they had so much explosives at hand proved that ETA 
aimed to re-initiate their campaign when it suited them strategically.726 El Mundo asserted 
that the two arrested brothers provided explosives to cells in order to employ them in their 
attacks. There was not any single mention of the ceasefire in the entire piece. A reader 
unaware of the context would conclude that the two brothers were at the time of the arrests 
providing explosives to active ETA cells.727 El Correo did not remind their readers either 
that the Basque group was in a ceasefire in the three full-pages information on the arrests. 
According to one of the subtitles, “the [two] terrorists” constituted “one of the last dormant 
cells” of ETA.728 The pieces of El País and Deia also explained that those arrested were in 
charge of distributing explosives among ETA militants for the commission of attacks, but 
they did not remind that the Basque group was in ceasefire.729 Berria and Gara offered a 
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different perspective of the arrests. Both newspapers emphasized that the sources were the 
Spanish government and some news agencies when they reported on the seizure of 
explosives and the accusations against the arrested brothers, and gave notice of some 
associations’ warning of the risk of torture given that the arrested brothers were under 
incommunicado detention.730         
The most significant conclusion regarding the coverage of the arrests of Legorreta 
is that most of the analyzed newspapers presented the news in a way to suggest that ETA 
was ready—and, in some cases, willing—to use the seized explosives. ABC was the only 
one expressly asserting that the Basque group was willing to re-initiate a campaign, but the 
rest of the publications, except Gara and Berria, provided narratives in which the idea of 
an armed and active group prevailed over the context of an organization who had 
unilaterally declared a “permanent” ceasefire.  
5.2.2.10. The legalization of Bildu 
The Spanish Constitutional Court reversed on May 5, 2011 a previous ruling by the 
Supreme Court banning the coalition Bildu from taking part in local and regional elections 
and, thus, enabled the participation of the new coalition. The legalization or banning of 
Bildu seemed of vital importance for the consolidation of the ending process of ETA. Six 
justices of the Court voted for the legalization, and five for the banning. It was definitive. 
There was no chance for appeals. 
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 The Spanish conservative media reacted very aggressively. ABC headline was that 
the Constitutional Court endorsed the proetarras, i.e. “those in favor of ETA.” It published 
the pictures of all justices of the Court specifying who voted what.731 El Mundo stressed 
that “six justices proposed by the PSOE” legalized “Bildu-Batasuna.”732 El País, El 
Correo, and Deia offered much more descriptive information and headlines on the issue.733 
Berria remarked the positive nature of the news with a big “yes” in the front page, followed 
by a mainly descriptive narrative.734 Gara editorialized on the event from the front page 
headline: “[With] Bildu legal, everybody wins.”735 
 The contrast among the different models of coverage of the legalization of Bildu 
was in accordance with the aggressive political controversy on the matter. The right-wing 
opposition party, the PP, and the most conservative media edited in Madrid shaped a 
discourse equaling Bildu with ETA, and making Zapatero’s government responsible for 
the Constitutional Court’s decision. ABC and El Mundo are examples of the perspective 
adopted by the right-wing media. El Correo, which belongs to the same editorial group as 
ABC, did not take such an aggressive approach, given that the Basque audience was largely 
in favor of the legalization of Bildu. 
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5.2.2.11. The conference of Aiete 
The international conference held in Donostia on October 17, 2011 was a clear signal that 
the definitive end of ETA’s campaign was about to be announced.  The prestige of the 
agents present in the palace of Aiete, led by Kofi Annan, suggested that things were well-
advanced. The participants urged ETA to announce a unilateral end, asked the Spanish and 
French government to talk with the Basque armed group in the event of a definitive 
cessation, and suggested to the Basque political parties to engage in a political dialogue. 
 Unsurprisingly, El Mundo and ABC did not welcome the conference. It was not 
good news at all. The big front-page headline of El Mundo was a reference to the well-
known International Film Festival of Donostia—San Sebastián in Spanish: “The festival 
of San Sebastián.” In the inside pages, the main headline highlighted that the conference 
did not ask for the dissolution of ETA.736 ABC did not use such an irony in its headline 
under the picture of the five international personalities: “In the service of ETA.” In the 
subtitle, ABC explained that the participants assumed the road-map proposed by the 
“terrorist gang.”737 El Correo and El País reported on the conference without criticism, 
emphasizing what the participants demanded.738 Gara chose a long headline to explain that 
ETA was not the only recipient of the Conference demands.739 Deia and Berria gave the 
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news a sense of a positive hope, and a suggestion of an imminence of the end of ETA’s 
campaign. Berria headline was “Three demands for peace.” 740 Deia headline was “Five 
steps to peace,” as the conference statement was structured in five points.741  
 By the time the Aiete conference took place, there were two main approaches 
among the analyzed media. Unlike the coverage of the news at the beginning of the process, 
now most of the newspapers gave credibility to the imminence of the end of ETA’s 
violence, and had abandoned the reluctance showed in an earlier period. El País, Deia and 
El Correo reported on the conference, to some extent, similarly to Berria and Gara, in a 
sense that they gave credibility to the signs of the end of ETA’s campaign. In contrast, El 
Mundo and ABC were the exponents of the sectors who regarded the efforts to facilitate 
the end of ETA as a concession to the armed group.         
5.2.2.12. The definitive end 
On October 20, 2011, ETA announced a historic decision. After 50 years of armed struggle, 
they decided to stop their campaign for good, unilaterally, with no conditions. It was the 
culmination of a process initiated in 2009.   
 It seemed good news for everybody. However, it was not. El Mundo devoted the 
front-page main headline to ETA’s decision, but, reading the content, it did not seem that 
such a big title was justified, as nothing new was highlighted: “ETA flaunts his murders 
and calls upon the Government to negotiate.”742 There were four subtitles on the matter in 
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the front page, but none of them gave the news of the definitive end. ABC gave the news 
of the cessation in one of the subtitles of the front page, but it emphasized what ETA did 
not do in the main headline: “ETA does not dissolve nor surrender weapons.”743 The rest 
of the newspapers caught the historical sense of the moment. They remarked it in their 
headlines and devoted a big amount of pages to cover the event.744 
 Like in the coverage of the conference of Aiete, there was a unanimity in the Basque 
newspapers in treating the announcement of ETA as a historic positive event which would 
open a new political era in the Basque Country, but such a unanimity did not exist among 
the Spanish newspapers edited in Madrid. The conservative media was so critical with the 
model of the end of ETA that they reported on the definitive cessation of its violence as if 
they were bad news. Now that the decision of ETA was public and, thus, it was more 
difficult to deny credibility to their will to put an end to violence, the media outlets critical 
about the process remarked that ETA did not surrender their weapons and did not dissolve 
as an organization. Therefore, the enemy was still there, and there was no need to change 
the discourse regarding Basque nationalism.       
5.2.3. Quality of the coverage 
In the previous sections I have examined the contents of a sample of pieces of news 
published by the seven selected newspapers. In order to complement this analysis, in this 
section I analyze the quality of this news coverage, in order to measure the accuracy and 
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reliability of the studied information. The methodology used for this study divides the 
analysis of each item into three segments: selection process, elaboration, and social 
contribution of the news. I have considered all three segments for the analysis of the items. 
However, it is worth to note that, for the specific case of the news analyzed in this 
investigation, the most significant segments are those about selection process and 
elaboration, specifically the identification of the sources, the nature of the sources, the 
accuracy and depth of the information, and the correctness of the journalistic language. In 
accordance of this methodology, each item obtained a quality score and each newspaper 
an average score. The methodology provides elaborate and rigorous criteria to evaluate the 
items with as much objectivity and accuracy as possible. Nevertheless, I am aware that the 
subjectivity of the researcher and, in this case, evaluator, is an unavoidable factor, and that 
the scores obtained by each item and each newspaper can only be consider as an indicative 
about the quality of the pieces studied here or, in other words, the extent to which these 
pieces have been elaborated following journalistic quality standards.   
5.2.3.1. El Correo 
In the items published by El Correo some major problems related to the identification and 
nature of the sources has been detected. Sources are often not sufficiently identified. 
Undetermined “anti-terrorist experts,” “juridical sources,” “French official sources,” 
“sources close to the executive,” “experts of the security forces,” or “all analysts” are cited 
as sources of information and interpretation. In some stories relating the Abertzale Left, 
the sources are identified as “some sectors which know well the radical world” and 





 The accuracy and depth of most of the items fulfill the standards proposed by this 
methodology, with the exception of a significant inaccuracy in the news about the arrests 
of Otegi and his associates in October 2009: the headline asserts that the Police avoided 
the re-foundation of the leadership of Batasuna, which was not justified with the contents 
of the news. Regarding the correctness of the journalistic language, there are incorrect 
expressions from a journalistic point of view or speculations with no justification in half 
of the items. For example, the news on the last killing of ETA asserts that the attack showed 
that the Basque group had decided that there would be “very few barriers” to how they 
would behave in the future.745 In the piece on the halt of offensive attacks in September 
2010, the reporter asserts that ETA showed Batasuna “a red line that could not trespass: 
the vanguard is ETA,” which is a speculation with no base in the narrative.746 In the news 
on the seizure of explosives and the arrests of two suspect members of ETA, the story says 
that it was not excluded the possibility that they had participate in some bombing attacks, 
not providing any evidence to make such speculation.747 Furthermore, the improper but 
very common use of the term “banda” (gang, band) to refer to ETA is usual in El Correo. 
 In connection to the section related to social contribution, it is noticeable that El 
Correo failed to act as a watchdog in some of the news for its uncritical identification with 
the perspective of the authorities in some of the pieces of news. In addition, it failed to 
respect what the methodology described as human dignity in the news reporting arrests, as 
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they did not take into account the presumption of innocence in any of the cases. In contrast, 
five of the pieces deserve a high score for promoting social debate because it provides a 
perspective which questions the official version of the subject of the news, namely the 
Abertzale Left or ETA. The average score for the quality of the pieces on the twelve 
selected events published by El Correo is 4.96 points. 
5.2.3.2. Gara 
Most of the items published by Gara properly identify the information sources.  There are 
some pieces in which the sources of the information are not sufficiently identified, but they 
are a few exceptions. For example, in a piece about the decision of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court about the coalition Bildu, Gara provides details about the internal 
deliberations among the justices of the court, without specifying the sources of that 
information, like most of the other analyzed newspapers. Some details of the news on the 
killing of the French gendarme in April 2010 come also from unknown sources. In the 
news of the seizure of explosives in the town of Legorreta, some information was based on 
what “was said from Legorreta.”   
 Regarding the accuracy of the news coverage, most of the items are elaborated 
following the standards of quality journalism. However, there are three items which did 
not deserve a maximum score according the criteria proposed by the chosen methodology, 
because the headline only partially reflects the contents of the news. The title about the 
arrest of Otegi and his group goes further than the information itself in the interpretation 





initiative of the Abertzale Left.”748 In the news about the presentation of the charter of 
Sortu, the headline does not highlight the big novelty of the event, namely that the new 
party rejected ETA’s violence, and remarks instead the supposed motivation of the 
leadership for doing that—give no excuse to be banned.749 Finally, the headline of the piece 
on the arrest of Legorreta fails to specify that the police operation was in connection to 
ETA.750 The correctness of the journalistic language is high in most of the pieces in Gara, 
but there is one exception. In the story about the detention of Otegi the reporter asserts that 
some TV cameras were at place before the arrests took place “to everyone’s surprise,” and 
that it was, “perhaps,” because they wanted to live broadcast the arrests in news shows.751  
 Regarding social contribution, it is remarkable that Gara acts as a watchdog, 
especially in the news linked to police operations, as it provides information which 
questions the government’s official version. Another positive feature of the news published 
in Gara is that, when arrests are involved, they carefully respect the presumption of 
innocence.  The score average for Gara’s pieces is 5.96 points.          
5.2.3.3. Deia 
In Deia there are some news itmes with significant problems regarding the identification 
and nature of the sources. Beyond the very common ambiguous identification such as 
                                                          
748 “El Gobierno español busca abortar la iniciativa política de la izquierda abertzale con la detención de 
Otegi, 
Díez, Etxeberria y seis militantes más,” Gara, October 14, 2009, 1. 
749 “La izquierda abertzale no deja resquicios para la ilegalización,” Gara, February 8, 2011, 1; 
750 Janire Arrondo, “Gran despliegue policial en el arresto de Aitor e Igor Esnaola en Legorreta,” Gara, 
April 13, 2011, 11. 
751 Oihana Llorente and Ramón Sola, “Garzón traduce en diez arrestos las amenazas de Rubalcaba,” Gara, 





“investigation sources,” “sources of the anti-terrorism fight,” “experts on anti-terrorism,” 
or “diverse sources” in some of the stories, in the piece about the arrest of Otegi the sources 
are identified with expressions such as “`[sources] with good knowledge about that world,” 
“a tanned analyst of the internal life of the group,” “a brilliant connoisseur of the country,” 
or “a connoisseur of the front line of Basque politics,” which cannot be considered rigorous 
identification of the sources at all.  
 Regarding the preparation of the news, there are two pieces with a low score in 
accuracy. The headline on the arrest of Otegi and other Batasuna leaders incorrectly asserts 
that the “old guard” of Batasuna was taken out of the game because they failed in 
challenging ETA.752 That assertion was not justified by the contents of the text, and, 
moreover, time has proven that it was untrue. A very serious problem regarding correctness 
of the journalistic language is the use of quotations with no identification of the source, 
which was profusely used in the news on the arrest of Otegi. In the story on the killing of 
two civil guards in Majorca, it qualified the attack as part of “an insane offensive.”753 
Similarly, Deia asserted that ETA appeared “in its unique and worst version” when it killed 
a French gendarme in a clash. In the story about the detentions in Legorreta, the 
correspondent asserts that “the investigation does not discard [the possibility] that those 
arrested had directly participated in attacks.”754 
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 Deia failed to act as a watchdog especially in the item about the arrests of Legorreta, 
because it presents the police detailed version as a verified story and, thus, it does not 
respect the presumption of innocence of those arrested despite the use of the term “alleged” 
at the beginning of the piece. The score average for the quality of the twelve selected pieces 
of news in Deia is 4.83 points. 
5.2.3.4. Berria 
Sources are mostly well identified in most of the pieces in Berria, but there are a few 
exceptions, such as the news about the Constitutional Court decision on Bildu, where there 
is not any mention of sources. In the stories on the ETA attack in Majorca and the arrest of 
Otegi there are mentions of undetermined “witnesses.”  
 Accuracy of the news are overall correct, but there are a few cases with lower rates. 
In the story on the conclusions of the internal debate of the Abertzale Left, the headline 
does not highlight the main idea of the news, as it does not specifically point out that the 
social base of the movement supported the end of armed struggle. This piece is written 
strictly following the terminology used by the Abertzale Left in its document, without 
giving the readers a more understandable interpretation.755 The news on the halt of 
offensive attacks in September 2010 is treated as a very big news, but there is not any 
contextualization of the event. It does not remind, for example, that the endorsers of the 
Brussels Declaration demanded from ETA a verifiable ceasefire and the Abertzale Left had 
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backed that demand.756 The ETA communiqué announcing the cessation of offensive 
attacks is given in full within the main informative piece, and not as a separate 
attachment.757 
In the stories linked to police operations Berria questions the official version and 
strictly respects the presumption of innocence of the detainees. In contrast, it fails to give 
its readers elements to question the official version given by the sources on the news on 
the conclusions of the Abertzale Left debate. The average score for the quality of the stories 
in Berria is 5.82 points.          
5.2.3.5. El País 
Regarding the identification and nature of the sources, El País shows problems similar to 
most of the newspapers. It refers to undetermined “police sources,” “investigation 
sources,” “sources within the anti-terrorism fight,” “some participants [of the meeting],” 
or “one of the speakers.”   
There are some accuracy problems in some of the analyzed news as well. In the 
piece about the arrest of Otegi, the headline asserts that those arrested were rebuilding 
Batasuna, an assumption not properly justified in the text.758 The headline of the story on 
the killing of the French gendarme does not specify that it occurred in a gunfight, a defining 
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fact of the occurrence.759 In the headline about the halt of offensive attacks, it uses an 
unidentified quotation to assert that the step taken by ETA was “insufficient.” It does not 
specific who the step is insufficient for.760 The headline about the seizure of explosives in 
Legorreta refers to “the main explosive deposit” of ETA, which was incorrect and did not 
match what the text narrates.761 Half of the analyzed pieces got a low rate because of some 
issues in the journalistic language. For example, the story about Otegi’s press conference 
in March 2009 names “the violent Abertzale Left” when referring to the movement led by 
Otegi.762 When describing the reaction of the Abertzale Left to ETA’s killings in Majorca 
in an informative piece, it asserted that they were “out of the reality,” and that their 
discourse was “prefabricated.”763 In the piece about the Aiete conference, the 
correspondent uses some quotations without identifying the author of such words.764 Like 
most of the newspapers, it refers to ETA as a “gang” (la banda). 
El País also failed to act as a watchdog in some pieces of news related to police 
operations, as it presented the stories only following the official version, and it did not 
respect the presumption of innocence of the detainees, although sometimes it uses the term 
“alleged” when labeling the arrested people as “terrorists” or members of ETA. In contrast, 
it provided a perspective which put into question the version of the source, namely ETA or 
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the Abertzale Left. The average rating for the quality of the news published by El País is 
4.87 points.         
5.2.3.6. El Mundo 
As it is usual in the news on the Basque conflict in the Spanish press, there are many 
problems regarding the use and identification of sources in El Mundo. Very often it uses 
undetermined sources such as “sources of the anti-terrorism fight,” “police sources,” or 
“police experts.” Sometimes it seems to use police sources but it does not acknowledge it. 
For example, the story about the gunfire between French gendarmes and ETA members, 
very likely based on police sources, is given without identifying any source.765 In the news 
of Otegi’s arrest, it narrates a detailed story about a confrontation between ETA and Otegi 
without identifying any source.766 Similarly, the assertion that Batasuna was disappointed 
because of the nature of ETA’s cessation of attacs in September is not based on any 
statement nor any identified source.767  
 There are also many issues in relation to the accuracy of the headlines. The title for 
the ceasefire in January 2011 argues that the objective of the truce is “to sneak into 
elections,” an assertion not justified by the information below.768 It says “proetarras,” 
which means “those in favor of ETA,” to refer to the promoters of the new party Sortu, 
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who actually rejected the violence of the armed group.769 It refers as “Bildu-Batasuna” to 
the coalition Bildu, which was formed by the parties EA, Alternatiba, and individuals from 
the Abertzale Left.770 When ETA declared the definitive cessation of their armed activity, 
El Mundo again remarked on what the armed organization did not do, instead of the novelty 
of the announcement.771  
There are also serious issues in relation to the correctness of the journalistic 
language in almost all analyzed news. There are assertions evidently not based on factual 
information, such as speculations on the motivation of the political behavior of arrested 
people, the intention of ETA to control future political projects, or the assumption that ETA 
was forced to release a cessation communiqué. There are evaluative terms improper for 
informative pieces, such as “disappointing communiqué,” and “habitual arrogance.” It calls 
“pantomime” to the Aiete conference.772 And it purposely refers to the new party Sortu as 
“Batasuna.” 
In the pieces related to police operations, El Mundo never puts into question the 
official version, and did not respect the presumption of innocence of the arrested people. 
In contrast, in the news about the political process El Mundo puts into question the version 
of both the Abertzale Left and the government. The average score for the quality of the 
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news published in El Mundo, 3.96 points, is significantly lower than the average because 
of the number of problems explained above.  
5.2.2.7. ABC 
Most of the stories under study published in ABC use unidentified sources. Sometimes 
there is not any mention of the information source at all. Very often the sources are 
undetermined and have a confidential nature, such as “sources of the anti-terrorist fight,” 
“anti-terrorist experts,” and “sources consulted by ABC.”  
 In more than half of the pieces the headlines are inaccurate. For instance, ABC 
asserts that the police aborted the reorganization of “HB,” when Otegi was arrested in 
October 2009.773 It referred to the temporary halt announced by ETA in September 2010 
as “false truce,”774 and “tramp truce” and “trick to the nth degree” to the ceasefire of 
January 2011.775 It affirmed that the explosives seized in April 2011 were ready to be used 
in attacks “when ETA broke up the truce.”776 It refers as “proetarras” to the coalition 
Bildu.777 It asserts that Kofi Annan and the rest of the international personalities present in 
the Aiete Conference were serving ETA.778 The journalistic language used by ABC got a 
negative score in eleven out the twelve pieces analyzed. The following sentence from the 
informative piece about Otegi’s arrest is an example of how far the reporters of ABC go 
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when dealing with facts in connection with ETA: “The operation confirms the 
Government’s strategy of cutting the head off the pro-ETA reptile whenever it sneaks it 
out.”779 In the informative piece about the Aiete conference, the story says that the final 
declaration was “contaminated from the beginning to the end.”780 The pieces about ETA 
and the Abertzale Left are full of speculations on their internal life. The use of quotations 
with no attribution at all is common in ABC news on the Basque conflict. There are many 
cases of terminological incorrectness too. For instance, Bildu is sometimes 
“ETA/Batasuna,”781 and the international facilitators, “mediators chosen by Bildu.”782  
 Regarding what this methodology considers social contribution, ABC fails to act as 
a watchdog in the pieces about police operations because it adheres to the police version. 
In addition, it does not usually respect the presumption of innocence. In contrast, in the 
news about the evolution of the Abertzale Left, it usually puts into question the versions of 
the story provided by both the Abertzale Left and the government. The average score for 
the quality of the news published by ABC, 2.3 points, is by far the lowest among the 
newspapers analyzed here. 
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5.3. Some concluding remarks 
5.3.1. Regarding the contents 
The analyzed pieces of news are a sample of twelve selected events in seven newspapers. 
Obviously, the studied newspapers gave much more information on the process toward 
ETA’s end. Yet, the analysis of the news on the events chosen for their significance shows 
some features of the information given at the time of the process. Some newspapers’ 
editorial line regarding the moves of the Abertzale Left did not significantly evolve over 
time, and other newspapers shifted their approach as the events showed that the end of 
ETA’s violence was actually coming. Within the first group are, on the one side, Gara and 
Berria, and on the other, ABC and El Mundo; within the second group are El Correo, Deia, 
and El País. 
Gara and Berria gave credibility to the moves of the Abertzale Left and the gradual 
announcements of the cessation by ETA from the beginning. Because they had reliable 
information or because they made the right interpretation of the context, they provided their 
readers contents suggesting that the Abertzale Left, including ETA, was moving toward 
the end of the use of political violence. Understandably, there is not any significant change 
in the editorial line of these two newspapers, because the events confirmed their 
perspective of giving credibility to the strategic shift. Yet, information about the internal 
struggle within the Abertzale Left was very scarce in Gara, and almost inexistent in Berria. 
The press conference given by Arnaldo Otegi and thirteen other members of the Abertzale 
Left was, to some extent, a starting point of the internal debate that they were about to 





suggest anything about an internal debate. It was too early for Gara and Berria as well. By 
the time Otegi talked about the necessity of an effective strategy in that press conference, 
they had already decided to initiate a gradual process to eventually end ETA’s armed 
struggle. Soon after, Gara showed that it had privileged information on the internal 
whereabouts within the Abertzale Left, but it did not disclose anything about it in March 
2009. Only after Otegi and his associates were arrested in October 2009 Gara and, to a 
lesser extent, Berria began to disclose explicit information on the important move that the 
detainees were preparing. Those arrests were a tipping point in the news coverage on the 
internal process of the Abertzale Left, especially for Gara and Berria. From then on, both 
newspapers started to release information on the coming change of course in the Abertzale 
Left. However, they did not disclose information on the internal disagreements within the 
Abertzale Left until all discussion was over and all strategic decisions were made. Even 
then, information on the internal discussions was very scarce. In addition, they showed a 
significant restraint regarding the explicitness of the real game changer that was about to 
come. Instead of explicitly explaining what Otegi and his allies were proposing, i.e. the 
end of armed struggle, they only suggested it, as if the explicit mention of the abandonment 
of armed struggle was taboo for these newspapers too.  
ABC and El Mundo denied any credibility to the strategic movements by the 
Abertzale Left and ETA from the beginning. When the social base of the Abertzale Left 
supported a document that proposed the abandonment of the political-military strategy, 
these newspapers remarked that they did not demand anything from ETA. When Sortu 





into elections. When ETA announced a cessation of the offensive attacks, they highlighted 
that they did not fulfill what the Brussels declaration had demanded. When ETA announced 
a permanent ceasefire, they remarked that they did not announce their definitive end. When 
ETA declared the definitive end of its activity, they remarked that they did not dismantle 
nor disarm. In the end, they reached the point of treating the unilateral and unconditional 
end of ETA’s violence as bad news. There was not any evolution in their editorial lines 
during the studied period. Unlike Gara and Berria, they provided their readers stories on 
the internal struggle within the Abertzale Left, based on police sources and speculations, 
only to conclude that there was no significant shift coming from ETA or the Abertzale Left. 
All events were interpreted in a way to fit an anti-terrorist discourse which did not 
acknowledge that the abandonment of violence by ETA was game changing.          
El País, El Correo, and Deia experienced an evolution in their editorial line 
regarding the process analyzed here. When ETA committed its last killings in Majorca, 
they treated the news as if it was another step within an offensive with no signs of being in 
its last stages. They gave credibility to the government and police sources when reporting, 
for example, about the arrest of Otegi. Deia even explained that Otegi and his group had 
lost an internal battle against ETA, suggesting that continuation of armed struggle was not 
in question anymore. These three newspapers did not report on the conclusions of the 
debate in the Abertzale Left as if it was an instrumental decision for the end of ETA’s 
violence. Instead, they highlighted the omissions and ambiguity of the document. 
Similarly, they remarked the insufficiency of ETA’s halt of “offensive attacks” in 





Sortu presented the charter of the new political party, where they expressly rejected the use 
of political violence by ETA. That seems to be a tipping point for these three newspapers, 
as much as for other media outlets. Since then, they reported from a positive perspective 
on the process toward ETA’s end, and gave credibility to the Abertzale Left and the armed 
group’s statements and moves.    
All in all, the readers of the information published at the time of the events were 
not aware of the real happenings. The actors involved in the process, such as ETA, the 
Abertzale Left, the international facilitators or the Spanish government, did not disclose 
much of the information instrumental in understanding the real evolution of the situation. 
In addition, all newspapers were obviously conditioned by their editorial approach and 
their variable degree of access to the diverse sources. The newspapers with direct access 
or, at least, proximity to the sources of the Abertzale Left, did not usually dare to go further 
than their sources in the interpretation of the reality, and did not disclose information that 
their sources in the Abertzale Left did not want them to disclose, i.e. the whereabouts of 
the internal battle. The newspapers which relied on police sources and other undetermined 
sources released stories that have later been proved untrue or, at least, distorted. 
Unsurprisingly, the study of the contents of this limited sample of news pieces confirms 
that the real significance of the events reported by the media rarely arise at the time of 
occurrence, let alone in the case of political processes with the involvement of clandestine 





5.3.2. Regarding the quality of the coverage 
The Basque conflict has been a source of a continuous flow of news over the last decades. 
Events in connection with ETA have occupied thousands of newspaper pages and newscast 
hours. Some events, such as ETA attacks or police arrests, have occurred on the surface, 
but much information has been hidden behind the scenes. Covering information about a 
clandestine organization and its political context needs a specialized knowledge of the 
background and, above all, an access to specialized sources. Most of the articles analyzed 
here are signed by journalists specialized in information on the Basque conflict. However, 
the results of the test of quality of the news studied in this sample show that most of the 
information analyzed here does not follow the standards of quality journalism. 
According to Montserrat Quesada Pérez, the specialization of a journalist is not 
given by the knowledge of the topic, but “the rigorous application of a professional 
methodology based on facts, their contrast, and their verification.”783 Francisco Esteve 
Ramírez adds that one of the most important principles of specialized journalism is the 
knowledge of expert sources, and their correct use.784  In the same sense, Quesada Pérez 
asserts that a piece cannot be considered as specialized journalism if the author has not 
contrasted the news with all the sources involved in the matter.785 Reporting on clandestine 
organizations such as ETA and outlawed political parties such as Batasuna has intrinsic 
difficulties. Most of the media has no access to direct sources of those organizations, and 
police, judiciary, or government agencies are usually the only sources of information. 
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Obviously, these sources provide unbalanced information, as they are interested parties of 
the issues at stake. Thus, the analysis of the sample shows that most of the newspapers use 
these sources’ information, interpretations, and even speculations as if it was verified 
information. The belligerence with the Abertzale Left of all the Spanish media and most of 
the Basque media has made them disregard the basic rules of specialized journalism when 
dealing with news in connection with the Basque conflict. The contrast between different 
versions, the accuracy of the information, and the correctness of the journalistic language 
are not required if the object of the news is the Abertzale Left, let alone ETA. 
There are two exceptions in the sample of the seven publications studied here. The 
two newspapers which gave most credibility to the strategic move of the Abertzale Left, 
Gara and Berria, stand out from the other newspapers because of a better identification of 
the sources, a more correct use of the journalistic language, a more accurate accordance 
between the headlines and the narratives, less speculation with no informative base, and a 
greater respect for the presumption of innocence in news linked to arrests. Basically, this 
higher respect for the quality standards of journalism comes from the absence of an 
editorial belligerency toward the Abertzale Left and ETA. They are prudent with police 
sources that they do not rely on, they are accurate in the terminology used to refer to issues 
related to the different organizations of the Abertzale Left, and they do not refer to anyone 
as member of ETA until they consider it proved. However, Gara and Berria usually fail to 
translate to their readers the opaque political terminology used by the Abertzale Left in its 
statements and documents. Quesada Ramírez notes that a text of specialized journalism 





requirement to translate these expressions to an informative language.”786 That is not the 
case in some of the pieces published by Berria and Gara; the most telling examples are the 
pieces on the conclusions of the internal debate of the Abertzale Left, where the main 
consequence—the social base support for the abandonment of the armed struggle—was 
not expressly mentioned in the news stories.  
 Overall, there is a clear difference in the average quality of the news between the 
Basque newspapers and the press edited in Madrid. The case of ABC and El Correo, two 
newspapers belonging to the same editorial group, is very significant. ABC has lower 
quality in the sections linked to the sources, journalistic language, accuracy of the contents, 
and respect for human dignity. The difference in quality is directly proportional to the 
difference on the degree of open belligerence with the actors of the news, in this case ETA 
and the Abertzale Left. ABC and El Correo have the same owners and, thus, the same 
values, ideology, and interests. They both share, in their editorial line, a belligerency with 
the Abertzale Left and, especially, ETA. However, given that El Correo readers are closer 
to the reality described in the news, and have a better knowledge of it, the Basque 
newspaper needs to be more accurate in the description of this reality, not to distort it as 
openly as ABC, and, in the end, to report on the Basque conflict more in accordance with 
the journalistic standards. The same reflections apply to the difference in the coverage of 
the newspapers edited in the Basque Country and Madrid. The stories on the Basque 
conflict published in the press edited in Madrid, usually based on speculations and distorted 
police versions, are not credible for the average Basque reader. Moreover, the Basque 






reader has access to a more plural offer of media than the Spanish reader regarding the 
treatment of the Basque conflict. Caricaturing the Basque reality, as some of the Spanish 
press does, is more difficult for a Basque newspaper which aims to have credibility in their 
readers’ view.  In contrast, newspapers such as El Mundo and ABC can allow themselves 
to report on news linked to Basque nationalism with an open belligerency, no respect for 
journalistic rules, and a distortion of the reality without losing credibility in the view of an 
important sector of the Spanish public, who regards Basque nationalism, and especially the 
Abertzale Left, as an enemy who must be combated.  
As for the contribution of specialized journalism in the understanding of the Basque 
conflict in general, and the process toward the end of ETA in particular, the main 
conclusion is that the kind of reporting on the Basque issue dominant in the Spanish and 
Basque media can hardly be considered specialized journalism. The overall attitude of the 
mainstream media is far from following the defining principle of specialized journalism, 
which is the application of a methodology based on facts and their verification. The rules 
of what Idoyaga and Ramírez de la Piscina labeled as “mediatic anti-terrorism”787 were 
still in force when the terrorism against which these media were belligerent was about to 
end. The analysis of the coverage of the unilateral decision by ETA to abandon definitively 
armed struggle shows that this model of reporting has not ended with the end of ETA’s 
long violent campaign. 
  
                                                          





6. Analysis of a definitive cessation 
6.1. An introduction on terminology  
6.1.1. Definition of terrorism and its political implications  
The definitive cessation of ETA’s violence is a single example among many other cases of 
insurgent armed groups’ ending. As Arendt Lijphard stated, a single case cannot be the 
ground for a generalization or for disproving an established generalization, but case studies 
can contribute to theory building, given that they can provide ground to establish, confirm, 
question, or invalidate general propositions.788 Before testing the process leading to the end 
of ETA in a framework of generalizations, it is necessary to establish what is comparable 
with the Basque case. Stones and monkeys, as Giovanni Sartori states, are hardly 
comparable, but pears and apples can be, with respect to some of their properties. Valuable 
comparisons are those between entities whose attributes are in part shared and in part non-
shared. Definitional sloppiness and conceptual stretching can cause comparative futility 
and fallacies.789 David Collier and James E. Mahon warn also about the problem of 
conceptual stretching. When scholars take a category developed for one set of cases and 
extend it to additional cases, new cases may be sufficiently different that the category is no 
longer appropriate in its original form.790 It is necessary to be aware of these risks in order 
to establish a framework in which the case of ETA can be properly analyzed. All in all, we 
need to answer the following question: is it appropriate to test the end of ETA’s campaign 
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in the light of the typologies and frameworks on the end of terrorist groups? In other words, 
is ETA a terrorist group? 
There are almost as many definitions on terrorism as researchers on terrorist groups. 
The pioneering work by Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman in 1984 recorded 109 
different definitions provided by scholars who responded to an email request. They 
identified 22 different definitional elements of terrorism, and Schmid worked out a 
consensual definition including 16 elements out of 22: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or 
political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as a message generator. 
Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a 
target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is 
primarily sought.”791 
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Many years after, in 2004, Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler worked on a 
new consensus definition.792 They examined first the 1984 proposal by Schmid, and the 
109 definitions recorded by Schmid and Jongman, and then scrutinized articles about 
terrorism published from 1977 through 2001 in three journals.793 They analyzed all those 
definitions in order to detect the common criteria among scholars, and proposed a 
consensus definition. They identified seventy-three different definitions drawn from fifty-
five articles. The final result of this contrast was the following definition: “Terrorism is a 
politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the 
pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”794  
Obviously, the purpose of finding a consensus produced a very wide definition, 
which does not include any criteria about the authorship of states or non-states agencies, 
neither about the character of the victims, or the random nature of their actions. The authors 
acknowledge that the consensus is “highly general” and seems “too vague,” and pose an 
unanswered question about the utility of such a definition: “Is the consensus definition 
helpful for those who wish to study terrorism?”795 Walter Laqueur responded long ago, in 
1986, by putting into question the validity of any definition trying to cover all different 
varieties of politically driven violent tactics. “There is little, if anything, in common 
between the Russian terrorists of the nineteenth century and Abu Nidal.” According to 
Laqueur, “there is no such thing as terrorism pure and unadulterated, specific and 
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unchanging, comparable to a chemical element; rather, there are a great many 
terrorisms.”796   
In any case, could ETA’s activity be considered one of these “great many 
terrorisms” alluded to by Laqueur? The Basque group’s features fit the “highly general” 
and “too vague” consensus definition by Weinberg and others. ETA’s tactic was, indeed, 
politically motivated, involved the threat or use of force or violence, and the pursuit of 
publicity played a significant role. Even ETA members and supporters would agree that 
the Basque group fits these definitional elements. Schmid’s classical definition, in contrast, 
demands a more rigorous examination of ETA’s activity to conclude whether it matches 
the definition. The Basque organization is a clandestine group. It used “an anxiety-inspiring 
method of repeated violent action” for political reasons. The direct targets of ETA’s 
attacks, such as individuals or state buildings and infrastructure, were not the main targets, 
as the Basque group intended to impact the public opinion in general, and policy makers 
in particular. ETA’s immediate human victims were not chosen randomly but selectively, 
as a representative or symbolic target, which is also considered a definitional element by 
Schmid. ETA’s actions have always been message generators. Their actions have primarily 
sought to intimidate and coerce their target audience, and its actions have also served as 
propaganda. Therefore, ETA’s modus operandi fits Schmid’s definition. 
However, the wide range of non-exclusive definitional elements provided by 
Schmid for the sake of consensus would enable labelling very diverse groups and 
individuals as terrorist. For instance, Schmid solves the controversy regarding the nature 
                                                          





of the victims by considering terrorist either those who choose victims randomly and those 
who choose them selectively. A group who selects its victims for whatever reasons or 
objectives and a group who commits random attacks can hardly be studied as phenomena 
of the same nature, whatever the label they are awarded. 
If committing random attacks was a condition to label a group as terrorist, ETA 
should not be defined as such. There is an exception: the bombing of the Rolando Café in 
Madrid, in which thirteen people were killed in 1974. The Basque group did not claim 
responsibility for it, but it is widely regarded as an ETA action.797 The bombing of a 
Barcelona supermarket in 1987, Hipercor, in which twenty-one people were killed 
indiscriminately, could hardly be considered a pure random attack, as the ETA activists 
warned in advance by several phone calls of the imminent explosion. Yet, the supermarket 
had not been evacuated. As a general practice, ETA selectively chose its victims, although 
many of them were unarmed civilians, and many unselected people were also killed in 
actions against chosen targets.798 When the Basque group placed a bomb in a public space, 
they warned the security forces in advance so that the place would be evacuated. ETA did 
kill unselected victims as a consequence of its actions, but it does not put the Basque 
organization alongside the groups which purposely commit random attacks. Carrying out 
random attacks in Spain would provoke a great impact for ETA propaganda purposes, but 
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it would not be in accordance with the principles claimed by the group since its origins, 
and, more importantly, the armed group was aware that its constituency would never 
approve such indiscriminate actions. 
Paraphrasing what Laqueur stressed about the differences between the Russian 
terrorists of the nineteenth century and Abu Nidal,799 we can state that there is little, if 
anything, in common between ETA and, say, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
which would be alongside  ETA in the list of terrorist groups according to the consensus 
definitions examined above. It would be, as Sartori would put it, like comparing stones and 
monkeys.800 Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass go further in their reflection on the 
discourse of terrorism, and question “the very possibility of defining (…) the facts 
categorized as terrorism.”801 They contend that defining terrorism in precise and objective 
terms is “an academic illusion,” and the concept of terrorism is “analytically far more of a 
hindrance than an aid to understanding political violence.”802  
ETA has used tactics which can be labeled as terrorist according to the mainstream 
definitional elements in academia. Even though, terrorist could not be the only epithet to 
be applied to the Basque group, or other groups labeled as terrorist. As Townshend rightly 
stresses, “‘terrorist’ is a description that has almost never been voluntarily adopted by any 
individual group.”803 Not surprisingly, neither has ETA ever accepted to be a terrorist 
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group. It defines itself in most of its statements as a “socialist and revolutionary Basque 
organization for national liberation.”804 Usually, it is the states which brands violent 
opponents as terrorists, and not without political intention, given that labeling someone as 
terrorist has “clear implications of inhumanity, criminality, and—perhaps most crucially—
lack of real political support.”805 As pointed out by Dipak K. Gupta, terrorism is a “label 
of convenience that we attribute to the activities of which we do not approve.”806 In this 
regard, the label can serve to obscure rather than to clarify, because it is often used, as put 
by Richard English, “in condemnatory rather than explanatory fashion.”807 The term 
terrorism goes beyond a neutral identification of a phenomenon, and provides an 
identification with political implications and disqualifying connotations. Townshend 
reminds that one person’s terrorist can be another’s freedom fighter.808 Yitzhak Shamir and 
Benachem Begin were terrorists according to most scholars’ definitions when they were 
members of Irgun, but they are considered heroes of the foundation of Israel and both later 
became Prime Ministers of Israel. Nelson Mandela was among the founders of the military 
wing of the African National Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), a terrorist groups 
according to mainstream definitions. He is also considered a national hero in the anti-
apartheid struggle, and he was the first president of the post-apartheid South Africa. Yassir 
Arafat and Gerry Adams had also been terrorists according to most of the definitions, and 
both were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.809 ETA’s members claim they are fighting for 
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their country’s freedom. The fact they are using methods labelled as terrorist does not 
change this other reality: from their perspective and the perspective of their supporters they 
are ‘freedom fighters.’ 
All in all, I rely on the following question posed by Zulaika and Douglass to 
conclude that using the concept of terrorism does not help in the understanding of political 
violence in general, and the case of ETA in particular.   
If all sorts of murders, kidnappings, threats, civil wars, government crimes, killings 
by secret or underground organizations, paramilitary executions, and so on, were 
simply called by those names without ever using the word ‘terrorism,’ would there 
be something missing in the description of the real world?810 
 Actually, I have examined the case of ETA in the previous chapters without 
referring to the group as terrorist. I have described the context of the political conflict where 
the Basque insurgent group have operated under a political-military strategy which 
included murders, kidnappings, bombings, and threats. Is there something missing in the 
description of the real world? However, comparing the case of ETA with the ending models 
of other insurgent groups that have used violent means to pursue political goals demands 
the examination of the case of the Basque group in the light of theories, typologies, and 
frameworks proposed by the scholars on the end of what they labeled as terrorist groups. 
Contrasting ETA and ISIS would be a useless comparison between monkeys and stones, 
but comparing ETA and the IRA, or FARC, could be useful comparisons between pears 
                                                          





and apples. Therefore, I will use the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist groups’ to refer 
to the findings of these authors, as long as they provide light to better understand the 
process toward the end of ETA.   
6.2. The patterns  
6.2.1. Literature-based frameworks  
The most recent studies on the decline of organizations labeled as terrorists are based on 
the analysis of empirical data of numerous groups. Not surprisingly, these databases of the 
groups considered to be vary substantially by each author, both because of the differences 
of the studied time period and because of the differences of what each author considers a 
terrorist group. However, all of them include ETA in their databases of terrorist 
organizations. Audrey Cronin investigated 457 groups active since 1968. Seth Jones and 
Martin Libicki examined 648 organizations active between 1968 and 2006. Leonard 
Weinberg bases his findings on a study of 433 groups which were active between 1900 and 
2006. They proposed different frameworks to distinguish the patterns of the ends of the 
groups. 
In short, Audrey Cronin identified six patterns to explain the end of terrorism: 
decapitation, negotiation, success, failure, elimination by repression, and reorientation into 
other forms of violence. Jones and Libicki distinguish five causes of the end of terrorist 
groups: joining political process, defeat by police and intelligence agencies, defeat by 
military forces, goals achieved, and splintering. Weinberg synthesizes even more the ways 





Weinberg specify that these patterns are not necessarily separate and distinct, because more 
than one dynamic may provoke the demise of these groups.811 
Marta Crenshaw does not propose a single set of patterns, but different levels of 
analysis. Firstly, she relates the decline of terrorism to the interplay of three factors: the 
government response, which could lead to a defeat of armed organizations; the strategic 
choices of the groups, which could lead to a decision to abandon violent means; and the 
lack of resources of the groups, which could lead them to organizational disintegration. 812 
Once she distinguished the three main factors, she focuses on the analysis of one of them: 
the choices made by the groups. She found three general sets of reasons for abandoning 
violent means: first, because it has succeeded in fulfilling its goals; second, because they 
conclude that the utility of violence has declined; third, because new alternatives that are 
preferable to violence may become available or more attractive.    
Weinberg proposes three general patterns—success, defeat and transformation—
which is sufficient to define the main typologies of the diverse models of the end of armed 
groups. The other patterns proposed by the rest of the authors, such as decapitation, military 
repression, police repression, negotiation, or reorientation, can be analyzed as variables 
within these three general patterns. Defeat, success, and transformation are not mutually 
exclusive. An awareness of imminent defeat, for instance, can provoke the transformation 
of a group, and a transformation can provoke some negotiations whose result can be 
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considered a success by the rebel group. The definitive end of ETA’s campaign has 
produced diverse kinds of narratives. There are no narratives claiming a total success or a 
total defeat. Most of the narratives are a combination of the three patterns; however, in 
some of them the success factor is dominant; in some others the defeat factor clearly 
prevails; and in others transformation is considered the key element.  
6.2.2. Success narrative 
Nobody claims that ETA has ended because of a military success. The Basque group has 
achieved neither its final goals of independence and socialism, nor the tactical pre-
condition previously given for the abandonment of the armed campaign, namely the 
recognition of the right for self-determination. In this regard, the Basque case is not unique. 
According to all studies, success is by far the least frequent outcome of the end of terrorist 
groups. Cronin’s data shows that less than five percent of the groups have fully succeeded 
in achieving their goals.813 According to Jones and Libicki’s data, only ten percent ended 
because their goals were achieved.814 Weinberg does not give specific percentages about 
the frequency of each pattern of ending, but he asserts that success is very rare.815  
Success and defeat, however, are relative terms. The Good Friday Agreement in 
Northern Ireland can be considered a success by the Republicans, because to some extent 
it was a consequence of IRA’s violent campaigns and ceasefires. On the other hand, 
Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, which is a failure for the IRA. In 
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short, the IRA achieved some of their aims, but it has not achieved its final goal. The same 
can be said about PLO or Hezbollah. The military campaigns under the umbrella of PLO 
during the 1970s and 1980s resulted in official recognition of the Palestinian nation by the 
United Nations and the visibility of the Palestinian cause on the worldwide stage. 
Hezbollah and its allies arguably provoked the withdrawal of the American and French 
forces from Beirut and, along with other factors, the withdrawal of Israel from all of 
Lebanon. Yet, the Palestinian state has not been established in a way satisfactory for the 
PLO, and Israel has not been destroyed as Hezbollah had aimed for. 
Total victories are rare, but partial success occurs more often.816 As put by Cronin, 
short-term tactical successes tend to reinforce the use of violent means, because they seem 
to show that it works.817 ETA’s history confirms Cronin’s findings about the consequences 
of tactical successes. The killing of the Admiral Carrero Blanco by ETA in 1973 is regarded 
as a decisive strike against the continuation of the dictatorship.818 Carrero Blanco’s killing 
clearly reinforced the military faction within ETA and became a strong argument for 
advocates of the effectiveness of armed tactics. As stressed by Garmendia, the success of 
the attack on Carrero Blanco placed “militarism” out of the question.819 In the early 1980s, 
ETA managed to halt the construction of a nuclear plant through a violent campaign, in 
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combination with mass mobilizations.820 This was another partial and tactical victory that 
strengthened the argument in favor of political-military strategy. 
Jones and Libicki note that the chance to succeed is higher when the group has 
narrow goals, such as policy change or territorial change, and not broader goals, such as 
regime change or worldwide revolution.821 ETA had very broad goals in the 1960s and 
1970s, as it pursued overthrowing the dictatorship through an insurrectional war, seizing 
power, and guiding a revolutionary process in a Basque independent state. The Basque 
group adopted a more realistic approach since the 1980s, and pursued a strategy aimed at 
forcing the Spanish state to negotiate with the armed group and recognize the right for self-
determination. It was a narrow goal with a higher chance of success than the previous 
broader goal. Yet, it did not work either.  
Nevertheless, there are narratives claiming a history of political success for ETA. 
The Basque group itself and the Abertzale Left argues that their struggle has been a success, 
because it led the majority of the Basque society to claim the right for the Basques to 
determine their political status. They claim that ETA’s armed struggle has reinforced 
Basque political identity and the wish for an independent state. Discussing ETA’s 
achievements is a sensitive matter. Advocating armed struggle is a crime in Spain, and a 
person who openly argued that ETA’s actions were politically effective could be 
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prosecuted. Consequently, ETA members or supporters usually refrain from bluntly 
explaining why they believe their struggle was worth it. 
When I asked former ETA militants what the armed group has achieved, a common 
reply is that it kept “the flame” for independence alive. Juan Karlos Ioldi argues that 
maintaining “the flame of this people” is not a little achievement in “these times of 
globalization.” According to him, the Basque Country would now be a region fully 
integrated in Spain, with no identity, if it was not for ETA’s struggle.822 Jokin Urain sticks 
to the same idea when asked about the achievements of ETA: “The endurance of a people.” 
He argues the political debate would not be where it is now, if it was not for the armed 
resistance. “Enduring until today,” and being in a position to achieve the same objectives 
by other means, these are the consequences of the armed struggle, according to Urain. 
Eugenio Etxebeste argues that a debate on sovereignty is now open, among other factors, 
thanks to the “political action of ETA and the whole Abertzale Left.”823 Antton López Ruiz, 
Kubati, regards ETA’s armed insurgency as a contribution to Basque history. He argues 
that rebellious Basque people have arisen at every historic crossroad “to fight for the 
people.” In this regard, ETA has fulfilled “an historic stage” in the path toward Basque 
independence. According to López Ruiz, the result of ETA’s struggle is that now they can 
say “here we are.”824 In summary, they regard ETA’s long armed campaign as worthwhile 
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because they believe that their struggle has been a decisive factor in opening a political 
scenario in which achieving independence through political means is a real possibility. 
The Abertzale Left and ETA itself have worked out this narrative in a more 
articulate way in many documents. The report Argitzen—backed by the majority of the 
rank and file of the Abertzale Left in their internal debate in 2009 and 2010—regards as a 
victory the fact that the political framework drawn after the end of Francoism has not 
stabilized. “We sustained a chance for a deep democratic change. (…) We brought the 
Basque Country to the gates of political change. 30 years later, the door for change is 
completely open.”825 Rufi Etxeberria, one of the most prominent promoters of the shift 
within the Abertzale Left, used a telling expression in an interview at the time of their 
internal debate: “It is the time to collect the fruits of long years of struggle, and not to let 
them waste.”826 
In their last internal bulletin, Zutabe 113, ETA acknowledged that the outcome of 
their struggle had not been a victory, “but the struggle carried out by a great effort and 
sacrifice of thousands of men and women has not been in vain. Thanks to this struggle, the 
Basque Country is alive and it still has an open opportunity to win.”827 In the same bulletin, 
ETA argues that the organization decided to stop following this logic: the struggle of the 
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Abertzale Left created some political conditions, such as a general acceptance that the 
conflict should be solved through political means and dialogue, and that the Basques should 
be allowed to determine by themselves their political status; the liberation struggle was 
now in a stalemate, with a risk to be blockaded; this stalemate put at risk “the political 
conditions” created by their struggle. Therefore, they decided to collect the supposed fruits 
before they got rotten, i.e. take advantage of the political capital accumulated by ETA 
before it was diluted.828 In the report containing the conclusion of ETA’s internal debate in 
2012, the armed group also summarizes the specific achievements of the armed activity, 
along with the more general political achievements of the “liberation movement” stressed 
in the bulletin Zutabe. The armed struggle, contends the conclusions’ report, has put into 
evidence the existence of a conflict and its dimension; it has enabled the implication of the 
international actors in the resolution process because it has spread the severity of the 
conflict worldwide; it has fueled the revolutionary and combative values; it has reinforced 
the eagerness to fight of subsequent generations; it has prevented the assimilation of the 
revolutionary and combatant feature of the liberation movement.829  
The strong emergence of the new pro-independence coalition in the Basque 
political scenario, its legalization, and its good electoral results have strengthened the 
argument that the Abertzale Left, at least, has avoided a political defeat. After a decade of 
illegalization, the Abertzale Left is now the driving force of a legal electoral coalition able 
to attract twenty-five percent of the Basque vote. Two members of the Abertzale Left, as 
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candidates of Bildu, are president of the provincial government of Gipuzkoa and mayor of 
the capital city of Donostia after May 2011.830 EH Bildu is the second force in 
representation at the Basque parliament since October 2012.831 The same coalition with a 
different name, Amaiur, obtained seven seats in the Spanish parliament in November 2011, 
more than any other Basque political force. The main leader of the Abertzale Left, Arnaldo 
Otegi, sticks to the argument of the emergence of Bildu to refute the claim that the 
Abertzale Left has been defeated: 
I do not know any case in history in which those proclaiming a (military, political 
or sport) victory showing such evident signs of anger and discomfort. In this 
context, the results of Bildu, by themselves, definitively thwarted any attempt to 
sustain the thesis of the defeat of the Abertzale Left.832 
Yet, the Abertzale Left and ETA did not carry out a costly political-military strategy 
for electoral purposes. Those electoral successes are hardly an argument to claim a victory 
of the political-military strategy of the Abertzale Left. However, it can reasonably be 
contended that the Abertzale Left has escaped a political defeat that seemed very likely in 
the event that ETA did not lay down arms and, hence, facilitate the return of the Abertzale 
Left to the political arena.  
ETA and the Abertzale Left are not the only ones claiming a narrative of political 
success. A faction of the PP, the main association of ETA’s victims, and some Spanish 
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media outlets have claimed that ETA has obtained a political victory because of the weak 
policy of the Spanish government regarding the Abertzale Left. The participation of Bildu, 
Amaiur and EH Bildu in elections, and their strong presence in official institutions, are 
signs of ETA’s victory in the view of these factions. The narrative of a scholar in harmony 
with this view, Rogelio Alonso, summarizes the argument. Between 2001 and 2003, with 
the PP government in charge, the combined counterterrorist policies against both ETA and 
its network put them on the verge of a total defeat. Then, the negotiation policy enacted by 
the PSOE government in 2004 was a relief for ETA. “In violation of the anti-terrorist pact 
signed by the two main political parties,” the Zapatero government negotiated a truce with 
ETA “in exchange for political concessions, conveying the message that the threat of 
violence could pay off.”833 Hence, Zapatero’s strategy strengthened the advocates for the 
continuation of the violent strategy, and delayed the end of ETA. Regarding the definitive 
cessation announced by ETA in October 2011, Alonso stresses that the Basque group has 
not disappeared, and still demands a negotiation with the Spanish and French states. More 
importantly, he regards ETA and its political movement as an entity, namely “the terrorist 
movement,” and argues that the new coalition Bildu is an instrument of this terrorist 
movement. The legalization of Bildu enabled an electoral victory of “ETA,” and the Aiete 
conference, which was allowed by the Zapatero government, gave legitimacy to ETA’s 
narrative. Consequently, what could have been a total defeat of the Basque insurgent group 
became a political victory of its movement. 
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ETA has managed to mitigate the impact of the police defeat, already evident in 
2001 and 2003, with a political victory, such as the neutralization of the instrument 
that enabled the isolation of its political representatives, which they have now 
overcome as they returned to the institutions.834  
One of the most influential leaders of the faction within the PP that shares this 
narrative is Jaime Mayor Oreja, a former Home minister under Aznar. I asked him his 
opinion on the dominant narrative which points out that an internal debate within the 
Abertzale Left drove ETA to lay down arms. “Abertzale Left, Batasuna… It is ETA. There 
are two [nationalist] projects: the one of the PNV, and the one of ETA.” I insisted: “Do 
you not believe that some leaders from Batasuna reached a conclusion and…” I could not 
finish the sentence. 
Not from Batasuna. From ETA. Is my friend Arnaldo Otegi Batasuna, or is he ETA? 
He is ETA. Now, I do think that ETA has changed. It changed strategy. Now they 
believe that they can achieve their objectives without killings.835  
Mayor Oreja’s narrative can be summarized as the following: the socialist party 
wanted to promote “a second transition” in Spain, and that is why Zapatero engaged in a 
peace process in his first term; after negotiations had failed, the negotiation process turned 
into “a conflict resolution process;” the legalization of Bildu, the conference of Aiete, and 
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the definitive cessation of ETA are parts of this resolution process. According to Mayor 
Oreja, what matters is that ETA is still alive as “a project of rupture of Spain.”836 
Maite Pagazaurtundua, whose brother was killed by ETA and herself lived for years 
with bodyguards because of the Basque group’s threat, argues that the violence carried out 
by ETA ended up being effective because they managed to change the political positions 
of some rulers. She believes that the leadership of the PSOE in Spain and, especially, the 
leadership of the Basque branch of the PSOE weakened over time because of the pressure 
imposed by ETA. That is why they promoted a negotiation process in 2005-2007, and 
facilitated the process of 2009-2011. She argues that the fight against terrorism does not 
end with the definitive cessation of ETA’s activity, but must challenge its political 
objectives. Pagazaurtundua contends ETA turned its victims into instruments to influence 
the society. Now, ETA has laid down arms, but their political strategy has not been 
defeated, she argues. “This political strategy cannot be accepted without a self-criticism, 
because it is rotten. You harassed people, you blackmailed people, and this strategy is not 
rotten? It is, unless you clean it.” She does not state that ETA has politically succeeded, 
but she contends that its political victory is still a possibility. “It is at stake.”837    
This narrative of ETA’s political success—or possibility of success—is based on a 
key assumption. A political success of the pro-independence movement is an ETA success. 
Therefore, the state has to prevent not only the illegal acts of ETA but the attainment of its 
objectives by other agencies. Alonso specifically proposes that the anti-terrorist policies of 
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the government should prevent the reinforcement of the pro-independence political 
movement because he considers it an extension of the “terrorist movement,” even though 
it does not use any violent method.838 
Not surprisingly, the success narrative claimed by ETA is based on similar 
assumptions. Regardless of the profit and loss balance of the armed struggle, ETA and 
those sharing its narrative claim that the struggle of the Abertzale Left movement as a 
whole has enabled a political scenario in which Basque independence is still a possibility. 
Hence, ETA’s strategy has not been a failure, but an effective tool toward the attainment 
of its objectives. Yet, this approach can be challenged arguing that there is not any evidence 
that the current political stance of the majority of the Basque society on the constitutional 
issue, and the political context supposedly favorable for a change of status, are a 
consequence of ETA’s violent campaign. In fact, it could also be argued that the current 
favorable context is more a consequence of the absence of violence, rather than the 
consequence of the violent campaign. The cases of Scotland and Catalonia show that 
nationalist movements with no political-military strategies can reach a scenario in which 
secession is backed by a significant part of the society to the extent of making it a real 
possibility. Of course, it does not imply that the Basque Country would now be in a similar 
situation to Catalonia had ETA abandoned armed struggle, say, at the end of Francoism. 
The experiences of Scotland and Catalonia do not invalidate ETA’s narrative about the 
                                                          





efficacy of armed struggle to create conditions for a chance for secession, but they put it 
into question.  
6.2.3. Defeat narrative 
Ixiar Galardi, a former ETA activist, showed herself to be proud of her contribution to the 
Basque cause in a documentary interview conducted after the definitive cessation of ETA. 
She expressed a positive view of the struggle in which she once engaged. Yet, in her 
testimony that the documentary director placed in the very end of the film, the former 
militant wondered whether they could not have stopped earlier. “The suffering that we 
provoked and the suffering that we experienced are huge… to reach this point. So to speak, 
we now accept the game rules coming from the [Spanish] constitution. Why now, and not 
before?”839 
Beyond the official narrative of ETA and the Abertzale Left claiming a success or, 
at least, a chance to succeed, there is a more pessimistic narrative within the Abertzale Left 
that is hardly spoken aloud. It is not only that ETA laid down arms without achieving its 
political objectives. It is the unilateral nature of ETA’s decision, without even negotiating 
the fate of their prisoners, exiles and militants in hiding. It is the way their political wing, 
now named Sortu, re-entered the political arena, rejecting ETA’s violence and assuming 
the rules established by the Law of Political Parties that once banned their party, Batasuna. 
This narrative of defeat is not publicly dominant in the Abertzale Left, although it is 
reasonable to think that it would not be rare in private spheres. The defeat narrative is very 
                                                          





likely sustained by the factions within the Abertzale Left who advocated for the 
continuation of armed struggle and lost the internal debate. Not surprisingly, they rarely do 
public statements, as advocating for armed struggle is a crime. I requested interviews from 
members of these factions, but they declined. There are a few blogs where some dissidents 
within the Abertzale Left considered the end of ETA’s campaign a surrender to the 
enemy.840 
In contrast, this narrative of a victory of democracy and a defeat of terrorism is 
dominant in mainstream politics in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in the Basque Country. 
According to this account, ETA has laid down arms without achieving any of its objectives 
as a consequence of a combination of police and judicial repression, and political isolation 
of the organizations supporting ETA. In summary, the Basque group has been forced to 
give up.  
Failure and/or defeat are very frequent outcomes of rebel armed groups, according 
to data analyzed by scholars on the end of terrorism. Weinberg states that defeat is by far 
the most common result,841 and Cronin points out that the majority of terrorist groups end 
because of failure. However, they are not referring to identical patterns. When talking about 
defeat, Weinberg includes both defeat by military or police force and defeat by self-
destruction. Cronin distinguishes between the pattern of failure and the pattern of defeat by 
military or police action. When Cronin states that most of the groups ended because of 
failure, she does not mean that they were defeated by military or police forces. Failure, in 
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Cronin’s framework, means self-defeat. “Terrorism can be self-defeating. Most terrorism 
ends because the group employing the tactic fails and eventually disintegrates.”842 Jones 
and Libicki, in contrast, consider only defeat or failure by military or police action. 
According to their data, forty percent of the groups ended because local police and 
intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members, and another seven percent because 
military force led to their end. Therefore, forty-seven percent of the groups ended by 
repression. They do not consider self-defeat as a pattern, and categorize the cases other 
than defeat and success as transition to a political process, which is a very frequent 
typology; according to their data, forty-three percent of the groups ended because they 
joined a political process. In summary, following the frameworks proposed by scholars on 
the end of terrorist groups, two main factors of failure can be distinguished: defeat by State 
repression and failure as self-defeat. Both factors can interact, and often do.  
A decapitation of an organization, a massive arrest of its members, and other sorts 
of repression can weaken a group and, even though it might not cause the group’s 
disappearance, can bring the group toward the conclusion that violence is no longer an 
effective method. In this regard, the police repression and the judicial action have 
weakened ETA’s ability to carry out and sustain an effective military campaign against the 
Spanish state, and the weakening of its capacity has surely influenced the internal debate 
on the abandonment of armed resistance. Still, it can hardly be asserted that ETA’s 
campaign has ended because of the state repression. ETA had a leadership in charge, active 
militants in hiding, deposits of weapons, and money when they announced the end of their 
                                                          





activity. The Basque case does not fit the pattern of defeat by military or police force. 
However, failure may arguably fit the case of ETA. In fact, a narrative about subsequent 
strategic failures can be worked out following the evolution of the Basque group.  
ETA followed in the 1970s what the armed group defined as an action-repression-
action spiral, which could fit what the scholars Kydd and Walter define as a provocation 
strategy.843 Through its armed activity ETA intended to provoke an indiscriminate reaction 
by the state, so that the Basque population would react through mobilization and activism 
against the state. At this point, ETA would have had more legitimacy to carry on attacks, 
and the spiral would go on until a popular insurrection against Francoism, and the 
achievement of independence and socialism.844 The spiral mechanism worked, to some 
extent. ETA actions provoked a huge repression by the state, not only against ETA but 
against a significant part of the Basque society. This generalization of the repression 
provoked a great mobilization and activism in the Basque society. However, that level of 
mobilization and activism did not bring about an insurrection. In this way, it was a failure. 
ETA soon realized that a more realistic approach was needed. 
Then, ETA shifted to what Kydd and Walter call strategy of attrition.845 Since then, 
ETA’s main strategy has been to show the Spanish authorities through violent attacks that 
it would be very costly not to negotiate and yield to some of their demands. In short, since 
the 1980s ETA’s strategy has been devoted to forcing a political negotiation with the 
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Spanish state. The attrition war worked in the 1980s, in the sense that a strong military 
campaign by ETA made the Spanish government sit down and negotiate with the Basque 
group in Algiers, in 1989. Attrition worked, but negotiations did not. In short, the Spanish 
government led by the socialist Felipe Gonzalez was prepared to negotiate the so-called 
technical conditions of the abandonment of the armed campaign, such as a gradual release 
of prisoners, but he was not prepared to negotiate political concessions. ETA, in contrast, 
was prepared to negotiate the end of their armed struggle in exchange for political 
concessions in relation to the recognition of the right for self-determination. It was a failure 
too, because a settlement was not possible at the time, given the position of the two parties. 
They might have reached what I. William Zartman defines as a “mutually hurting 
stalemate,” but they did not reach what he calls a “ripe moment.” According to Zartman, a 
mutually hurting stalemate is reached when: 
The parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to 
victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in 
equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or way out.846 
In the 1980s ETA showed through an intense offensive an effective ability to inflict 
great damage and even provoke destabilization in Spanish politics, but the Basque group 
was aware that a victory over the state was unrealistic, and that they should seek a 
negotiation. The state repression of ETA was relatively effective but proved insufficient to 
defeat the Basque armed group. Following Zartman’s terminology, they reached a mutually 
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hurting stalemate in their confrontation, and a dubious ripe moment for negotiations. 
“Ripeness is necessarily a perceptual event, and as with any subjective perception, there 
are likely to be objective referents to be perceived.” In the Basque case, both the Spanish 
government and ETA seemed to perceive there were conditions for negotiations. However, 
Zartman recognizes that ripeness theory only addresses the opening of negotiations, but 
not the outcome.847 Nevertheless, the outcome of the Algiers negotiations proved that the 
opposing parties perceived a ripe moment to open negotiations at the end of the 1980s, but 
they were still far from a ripe moment for a real settlement. From ETA’s perspective, the 
opening of negotiations with the Spanish government was an important tactical success, 
given that the Basque group had been recognized as a negotiation partner, but the outcome 
was a failure. 
ETA resumed an attrition strategy throughout the 1990s, with a significant 
escalation after 1995. They initiated a campaign against the major Spanish political parties, 
especially the PP and the PSOE, aiming to force a negotiation with the Spanish 
government. As expected, the PP came to office in 1996, led by José María Aznar, himself 
a survivor of an ETA attack in 1995. However, the attrition strategy directed at the PP did 
not work. The Aznar government, with Jaime Mayor Oreja as Home minister, adopted an 
approach of repressive counterterrorism with no chances for negotiation. ETA’s strategy 
of conflict escalation through direct attacks on political representatives failed. 
Then, ETA shifted strategy and sought political unity among Basque nationalist 
forces to politically challenge the state. In 1998, the Basque group declared for the first 






time a cessation not aimed to enable negotiations with the Spanish government, but to 
enable a joint strategy among Basque nationalists. The Abertzale Left joined forces with 
moderate nationalist parties such as the PNV and EA, and, to some extent, shared a 
common political action which, from ETA’s perspective, should seek an establishment of 
a new political framework for all the Basque Country, including the territories under 
French sovereignty. The PNV and EA did not agree to call unofficial elections to constitute 
a new Basque national parliament in all territories on the grounds that it was a highly 
unrealistic proposal. Consequently, ETA decided to break the ceasefire and resume armed 
struggle following an attrition strategy similar to the one initiated in the mid-1990s.  
The strategy of forcing negotiations did not work while the PP was in office, but a 
new ripe moment came about when the PSOE returned to power. The Zapatero government 
engaged in negotiations with ETA, under the condition that the issues related to the political 
status were to negotiate among the Basque political legitimate representatives, and not with 
ETA. Theoretically, the armed group agreed to the scheme. Practically, it did not. Political 
negotiations among the PNV, the PSE-EE and Batasuna in 2006 were partly successful. 
They reached a draft agreement on the political basis for a new framework, but Batasuna 
did not ratified the draft because they knew that ETA would not agree. The armed group 
did not renounce their influence in the political negotiations, as they proved by setting off 
a powerful bomb in Madrid’s airport while the ceasefire was theoretically in force, in order 
to put pressure on the Spanish government. The negotiations failed, and the attempt to 





2007 and 2009 was an unsuccessful attempt to reinitiate the attrition strategy. It ended 
without any result. 
The overall strategic failure of ETA was confirmed. The provocation strategy 
known as the action-repression-action did not bring any insurrection in the 1960s and 
1970s, and the attrition war carried out since the 1980s ended without any negotiation and 
any political concession. Moreover, ETA has ended its campaign leaving the situation of 
hundreds of prisoners unsolved, with no other perspective than serving their sentences in 
the Spanish and French prisons, and with its exiles and militants in hiding with an uncertain 
future.    
Ander Gurrutxaga’s devastating evaluation of ETA’s trajectory is a clear exponent 
of the defeat narrative.  
ETA did not bring democracy. It did not have anything to do with political 
autonomy; it was out and against. It did never agree with the Basque Statute. (…) 
The well-being we enjoy was made despite ETA. If it was an enterprise and should 
have to report its results, it would have only been able to present two entries: victims 
and prisoners. It is a paradox that the organization that wanted to be the vanguard 
of the movement for national liberation ended up not being a vanguard, without a 
movement, and without national liberation.848  
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Rodolfo Ares, a former Home minister of the Basque government led by the PSE-
EE, shares this narrative of defeat:  
They arrived at the conclusion that they had no escape. (…) That is why I insist that 
this is not a fruit of a gracious decision [by ETA], but something conquered by us. 
It is a conquest. We force them to take these decisions.849 
Ramón Jauregui, a former minister of the Zapatero cabinet, makes a similar 
reflection: “The Abertzale Left and the nationalism as a whole concluded that they were 
ruined if the violence continued.”850 Miguel Sanz, a former president of the regional 
government of Navarre, states that ETA decided to laid down arms because they were in 
an unsustainable situation as a consequence of the policies implemented “by the 
democrats.”851 
Iñaki Esnaola was a prominent leader of the Abertzale Left in the 1980s. An 
advocate for the end of ETA’s violence, he tried to facilitate a negotiated way out at the 
beginning of the 1990s, without the support of the leadership of both ETA and HB. He 
failed, and was expelled from HB. He contends that ETA has arrived too late to the 
conclusion that an end of the armed activity was the only reasonable way out: “When the 
organization is suffocated, with no chances, (…) because they do not have any other 
choice.”852 Carmen Gisasola was an ETA activist in the 1980s and a member of the 
leadership of the organization at the end of the decade. From the end of the 1990s, she has 
                                                          
849 Author interview, Rodolfo Ares, Bilbao, June 10, 2013. 
850 Author interview, Ramón Jauregui, Gasteiz, April 12, 2013. 
851 Author interview, Miguel Sanz, Iruñea, December 12, 2013. 





made public her critical view on ETA’s trajectory. She believes it is a history of total 
failure.  
We dreamt to achieve independence and socialism through armed struggle. But 
territoriality and the right for self-determination are in the same place as before. 
(…) We caused suffering and divided the society. (…) The consequence? The 
prisons are full of prisoners who do not know when they will be released, and the 
society is full of victims. (…) Every time we sat down around a [negotiation] table, 
we lacked a serious reflection and willingness to end definitely armed struggle. I 
mean, every time we sat down around a table, we placed claims which were 
unacceptable for our rivals. (…) In the end, the abandonment of the military 
strategy has arrived by the sheer impossibility of the impossible.”853 
 The spokespersons of the current ETA do not obviously agree with this narrative 
of defeat. In an interview released in November 2011, they asserted that ETA has made a 
“great contribution” to avoid the assimilation of the Basque Country into the Spanish 
political system, and to create political conditions for a change. Still, they acknowledged 
that the combination of police repression and political banning led ETA and the Abertzale 
Left to a blockade. The spokespersons of ETA regarded the Lizarra-Garazi process of 
nationalist unity the starting point of a new repression strategy by the state. According to 
their narrative, the power showed by the nationalists’ united action at the end of the 1990s 
                                                          





sounded alarms in the Spanish state, and the Spanish rulers decided to take a qualitative 
leap, namely the banning of the political party of the Abertzale Left.  
The final goal [of the state] was to leave the Abertzale Left with no social base, 
with no political and institutional reference, with no ability to deepen the chances 
for national building, in order to make the Abertzale Left limit its action to a mere 
armed struggle, hoping that police repression would neutralize it somehow. All that 
caused a halt to the liberation process, a blockade. And what is worse: it put at 
serious risk the conditions created. The Abertzale Left had to take the initiative to 
escape that trap (…).854            
ETA does not publicly acknowledge any defeat, but it does recognize that the 
political-military strategy reached a situation in which it was unable to achieve its 
objectives. Furthermore, ETA saw a real possibility of a political defeat after a certain 
military failure, as they perceived a risk of wasting the alleged political condition created 
by their struggle. 
In summary, it can be more accurate to define the end of ETA’s violent campaign 
as a failure rather than a defeat. The Basque group’s strategy of attrition toward a 
negotiation has failed. It is a failure of the political-military strategy, and it is a failure of 
ETA, in the sense given to the term by Cronin.855 It is a self-defeat, given that it has ended 
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by a unilateral decision, with no political concessions by the Spanish state. However, the 
failure of the political-military strategy of attrition has not necessarily meant a defeat of 
the Abertzale Left, the broader political movement to which ETA belongs. It is a case that 
fits Weinberg’s reflections on the relativity of the concept of success and defeat, as he 
points out that the awareness of an imminent defeat can be a catalyst for a transformation.856 
All evidence, including ETA’s reflections, suggest that this is the case of the Basque 
insurgent group. 
6.2.4. Transformation narrative 
The borderline between self-defeat and political transformation is not always clear. 
Abandoning violent methods without having achieved the final goals because the group 
concludes that using violence is useless can be a reason to initiate a transformation which 
can eventually be a political success. Scholars on the end of terrorism refer differently to 
transformation. Weinberg refers to transformation, Cronin to negotiation, Crenshaw to 
strategic choices, and Libicki and Jones to the joining of a political process. However, they 
all are referring to the process of transformation from an insurgent group into a non-violent 
political organization or movement. According to their data analysis, transformation is less 
common than defeat (or failure) and much more frequent than success. Jones and Libicki 
found that forty-three percent of the cases ended through political transformation. 
According to Susanne Martin’s study on the political groups shifting to and from terrorism, 
instances of groups turning to politics may be on the rise.857  
                                                          
856 Weinberg, End, 29. 
857 Susanne Martin, “From Parliamentarianism to Terrorism, and back again” (Ph.D. diss., University of 





Many individuals engaged once in armed struggle have become political leaders. 
Nelson Mandela, Yassir Arafat, Yitzhak Shamir, Gerry Adams, and José Múgica are some 
of the many examples. The same applies to multiple organizations or movements which 
were once engaged in armed struggle and then engaged in standard politics. Weinberg 
highlights the case of the Irish Republican movement as an obvious example of 
transformation: “What had been the political wing of a terrorist group comes to dominate 
the group as a whole. And its tactical focus shifts to competing at elections and winning 
votes.”858 ETA has followed a similar path to abandon armed struggle, although there is a 
significant difference between the Irish and the Basque cases. The IRA’s final decision was 
preceded by a successful negotiation process, and the Basque group’s decision was 
preceded by a failed peace process. In any case, Weinberg’s logic can be used to explain 
the Basque case: what had been the political wing (Batasuna) of an armed group (ETA) 
has come to dominate the group as a whole, and its tactical focus shifts to competing at 
elections and winning votes. The path to politics can include political negotiations and a 
settlement, like in Northern Ireland, but it is not a necessary condition. Jones and Libicki 
describe the transformation with no negotiation as “a transition to civic action.” In this 
case, the group makes the decision of laying down arms based on cost-benefit calculations 
and conclude that pursuing their goals through non-violence has greater benefits and lower 
costs.859  
                                                          
858 Ibid., 117. 





Audrey K. Cronin argues that negotiation can be a useful factor even in the case of 
failure of those negotiations. According to her data, the vast majority of negotiations yield 
neither a clear resolution nor a cessation of the conflict, and about half of the groups that 
negotiated in recent years have resumed violent activities as talks unfolded. In the event of 
negotiation failure, she contends, the relevant question for a government is whether the 
situation following the failed talks is better or worse than it might have been without 
negotiations. In her words, the most likely result for a government that negotiates is “long-
term management of the threat over a lengthy period of gradual demise of the terrorist 
campaign, while other factors lead to its end.”860 
Representatives of the socialist government in the Algiers negotiations in 1989 have 
acknowledged in later testimonies that their most realistic objective was not to agree on a 
settlement, but to demonstrate that ETA was unwilling to engage in a negotiated 
abandonment of armed activity. They wanted to put it into evidence especially before the 
Algerian and French governments, in order to obtain their collaboration against ETA. José 
Luis Corcuera, the Spanish Home minister at the time, recognizes that they did not believe 
a settlement was possible. They engaged into the talks because the Algerian government 
promised that the numerous ETA members exiled in Algeria would be expelled if the 
process collapsed. That is what eventually occurred. “That was the operation. I have to say 
that it went as we expected.”861 Eugenio Etxebeste, the ETA chief negotiator in Algiers, 
believes that the Spanish government sought to provoke disagreements within the Basque 
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group, because they considered that the military confrontation unified the organization but 
a dialogue process could disunite it. In fact, Etxebeste acknowledges that the outcome of 
the Algiers talks caused contradictions which sharpened disagreements within the armed 
group. The overall evaluation about the breakup is that cost was higher for ETA than the 
government. “We lost recognition, people and a country [Algeria]. The cost was 
important.”862 In short, the collapse of the process weakened the position of the armed 
group and reinforced the position of the Spanish government. 
A decade later, the Basque group paid a high price after the collapse of the Lizarra-
Garazi process. That process was not based on negotiations with the Spanish government, 
although a meeting took place in Switzerland. In the Lizarra-Garazi process the 
instrumental negotiations were held between the Basque moderate nationalist parties PNV 
and EA, and the clandestine group ETA. As the insurgent group was the one who decided 
to end the process and resume armed activity, a great part of the Basque public blamed 
ETA and the Abertzale Left, as the results of the 2001 Basque elections showed.863 
The last negotiations in 2005-2007 also confirmed Cronin’s theory. The 
negotiations were a failure because the parties did not reach any settlement and ETA 
resumed armed resistance in 2007, but the position of the faction in favor of the 
continuation of the military strategy became unsustainable. In Arnaldo Otegi’s view, the 
credibility of the Abertzale Left was “seriously damaged” because it was the third failed 
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peace process.864 A political correspondent of El Pais, Luis R. Aizpeolea, summarized in 
a telling sentence: “It [the negotiation process] was a tactical failure but a strategic success 
[for the government], which has made ETA enter a terminal stage.”865 Jesús Eguiguren, the 
principal negotiator on behalf of the Spanish government, argues that ETA’s abandonment 
of terrorism is a direct consequence of the failed process in 2006-2007.866 In the end, the 
situation following the failure of each negotiation attempt has been worse for ETA and 
better for the government, in the sense that the bargaining position of the Basque group has 
gradually weakened over time. In summary, the transformation of ETA and the Abertzale 
Left into an exclusively political movement has not been an outcome of any negotiations, 
but subsequent failed negotiation attempts have been instrumental factors. 
Transformation can be a necessity or an opportunity, or both. Jonan Fernández, a 
founder of the movement Elkarri in the 1990s and the director of peace policies in the 
Basque government since 2013, agrees with the idea that the end of ETA is not a case of 
defeat or success but a case of transformation. According to his explanation, one of the 
possible causes of transformation is usually an awareness of “imminent catastrophe,” 
which he believes is the case of the Basque group.867 Otegi ratified to some extent the 
interpretation of Fernández. The political leader of the Abertzale Left asserted that the 
collapse of the peace process in 2007 led the Abertzale Left “to the abyss of political 
marginalization and ideological drift.” According to Otegi, when the political leadership 
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of the Abertzale Left decided to make “the transatlantic of the Abertzale Left” swerve, their 
diagnosis was that their transatlantic was about to crash against the shore.868 
Otegi confirmed the narrative on necessity for transformation, but he also contends 
that it was a transformation for opportunity, as the shift to politics opened a new avenue 
for national liberation. He argues that the 2007 negotiations in Geneva showed that the 
Abertzale Left could win the debate when it addresses political issues such as the 
controversy on the right for self-determination, but their arguments were much weaker 
when the discussion is about armed confrontation. His main argument is that the State wins 
in the military battlefield, and the pro-independence movement wins in the political 
battlefield. “In an open low-intensity [military] conflict between ETA and the state, they 
win and we the pro-independence people lose in political terms.” Consequently, "we 
needed to build a scenario in which everybody won in human terms, but the state lost and 
we won in political terms.”869 Two decades earlier, the ETA negotiator Etxebeste 
questioned the strategy of ETA and the Abertzale Left in an internal letter directed to the 
leadership of his organization, arguing that they needed to avoid a political defeat as a 
consequence of a very likely military defeat, which he intuited by the early 1990s. He was 
suggesting a transformation as a consequence of an imminent military defeat, in order to 
avoid a political defeat too.  
During the Lizarra-Garazi process at the end of the 1990s, the Basque nationalist 
forces experienced the political opportunities enabled by the cessation of armed struggle 
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for the first time in decades. The nationalist party that ruled the Basque government since 
its establishment in 1980 and the movement that had opposed the autonomous framework 
throughout all that period were suddenly able to join forces, along with other parties and 
organizations such as the trade unions ELA and LAB. With violence out of politics, the 
pro-independence side felt stronger in the political debate. The new situation had a clear 
reflection in elections, as nationalist ballots increased overall, particularly the vote for the 
Abertzale Left. The process collapsed, but the memory of the opportunity remained. 
All nationalist forces but the Abertzale Left had always contended that the cessation 
of ETA’s violence was an absolute condition for collaboration. The political leaders of the 
Abertzale Left were also aware of that condition. After the Lizarra-Garazi experience, the 
PNV would hardly seek a new collaboration with the Abertzale Left, let alone after the 
change in the leadership of the party in 2004, when Josu Jon Imaz substituted Xabier 
Arzalluz. From then on, pan-nationalist strategies were absolutely out of the PNV agenda. 
Nevertheless, the rest of the Basque nationalist parties such as EA, Aralar and AB have 
sought to join forces among nationalists in the event of a cessation of violence. The political 
leaders of the Abertzale Left were aware that an important part of their base regretted the 
collapse of the Lizarra-Garazi agreement, and would welcome a strategy based on 
nationalists’ collaboration under the condition of a cessation of violence. In this regard, a 
cessation—a transformation into a political movement—was a necessity but an opportunity 
too. 
Transformation is a psychological matter too. Shifting from armed struggle to 





have become de-radicalized. As John Horgan points out, individuals may desist from 
engaging in violence, they may substitute the bullet for the ballot for tactical reasons, but 
they may retain their original ultimate goals.870 Arnaldo Otegi’s confessed concerns show 
that the psychological and biological factors are to be taken into account to understand 
political transformation. While he was in jail, he wondered whether the evolution of his 
position regarding armed struggle could be a consequence of his age, “because of 
biological reasons rather than political reasons.” However, when he was released from 
prison in 2008, Otegi explains, he was pleased to verify that younger militants were in 
harmony with him. Thus, he discarded “the biological factor.”871 It might be an obvious 
remark to point out that personal evolution of the decision makers within the Abertzale 
Left movement and ETA counts. The psychological evolution of the actors involved in the 
process leading to the end of ETA is beyond the scope of this study, but its importance for 
the understanding of the deep metamorphosis of the Abertzale Left is hardly questionable. 
Antton López Ruiz, Kubati, who spent 26 years in prison, remarks that time is obviously a 
factor to consider regarding the strategic choices advocated by the individuals involved in 
the struggle. 
You are not the same person as thirty years ago. Age gives you a frame to analyze 
reality. After a life experience, at one given moment you regard as useless the tools 
that you once used to analyze reality. You do not think the same. You might have 
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the same final goals, but you analyze the reality through different ideas and 
mechanisms.872  
It could not be accurate to assert that the Abertzale Left has simply changed tactics, 
or strategy, but remained as radicalized, revolutionary, and combative as ever, on the 
ground that they have not abandoned the final goals of independence and, in much more 
ambiguous terms, socialism. Over time, the movement has evolved from revolutionary 
positions to the assumption of the rules of representative democracy. In the past, they 
regarded an armed vanguard as legitimized in using coercion and leading a struggle on the 
grounds of the fairness of its objectives, regardless of the will of the majority of the Basques 
expressed in elections. Today, they have assumed that their political goals will only be 
achieved in the event that a majority of the Basques support them, and they pledge an 
allegiance to exclusively peaceful means, and to the rules of representative democracy. 
Eugenio Etxebeste’s words, spoken when the transformation was not completed yet, 
synthetized the depth and nature of the transformation experienced by the Abertzale Left: 
“We need to transition from the era of ‘resisting is wining’ to the era of ‘convincing is 
winning.’”873             
 In summary, the end of ETA’s military campaign can hardly be regarded as a 
success of a strategy. On the contrary, regarding the use of violent means for political 
purposes, it is a story of failure. The definitive cessation of ETA’s violent activity has come 
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after a failure of a political-military strategy of attrition. The strategy seeking a negotiation 
has not brought any result. However, failure of a strategy is not equal to a defeat of an 
organization or movement, as much as military defeat is not always equal to political 
defeat. The deep transformation of the movement and the abandonment of violent methods 
has enabled, in a short term, the reorganization and reinforcement of the pro-independence 
movement. After the 2002 banning, the Abertzale Left was legally inoperative and 
politically isolated, unable to collude with any other political force because of the rejection 
of ETA’s violence. Once the Abertzale Left evolved toward the assumption of purely 
democratic rules and the armed group abandoned violence, the political organization once 
considered part of ETA—along with other coalition partners—has become the second 
Basque political force regarding overall electoral strength. All in all, the end of ETA’s 
campaign is the result of a deep transformation of a whole movement which decided to 
engaged in exclusively political means, as a consequence of an awareness of an imminent 
political defeat after an irreversible failure of the political-military strategy of attrition. This 
transformation has placed the movement that has abandoned armed struggle in a position 
where a political success is a real possibility in the near future. 
6.3. The factors 
6.3.1. Increasing opposition from society 
In political violent conflicts involving insurgent groups with a support of a significant part 
of the society, the battle for social legitimation and the conquest of public opinion are 
crucial. As defined by Jean-Pierre Massias, the Basque conflict is asymmetric, as there is 





of the public opinion becomes fundamental,” as the weakest party needs a public who asks 
for a resolution that may involve concessions. It did not happen with ETA, but the opposite: 
“The domination of the disqualifying discourse of ETA in the public opinions and in the 
media marked the victory of the Spanish state in this battle for the conquest of the 
opinion.”874 Cindy R. Jebb and others arrived at a similar conclusion regarding the Basque 
case: “Spanish democracy has outpaced ETA in the race for political legitimacy.”875 
 ETA was founded during a dictatorship. Although the degree of social support 
enjoyed by the Basque group during the authoritarian regime is difficult to measure, it is 
commonly accepted that a big part of the Basque society and a significant part of the 
Spanish society regarded ETA members as freedom fighters. When the transition began 
after the death of the dictator Francisco Franco, and the Basque organization decided to 
carry on the armed resistance, the legitimation of the new system was still at stake. The 
new chief of state, the king Juan Carlos de Borbón, was appointed by the dictator. The 
Spanish constitution was overwhelmingly approved in Spain, but the high rates of active 
abstention in the Basque Country questioned its legitimacy in the Basques’ view. ETA’s 
argument was that Juancarlism was a mere continuation of Francoism. Yet, the statute of 
autonomy of the three Western Basque provinces got a legitimizing majority in the 1979 
referendum. The statute of Navarre was never voted on a referendum, but a majority of the 
political representatives of Navarre agreed on it. Since a new framework based on 
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autonomy was established with the support of a majority of the Basque society, the fight 
for legitimacy began to crumble for ETA. 
ETA claimed a revolutionary legitimacy as a justification for its struggle. That 
legitimation was not based on the support of the voters, but in the rightness of their 
revolutionary goals, such as fighting injustice. However, the crisis of the revolutionary 
models and the collapse of the socialist bloc weakened those arguments for legitimacy. As 
highlighted by Emilio López Adán, Beltza, ETA started to change its legitimizing argument 
to justify their struggle in the 1990s. Since ETA presented the Democratic Alternative as 
their ‘road map’ for conflict resolution, they prioritized the democratic legitimacy to the 
revolutionary one. They came to accept that social support and votes were the source of 
legitimacy. According to López Adán, this change of model, and this assumption of 
democratic votes as a source of legitimacy, questioned all theoretical foundation for the 
justification of an armed vanguard.876 Mikel Saratxo and Julen Zabalo stress that justifying 
armed struggle became more and more difficult for ETA in a new context defined by three 
main changes: firstly, democracy gave international legitimacy to Spain; secondly, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union weakened socialist theories; and thirdly, the end of the Cold 
War strengthened pacifism.877 In summary, as the new democratic framework was 
stabilizing and the international revolutionary references declined, ETA’s justification for 
the use of violence as a political tool lost ground.     
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The attitude of the Basque society regarding ETA evolved substantially over time. 
Gurutz Jauregui distinguishes six stages to explain the evolution of the Basque society’s 
stance regarding ETA: first, an explicit support throughout the Francoist era and the early 
years of transition; second, from 1978 to 1981, an implicit support; third, from 1981 to 
1986, a period of indifference; fourth, from 1986 (year of the killing of Yoyes) to 1987, an 
implicit rejection; fifth, from 1987 (year of the attack on the Barcelona supermarket 
Hipercor) to 1997, an active rejection guided by Gesto por la Paz and others; and sixth, a 
massive rejection since 1997, after the strong reaction to the kidnapping and killing of the 
PP city councilor Miguel Angel Blanco.878 
Some policy makers such as the former lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea would not 
agree with Jauregi’s approach. He contends that the social reaction against ETA was 
initiated earlier. According to Garaikoetxea, the social delegitimation process of ETA had 
four landmarks; first, the great demonstration against ETA in 1978, mostly promoted by 
the PNV, which was exceptional because, beyond being a huge demonstration, it was the 
first time that the PNV called citizens to mobilize against ETA; second, the giant 
demonstration against the kidnapping and killing of José María Ryan, the chief engineer of 
the projected nuclear plant in Lemoiz, in 1981;  third, the demonstration after the 
kidnapping and killing of the military man Alberto Martin Barrios in 1983; and fourth, the 
massive mobilization during and after the kidnapping of Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997.879 
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According to the director of the pollster Euskobarometro, Francisco J. Llera, 
opinion polls on Basque attitudes regarding ETA suggest that the majority of the Basque 
society did not openly reject ETA until the early 1990s, “when the effects of democratic 
unity in the fight against terrorism, the failure of the negotiation process in Algiers, and the 
onset of social mobilization all took their toll.”880 Based on the findings in the 
Euskobarometro polls conducted twice a year since 1995, Llera also asserts that the 
rejection of ETA declined and support increased during the three periods of long ceasefires 
and talks, namely Algiers (1989), Lizarra-Garazi (1998-1999), and Loiola (2005-2007). 
The lehendakari who replaced Garaikoetxea in 1985, José Antonio Ardanza, 
contends that the most decisive milestone in the legitimacy battle with ETA was the Ajuria 
Enea pact signed in 1988. According to him, “the political legitimation of the use of 
violence was defeated forever” through the united discourse by the endorsers of the Pact. 
The Pact established that political issues should not be negotiated with ETA, but stated that 
a negotiation on the end of the armed confrontation should be conducted with those who 
showed an unequivocal will to lay down arms. Ramón Jauregui, a socialist vice-
lehendakari under Ardanza in the 1990s and a minister in Zapatero’s last cabinet, also 
argues that the Pact was a decisive milestone, “an absolute tipping point,” because it 
changed the foundations of the fight against ETA, establishing a “democratic unity” that 
did not work in the previous years.881 The Ajuria Enea pact succeeded in drawing a divisive 
line between those labeled as ‘democrats’ and those labeled as supporters of violence, 
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substituting the traditional divisive line between Basque nationalists and Spanish 
nationalists. Thus, it succeeded in implementing a united discourse against ETA’s violence 
and in politically isolating the Abertzale Left.882 
The discourse of the Ajuria Enea Pact fully matched the discourse and praxis of the 
Gesto por la Paz and other organizations who mobilized against ETA from the late 1980s. 
The Gesto enjoyed support from the Basque political institutions and parties committed to 
the Pact. Fabián Laespada, a long time spokesperson of the Gesto, asserts that they 
identified with the Ajuria Enea Pact’s principles, and that they felt backed when it was 
signed.883 The Gesto’s main goal was the social delegitimizing of ETA’s violence. They 
succeeded in mobilizing a significant part of the Basque society against the armed group. 
The pacifist movement led by Gesto reached its peak in the mid-1990s, when ETA carried 
out subsequent long kidnappings of Basque businessmen, and the Gesto managed to 
organize weekly mobilizations all over the country. They successfully promoted a symbol, 
a blue ribbon, which became an individually-carried claim for the freedom of the 
kidnapped persons by ETA and, therefore, a symbol against ETA. According to Egoitz 
Gago Antón, a researcher on the contribution of the Gesto por la Paz, “the Gesto broke the 
cultural routine of remaining silent against a violent act.”884 A theoretical contribution of 
the Gesto was the separation of political issues and the violence problem. Laespada 
contends that one of the souls of their movement was this disengagement of conflicts: 
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“There is a political conflict that should be addressed, but the problem of the violence of 
ETA should be treated separately.”885 In this regard, the Gesto avoided criticizing Basque 
nationalism; the problem was ETA, not Basque nationalism.886 Gago Antón contends that 
Basque peace organizations led by the Gesto were instrumental to the significant change 
of the Basque social perception of violence. The perception that violent actions were 
unnecessary and ineffective was not new. Rather, the novelty was “the public perception 
of it, derived from the use of public space by the Basque peace movement.”887 The former 
lehendakari Ardanza also regards the pacifist organization Gesto por la Paz as instrumental 
in the process of delegitimation of ETA, and as a substitute of the Ajuria Enea pact when 
the consensus around it was broken. 
When partisan disagreements arose within the endorsers of the Ajuria Enea Pact 
three years after its signing, Gesto por la Paz took over the role of representing 
democratic unity against terrorism and leading popular mobilization against the 
attacks on freedom and human rights carried out by ETA.888          
The social movement Elkarri, with a very different approach regarding the 
resolution of the conflict, also played an important role in the social delegitimizing of 
ETA’s violence. Unlike the Gesto, Elkarri advocated for a negotiation-based process. 
Elkarri even organized some so-called peace conferences that failed in the results, but 
contributed to strengthening a culture of dialogue for an agreed resolution. One of the 
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novelties of Elkarri was that most of their leaders and members were once in the orbit of 
the Abertzale Left, and they were now openly rejecting ETA’s violence. According to 
Jonan Fernández, the main leader of Elkarri from their foundation in 1992 to their 
transformation to Lokarri in 2006, the main contribution of their movement was that they 
pioneered in working out what was called ‘a third space.’ “We say: in this country we  want 
neither ETA’s strategy nor [political] isolation [of the Abertzale Left]. I think that it [our 
discourse] had a big influence in politics; it changed [Basque] politics.”889 Elkarri was not 
the only agency promoting the so-called third space. Diverse Basque nationalist actors who 
were not comfortable with the Ajuria Enea pact and, at the same time, rejected ETA’s 
methods gradually assumed this middle-ground discourse, which sought a conflict 
resolution process based on dialogue. 
After the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997, the model of the 
Basque peace movement changed radically. The huge social reaction against ETA’s action 
was soon directed by the PP and other actors against the Basque nationalism as a whole. It 
was the end of the Ajuria Enea pact, and the end of the harmony between the Gesto and 
the Spanish major political parties. The Gesto turned into a marginal group with very 
limited resources and influence, and new associations with a very aggressive discourse 
against both ETA and Basque nationalism obtained the support of the dominant Spanish 
media and parties, especially the PP. The social delegitimizing of ETA now turned into an 
attempt to delegitimize Basque nationalism. It was a significant change in Basque politics, 
as the divisive line between ‘demócratas’ and ‘violentos’ vanished, and a renewed line 
                                                          





dividing Basque nationalists and the so-called Spanish constitutionalists emerged. 
However, that shift did not slow down the gradual social delegitimizing of ETA. The 
support of ETA within its own traditional social base was also decreasing irredeemably. 
6.3.2. Decreasing support within its constituency 
José Miguel Beñaran, Argala, ETA’s ideologist at the end of the 1970s until his killing by 
Spanish death squads in 1978, and one of the key persons in ETA’s determination to 
continue the armed struggle after Francoism, was quoted as saying: “We must use the 
armed struggle, but we need a political backing. We cannot be the Red Army Faction or 
the Red Brigades. If there is no political backing, we quit.”890 In ETA’s rationale, they did 
not need the support of the majority of the Basque society to justify armed struggle, as they 
regarded themselves a legitimate vanguard of the most combative section of the society 
who aimed for independence for the Basque Country. Still, ETA members were aware that 
they needed the support or, at least, the understanding of a significant part of the society. 
Crenshaw pays special attention to the link between what she calls 
representativeness and continuity. The existence of a conflict of interests, the persistence 
of grievances, and the government’s contested legitimacy may produce, she argues, an 
environment in which insurgent groups “are genuinely representative of a popular base.” 
In this context, part of the population understands and possibly admires armed resistance, 
“in part because the users of terrorism can claim to be representative.” Thus, it becomes an 
interactive process, in which constituencies are particularly important to its changing 
                                                          





dynamics.891 If representativeness is linked to continuity, decrease of the perception of this 
representativeness can be a decisive factor for the decline and end of insurgent groups. 
What influences most in the discontinuation of the group, Crenshaw argues, is the 
withdrawal of support of their own bases, not the decrease of the support in the general 
population.892  
Among the important factors leading to the end of terrorist groups, Cronin mentions 
the loss of support among many other concurrences, such as failure to pass the cause to the 
next generation, infighting and fractionalization, loss of operational control, acceptance of 
individual exits, conclusion that violence is not effective anymore, irrelevance of ideology, 
loss of contact with their constituency, and miscalculation of the effects of its action and 
targeting errors.893 Obviously, some of these factors are directly linked to the loss of 
support. ETA has committed targeting errors and has arguably miscalculated the effects of 
some actions, such as the killing of civilians, especially political representatives, which 
provoked the rejection of many of their followers. In Cronin’s words, “popular support has 
continued to erode as ETA has become increasingly indiscriminate in its targeting.”894 
Jones and Libicki refer to the withdrawal of support as one of the factors which can 
led a group to decide to transition to civic action. If a group perceives that their constituency 
does not support violence anymore but they still back their political goals, its members can 
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conclude that it is time for transformation. As pointed out by Jones and Libicki, insurgent 
groups often make their strategic decisions based on cost-benefit calculations. In many 
cases of transition to civic action, the groups conclude that pursuing their goals through 
nonviolence has greater benefits and lower costs. According to their investigation, one of 
the most important costs of violence is the withdrawal of popular support.895 That is why 
insurgent groups such as ETA usually take care not to overcome what Crenshaw calls 
“tolerance limits,” as a campaign that cross the threshold of acceptability of the audience, 
whose support the group needs, may provoke rejection, and may trigger a movement 
toward abandonment of the violent strategy.896 
Xabier Arzalluz, the main leader of the PNV for decades, remarks that ETA has 
always been very aware of the “swallowing ability” of their constituency. “Anytime they 
give another twist, they observe how things evolve. If they people do not rebel, they say, 
‘People have assumed it’, which means, “my people have swallowed it.”897 De la Calle and 
Sanchez-Cuenca studied how ETA’s attacks have affected the size of its popular support. 
Overall, they found that Batasuna’s support is higher when ETA stops violence.898 The 
development of Batasuna’s vote is not a linear trend and, of course, other factors influenced 
the evolution of its popular support, but they conclude that electoral punishment seems to 
be driven to Batasuna by ETA’s killing of politicians: “The organization’s killings of non-
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nationalist politicians were clearly unpopular among Batasuna voters.”899 Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to measure the extent of the real diminution of the popular support for the 
Abertzale Left since Batasuna was outlawed in 2002 and, as a consequence, it has not been 
able to participate in most of the elections.  
It is impossible to estimate the real degree of disagreement caused among members, 
followers, or voters of the Abertzale Left by the diverse violent actions of ETA. Leaders 
and members of the Abertzale Left have always been supposed not to make public any 
criticism, on the grounds that the enemy would use that criticism against the movement. 
Internal cohesion has been a priority, and public disagreements have been regarded as 
disloyalty. Most of the members of ETA or the Abertzale Left who have showed public 
disagreements with the armed group have ended up out of the movement. Advocates of 
armed struggle and advocates of only political means have coexisted within the Abertzale 
Left, but the price of this coexistence has been the silence of the advocates of the 
abandonment of violence in the name of the cohesion. 
However, some internal disagreements regarding ETA eventually became public. 
The public criticism of the HB member of the European Parliament Txema Montero on the 
Hipercor attack in 1987, the deadliest action ever by ETA, was a reflection of a critical 
sentiment within the Abertzale Left regarding the numerous unwanted killings of civilians 
as a result of methods such as car bombs. When Iñaki Esnaola, a long time leading member 
of HB, advocated for a negotiated abandonment of armed struggle right after the collapse 
of Algiers and even tried to initiate a dialogue between Spanish government’s 






representatives and some members of ETA, was also evidence that not all members of the 
Abertzale Left agreed with the resumption of the military action. Carmen Gisasola, an 
activist of ETA in the 1980s, stresses that they perceived a decline of people willing to help 
militants in hiding after the failure of the Algiers negotiations: “Families who used to open 
their doors to us stopped helping us. (…) After Algiers, only people living alone were 
willing to give us shelter. Sometimes we had to rent houses because people did not want to 
commit.”900  
Two internal debates within the Abertzale Left in the 1990s showed that a 
significant minority questioned the continuation of the political-military strategy. In the 
Urrats Berri debate, in the early 1990s, fourteen percent of the participants supported a 
motion critical of ETA.901 The emergence of the social movement Elkarri by people close 
to the Abertzale Left, and their quick rejection of ETA can be regarded as a direct 
consequence of a shift on the stance of a significant sector of voters or former voters of the 
Abertzale Left. The internal reports—written by the former ETA negotiators Eugenio 
Etxebeste, Iñaki Arakama and Belen Gonzalez from their exile in the Dominican Republic 
in the early 1990s questioning the methods, the efficacy, and the viability of armed 
strategy—were a reflection of a concern among the militants.902 When Begoña Garmendia, 
head of the HB city councilors in Donostia, resigned in 1995 because of the killing of the 
PP councilor Gregorio Ordoñez, arguing that ETA’s armed struggle should not target 
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political representatives, she was expressing a very broad concern within the Abertzale 
Left. The fact that only a few voices of the Abertzale Left, such as Patxi Zabaleta’s, 
publicly asked ETA not to kill the kidnaped city councilor Miguel Angel Blanco did not 
mean that as a significant part of the Abertzale Left agreed with that action, rather the 
contrary. The collapse of the Lizarra-Garazi process provoked a great frustration and 
internal tensions within the Abertzale Left because of the resumption of ETA’s offensive. 
Some disagreements and tensions did not see the public light, but others did. The splits of 
Aralar and AB were a reflection that the coexistence of those favoring armed struggle and 
those advocating for exclusive political means became unfeasible for some. The public 
criticism of some prominent ETA prisoners such as José Luis Alvarez Santacristina, 
Carmen Gisasola and Joseba Urrosolo during and after the Lizarra-Garazi process were a 
signal that discontent was growing inside prisons too. The devastating results of the 2001 
Basque regional elections for EH were a message that many voters were not prepared to 
give their confidence to a political force that shared strategy with a militarily active ETA. 
The letter of other prominent ETA prisoners, such as the former member of the leadership 
Pako Mujika Garmendia, in 2004, who criticized the inefficacy of ETA’s military 
campaign and proposed the end of it, was a signal of a loss of hope for an eventual success 
of the attrition strategy.  
Still, a big community remained loyal to the movement. The failures of subsequent 
peace processes and the broadening of the scope of ETA’s targets provoked disagreements 
and discomfort within the Abertzale Left, and resulted in individual abandonment of 





in the early 2000s, and a very significant decrease in voters in 2001. However, most of the 
militants chose to keep loyal to the Abertzale Left. Once Batasuna was banned, the lists of 
candidates promoted by the outlawed party always obtained more than a hundred thousand 
votes, even when those ballots were officially invalid because of the banning. The 
solidarity mechanism toward detainees and prisoners, and the collective reaction to the 
repressive policies of the State not only against ETA but against many Basque civil 
organizations, gave cohesion to a political community which, by that time, had no common 
stance regarding ETA’s activities. 
It is difficult to measure since when, and to what extent, the majority of the social 
base of the Abertzale Left wanted ETA to stop. It was a gradual process, in which the 
failure of past peace processes might have been decisive turning points. The 
Euskobarometro polls show that explicit support of ETA fell to its lowest levels in the post-
Lizarra-Garazi period. Polls indicate that around twenty percent of the HB voters totally 
supported ETA in the mid-1990s. This proportion fell in 1998, most likely as a 
consequence of the outcome of the kidnappings of Ortega Lara and Miguel Angel Blanco 
a year earlier. The unequivocal support recovered to the prior level of twenty percent in the 
ceasefire period of Lizarra-Garazi. It fell below ten percent after that. In 1999, nineteen 
percent of EH voters claimed to fully support ETA, forty-three percent gave a critical 
support (acceptance of armed struggle, criticism to some actions or methods), and twenty-
five percent supported ETA’s objectives but disapproved of violent methods. In May 2001, 
the total support fell to ten percent, the critical justification to twenty-six percent, and the 





2003, only five percent of the Abertzale Left voters recognized a full support of ETA, 
eleven percent expressed a critical support, and fifty-eight percent a disapproval of 
methods. In November 2006, six percent claimed a total support, fourteen percent a critical 
support, and fifty-three percent a disapproval of methods. In November 2009, four percent 
claimed total support, fifteen percent critical support, and thirty-nine percent disapproval 
of methods. In November 2013, two years after the definitive cessation of ETA, four 
percent of EH Bildu voters supported the armed group, sixteen percent recognized a critical 
support, seventeen percent a support in the past and rejection in the present, and thirty-five 
percent a disapproval of methods.903 Interpretation of opinion polls on political violence 
needs to consider that supporters of an illegal and clandestine organization considered 
terrorist by law can be reluctant to recognize their real opinion. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to estimate that support of ETA could have been higher than what the Euskobarometro 
polls showed. However, this fact does not question the validity of the credible trends 
showed by the surveys.  
Regarding the difficulties for justifying violent means before their constituency, 
Saratxo and Zabalo consider, on the one side, some inconsistencies of the Basque group 
regarding armed struggle, and on the other, the limits of the potentiality of the political-
military strategy. In its political discourse, the Abertzale Left claimed that political 
conflicts should be solved through peaceful means, whereas the armed organization of the 
Abertzale Left used violence; they wanted negotiations among the involved parties, but 
tried to force them through violence; they claimed to consider the citizen’s voice, but 
                                                          






sought a direct negotiation with the state. With these arguments, they contend, “it is more 
and more difficult to prove the inevitability of armed struggle.” Regarding the potentiality 
of armed struggle, Saratxo and Zabalo argue that the Abertzale Left, including ETA, 
eventually arrived at the conclusion that their military action would not be able to force 
negotiations, was an obstacle for an alliance of Basque nationalist forces, and would 
prevent international involvement in the resolution process.904     
The failure of the Algiers talks diminished the confidence in the negotiation 
strategy, and the Bidart arrests caused doubts over ETA’s invincibility to police force. 
Then, the collapse of the Lizarra-Garazi process marked a tipping point in the evolution of 
the Abertzale Left social base’s perception on the inevitability of armed struggle. Clem 
McCartney argues that most of the armed groups “have an analysis of their situation in 
which armed action seems an inevitable (…) component,” and that they need to transition 
to a view in which violence is regarded as “an optional element in the repertoire of 
options.”905 It is what happened to the Abertzale Left’s constituency with the experience 
of the Lizarra-Garazi process. In the words of Alfonso Etxegarai, a former ETA activist 
deported to Sao Tome, “Lizarra-Garazi showed us that there could exist other models.”906 
Finally, the frustrating outcome of the 2005-2007 process turned into a catalyst for the shift 
of the majority of the Abertzale Left constituency toward a negative view on the armed 
struggle. 
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It was not easy for the militants of the Abertzale Left to break a taboo such as the 
unquestionability of armed struggle. That is why the leadership of Batasuna addressed the 
debate from a utilitarian perspective, which might be the only way to face it without causing 
a split. When launching the debate, Otegi did not talk on armed struggle or political-
military means, but efficacy of the strategy. The documents on debate did not mention any 
abandonment of armed resistance, but the adoption of exclusively political means. The 
outcome of the internal debate within the Abertzale Left in 2009-2010—an outstanding 
support of the end of the armed struggle—is a clear indication that a majority will of change 
was latent within the Abertzale Left, silent because of the priority of cohesion and the 
difficulty of overcoming the taboo of questioning armed struggle. Otegi’s comments in this 
regard are very telling: 
I believe that this conclusion [that armed struggle should end] was latent within the 
Abertzale Left, but it did not quite emerge. Therefore, it was us who had to put it 
on the table with all the consequences. It was tough, it caused tensions, but it ended 
up being an exercise of revolutionary honesty which, to some extent, was a relief 
for all of us. 
I know, for example, that years after Raul Sendic, leader of the Tupamaros, first 
said that the armed cycle should end, many of the ‘Tupa’ militants felt that Raul 





October 13—put voice and ‘interpreted’ a vast silent majority of our social base 
when we put on the table the need to end the armed cycle.907 
That is what happened. Once the leadership broke the taboo, the dormant majority 
arose and supported the turnaround on utilitarian grounds. The once constituency of ETA 
decided that armed struggle should be stopped because they did not regard it effective 
anymore, because they could not expect any positive result out of a resumption of an 
attrition war against the Spanish state.          
6.3.3. Police and judicial action 
Even though ETA decided to lay down arms in October 2011, it has a capacity to carry on 
a military campaign. It had a leadership, cells, a network, money, and guns.  The Basque 
insurgent group has not been entirely crushed by police force and judicial persecution. It 
has not been defeated by repression. However, repression weakened ETA and gradually 
diminished its capacity to commit attacks. Recent internal documents of the armed group 
reveal that difficulties to carry out actions were discussed in their debate in 2007 and 2008. 
In a document comprising the temporary conclusions of the internal debate, ETA 
recognized they had “serious problems” to put into practice an effective armed struggle, 
and had entered “an operative-military crisis.” The document pointed out that it would be 
necessary to get out from the scheme in which “the enemy” had forced them to enter, and 
to look for new spaces to develop their actions.908 For a group not fond of acknowledging 
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the effectiveness of the state repression, it is a telling testimony. ETA itself recognized it 
was suffering a crisis in military and operational terms. 
 When ETA carried out fewer attacks than usual or none at all during periods with 
no ceasefire, there was always speculation on the reasons: was it because they had decided 
so, or was it because they could not? After the end of the 2006-2007 ceasefire, ETA did 
commit attacks, but its offensive was not comparable, for instance, to the post-Lizarra-
Garazi aggressive campaign in the early 2000s. The arrests and explosives’ seizures by the 
Spanish and French police in 2007 and 2008 indicated that ETA was trying to attack, but 
repression had prevented it. ETA’s first deadly attack, nine months after the announced 
end of the ceasefire, was a killing of a former city councilor of the PSE-EE, with no current 
political responsibilities and, therefore, with no bodyguards. The Basque group itself 
recognized in a later internal document their difficulties to sustain a strong military 
campaign: “ETA aimed to move the state toward a negotiation table by an armed campaign. 
However, it had not been able to develop a continuous armed campaign.”909 In sum, ETA 
was not defeated but was notably weakened and limited as a consequence, to a great extent, 
of police repression and judicial persecution. 
 Scholars on the end of terrorism view state repression as one of the decisive factors 
in the survival or demise of insurgent groups. According to Jones and Libicki’s data, forty 
percent of the groups ended as a consequence of police repression and seven percent as a 
consequence of military force.910 According to Weinberg, government repression explains 
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more than ten percent of the ends.911 Cronin notes that repression can be counterproductive 
because states can lead to their own delegitimation if in the process of repressing armed 
groups they challenge civil liberties and human rights. The key, in Cronin’s view, is the 
capacity of the state to attract the support of the community while fighting terrorism.912 
Crenshaw and Cronin contend that state repression weakens terrorism but must be 
accompanied by other measures to effectively provoke its end.  
 Counterterrorism to combat ETA evolved over time. During Francoism, the state 
repression was, to a great extent, indiscriminate. It persecuted militants of ETA and 
political opponents alike. Torture of detainees was common. Death squads acted with 
impunity. A great part of the civil Basque society suffered Francoist repression, and many 
people identified with those repressed by the regime. The regime was able to almost crush 
the entire ETA network more than once, but, at the same time, the state lost social support 
and fueled support for the armed group. This broad repression planted the seeds for 
subsequent re-emergences of ETA, based on numerous new recruits and an important part 
of the society willing to help. In addition, the regime did not have any international 
collaboration. ETA militants could get shelter in the Basque territories under French 
sovereignty, and even get political refugee status. This rearguard turned into an 
instrumental factor in the evolution of the effectiveness of ETA’s campaigns over time. 
The counterterrorism model of the Spanish state did not meaningfully change in the early 
years of transition after Franco’s death, among other reasons because police and judicial 
authorities were the same as in the Dictatorship. Repression was highly indiscriminate, 
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torture was widely used by police, and death squads were active. The state repression was 
weakening ETA for the short run, but giving it legitimation and prestige for the long run. 
There was no change on the other side of the border either: ETA members could take cover 
in the northern Basque Country.  
A new stage began in 1982, when the PSOE led by Felipe Gonzalez came to office. 
The highly indiscriminate nature of repression did not substantially change over the first 
years of the socialist rule. According to Reinares, it is estimated that only one-third of the 
5,700 people arrested from 1977 to 1987 in relation to ETA were finally prosecuted by 
judges. From the end of the 1980s the state repression gradually became more discriminate 
than during Francoism and early transition, but it was still affecting many citizens who 
were not involved in illegal activities. About 970 people were arrested in connection to 
ETA activities from 1988 to 1997—one-fifth of all arrested during the previous decade—
and the judiciary prosecuted over sixty percent of those arrested.913 
A significant part of the Basque society, the faction who identified with the 
Abertzale Left, perceived themselves as direct victims of the state repression. As stressed 
by Letamendia, the violence generated by ETA and the violence inflicted by the state to 
the community who identified with the Abertzale Left were mutually reinforced. 
According to a 1984 poll, thirteen percent of the Basque population declared they had been 
incorrectly treated by the Spanish security forces. Among the HB voters, the proportion of 
the people who felt that they had suffered unfair police harassment was as high as forty-
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one percent.914 This repression directed at a specific political community shaped what Ruiz 
Olabuenaga calls a minority of fear, who regarded the state as an aggressor and ETA as an 
avenging agent.915 In the 1980s torture allegations continued to be numerous. These alleged 
torture cases worked as a delegitimizing factor for state policies, but only in the Basque 
society, especially within the nationalist community, where torture allegations had a high 
credibility. In Reinares’ words, “such behavior produced widespread anger and resentment 
among affected sectors of the Basque population because of police abuses and not 
uncommon cases of torture,” and “facilitated the reproduction of affective adhesion and 
even a significant amount of popular support of ETA.”916 The Spanish public opinion, 
overall, was not aware of these police practices, as the Spanish media and political parties 
turned a blind eye to it. Therefore, it did not work as a delegitimizing factor in the Spanish 
public opinion and a section of the Basque society.  
The main novelty in the counterterrorism policies during the first two terms of the 
Gonzalez cabinet was the GAL, a state-sponsored organization of police officers and 
mercenaries that killed 27 people from 1983 to 1987, mostly in the Basque territories under 
French sovereignty. They mainly attacked ETA members and militants of the Abertzale 
Left, but also non-selected civilians by mistake. If the objective of the creation of the GAL 
was to crush ETA, they failed. In addition, the GAL was a delegitimizing factor of the state 
policies against ETA, and reinforced the arguments claiming legitimacy for armed struggle 
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as a reaction to the violence of the state. Nonetheless, if the goal was to provoke the French 
to react and put an end to the relatively safe rearguard of ETA in the northern Basque 
Country, the strategists behind the GAL succeeded. 1984 was a turning point. An 
agreement between the Spanish and French Home ministers, José Barrionuevo and Gaston 
Defferre, triggered a shift in French policies. France initiated a policy of extraditions, first, 
and direct renditions, in 1986.917 In a few years, the French sanctuary disappeared, and 
ETA members were persecuted by French police and judges.  The loss of the French 
rearguard was a tipping point in the evolution of ETA. Eugenio Etxebeste warned in his 
internal post-1992 report that a safe rearguard was “a strategic element of the first order” 
because it enabled the armed vanguard to conduct an effective political leadership. He 
contended that the “political decision of the French state” had attacked the “main engine 
of the MLNV,” and, in this regard, it was not just one more step in the logic of the states’ 
repression, but an important qualitative leap.918 
The arrest of the entire leadership of ETA in March 1992 in Bidart (Lapurdi) was a 
consequence of the vanishing of the French rearguard, and the effective collaboration of 
the French and Spanish police. The arrests of Pako Mujika Garmendia, José Luis Alvarez 
Santacristina, and Joseba Arregi Erostarbe was planned by the Spanish Civil Guard, and 
carried out by the French police in a coordinated action. It was a landmark in the history 
of ETA. The man behind the arrests in Bidart, the colonel of the Civil Guard Enrique 
Rodríguez Galindo, who was in charge of the anti-ETA operations by the Civil Guards, 
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wrote that he believed at the time that the arrest of ETA’s leadership in 1992 would mean 
the end of the Basque group.919 It was not. A new leadership was reorganized. Yet, this 
time, the effects of the decapitation were devastating, as the three senior leaders were 
caught at once, many compromising documents were seized, and some of the new leaders 
replacing those arrested were soon caught as well.  
The context sharpened the effects. After the failure of the Algiers process, ETA had 
re-initiated a strategy of attrition with the year of 1992 as a reference. The Basque group 
expected that the Spanish government would be more willing to negotiate because the 
organization of the Barcelona Olympics and the Sevilla Expo would bring the attention of 
international public opinion. The arrest of the leadership overturned the whole strategy 
worked out by ETA after 1989, and the subsequent police operations deepened the crisis 
within ETA. The 1992 arrests were a blow of “unused importance” for ETA.920 Otegi 
recognizes that the Bidart arrests caused disorientation within the movement, because it 
put into question the idea that the conflict would be solved in a short-term negotiation. 
“The dominant feeling was: ’What now?’”921 Bidart changed the image that ETA members 
had of themselves. From then on, they perceived that a police defeat was a real risk.922 
Bidart was a turning point, but it was not a catalyst for the questioning of the whole 
strategy. On the contrary, ETA embarked on what Whitfield named “a strategy of ‘all or 
nothing’ through a deliberate expansion of its targets and the ‘socialization of suffering.’” 
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ETA did not realize that, “while Spain might not have had the capacity to inflict a total 
defeat, it could limit the organization’s operational capacity so completely as to render any 
possibility that it could extract substantive political gain from negotiations beyond 
question.”923       
The arrival of the PP led by José María Aznar to the Spanish government in 1996 
inaugurated a new era. The new government cut off all channels to contact ETA to 
demonstrate that they were not prepared to engage in any negotiation process. Police 
repression against ETA was gradually improving, mostly because of the increasing French 
collaboration. There were oscillations in the dynamics of the French police and judicial 
cooperation, “accelerating as parties of the center-right formed the French executive and 
becoming less intense when the left was governing,” but overall it intensified over time.924 
The anti-terrorism judge Javier Gómez Bermúdez stresses that the French collaboration 
improved in “geometrical progression.” In 1989 the Spanish Civil Guard was allowed to 
act in French territories for investigation purposes, and the exchange of information 
between French and Spanish polices gradually improved through diverse agreements. The 
collaboration between judges of the two states developed similarly. According to Gómez 
Bermúdez, by the 2000 decade the collaboration between the two administrations had 
become extremely effective.925 In addition, a new Spanish Penal Code which hardened the 
enforcement of prison sentences of the members of ETA was approved in 1995, the last 
year of Felipe Gonzalez’s term, but the following two terms the PP promoted further legal 
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reforms to toughen the judicial treatment of crimes linked to ETA activities and street 
violence in the Basque Country even more. Aznar’s second term was more active in this 
regard, as the PP was in control of the parliament thanks to an absolute majority. 
ETA demonstrated in the mid-1990s that they were able to recover from the serious 
and continuous damage inflicted by police repression. Long kidnappings and numerous 
attacks showed that the Basque group maintained its ability to shake Basque and Spanish 
politics through military actions. After the parenthesis of 1998-1999, ETA proved its power 
with a renewed campaign. ETA sustained an intense campaign for two years, but police 
repression on both sides of the border was effective as well. ETA’s machinery slowed down 
in 2002. As a culmination of other important police operations, senior members of the 
leadership of ETA such as Mikel Albizu, Mikel Antza, and Marisol Iparragirre were 
captured in October 2004, along with five explosive and gun deposits. According to many 
of the critics of the 2005-2007 negotiation process, by 2004 ETA was weaker than ever as 
a consequence of police repression and judicial persecution.926 A Guardia Civil report cited 
by Escrivá stated that, after the police operation of October 2004, ninety percent of ETA 
was dismantled.927   
By that time, three years had passed since a new game changer had emerged. The 
9/11 attacks accelerated international harmonization and decision-making on 
counterterrorism to a high degree. The European Union turned into one of the driving 
forces in the harmonization of anti-terrorist policies. As Monica den Boer remarks, “the 
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terrorist attacks in the US inspired a transatlantic axis of police and judicial cooperation.”928 
The Spanish government suddenly found an extremely adequate context to fulfill some 
objectives pursued for a long time regarding international harmonization of counterterrorist 
policies. Among other measures, the main achievement for Spanish interests was the 
approval of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant for terrorism crimes, 
or ‘Euro-warrant,’ agreed upon in December 2001 and approved in June 2002. It replaced 
the traditional mechanism of extradition by a quicker and simpler system. A ‘Euro-warrant’ 
is valid for all member states and, once issued, it requires states to arrest and transfer a 
criminal suspect or convicted person to the issuing state. According to Aznar, the president 
of the Spanish government at the time, “all measures that were being set during those 
months [after 9/11] had an extraordinary positive impact” in anti-terrorism policies.929  
Within that context, once ETA resumed its campaign after breaking up the 2006-
2007 ceasefire, the blows against the Basque group were constant. As pointed out by 
Saratxo and Zabalo, ETA was not able to exert “a minimum constant pressure” to hassle 
the Spanish state, as a consequence of “a better preparation and a bigger pressure of the 
police.”930 For understandable reasons, Spanish police sources sometimes tend to 
exaggerate the rank of detainees. The more important the detainees are, the more credit the 
police obtain. Hence, reports on ETA leaders’ arrests should be taken with caution, 
although most Spanish media and some Basque media usually buy police sources’ stories 
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without any verification. If the police say that ETA’s number one has been arrested, the 
media publish it as verified truth. However, some exaggerations of the rank of those 
arrested do not mean that continuous arrests of alleged members of the leadership of ETA 
from 2007 to 2010 did not seriously damage ETA’s capacity to operate. Xabier Lopez 
Peña, Igor Suberbiola and Ainhoa Ozaeta were arrested in May 2008, Garikoitz Aspiazu 
in November 2008, Aitzol Iriondo in December 2008, Jurdan Martitegi in April 2009, Aitor 
Eliazaran in October 2009, and Mikel Karrera in May 2010. All these arrests surely hit the 
upper level of the ETA structure, and damaged its ability to implement with effectiveness 
its planned resumption of the attrition strategy.  
The arrests of some ETA leaders might also have influenced the outcome of the 
debate within the Abertzale Left. When ETA decided in 2007 that armed struggle had to 
be resumed, those arrested by the French police between 2008 and 2010 were in charge of 
the organization. According to the narrative of the promoters of the debate within the 
Abertzale Left such as Otegi, the armed group led by the members later arrested were 
against putting the continuation or armed strategy under discussion. Thus, the arrest of 
these leaders of ETA might have influenced the gradual adaptation of ETA to the 
conclusions approved by the majority of the social base of the Abertzale Left.  Similarly, 
the police operations against suspected members of Ekin, Segi and some lawyers of ETA 
prisoners in 2009 and 2010 could be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize or condition the 
factions more reluctant to the abandonment of armed struggle among the civil associations 





In sum, the police repression against ETA became especially effective since the 
French political and judicial authorities began to collaborate with Spain at the end of the 
1980s. The loss of the French rearguard became instrumental for ETA’s decline, and the 
arrest of the entire leadership in 1992 marked a milestone, as the risk for a police defeat 
seemed more real than ever. However, ETA demonstrated a great capacity to recover and 
reorganize again and again. The Spanish-French bilateral police and judicial action 
increased and improved over time, and the post-9/11 international context enabled further 
anti-terrorism measures, which narrowed the siege against ETA. At this point, it is not 
possible to conclude, in military or operational terms, how weak the Basque armed group 
was when it laid down arms. Most evidence and testimonies suggest that ETA was at its 
weakest at the end of the 2000 decade, as a consequence of an increasingly effective police 
action against its militants and network. They have apparently decided to stop when they 
still had guns, infrastructure, militants and leadership, and an ability to carry out military 
actions. The trend of the confrontation with the Spanish and French states, however, 
suggests that the defeat by police force could have been a feasible outcome in the event of 
a continuation of another long cycle of armed campaign. 
6.3.4. Smothering of the political movement 
The banning of Batasuna and the judicial persecution of the Abertzale Left civil 
associations are a milestone in the process leading to the end of ETA. They were persecuted 
in two ways.  
Firstly, many organizations were persecuted under criminal law: a judge of the 





were conducting activities in associations allegedly under ETA control. Thus, these 
activists were accused of being members of or collaborators with ETA, although their 
alleged crimes were not directly connected to any violent activity. It was the case of the 
political parties HB, EH, Batasuna, EHAK, ANV; the political associations Ekin, KAS, 
Xaki; the prisoners solidarity groups Gestoras pro Amnistia and Askatasuna; the youth 
organizations Jarrai, Haika and Segi; and the newspaper Egin. Most of those tried were 
sentenced to prison. Their associations could never work again. The association of city 
councilors Udabiltza and the newspaper Euskaldunon Egunkaria were also victims of this 
state strategy, but the trials concluded that there was no proof of their alleged link to ETA, 
and all defendants were absolved.  
Secondly, the political parties of the Abertzale Left were specifically persecuted 
through administrative procedures. The Spanish parliament approved an ad hoc Political 
Parties Law worked out by the government of the PP in 2002, and the Supreme Court 
outlawed HB, EH and Batasuna in 2003, and later EHAK and ANV, on the grounds that 
they did not comply with the new law as they failed to condemn ETA. Candidates of the 
Abertzale Left occasionally managed to participate in elections, but they were effectively 
expelled from electoral competition in most of the elections from 2003 to 2009. 
Nevertheless, the Abertzale Left demonstrated an unusual capacity to sustain an electoral 
support even with outlawed candidates. They called their followers to vote for them 
through ballots officially invalid, and they never obtained less than a hundred thousand 
votes. Considering that the voters were aware that their ballots would not have any official 





of their traditional support, although not all. In any case, the crude reality for the Abertzale 
Left was that they were out of most of the Basque political institutions, most of their 
political cadres were judicially prosecuted, and many of them sentenced to prison. The 
political part of the combined political-military strategy was at stake. 
Regarding state response, Crenshaw notes that repression needs to be combined 
with other processes. In her view, political measures can facilitate the end of terrorism 
because they can take arguments away from the group. “A government offer to negotiate, 
grant amnesty, or permit democratic participation may create new options.”931 The decline 
of a particular organization will not be sufficient “if new sources of discontent awaken 
grievances.”932 The Aznar government did not follow Crenshaw’s observations. On the 
contrary, the Aznar cabinet decided not only not to address politically the sources of the 
conflict, but to clear off all expectations for any political negotiation. In Crenshaw’s 
rationale, denying democratic participation to an entire movement, backed by a fifth of the 
Basque electorate, might strengthen the justification of violent means, as they were 
prevented to participate in politics. Nevertheless, in terms of fighting for legitimacy, the 
cost for the Spanish state happened to be manageable. In the view of the majority of the 
Spanish public, the repression of the parties and associations of the Abertzale Left was 
legitimate on the grounds that they were satellites of ETA. In contrast, the majority of the 
Basque society was against outlawing Batasuna. If the Political Party Law was voted on in 
the Basque parliament while the Abertzale Left was legal and had its corresponding 
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representatives, it would be reversed with a clear majority. Big mobilizations were held in 
the Basque Country against the banning of political parties, but they were not strong 
enough to counteract the support of the Spanish major parties, media organizations and the 
majority of the public opinion. In sum, the fact that the political rights of a fifth of the 
Basque voters were affected did not damage the legitimacy of the policies of banning 
parties in the view of the Spanish public. 
 The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights confirming the banning of 
Batasuna in 2009 was the endgame.933 There were no more courts to appeal. The European 
legitimation of the decision to ban Batasuna meant that the Abertzale Left would not be 
able to participate in the political arena as long as their attitude toward ETA did not change, 
or ETA’s armed activity did not end. By the time the European Court of Human Rights 
upheld the banning, the political leadership of Batasuna was advocating for the end of the 
political-military strategy. Then, the ruling confirmed that there was not political life for 
the Abertzale Left unless they disengaged from armed resistance. Saratxo and Zabalo agree 
on the importance of the European ruling, in the sense that it ratified the incompatibility of 
ETA’s armed struggle and the Abertzale Left’s institutional politics.934   
Political actors who backed the banning of Batasuna such as Rodolfo Ares and Iñaki 
Oyarzabal regard the outlawing as an instrumental factor in the end of ETA. In Oyarzabal’s 
words, it was the last thrust: “They were smashed when the judges said that ETA was more 
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than its cells, when their political structure was attacked. That is the key.”935 According to 
Ares, the key factor is that the Abertzale Left had to transit from a situation in which they 
could operate as they wished to a situation in which they could not breathe politically and 
did not see any way out but to abandon violence.936 The judge Gómez Bermúdez sustains 
a similar point: the combination of the judicial persecution of ETA and the banning of 
Batasuna made them realize that they could not achieve anything by means of bullets, and, 
although they could advance by means of politics, they were out. Since they were out of 
politics, they could not reach the society, who at that point only viewed the dark side of the 
Abertzale Left: the bullets. “All that provoked an implosion [within the Abertzale Left],” 
contends Gómez Bermúdez.937 Authors such as Antonio Batista and Patxo Unzueta see the 
banning as a key element too. Batista contends that the Political Parties Law was “the coup 
de grace.” In his words, “beyond attacking the armed vanguard, they shrunk the spaces of 
the political rearguard. Once the social backing was lost, the armed core was smaller and 
more vulnerable, and the police defeat more feasible.”938 Unzueta asserts that the outlawing 
of Batasuna was crucial, because it made “at least a part of the leaders of Batasuna” assume 
that they needed to convince ETA that the end of armed struggle was necessary to be back 
in politics.939 
Some actors such as Jonan Fernández, who are critical with the banning of Batasuna 
on the grounds that it was a violation of political rights, question its importance in the final 
                                                          
935 Author interview, Iñaki Oyarzabal, Gasteiz, October 9, 2013. 
936 Author interview, Ares. 
937 Author interview, Gómez Bermúdez. 
938 Antoni Batista, Adiós a las armas. Una crónica del final de ETA (Barcelona: Debate, 2012), 69. 






outcome. “It had influence, but less than it is said. (…) It has also obstructed the process 
and, maybe, it has delayed it as well.”940 Rafa Larreina, a leading member of EA, sustains 
that the banning of Batasuna delayed the end of ETA “at least five years.” According to 
his view, the transition within the Abertzale Left toward the abandonment of armed 
struggle would have gone faster without any banning, for two reasons: firstly, because a 
legal Batasuna with an active ETA would have achieved very bad electoral results, and the 
electoral decline would have triggered an earlier transition toward exclusive political 
means, while the injustice of the banning provoked a reaction of solidarity which made the 
electoral decline of the Abertzale Left less noticeable; secondly, because the continued 
penal prosecution of the political leaders has obstructed the decision-making process within 
the movement.941 Whitfield also argues that banning Batasuna, although effective in 
isolating it in social terms and putting pressure on ETA to put an end to its military 
campaign, “hindered efforts to resolve the conflict more quickly,” as it undermined 
dialogue and “directly inhibited the logical course of action in any peace process, which 
would be to strengthen the ‘moderates’ at the expense of their violent associates.”942 
Internal documents of ETA and a few public statements by members of the 
Abertzale Left suggest that the smothering of the political movement that once backed the 
armed group could have had an important influence in the transformation of the Abertzale 
Left. In a document with the conclusions of the debate in 2012, ETA explains why the 
armed group decided to enable “a change of political cycle” stopping armed struggle. In a 
                                                          
940 Author interview, Fernández.  
941 Author interview, Rafa Larreina, Gasteiz, March 18, 2013. 





section titled “Limits and exhaustion of the hitherto strategy,” ETA notes that the Spanish 
states tried to prevent the Abertzale Left from operating politically, and limit its action to 
armed struggle, so that the conflict would be regarded as simply terrorism, instead of a 
political issue. In this sense, ETA acknowledges the following achievement of the Spanish 
state: step by step, the state was destroying all the Abertzale Left’s means to articulate 
social and political majorities for a political change; repression weakened the organization 
and the leadership structures of the Abertzale Left; in terms of ideological struggle, the 
state managed to influence on the social base of the Abertzale Left and, to a great extent, 
spread the idea that there was no other option than laying down arms. “The strategy of the 
State brought the Abertzale Left almost into the underground, and caused [to the Abertzale 
Left] great difficulties to share its proposals, offers, and dynamics with the Basque 
society.” Thus, “with the smothering of political action and the decreasing of the Basque 
society activation,” the effectiveness of the armed actions of ETA was “conditioned.” 
According to ETA’s rationale, the Abertzale Left needed to get out of the trap set by the 
State, because the national liberation process was blockaded and, in addition, there was a 
risk to waste “the conditions created” by their struggle.943 
The above reflections were written in an internal document, but ETA spokespersons 
made similar comments in an interview in November 2011, as quoted in the section 6.2.2. 
of this chapter. According to ETA representatives, the state’s effort to leave the Abertzale 
Left without a social base and without political references, and limit its action to a mere 
                                                          






armed struggle caused a halt to the liberation process; for that reason, the Abertzale Left 
had to take the initiative “to escape that trap.”944 It can be concluded that ETA’s internal 
reflections and external public statements are consistent with the idea that the smothering 
of their political movement played an instrumental role in their decision to abandon armed 
strategy, as they understand that they had to escape from an armed confrontation not 
complemented by political action. Eugenio Etxebeste expresses a similar idea in other 
words: 
We had to find a quick and urgent solution to a situation which was not going well 
for us, because we still were outlawed, we viewed that the Basque society needed 
the Abertzale Left, but we could not give the society what it was asking us for. 
Therefore, we understood we had to take the step, to make the turn.945 
Jones and Libicki’s theory that armed groups usually decide to lay down arms and 
transition to civic action based on cost-benefit calculations can properly explain the process 
analyzed here.946 The Abertzale Left as a whole, and ETA in particular, concluded that 
pursuing their goals through nonviolence would have greater benefits and lower costs in a 
new context caused by the state strategy to limit the conflict to armed confrontation by 
preventing the Abertzale Left from operating politically. Continuing armed struggle would 
bring little political benefit to the Abertzale Left in a situation with no chance of sharing 
with the Basque society their political proposals. On the contrary, they estimated that the 
                                                          
944 Iñaki Soto, “Entrevista a ETA. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna nunca será una amenaza para el proceso de 
resolución política,” Gara, November 11, 2011. 
945 Author interview, Etxebeste. 





costs of continuing armed struggle in the new context could have been very high, given 
that they felt a real risk of wasting what they regarded as the political capital accumulated 
so far—a significant popular support, above all.  In sum, the Abertzale Left and ETA 
decided that nonviolent options have more benefits and lower costs in a context where the 
state wanted to limit the Basque conflict to a violent confrontation between the state and 
an Abertzale Left deprived of all political tools. 
6.3.5. Gradual international isolation 
 
David C. Rapoport distinguishes four major “waves of terrorism” throughout history.947 
The first wave dates from the last three decades of the nineteenth century to World War I. 
This wave consisted especially of Russian, Armenian, and Balkan revolutionaries, and 
European anarchists. The second wave began in the 1920s and crested in the 1960s. Its 
principal stimulus was the pursuit of national independence for nationalist movements in 
territories ruled by the European colonial powers. The wave largely receded as colonial 
powers disappeared and new states such as Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Yemen, and Algeria 
emerged. The Vietnam War precipitated the third wave. The groups which emerged in this 
period had mostly a revolutionary character but, “occasionally, a revolutionary ethos and 
separatist purpose were linked,” in such groups as ETA, the Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia, the Peasant Front for the Liberation of Corsica, and the IRA. However, 
“separatism always has a larger potential constituency than revolution, and over time 
separatism dominated these groups.” The fourth wave is motivated by religion, largely by 
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Islam. The events which provided a turning point to this wave are the 1979 Islamic 
revolution in Iran and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan in 1989. This fourth wave is still in 
effect with Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, and other active groups.948 
Thus, Rapoport includes ETA in the third wave of revolutionary terrorism, which 
emerged in the 1960s and declined in the 1980s. However, the first founders of ETA were 
inspired among others by the Algerian and the Israeli nationalist struggles, which the author 
includes in the second wave. It can be considered, to some extent, that ETA is also a product 
of this second wave of anti-colonialist groups. Partially influenced by the second wave and 
ignited in the third wave, ETA did not decline when most of the revolutionary organizations 
active in the 1960s and 1970s disappeared in the 1980s, and it has thus far coexisted with 
the fourth wave. It is one of the few organizations of the third wave that lasted into the 21st 
century, along with the Irish IRA, the Colombian FARC and ELN, and others.  
All waves have had an international dimension, and all organizations have evolved 
accordingly.949 ETA has not only been aware of the international dimension of the Basque 
conflict, but it has claimed it, as it did in 2004 in a document right after the 3/11 attacks in 
Madrid:  
The conflict affecting the Basque Country has an international dimension, because 
the right of self-determination entitled by a people is in its core. That affects not 
only Spain and France but Europe as well, and the entire international community. 
The Basque conflict needs a solution with an international dimension. Although the 
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solution will come from an agreement and settlement between agencies of the 
Basque Country, on the one hand, and Spain and France, on the other, that 
settlement will require the backing and endorsement of Europe and the international 
community.950    
Although founded in 1958, ETA emerged as an active insurgent group at the end 
of the 1960s and, especially, through the 1970s, when revolutionary goals were regarded 
as feasible. The Palestinian struggle commanded by the PLO became a heroic model in the 
view of national liberation movements. The success of revolutionary guerrillas such as the 
sandinistas in Nicaragua and the strength of other guerrillas in Latin-America were 
references of armed struggles in favor of social transformation. The IRA was viewed by 
ETA as a sister organization fighting for national rights against a European country. Other 
European revolutionary armed groups, such as the Italian Red Brigades and the German 
Red Army Faction (RAF), although not seen as references by ETA because of their small 
social support, were further examples of revolutionary people trying to provoke social 
changes through the use of a violence. Finally, the existence of a socialist bloc led by the 
Soviet Union made socialism a tangible reality, not a utopia. 
The third of the waves defined by Rapoport, which gave ETA a very favorable 
international context in the 1970s and early 1980s, began its decline in the 1980s, “as 
revolutionary terrorists were defeated in one country after another.”951 Western 
revolutionary groups such as the Red Brigades and the RAF declined in the late 1970s, and 
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vanished in the 1980s.952 The success of the sandinistas turned the revolutionary movement 
into a party prepared to compete for institutional power through democratic elections. 
Other Latin-American guerrilla groups, such as the Argentinian montoneros, were defeated 
by force, or such as the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso, severely weakened. Others, such as 
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front from El Salvador, later engaged in political 
processes. The Colombian FARC and ELN are some of the few significant exceptions, as 
they have persisted as active armed groups. Most of the Latin-American left-wing 
movements have gradually engaged in exclusive political means, and many of them have 
succeeded in coming into power through elections, namely in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The example of Uruguay is especially telling, as the elected 
president José Múgica achieved through elections what he could not achieve as a leader of 
the tupamaros, a guerrilla movement. In the Middle East, the once prominent secular 
revolutionary organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine lost strength and influence in the 
1990s, and new religion-inspired groups such as Hamas emerged as new powerful actors 
in the region. Another important reference as a practitioner of armed struggle, the South 
African ANC, engaged in a peace process in the early 1990s, and concluded a successful 
democratic transition in the mid-1990s.      
This evolution of the armed revolutionary movements toward civil movements is 
to some extent linked with the fall of the Berlin wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
and the demise of the socialist bloc. Although the socialism claimed by the Basque 
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Abertzale Left and ETA could not be defined as pro-soviet, there were Marxist-Leninist 
factions within the movement, and the vanguard model of the whole movement had its 
source in Leninism. However, regardless of the ambiguous model of socialism of the 
Abertzale Left, the crisis of the revolutionary guerrilla movements and the collapse of the 
socialist bloc caused an overall crisis of socialism that affected ETA and the Basque leftist 
movement. The former militant of ETA Antton López Ruiz, Kubati, was in prison when 
the socialist bloc collapsed. According to his testimony now, he realized that those changes 
meant that armed revolutionary movements would decrease over time.  
I saw that it would influence us a lot. The Democratic Alternative [of ETA] 
emerged from this reflection. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was not 
any feasible way to reach socialism in the world. It was democracy. We had to 
accept that system. In this regard, the Democratic Alternative was a milestone. It 
was the ideological foundation of our stance now.  
He concluded as early as then that they had to find a quick way out. He wrote 
several proposals to the leadership of ETA exposing his view, but he never made his point 
public by discipline, as he was in the minority.953 
Another important change gradually took place over the 1980s and culminated in 
the early 1990. Spain’s democratic transition did not get international full recognition at 
once. The dictatorship regime’s structures such as the military, police or judiciary remained 
in place after Franco’s death. The chief of State, the king Juan Carlos de Borbón, had been 
                                                          





appointed by the dictator himself. In the early stages of the transition, there was not any 
guarantee that Spain was about to become a real democracy. The 1980s were a period of 
consolidation of Spanish democracy, and its recognition in the international arena, as it 
became a member of NATO and the European Union. Spain was accepted by the Atlantic 
organization in 1982, and Spanish voters ratified the integration in 1986, with the 
significant rejection of a large majority of Basque votes.954 The treaty for the adhesion to 
the European Union was signed in 1985, and Spain became a full member in January 1986.  
ETA and the Abertzale Left had once expected European countries to put pressure 
on Spain to resolve the Basque armed issue through negotiations before being accepted in 
the Union. It did not happen that way. Spanish rulers did feel an international pressure to 
address the Basque issue through dialogue. To some extent, the process of Algiers was a 
consequence of that pressure. That is why the Spanish government representatives were 
satisfied with the outcome of the process despite its failure. They considered that they had 
proven to their European counterparts that ETA was not prepared for a settlement. Once 
Spain was integrated into the international establishment, the narrative of ETA, which 
argued that Spain was not a real democracy but a reformed continuation of the old regime, 
lost credibility. As put by Altier and others, democracy is not “an all-purpose vaccine” that 
inoculates countries against armed insurgencies,955 but justifying violence becomes more 
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difficult. Indeed, the international legitimation of the Spanish democracy in the 
international arena made it more difficult for ETA to justify its ‘war.’     
By the early 1990s, the IRA seemed to be the only reference for ETA. It was not 
only a reference, but an ally too. Beyond alleged operational relationships between the 
armed organizations,956 the Irish Republican movement and the Basque pro-independence 
movement were in contact since the 1970s, and their communication and political harmony 
increased when the Sinn Fein and [Herri] Batasuna developed a more formal relationship 
since the early 1990s.957 When the Irish Republican movement engaged in a conflict 
resolution process in the mid-1990s and, especially, when the process succeeded by 
reaching a settlement in 1998, the Basque Abertzale Left could not help but look at Ireland 
as a mirror. On the one hand, ETA, as a nationalist left-wing armed group, found itself 
more alone than ever. On the other, ETA and the Abertzale Left could look at a successful 
model for conflict resolution within the European Union from which to extract useful 
lessons. 
‘Borrowing’ and ‘lending’ in peace processes have been analyzed by John Darby. 
He highlights, as an example of ‘borrowing’ between contemporary peace processes, that 
the Irish model inspired the Basque pro-independence movement.958 The generation of 
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political leaders of the Basque movement who eventually drove their movement to a civic 
transition initiated their long journey in the late 1990s, when they promoted the Forum of 
Ireland with the objective of analyzing the Irish process in order to adequate that model to 
the Basque circumstances. Although the Irish model was among the factors that triggered 
the Lizarra-Garazi process in the Basque Country, important differences made the Basque 
process collapse. On the one side, the Spanish government was far from the constructive 
attitude of the British government. Nothing with the political substance of the Downing 
Street Declaration (1993) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998) could be expected to 
emerge from the Spanish government led by Aznar. On the other side, ETA did not pursue 
a peace process based on a dialogue involving all parties and the Spanish government, but 
a national building process based on the joining of nationalist forces, regardless of the 
Spanish government’ and parties’ position. Another substantial difference happened to be 
decisive. In the Irish case, the leadership of the Sinn Fein was in command of the movement 
or, at least, was in harmony with the leadership of IRA. In the Basque case, it was ETA 
who secretly negotiated an agreement with the PNV and EA, and it was ETA who decided 
to break up the ceasefire because the PNV and EA did not accept the conditions set by the 
armed group. EH was absent.  
Despite the failure of the Lizarra-Garazi process right after the success of the Irish 
process, the transition completed by the Irish Republican movement has not ceased to be a 
reference for the Basque Abertzale Left, especially for the factions seeking an end to the 
armed conflict. The 2005-2007 negotiations had more similarities with the Irish model than 





national building process, with a double negotiation involving all political parties on the 
one side, and ETA and the Spanish government on the other. When ETA and the Spanish 
government reached an agreement in 2005, one of ETA’s conditions was that the president 
of the Spanish government publicly declare that it would respect any decision of the 
Basques regarding their political status. It was the parallel of what the British government 
did in the Downing Street declaration and the Good Friday agreement. When ETA 
evaluated that the process was going to a dead end, they set off a powerful bomb in Madrid 
airport, as the IRA did in 1994 in the middle of the city of London to put pressure on the 
British government in an attempt to reactivate the process. It worked for the IRA, it did not 
work for ETA. Ireland has continued to be a reference in the last stages of the transition of 
the Basque Abertzale Left. The Mitchell principles adopted by the Irish actors during the 
all-party talks which led to the Good Friday agreement were also expressly adopted by the 
Basque pro-independence movement in October 2009, in a move which proved their 
commitment to non-violent means. The prestige of the Irish Republican movement among 
the social base of the Abertzale Left made such a move easier on the grounds that their 
allies in Ireland made that move previously.    
By the time the 9/11 attacks changed the worldview on terrorism and 
counterterrorism, ETA was alone in the international scene. An armed group partly inspired 
by the anti-colonialist struggle of the second generation in Rapoport’s scheme, which 
emerged as a strong organization in the context of the third generation of revolutionary 
groups, was now an isolated example of a surviving third-generation group acting in an 





post-9/11 environment, the international community led by the US accelerated decision-
making concerning the harmonization of counterterrorist instruments, and initiated a ‘war 
on terror’ in which security became the main priority, and concerns on the respect of 
fundamental rights decreased substantially.959 In addition, the proposals on conflict 
resolution theories for negotiated settlement lost ground after 9/11. As highlighted by 
Crenshaw, Al Qaeda attacks led the US to conclude that terrorists’ demands were non-
negotiable. Moreover, “the international norms that encouraged negotiated settlements in 
the immediate post-Cold War period may have eroded significantly.”960 Daniel Conversi 
also notes that since 9/11 there is an influence of US counter-terrorism policies which 
strengthened the non-negotiating approach.961 An alleged discomfort of Sinn Fein 
regarding their relationship with Batasuna in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks is a telling 
reflection of the degree of the shift in the international political environment. Agnes Maillot 
notes that the relationship between Irish republicans and Basque nationalists became more 
difficult after the 9/11, the banning of Batasuna, and its inclusion in the EU terrorists list, 
and it turned into a source of embarrassment for Sinn Fein. The international affairs 
spokesperson of Sinn Fein acknowledged to Maillot that the 9/11 attacks have changed the 
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situation, and those once seen as fighting for self-determination were now simply viewed 
as terrorists. However, the Sinn Fein did not turn its back on their longtime Basque allies.962  
The Islamist attacks in Madrid’s train stations in March 11, 2004, came to confirm 
and strengthen the worldwide dominant ‘war on terror’ approach, and worsened the already 
unpopular image of armed struggles regarded as terrorism. In fact, ETA did not commit 
any action in the five months following the Madrid attacks. According to Casanova963 and 
Domínguez,964 the Basque group expressly decided not to act for a while because of the 
impact of the Madrid attacks. At the end of the last century, ETA had difficulties justifying 
the use of violent means before their constituency. After 9/11 and 3/11, it was even more 
difficult because the massacres in New York and Madrid had provoked a strong rejection 
of violent means in all societies including the Basque. 
Not all elements of the world’s geopolitics evolution has been negative for the 
Basque pro-independence movement. The reverse side of the collapse of the socialist bloc 
was the evidence that state borders were not immovable. Many new states were born out 
of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, although the 
experience of the Balkans Wars were often to be used as arguments against secessionist 
movements. The more recent developments in the map of Eastern Europe with the 
secession of Montenegro (2006) and Kosovo (2008) from Serbia reinforced those who 
argue that independence of a given territory should be feasible in the event of a majority 
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willing it. Montenegro became independent after a referendum under the rules set by the 
European Union, and has been internationally recognized. Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence has not been unanimously recognized by the international community, as 
Serbia and Russia regard it as illegal, but by 2014 more than a hundred UN states had 
recognized it. Western Europe borders have not moved since the reunification of Germany, 
but the referendum on Scotland’s secession held in September 2014 proves that European 
borders could be modified through votes. The closer reference for Basque separatism is 
now Catalonia. The Parliament of Catalonia called for a referendum on secession to be held 
in November 2014, but the Spanish institutions forbade it. Regardless of the outcome of 
the project of the referendum, Catalonian nationalists are opening a new avenue from 
which the Basque movement can extract lessons. However, experiences such as the 
referendum in Scotland and the project of referendum in Catalonia are further elements of 
an unfavorable context for the continuation of ETA’s armed activity. They shape a 
favorable context for the advocates of a pro-independence movement based on exclusively 
political means. It is a favorable international context for political secessionist movements, 
but unfavorable for armed strategies in pursuit of independence.   
6.3.6. Vanishing of negotiation prospects 
Mario Moretti was the main leader of the Red Brigades when the Italian group kidnapped 
Aldo Moro, the president of the Democrat-Christian party, the ruling party in Italy, in 1978. 
The Red Brigades demanded the Italian government release 16 prisoners in exchange of 
Aldo Moro. The government, led by Moro’s party colleague Mario Andreotti, refused all 





confessed in an autobiographical interview to be the executioner. He argues that a 
mechanism that had once worked did not work this time. They caught the president of the 
ruling party in a technically successful kidnapping, but the government did not 
compromise. If they have sacrificed the president of the DC, he wondered later, for whom 
would they be prepared to negotiate? In this regard, Aldo Moro’s kidnapping was the end 
of a way of the guerrilla thinking. Moretti argues that, from then on, they would never 
obtain again a political objective through a guerrilla action, because the political scene had 
been reduced to pure defense of the State.965 
When the Algiers talks failed in 1989, and the leaders and negotiators of ETA 
concluded that the Spanish government had not been prepared for any real political 
negotiation, doubts about the real chances to force the state to compromise politically arose 
within the Basque group. They might have wondered, as Moretti did many years later 
regarding his own experience, what could have made the state negotiate if after ETA’s 
powerful armed offensive in the 1980s, the government was not willing to make any 
political concession. Eugenio Etxebeste, the ETA chief negotiator in Algiers, 
acknowledges that it was a source of hesitance within the organization. 
If you have reached a peak, a climax, in your military operations (…), increasing 
actions, increasing armament (…), and you have not succeeded in making your 
enemy bend the knee, and if you have reached your [military] limit…966 
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The uncontested leader of ETA until his accidental death in 1987, Txomin Iturbe, 
has often been quoted as saying in the 1980s that, then, it was the moment to find a way 
out through negotiations because the balance of power would only get worse over time. 
According to his close collaborators such as the lawyer Iñaki Esnaola, Iturbe believed that 
ETA had strength enough to bargain with the state at the time, but he expected the situation 
to evolve gradually for the worse.967  
If Iturbe predicted that ETA would have worse and worse chances to bargain, he 
was right. Negotiators of the Spanish government in Algiers later claimed that they were 
not prepared to negotiate about politics with ETA. They were willing to negotiate about 
‘technical’ issues such as an early release of prisoners, return of exiles, and re-integration 
of militants in hiding. ETA was in a position to negotiate about its militants in prison, exile 
and underground, but at the time the Basque group was far from accepting its end in 
exchange for a resolution of their militants’ fate instead of a political settlement. Talks 
between ETA and the Spanish government were not instrumental in the making of the 
Lizarra-Garazi process, but a meeting took place. Neither sides sought a negotiation 
process between the two parties, but the basic disagreement of Algiers remained. ETA 
claimed a recognition of the Basques’ right to determine their political status, and the 
Spanish government tested the Basque group’s willingness to end their campaign in 
exchange for a negotiation on ‘technical issues.’  
                                                          





Yet, things had already evolved in the direction predicted by Iturbe. If in Algiers 
ETA could have been in conditions to negotiate an early release of all prisoners, a decade 
later any negotiation on prisoners would have to be much less ambitious, as the Spanish 
political agencies, media, and public opinion would not have accepted an overall release 
of ETA prisoners. In the late 1990s the PP rulers were still prepared to act with flexibility 
in the event of a definitive end of ETA’s campaign.968 Jaime Mayor Oreja, Home minister 
under Aznar, recognizes that, at the time, he had doubts about the measures the government 
should be prepared to take to accelerate the end of ETA.969 In fact, Aznar publicly declared 
that he had allowed talks with “the Basque liberation movement,” and three government 
emissaries eventually held a meeting with ETA representatives during the 1998-1999 
ceasefire. In sum, even the PP of Aznar was prepared to talk with the Basque armed group 
at the end of the 1990s. 
In the 2005-2007 negotiation process, the Zapatero cabinet was willing to talk on 
the ‘technical issues.’ According to the ‘road map’ agreed on between ETA and the Spanish 
government, the peace process would have two negotiation tables, one between the armed 
group and the government to deal with the consequences of the conflict, and the other 
among Basque political parties to deal with political issues. ETA was theoretically out of 
political negotiations. Yet, the armed group refused to negotiate about prisoners until the 
three major Basque political parties, the PNV, the PSE-EE and Batasuna, reached a 
political settlement satisfactory enough for ETA. Indirectly, the armed group aimed to 
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condition political negotiations. The three parties reached a draft of a settlement in which 
they agreed upon a formulation of the Basques’ right to determine their own political status 
following the current legal procedures,970 but ETA and others in the Abertzale Left did not 
accept it, and the political dialogue collapsed.  
Six weeks after the end of those political talks, ETA set off a powerful bomb in 
Madrid airport and killed two people. The armed group did not announce the end of the 
ceasefire. Moreover, in the statement to claim responsibility for the attack, ETA stated that 
the ceasefire was still in force, but it warned the Spanish government that they would 
commit more military attacks—in ceasefire period—if “the attacks against Euskal Herria 
[Basque Country]” continued. Obviously, the ceasefire lost all credibility as a period of 
time guaranteeing the absence of armed actions. According to ETA, the Madrid airport 
attack was “a pressuring action to put the process in a track toward political resolution.”971 
Otegi’s later reflections are a response to ETA’s view. Believing that an armed 
action could cause a substantial modification of a government’s political position is a 
mistake, he argues.972 Several documents of the Abertzale Left stressed similar conclusions 
from 2009 on. The Abertzale Left made that view official in the Iruñea declaration in April 
2010, as it asserted that ETA’s armed actions, instead of breaking a blockade in the 
dialogue process, increased the blockade and obstructed the path toward a resolution.973 
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Nevertheless, some talks between the Spanish Government and ETA on the one hand, and 
between the PSE-EE and Batasuna on the other, took place five months after the Madrid 
airport attack. By that time, however, there was not any real chance for any settlement.     
After ETA announced the end of the ceasefire in June 2007, all parties, including 
Batasuna, concluded that there would not be any other chance for negotiations between 
ETA and the Government. The truce as a tool to enhance dialogue had lost credibility as 
ETA had carried out attacks within a ceasefire period. After the failure of the 2005-2007 
process, the Spanish government and the PSOE knew that any other attempt of negotiations 
with ETA could be very costly in electoral terms, as all major media outlets and the Spanish 
public opinion would punish it severely. It seemed that the Spanish society arrived at a 
point where the sporadic ETA attacks were manageable and any talks with the Basque 
group were seen as an unacceptable surrender to their blackmail. The negotiation, finally, 
would have to take place within the Abertzale Left. 
6.4. The management 
6.4.1. Leadership 
The option to engage in armed struggle is ultimately a human decision. A collective of 
human beings can make a decision to use violence as a method to pursue political goals, 
and an individual can decide to get involved in an insurgent group. Accordingly, giving up 
violent methods is also a human decision, either as a group or as an individual. Supporting 
armed struggle and ceasing to support it is also an individual choice, although it is always 
made in an interactive context. Testimonies of people involved in armed struggle suggest 





difficult to implement without a proper context. Cleam McCartney stresses the importance 
of the context, when he argues that when circumstances favor maintaining the war “then 
the doves will be silent,” but when circumstances favor negotiations “then the hawks will 
be silent.”974  
Mario Moretti, a leader of the Italian Red Brigades, notes that after ten years of 
violent campaign he knew that armed strategy was going nowhere, that “the cycles of 
struggles born in the 1960s had exhausted,” but it was very complicated to conclude it. He 
argues that it was necessary that they were allowed to transform without having to renounce 
their identity; it was necessary that it did not mean abandoning the prisoners to their fate; 
it was necessary that an alternative political avenue be feasible… What was needed, he 
concludes, was “the impossible.”975 Moretti asserts that he arrived at the conclusion that 
armed struggle was over as early as 1981. By that time, he believed the Red Brigades’ 
activity had to be stopped. Still, Moretti himself dared to share his reflections with very 
few comrades, because his views could have been seen as a betrayal.976 
It was the former ETA militant Antton López Ruiz who pointed out what Moretti 
said about the difficulties to openly question the persistence of armed struggle, as there is 
a risk of being regarded as a traitor or, at least, ideologically weak.977 Weinberg and 
Pedhazur remark that recognized leaders are needed to guide this kind of transformation, 
as they can be vulnerable to accusations of treason and betrayal. They warn that a 
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leadership can lose support and more intransigent leaders might emerge.978 Crenshaw 
argues that within underground groups pressures toward cohesion can be intense and 
contact with reality can diminish, so that preservation of the group can become a priority. 
In these cases, she argues, “only a strong leader who is willing to take risks” can accomplish 
the transition toward politics.979 I. William Zartman includes the factor of the contrast 
between generations in his reflection:  
Conflict evolution is governed by (at least) two contrary generational trends: fatigue 
and radicalization. Fatigue concerns the current generation, which, because of age 
and other reasons, tends to tire of war and turn to a search for normalization. 
Radicalization is the successor generation’s response to the normalization trend, 
which it views as a sell-out.980 
 In fact, when Otegi arrived at the conclusion that political-military strategy was to 
be abandoned, he was concerned that his conclusion might be a consequence of age and 
tiredness. He argues that he scrapped that idea after having checked that younger cadres of 
the Abertzale Left shared his views.981 However, it is not clear when Otegi and his close 
associates saw that a transition toward an exclusively political strategy was needed. Otegi 
acknowledged in 2012 that for him “and others” it was evident “years ago.”982 This 
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ambiguous “years ago” does not clarify when Otegi and those agreeing with him came to 
that conclusion, and when they expressly proposed it internally. According to their account, 
it was not earlier than August 2008, when Otegi began advocating for a change of strategy 
in private meeting with cadres of the Abertzale Left. 
 The Abertzale Left’s internal history of the Lizarra-Garazi ceasefire’s break-up has 
not been written yet. The main leaders of Batasuna and the trade union LAB, Otegi, and 
Diez, seemed to be fully committed to a new exclusively political strategy at the end of the 
1990s. ETA’s rupture of the ceasefire affected the strategy of the whole Abertzale Left, 
but, at least formally, only ETA made the decision. In later statements, Otegi has suggested 
that he did not agree with such an end of the Lizarra-Garazi process. However, neither he 
nor any other senior members of the political leadership of the Abertzale Left publicly 
expressed any disagreement with ETA’s decision. The armed group was still in charge. It 
seemed to be strong enough to discourage the political leadership to challenge it. Yet, 
internal disagreements were serious. In later documents, ETA recognizes that the Abertzale 
Left lacked “unity of interpretation and cohesion” after the Lizarra-Garazi process, and 
entered a crisis because of it.983 An anonymous source with a direct knowledge of the 
internal whereabouts of the Lizarra-Garazi process notes that the most prominent leaders 
of Batasuna did not agree with ETA’s decision, but the armed group still had such an 
ascendancy within the movement that confronting it was unthinkable at the time.984 Patxi 
Zabaleta, the leader of the dissidents who eventually created a new party, Aralar, explains 
that many of the leaders and members who remained in Batasuna also favored the end of 
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armed resistance, but they argued that they needed to convince the majority of the 
movement from inside.985  
 Joseba Egibar, a leader of the PNV, narrates that a prominent leader of HB in the 
1980s and 1990s, the long-time spokesperson Jon Idigoras, privately told him once that 
they should go “to the other side,” meaning the Basque territories under French sovereignty 
where ETA leaders were hidden, and tell them: “It’s over! Give us the guns!”986 Regardless 
of the veracity or accuracy of the account, this anecdote reflects the inability of the political 
leaders of the Abertzale Left to prevail over ETA. One of the few leaders of the Abertzale 
Left who challenged ETA’s leadership in the 1990s, Iñaki Esnaola, argues that the fusion 
of ETA (m) and the groups of ETA (pm) known as ‘berezis’ in the early 1980s was the 
beginning of the subordination of the political movement to the armed group. According 
to Esnaola, ETA (m), in its origins, did not aim to control the political movement, but 
operate  autonomously as an insurgent group without having to follow the guidance of a 
political-military direction, unlike ETA (pm). According to Esnaola, once the former 
‘berezis’ took control of the leadership of ETA, the armed group went back to a political-
military approach, and gave to the clandestine organization a vanguard role, which was 
assumed and theorized by the Abertzale Left organizations since the early 1980s.987 
As analyzed by Ibarra, Letamendia, López Adan, Domínguez, Mata López and 
others,988 the organizations of the Basque Movement for National Liberation (MLNV) had 
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a pyramidal structure with ETA at its vertex as the dominant force. The armed group was 
expressly considered the vanguard of the movement. In the 1980s, ETA’s representatives 
were present at the meetings of the coordination body KAS Nacional, as the bulletin Zutabe 
had regularly stated until 1987.989 Later on, ETA’s role of vanguard had not been 
acknowledged so openly. Through the 1990s, ETA is not mentioned as a member of KAS 
in internal documents, and there is no evidence of ETA representatives taking part in KAS 
meetings. In the programmatic document approved by Batasuna in the 1992 debate, Urrats 
Berri, ETA is not expressly named as the vanguard, but as “an essential reference.”990 Yet, 
regardless of the express mentions about the role of ETA within the Abertzale Left, the 
clandestine group assumed a factual leadership until 2007, in accordance with the 
following rationale: ETA members are those who fight the most and are prepared to give 
the most; therefore, they lead the way. Moreover, the scheme in which ETA does not share 
its decisions, and the civil movement cannot publicly question them, gives the civil 
movement a subordinate role, always conditioned by ETA’s decisions and praxis. It is 
important to note that (Herri) Batasuna never had a structure parallel to standard political 
parties. It had no listed affiliates, but open assemblies of followers. It had not any pyramidal 
structure elected in a party congress with a president, secretary general etc., but collective 
leaderships both in national and provincial levels. The public references of the party were 
entitled as spokespersons. In sum, Batasuna had an ambiguous structure in which the 
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accountability of the strategic decisions were not formally established, a situation that 
could enable organizations such as KAS or ETA to influence or condition their course. 
Through the unilateral end of the Lizarra-Garazi ceasefire in 1999, ETA caused the 
collapse of the whole process of accumulation of nationalist forces, and gave Batasuna no 
other option than adjusting their discourse and praxis to the new violent context. By their 
veto to the draft agreement of Loiola and the bombing of the Madrid airport in 2006, ETA 
prevented Batasuna from keeping its compromising approach in the negotiations. In sum, 
ETA’s maximalist approach prevailed in both Lizarra-Garazi and Loiola processes, and 
factually prevented Batasuna from operating according to its leadership’s understanding. 
Now it is known that both collapses provoked serious disagreements within the Abertzale 
Left, but only after the collapse of the 2005-2007 process did the political leadership 
challenge ETA. Obviously, conditions had changed to the extent that the political 
leadership that had insofar played a subordinated role now saw that they could challenge, 
or persuade, the once unquestionable vanguard. Ohlson argues that a movement, its 
leadership, must answer three questions before driving their movement to a process of 
abandoning terrorism: (1) Do we want to do it? (2) Can we do it? (3) Do we dare to do it? 
In other words, they need reasons, resources and resolves.991 It seems that the leadership 
of the Abertzale Left started to have reasons at the end of the Lizarra-Garazi process, but 
they did not resolve to act until the end of the 2005-2007 process because they did not feel 
they had enough power for that. Then, why could they now? Why dared they now?  
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According to the dominant account in the Abertzale Left, the outcome of the last 
failed peace process convinced the political leadership that their movement was at the edge 
of a precipice, and a total defeat could be imminent if they did not turn their transatlantic, 
Otegi’s word, on time. They intuited that their social base would support their proposal 
and, therefore, they dared to challenge ETA’s military stance. There might surely be other 
factors that made possible this change in the balance of forces within the Abertzale Left. 
The gradual military weakness of the armed group might have been a factor of its authority 
crisis. Had ETA had the ability to carry out a campaign comparable to the post-Lizarra-
Garazi campaign, the armed group would surely condition the capacity of the political 
leadership to conduct the internal debate and convince the majority of the social base. In 
addition, the internal division between the two factions of ETA’s leadership in 2007 and 
2008 had seriously damaged the already diminished prestige of the direction of the armed 
group in the view of some political cadres of the Abertzale Left. According to anonymous 
sources of the Abertzale Left, the internal crisis of ETA made much more feasible a 
questioning of the ascendancy of ETA within the movement. Political leaders of the 
Abertzale Left definitively lost confidence in a generation of ETA leaders who did not 
prove able to manage internal disagreements. How could they lead an entire political 
movement if they were not able to lead their own organization?992 Police repression did the 
rest. From 2007 to 2010 the French police, in collaboration with Spanish security forces, 
arrested all militants who formed the leadership of ETA when the organization decided to 
resume their armed campaign in 2007. When Otegi and other cadres of the Abertzale Left 
                                                          





questioned ETA’s strategy and promoted an internal debate in order to reverse it, ETA was 
a weakened organization with an unstable leadership, whose prestige was seriously 
damaged within the Abertzale Left, especially in the view of those who knew about the 
recent internal fight between the two factions of the executive committee. 
 Juan María Uriarte, bishop emeritus of Donostia, a mediator in the Lizarra-Garazi 
process, and an influential actor in Basque politics as a member of the hierarchy of the 
Basque Catholic Church, summarizes the evolution of the leadership of the Abertzale Left 
regarding the ascendancy of ETA in three periods: firstly, there was harmony between the 
leadership of the Abertzale Left and ETA; later, the leadership of the Abertzale Left saw 
the limits and obstacles of armed struggle, and they did not agree with some of ETA’s 
actions, but they did not have enough strength to challenge the armed group; finally, they 
realized that ETA was surrounded and gradually weaker, and that the Abertzale Left would 
sink with the armed group, unless they opposed them. “That’s when they felt strong enough 
to grab ETA by the neck. They wanted it earlier too, but they did not have strength 
enough.”993 Whitfield also regards the ability of Otegi and his associates to convince ETA 
that a political transformation was viable as “a direct catalyst” of ETA’s decision to call 
the end of its violence. “Without such leadership,” she argues, “the end of ETA’s violence 
would not have been achieved.”994 
Not everybody agree with the version of the group of Otegi opposing ETA and 
convincing the social base of the Abertzale Left. Juan Mari Olano, a veteran leader mostly 
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involved in the pro-Amnesty movement, remarks that “it is not right to believe that the 
[new] approach was theirs [Otegi and his close affiliates], and they tried to convince 
everybody else. (…) There were two factions within the Abertzale Left, within all its 
organizations. There were those in favor of a strategic change, and those against, and the 
decisions were made by the majority.”995 What Olano clearly suggests is that even within 
ETA—and within Ekin, or Segi—there were activists in favor of abandoning armed 
struggle, and the role played by Otegi and his group has been overestimated by some 
narratives. Nevertheless, all evidence suggests that a personal effort of some specific 
leaders was crucial to launch the decisive debate, and break the traditional taboo of not 
questioning the armed struggle by the civil organizations of the Abertzale Left. When the 
interviewer asked Otegi whether he was the captain of the transatlantic of the Abertzale 
Left when it changed course, he replied the following:  
It would be arrogant to assert that. Let’s put it this way: being aware that the adopted 
maritime course was inexorably driving us to a certain political shipwreck, a group 
of young activists (such as Arkaitz [Rodriguez], Sonia [Jacinto], Miren 
[Zabaleta]…) and some veteran seamen (such as Antton [Etxebeste], Rafa [Diez], 
Rufi [Etxeberria], Txelui [Moreno]…) took the helm of the ship and we turned it 
180 degrees (not without opposition). It had not been easy. There were great 
tensions and an enormous human and personal wear.996           
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In 2012, ETA expressly acknowledged in its conclusions of the internal debate that 
the armed group was not a vanguard anymore. According to this conclusion endorsed by 
ETA militants, “the relationship among the organizations of the Abertzale Left should not 
be based in hierarchy and subordination,” although the liberation movement needs tools 
and coordination bodies to guarantee its cohesion and political harmony. However, in this 
context of autonomous organizations and coordination tools within the Abertzale Left, the 
militants of ETA recognize that “the main political reference of the Abertzale Left” is their 
political party.997 
6.4.2. Mediation 
The contrast between the full engagement of the Algerian government as a mediator in 
1989, the difficulties of involving international agencies in the 1990s, and the experience 
of the second half of the 2000 decade, when international actors were intensely involved 
in the process toward ETA’s end, shows that a perceived ripeness of a conflict situation 
can be a decisive factor in the chances for an engagement of outside mediators. The 
situation that the Algerian government surely had perceived at the end of the 1980s fits 
what Zartman defined as a ripe moment caused by a mutually hurting stalemate. A mutually 
hurting stalemate is reached when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from 
which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them. The 
stalemate is directly linked to the ripe moment. Ripeness is, in Zartman’s view, a necessary 
condition for the initiation of negotiations.998 Christopher Mitchell relies on Zartman’s 
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contentions when he tries to find an answer to the question of when mediation can help: 
“Mediators and other types of third-party intermediaries should best await the development 
of a ‘hurting stalemate’ for both adversaries, perhaps accompanied by an approaching 
mutual catastrophe.”999 
The Algerian government assumed a mediator role in the whole process, as they 
perceived that the situation was ripe for talks. Once the negotiations failed, several attempts 
to re-initiate a peace process were made by the Abertzale Left and Basque peace brokers 
such as Elkarri and Gernika Gogoratuz, a Basque peace association. As stressed by the 
long-time leader of Elkarri Jonan Fernández, all those efforts had little results because 
international agencies did not see any prospect for success. In other words, the ripe moment 
was still far away.1000 Elkarri itself tried to play a mediator role promoting both secret 
contacts and public conferences, but the peace organization ended up in very bad terms 
with ETA and the Abertzale Left. The situation was not ripe for Elkarri either.  
 Zartman’s framework can only partially explain what occurred in the second half 
of the 2000 decade. The 2005-2007 process took place after the conflict reached a new ripe 
moment in 2004. The Abertzale Left was looking for a way out when the Spanish socialist 
party came to power. It is controversial whether there was a mutually hurting stalemate, or 
an asymmetrical hurting situation for ETA easily manageable for the Spanish government 
as the PP argued. In any case, the PSOE perceived a ripe moment for the resolution of the 
conflict, once they learned that ETA was prepared to compromise. By that time, some 
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international facilitators were discretely in contact with ETA. When the Spanish 
government gave a green light, the Norwegian government, the Center Henri Dunant for 
Humanitarian Dialogue—sponsored by several European governments—and other 
agencies got fully involved. When the process collapsed, the main international agencies 
withdrew to the backstage. Similarly to Harry Barnes and Adolfo Perez Esquivel in the 
1990s, only individuals such as Brian Currin tried to play a mediation or facilitation role 
in the period of confusion following the break-up of the ceasefire in 2007. 
This time there was not any mutually hurting stalemate on the horizon, but Currin 
and others predicted that a ripe moment was likely to arrive soon. Not in the sense defined 
by Zartman, i.e. a ripeness for negotiation, but in the sense that the Abertzale Left was 
about to reach its own ripe moment for internal talks. The political leadership of the 
Abertzale Left, who to a great extent lost credibility in the view of the international 
facilitators who participated in the 2005-2007 process because of the disappointing 
outcome, had succeeded in gaining the trust of Currin and those working with him. The 
South African lawyer was convinced that the political leadership of the Abertzale Left was 
sincere in their attempt to end armed struggle. The ripe moment for internal negotiations 
and external facilitation had arrived. 
Currin and others succeeded in involving some renowned international actors to 
pressure both ETA and the Spanish government. The Brussels declaration, the International 
Contact Group (IGC), the International Verification Committee (IVC), and the Aiete 
conference were the public face of all this diplomatic activity. There was a non-public side 





to ETA, established a direct channel with the Spanish government since Zapatero’s cabinet 
arrived at the conclusion that the Abertzale Left’s will to stop armed struggle was genuine. 
The Aiete conference in October 2011, with the participation of the former secretary of the 
United Nations Koffi Annan, was a telling result of the discrete facilitation work of 
international agencies with the acquiescence of the government, and, at the same time, a 
clear sign that the big decision was already made. It was common ground. Koffi Annan 
and the rest of the international personalities in the conference would not come to the 
Basque Country if they did not have a guarantee that their involvement would result in a 
positive response from ETA. International agencies involved in the Basque peace effort 
were commonly referred to as “the international community,” but in truth it was, as put by 
Whitfield, “a small number of committed individuals and entities, able to operate in ways 
that a state could not,” whose efficacy was “inextricably interwoven with the discretion 
within which they operated.”1001 
 However, international leverage was not as powerful as expected by the actors 
promoting the process, and especially by ETA and the Abertzale Left. According to Otegi, 
they sought the involvement of the international community because they needed “an 
external agent with capacity to influence all parties.”1002 Rufi Etxeberria explains that the 
Abertzale Left’s unilateral strategy had two recipients: the Basque society and the 
international community. Why these two recipients? “Because we are aware that the state 
does not want to engage in a resolution process, and we are aware that this [the 
government’s involvement] will come as a consequence of the pressure coming from the 
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Basque society and the international community.”1003 There is little doubt that international 
initiatives, such as the Brussels declaration in 2010 and the Aiete conference in 2011, 
created a facilitating context for ETA to gradually announce the end of armed activity. The 
international agents pressured ETA and facilitated the Abertzale Left to pressure the armed 
group. Furthermore, the international actors asked the Spanish and French government to 
get involved in a resolution process, and shaped the issue not as a terrorism problem, but 
as a politically motivated conflict whose sources need to be addressed. Doing that, they 
portrayed an acceptable scenario for ETA, as it gave the armed group a chance to 
contextualize the end of its armed campaign in a political framework. 
We still know too little of the whereabouts of the always discrete role of the 
international agencies and their actual influence on the decision and moves of the actors 
involved, especially the Spanish government while ruled by the socialist Zapatero. There 
are credible testimonies asserting that the Spanish government committed before some 
international mediators to meet with ETA once the armed group announced the definitive 
cessation. Yet, later developments of the events show that the international actors’ 
influence ended once ETA gave the government what the government was seeking. Once 
the definitive cessation was announced, the Zapatero cabinet did nothing, and the on-
coming right-wing government led by Mariano Rajoy acted as if it was impermeable to all 
requests of involvement. Moreover, the Rajoy cabinet, his party, and all actors opposing a 
dialogue have rejected any need of international mediation. They claim that Brian Currin 
is an ally of the Abertzale Left, and the Aiete conference was an unacceptable concession 
                                                          





to ETA. Zartman’s contention that only mutual pain and a sense of never ending conflict 
will make the opposed parties welcome outsiders’ mediation or facilitation can explain the 
Rajoy cabinet’s position. The Spanish right wing political party and its allies did not regard 
a continuation of ETA’s campaign as a hurting stalemate, as they regarded ETA’s violence 
as politically bearable, and they expected to bring the armed group to an end through 
repression. 
 Ending ETA’s campaign has not been a consequence of negotiations. Thus, the 
phenomenon of mediation in the process toward ETA’s end cannot be analyzed following 
patterns used to study standard peace processes. However, outsider actors have played an 
important role as facilitators, even though they have not been accepted as legitimate 
mediators by some involved parties. Mitchell proposes a useful framework to define the 
core mediator tasks in conflict resolutions.1004 Some of these patterns can match the 
contribution of international mediators in the Basque case. They were mainly explorers in 
the first stages after the collapse of the 2005-2007 process, as they tried to determine the 
readiness of diverse actors to get involved in a process. They later acted mainly as 
enhancers of a favorable context for an end of violence, and legitimizers of the steps taken 
by the Abertzale Left toward the renunciation of violence. Finally, they acted as facilitators 
especially when they acted as messengers between ETA and the Spanish government, as 
conveners when they promoted the Aiete conference, and as verifiers when they assumed 
the mandate of checking that ETA was fulfilling the ceasefire commitments.  
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When Brian Currin received a letter with ETA’s seal urging him to renounce all mediation 
activities in the summer of 2008, the South African lawyer asked his contacts in the 
Abertzale Left whether they were aware of it. They replied that they knew nothing about it 
at the time, but they would try to find out. Later on, Currin received assurances that neither 
the Abertzale Left nor ETA wanted him to leave his mediation activities. Finally, he 
received a letter from ETA denying they sent the first letter. According to suggestions made 
by members of the Abertzale Left, the first letter was sent by the Spanish secret services 
who wanted to sabotage the peace efforts of international mediators.1005 However, ETA’s 
internal crisis in 2007-2008, which divided its leadership into two factions, makes plausible 
the hypothesis of a faction sending the first letter in the middle of the crisis—in a period 
when ETA had just decided to reactivate a long-run armed campaign—and a renewed 
leadership sending the rectification—once the crisis was over, and the decision for a long 
armed campaign had been put into question. In any case, the letter received by Currin is a 
clear exponent of the influence of what are called spoilers in the development of peace 
efforts. 
 The pioneering work on spoilers by Stephen John Stedman defines them, in a 
context of peace processes, as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine 
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attempts to achieve it.”1006 Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond produced a wider 
definition to deal with the spoiling factor, not only in peace processes with the opposed 
parties engaged in negotiations, but also in contexts “where some form of peace process is 
under way and where at least one of the parties to the conflict is either engaged in or 
committed to a peace process,” which can perfectly fit the Basque case. Newman and 
Richmond define spoilers or spoiling as “groups or tactics that actively seek to hinder, 
delay, or undermine conflict settlement through a variety of means and for a variety of 
motives.”1007 Daniel Conversi also considered a broad definition of the concept of spoiling 
to analyze its influence in Basque peace efforts until the end of the 1990s. He points out 
that the major spoilers in peace processes in general tend to be veto holders, usually the 
paramilitaries and the government. In the Basque case, Conversi contends, none of the veto 
holders were interested in bringing forward the peace process in the 1990s.1008 
After the period analyzed by Conversi, the spoiling phenomenon can be analyzed 
from a different perspective since an actual peace process took place in the mid-2000s. 
According to Stedman’s definition, spoilers use violence to undermine peace efforts, but 
according to Newman and Richmond, spoilers undermine conflict settlement through a 
variety of means, which has been the case in the Basque peace efforts over time. The right-
wing opposition to the government led by Zapatero acted as a spoiler during the 2005-2007 
process, as the PP, all conservative media, and the major victims’ associations opposed the 
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peace process. Talking with ETA was an unacceptable surrender and a betrayal to victims 
in the view of the Spanish right-wing opposition. They did not accept any international 
mediation and would not support any other policy than counterterrorist measures. With 
their powerful political and media campaign, they hindered the government’s 
maneuverability, as the socialists were afraid of paying a high price in elections. They were, 
according to Stedman’s typology, an outside spoiler—“parties who are excluded from a 
peace process or who exclude themselves.”1009 
Some factions within the Abertzale Left could also be regarded as spoiling elements 
during the 2005-2007 process, although the fact that their alleged opposition to the end of 
armed struggle was not displayed publicly makes its analysis difficult. ETA, and probably 
other organizations of the Abertzale Left, did not accept the draft of the political agreement 
reached by Batasuna, PNV and PSE-EE in October 2006. That rejection led Batasuna to 
propose substantial modifications to the draft, which triggered the collapse of the 
negotiations. Soon after, ETA de facto broke up the ceasefire planting a bomb in Madrid’s 
airport. This contention that ETA acted as a spoiler can be disputed, as the armed group 
was still prepared to engage in negotiations and, in fact, took part in the last contacts in 
Geneva in May 2007. However, the insurgent group clearly failed to fulfill their ceasefire 
obligations. ETA was, in this case, an inside spoiler—one who “signs a peace agreement, 
signals a willingness to implement a settlement, and yet fails to fulfill key obligations to 
the agreement.”1010 In this regard, the Spanish government itself was regarded as a spoiler 
by ETA, as the Basque group claimed that the Spanish side did not fulfill the accord agreed 
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on in 2005 because they did not cease persecuting members of the Abertzale Left. The 
peace process eventually collapsed. The spoilers succeeded. 
The spoiler factor needs to be analyzed differently since the collapse of the last 
peace process. There is not any peace process based on negotiations, but there was a peace-
building effort with one of the parties committed to transit from violent means to 
exclusively political means. Factions of the Abertzale Left, including ETA until 2010, 
seemed to have opposed the efforts of the political leadership of Batasuna. In 2008, ETA 
was determined to carry on a long campaign of violence. When the advocates for a change 
of course intended to promote a debate on the continuation of armed struggle among the 
social base of the Abertzale Left, ETA opposed that discussion. There is credible evidence 
that the armed group tried to carry out attacks as late as January 2010, when the debate 
within the Abertzale Left was about to conclude. What would have happened if the 
suspected ETA members arrested in January 2010 in Zamora (Spain) and Obidos 
(Portugal) had actually set off a bomb in the center of Madrid, as they allegedly planned? 
That question will not ever be answered. Yet, the hypothesis that ETA wanted to sabotage 
the outcome of the debate is not the only plausible one. Committing an attack of great 
impact in the middle of the Spanish capital could also have been an action to demonstrate 
capability and strength in the eve of the inevitable cessation. 
In any case, the spoiling elements inside the Abertzale Left ceased to act once ETA 
assumed the decision of the social base. The armed group announced in September 2010 
that they had decided to stop temporarily their campaign in February 2010. The prisoner 





September 2011. The organization Ekin, whose leadership had allegedly opposed the 
abandonment of political-military strategy, announced their dissolution in October 2011. 
All factions who were reluctant to end armed struggle accepted with discipline the majority 
decision. Nothing similar to the Real IRA or Continuity IRA in Ireland emerged in the 
Basque Country. In the end, the whole movement managed to keep united.  
Since the end of 2011, the spoiling factor has only worked on the Spanish side. The 
Zapatero cabinet could arguably be regarded as a spoiler, at one point, if it is taken for 
granted that they failed fulfilling their commitment to engage in a dialogue with ETA in 
the event of a unilateral cessation. Once the PP came to power, the spoiling actors in the 
Spanish right-wing spectrum evolved. The leading faction of the PP, who is ruling the 
government since 2012, has still been contrary to any dialogue with ETA. The PP 
government and the judiciary have never given in to police and judicial action, not only 
against ETA underground militants, but also against legal members of the diverse 
associations of the Abertzale Left.1011 The government has even rejected ETA’s proposal 
to talk about disarmament. It has refused to contact international actors such as the 
members of the IVC. 
Yet, there is a more radical faction who regard the government’s position as a sell-
out. Why? The Rajoy government welcomed as good news ETA’s decision to lay down 
arms. In addition, they neither tried to reverse measures taken by other agencies such as 
the Constitutional Court—who legalized Bildu and Sortu—nor disregarded decisions such 
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as the ruling on the ‘Parot doctrine’ by the European Human Rights Court—who ordered 
to release some ETA prisoners on the grounds that they were victims of a misinterpretation 
of imprisoning rules and had already served their sentences.1012 This radical faction, with 
the express support of the former Home minister Jaime Mayor Oreja and the suggested 
support of the former president José María Aznar, did not welcome the unilateral cessation 
by ETA, and regarded the participation of the Abertzale Left in legal elections as a victory 
of ETA. They claim, for instance, that the government should pursue the banning of the 
party Sortu and the coalition Bildu. The main association of ETA victims, AVT, is one of 
the most prominent agencies of this faction, and some influential conservative media 
outlets are in harmony with this trend. 
Scholars such as Antonio Batista argue that those rulers of the Spanish state, who 
are opposed to any peacebuilding process, act according to a conclusion that the existence 
of ETA helps the state interests. “The strategists of the Spanish military intelligence” came 
to the conclusion, contends Batista, that terrorism made unfeasible separatism because it 
delegitimized it, and, on the contrary, ETA’s abandonment of violence could make Basque 
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separatism feasible because it would turn legitimate.1013 Whitfield stresses that the 
existence of ETA was an ambivalent problem for Spain: on the one hand, it was “an illegal 
band guilty of the perpetration” of multiple crimes, but on the other, it prevented Basque 
nationalists’ broad alliances and allowed successive Spanish governments to dismiss 
nationalists’ claims, “with a tacit understanding that the continuation of ETA’s violence at 
a manageably low level was the least bad option available.”1014  
However, this time the spoiler factor had not succeeded in obstructing the process 
toward the end of ETA’s campaign, although it is succeeding in delaying the management 
of many issues related to it. The unilateralism of the Abertzale Left’s moves has much to 
do with the inability of spoilers to provoke a setback in the process.    
6.4.4. Unilateralism 
The end of ETA’s campaign can hardly be regarded as a consequence of a peace process. 
John Darby and Roger MacGinty identify five essential criteria which define a peace 
process: (1) the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith; (2) the key actors are 
included in the process; (3) the negotiations address the central issues in dispute; (4) the 
negotiators do not use force to achieve their objectives; (5) the negotiators are committed 
to a sustained process.1015 In the Basque case, regarding the period from the end of the last 
peace process in 2007 until the cessation announced by ETA in October 2011, some 
instrumental actors such as the Spanish and French governments were not willing to 
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negotiate. The French government stuck to its traditional position of considering the 
conflict with ETA an external issue, and endorsing and following the Spanish 
government’s criteria.  The Spanish government refused to engage in negotiations with the 
Basque group. Still, the Spanish government secretly exchanged some messages with ETA 
through third parties. Some commitments were allegedly agreed on through indirect 
dialogue. The international conference held in Donostia in October 2011 was one of the 
consequences of those commitments.  Finally, ETA announced the definitive cessation of 
its campaign in the assumption that the Spanish government agreed on opening a dialogue 
after the announcement of the end. No matter how unilateral ETA’s final decision has been, 
a process of contacts, talks and internal and external negotiations have taken place previous 
to the announcement of the cessation in October 2011. 
Vicens Fisas proposes a framework to examine diverse ways to address conflicts. 
He identifies seven major patterns: management, settlement, regulation, resolution, 
analytical problem solving, transformation, and reconciliation. According to Fisas, the 
agencies who address conflicts following the pattern of management do not seek to solve 
the causes of the conflict, do not aim for any settlement, and their objective is to limit the 
conflict and mitigate its effects.1016 The Spanish and French government’s approach to the 
Basque conflict from 2007 to 2011 would fit the management pattern, as they did not seek 
any settlement, regulation, or resolution of the conflict. Other agencies involved in the 
Basque case, such as international mediators and many Basque political actors, were 
willing to follow the patterns of settlement, regulation, resolution, analytical problem 
                                                          





solving, transformation, and reconciliation, but the position of the governments prevented 
those patterns from being developed. Adrian Guelke proposes a framework of seven phases 
of negotiations: Pre-talks, Secret talks, Multilateral talks, Settlement, Endorsement, 
Implementation, and Institutionalization.1017 In the Basque case, some Pre-talks, Secret 
talks, and Multilateral talks took place, but they were never led to substantial negotiations 
and settlement between the belligerent actors. The goal of those talks was to facilitate a 
context for a unilateral decision, rather than develop a multilateral resolution process.   
Yet, regardless of the influence of the peacebuilding efforts, ETA and the Abertzale 
Left have always claimed that the decision to abandon armed struggle has been unilateral. 
It can be understood that, regardless of the multilateral contacts and talks involving many 
agencies that facilitated the end of ETA’s campaign, the final decision was not taken under 
any condition or settlement. The later developments of the process have tested the 
unconditional nature of the decision. In ETA’s view, the Spanish government has not 
fulfilled the commitments undertaken through indirect talks, but that fact has not changed 
the Basque group’s determination. Otegi expressly states this point:  
The PSOE government had enough time to make gestures (which I know they had 
engaged in with the international community), for instance regarding ill prisoners 
etc., but it did not do it. (…) In any case, the cessation of the armed activity would 
have come regardless of the existence of those commitments, as it was an 
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inexcusable condition to launch the new strategy. In our view, the cessation was 
not conditioned to previous agreements with the State.1018 
Unilateralism is a newly adopted concept for the leaderships of the Abertzale Left 
and ETA. In the political-military scheme of the long-sustained attrition war, the end of the 
armed campaign was to be a consequence of a political settlement after negotiations. Since 
all previous negotiation attempts had failed, the leadership of the Abertzale Left theorized 
about the potentiality of a unilateral process, as they lost confidence in the ability of an 
armed campaign to force the government to negotiate ever again. Moreover, they 
concluded that the armed confrontation and the political blockade resulting from the 
confrontation was hurting the pro-independence movement and favoring the Spanish state. 
Since the Spanish government was unwilling to move toward any kind of conflict 
resolution, waiting for a bilateral process was a way to endure a blockade in which the 
Abertzale Left and ETA were having more costs than benefits, and the state more benefits 
than costs. In contrast, unilateral moves had the potentiality to change the political scenario. 
Otegi states that the key to analyze all unilateral initiatives is the following question: “Who 
is strengthened and who is weakened.”1019 The adoption of unilaterality as a key concept 
to move forward has been “a political and mental revolution” within the Abertzale Left, in 
Otegi’s words.1020 It has indeed been a deep change in a political community that has 
strongly believed in a negotiated outcome of the conflict, and which once viewed laying 
down arms without achieving any concession from the state as a surrender.  
                                                          
1018 Munarriz, Tiempo, 196-197. 
1019 Ibid., 108-109,   





The proposal to act unilateraly, however, is not a total novelty within the 
movement. Alfonso Etxegarai, a former ETA activist deported in Sao Tome since 1986, 
proposed in an Op-Ed in 1994 that the cessation of armed struggle should not be a result 
of negotiations but a consequence of a unilateral decision. After the failure of the Algiers 
process and the arrests of Bidart, the early 1990s were a time of strategic confusion within 
the pro-independence movement, but negotiation was still an almost non-questioned 
tactical goal. In that context, Etxegarai wrote the following:  
Using it [armed struggle] is a political option, and abandoning it too. (…) The 
Basques can abandon armed struggle sooner or later, but we cannot negotiate it. We 
can abandon it because we can reach the conclusion that it is not fruitful anymore, 
or because we see it as unnecessary in a given stage of the struggle. We can also 
keep on using it if we believe that it is a catalyst (what we cannot do is using it in 
any event). (…) We should decide internally on armed struggle, and not in a 
negotiation table with the enemy.1021 
Etxegarai recounts that it was a personal reflection, not shared with other militants 
until its publication. “I reached that conclusion through my own experience. I knew that 
the armed struggle did not have many alternatives and could not be developed further.” 
After Spain’s integration into the European Union, the evolution of the armed 
confrontation, and the increase of a national conscience in favor of sovereignty, the armed 
struggle “did not make much sense” in Etxegarai’s view. “The model of the negotiation 
with the state would only occur through a military victory, and that option was discarded.” 
                                                          





That is why he proposed to “surrender the weapons to the people, without expecting any 
compensation, and hoping that the ‘legal struggle’ will take the central stage.” After that, 
they should only rely “on the ability of the legal political forces to achieve agreements ‘at 
home’ and challenge the states.”1022 
The unilaterality proposed by Etxegarai in 1994 became the doctrine of the 
movement in 2009-2011. It was the key factor for ETA’s final decision to cease the armed 
campaign, although multilateral talks among agencies such as international agents and 
Basque political actors have facilitated the decision-making process, framing an adequate 
scenario for ETA and the Abertzale Left.  
  
                                                          





7. Conclusions  
7.1. Contribution and limitations  
On October 13, 2014, almost three years after ETA’s unilateral announcement, The New 
York Times mentioned the Basque case in a leading editorial devoted to the controversial 
Catalonian referendum project. The Catalonian regional government had called for a 
referendum on independence, scheduled for November 9, 2014. The Spanish government 
challenged the vote on the grounds that it was against Spain’s Constitution, and the 
Constitutional Court invalidated the call. The New York Times argued that the dispute 
should be solved through democratic means, and the referendum should be allowed, as it 
was recently in Scotland. Surprisingly, the Basque case was also referred to as a model of 
negotiated settlement: “The long war with Basque separatists ended only when both sides 
agreed to negotiate. There is room for a political settlement here [in Catalonia], too.”1023 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet, one of the most prestigious newspapers in the 
world asserted in a leading editorial the opposite of what really happened in the Basque 
case. The New York Times’ grave error is evidence of a need for clarification of the factors 
and reasons leading to the end of ETA’s campaign.  
This research contributes to a better understanding of the end of ETA’s armed 
activity. It provides new information on the events from the resumption of ETA’s campaign 
in 2007 to the definitive end of its armed activity in 2011. Oral and documentary sources 
have been instrumental in this investigation, especially to clarify what happened beyond 
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the information provided to the public throught the media. Clarifying the whereabouts 
within the Abertzale Left movement is crucial to understanding why the armed group 
decided to lay down arms, unilaterally, at this specific time. I contend that the end of ETA’s 
campaign is a case of transformation triggered by its constituency’s withdrawal of support 
for armed struggle. Therefore, understanding what occurred within the movement regarded 
as ETA’s constituency, the Abertzale Left, has been a priority in this research. 
The clandestine nature of ETA and the opacity of the relationship among all 
organizations of the Abertzale Left has made it difficult to scrutinize the process that led 
ETA to its end. Former members of the Basque armed group have been interviewed, but 
the current leadership of ETA has not, although a request was sent through reliable 
channels. Research hindrances are not limited to the armed group. Even before the banning 
of Batasuna and others, it was difficult to obtain and verify information on the nature of 
the relationship among these organizations, let alone their relations with the clandestine 
group. For example, members of the leaderships of the PNV, PSE-EE, and EA had no 
objection to disclosing information about meetings they had with ETA representatives. 
They did not fear a criminal procedure as a consequence of it. In contrast, members of 
Batasuna would hardly acknowledge having met with ETA members, as they are under 
suspicion of acting in harmony with them, and disclosing information on these contacts 
would surely result in a criminal prosecution. When the judicial persecution against the 
political and civil associations of the Abertzale Left began in the early 2000s, the obstacles 
to collecting information on the internal life of the movement increased. Admitting 





result in a conviction for terrorism. Political and civil organizations of the pro-
independence movement did not go underground, but their work could not be as public as 
it had been earlier. In addition, arguing in favor of armed struggle is a crime according to 
Spanish legislation. The internal debate within the Abertzale Left between those 
advocating for the end of ETA’s armed campaign and those advocating for its continuation 
was the main catalyst for the transformation studied here, but those favoring violent 
methods, who eventually lost the debate, refused to be interviewed for this investigation. 
Nevertheless, ETA’s views and the arguments of those favoring a continuation of 
the armed struggle have been collected through a number of documents, and analyzed as 
valuable material for the interpretation of the process under study. ETA has its own 
information bulletin, Zutabe, whose issues are not accessible to the general public but can 
be reached by journalists and researchers. ETA regularly releases public statements and its 
leadership occasionally gives interviews. In addition, some of the groups’s can be reached 
because judicial investigation, or other channels, has made them accessible, which is the 
case for a number of non-public documents used in this research. The examination of these 
ETA documents, and others such as the report Mugarri, allegedly worked out by Ekin, has 
uncovered the arguments of those who, at least at the time of writing those documents, 
were favoring the continuation of the armed struggle. In addition, some off-the-record 
conversations with militants of this factions have also provided relevant insights about their 
rationale. 
The difficulties in obtaining verifiable data are not only related to the Abertzale 





involving many different actors took place behind the scenes. Some events have been 
disclosed by other journalistic or academic works, some have been clarified in this 
research, and some others remain unknown. Time will allow future researchers to analyze 
new data.  
Regardless of the difficulties in accessing some sources and the secrecy of some of 
the facts related to the end of ETA, this research contributes to the knowledge and 
understanding of the process under study with new data provided by those directly involved 
in the decision making and by the abovementioned documents. I contend that the internal 
debate—and struggle—between the two opposing trends within the Abertzale Left was the 
tipping point in the process toward the end of ETA. The narrative of this internal struggle 
displayed in section four of this dissertation is, for the novelty of many of its details, one 
of the most valuable contributions of this research. In addition, the variety of the 
perspectives provided by the interviewees has allowed me to develop a comprehensive 
narrative about the process under study. From a former Spanish Home minister opposed to 
any dialogue with ETA to former members of the Basque armed group who spent almost 
30 years in prison and are proud of their militancy, most of the perspectives from which 
this story can be told have been included in the narrative and analysis. This variety and 
diversity of primary sources for the elaboration of the narrative is another contribution of 
this research.               
Almost all internal and external documents issued by ETA and the rest of the 
organizations of the Abertzale Left are in Basque. Some of the external statements are also 





Left are conducted in Basque. Therefore, knowledge of the Basque language has been 
instrumental for analyzing all sources of information coming from the Abertzale Left and 
other Basque actors. Taking into account secondary sources published in Basque, which 
have not usually been considered by scholars in the field, has also been important in order 
to offer a more complete overview of the literature on the matter. Bringing these references 
originally in Basque to an English-speaking audience might also be a useful contribution 
for future researchers.  
7.2. Research results  
The results of the investigations have confirmed the initial hypothesis of this research, 
namely that ETA laid down arms because its constituency withdrew its support from armed 
struggle. Its social base, the Abertzale Left movement’s members and followers, arrived at 
the conclusion that armed strategy was not effective anymore and, furthermore, was 
damaging for the Basque pro-independence movement. Once ETA was aware of its 
constituency’s stance, it had no other choice than stopping its campaign as demanded by 
its social base. For an insurgent group practicing armed struggle as part of a political-
military strategy, the loss of the support of the political wing of the movement means the 
end of it. Yet, why did the Abertzale Left political leadership and constituency reach the 
conclusion that the armed struggle was ineffective and damaging for the pro-independence 
strategy? This research shows that it has been a gradual process, in which the influence of 
the frustrating outcomes of the past peace processes have been determining milestones, and 






The failure of a strategy designed to provoke negotiations had been the decisive 
factor in the final removal of the Abertzale Left’s political support for armed struggle. The 
Algiers negotiations proved that armed struggle could push a government to a negotiation 
table, but also showed the difficulties of achieving political concessions from it. The 
Algerian experience put into question a model solely based on direct negotiations with the 
state. The Lizarra-Garazi process demonstrated that a scenario without ETA’s armed 
struggle opened new opportunities to the Basque nationalist forces and, more importantly, 
as the ceasefire was not a result of negotiations with the government, it showed that 
practicing the armed struggle was an option, not an inevitable consequence of the political 
conflict. 
The end of the Lizarra-Garazi process as a consequence of ETA’s unilateral 
decision was the beginning of the end. Members of the leadership of Batasuna did not agree 
with ETA’s decision, but they did not challenge it. It was too early. They did not feel strong 
enough to question ETA. Moreover, they disagreed with the outcome of the process, but 
there were no signs of a loss of confidence in the political-military strategy. The 
developments of the events since then show that the leadership of Batasuna had finding an 
exit from the armed conflict as a priority, but they did not consider any unilateral resolution 
at the time. Instead, they still expected that a negotiation process would bring a peaceful 
resolution. 
The frustrating outcome of the 2005-2007 process triggered a unilateral solution. 
After the failure of the last negotiation attempt, the political leadership of the Abertzale 





Spanish government. All in all, it was the recognition of a failure. The political-military 
strategy of attrition, seeking a political negotiation with the objective of obtaining the 
recognition of the right for self-determination, had failed. The armed struggle had proved 
effective to make the government sit down at the negotiation table, but it was not effective 
enough to obtain what ETA mistakenly considered obtainable. The Basque armed group 
had overestimated their bargaining power and it ended up willing to accept what the 
government had offered in previous negotiations’ attempts—‘peace for prisoners’—when 
it was too late.      
Once aware of this fact, the political leadership of the Abertzale Left concluded that 
a transformation toward an exclusively political strategy was imperative if they wanted to 
avoid a total defeat as a consequence of the strategic failure. Their ability for self-criticism 
was crucial at this point. They recognized a failure of a strategy in order to avoid a total 
defeat. As negotiations were not a realistic possibility anymore, unilaterality was the only 
choice. Furthermore, unilaterality would give them autonomy of decision, i.e. a capacity to 
operate without being reliant on how the Spanish government and other actors would 
respond. 
By that time, the constituency of the Abertzale Left was receptive to the new 
approach coming from the leadership. Only a few years ago, the majority of the social base 
would not have accepted a proposal to demand from ETA a unilateral cessation which 
would leave unresolved even the situation of their prisoners, exiles, and militants in hiding. 
Regardless of the gradual decline of the confidence and support for armed struggle, such 





which was viewed as a last opportunity to resolve the armed conflict through dialogue, a 
unilateral cessation sounded reasonable to the majority of the Abertzale Left constituency. 
Yet, why did they regard it as the last (and lost) opportunity? 
Many factors contributed to the loss of confidence on the effectiveness of the armed 
struggle to force a negotiation with the state. The Spanish and French state combined 
repression against ETA in the 1980s and 1990s, and against the whole Abertzale Left in 
the 2000s, gradually diminished the military capability of ETA and the political potentiality 
of the entire movement. Police and judicial repression did not defeat ETA, as it has always 
been able to subsequently replace its arrested leaders and militants, and has never ceased 
to have enough resources to carry out armed actions. Still, the state repression had 
weakened it to an extent that a total defeat could have been feasible in the future. 
The evolution of the effectiveness of the state repression against the armed group 
has a main landmark, namely the initiation of the full French collaboration with the Spanish 
authorities in the persecution of ETA members, and the subsequent loss of the French 
rearguard for the Basque group. The arrests of Bidart were a starting point of a declining 
of the military power of ETA. The weakening process has been gradual, and have seemed 
to accelerate after the parenthesis of the two-year-long, post-Lizarra-Garazi strong 
offensive in the early 2000s. After the collapse of the last peace process in 2007, the balance 
between police operations and ETA’s actions were more unfavorable to the Basque group 





In addition, the judicial persecution of the whole Abertzale Left initiated in the late 
1990s and fully developed in the 2000s hindered the viability of the political-military 
strategy, as the civil organizations of the movement were prevented from operating in the 
political arena. The combined strategy could not properly work with one of its elements 
disabled or, at least, handicapped. In addition, the post-9/11 worldview on counterterrorism 
reinforced the Spanish repressive approach, as the inclusion of Batasuna and other civil 
organizations of the Abertzale Left in the list of terrorists groups approved by the European 
Union shows. The ruling of the European Courts of Human Rights ratifying the banning of 
Batasuna was the final blow. The leadership of the Abertzale Left understood that the 
political arena would be closed for them as long as ETA was active. 
The evolution of worldwide geopolitics also had a decisive impact in the process 
leading to ETA’s end. The Basque group engaged in armed struggle in an era when 
revolutionary and anti-colonialist insurgent movements and organizations were operating 
worldwide, some of them with success. Armed resistance was justified by the fairness of 
its revolutionary objectives. The collapse of the socialist bloc and the end of the cold war 
changed the world geopolitics, and revolutionary armed movements gradually declined or 
transformed. When the IRA definitively abandoned armed struggle, ETA found itself 
alone, with no references in a time when religious-oriented insurgent groups were emerging 
and revolutionary groups declining. The indiscriminate nature of many of the attacks 
committed by Jihadist groups undermined even more the already diminished prestige of 
armed insurgency. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Basque armed group 





The Spanish and the Basque societies were part of this evolving trend. The majority 
of the Spanish society was in harmony with the worldwide mainstream view on terrorism, 
its majority opposed to any dialogue with ETA. Facilitating the end of ETA through 
dialogue was regarded as an unacceptable concession to terrorists, and crushing them by 
force was the preferred solution to the problem. Producing the end of ETA through a peace 
process would have meant a great political success in the past. Now, solving the ETA 
question through dialogue would mean losing votes in Spain. The majority of the Basques 
were open to dialogue and supportive of any peace process, but the opposition to ETA was 
overwhelming and, since the end of the 1990s, became mainstream. The Ajuria Enea pact 
and the emergence of peace movements such as Gesto por la Paz were important landmarks 
in the shaping of a collective and public opposition to ETA, and movements such as Elkarri 
contributed to the social awareness for the need to find a solution based on dialogue. The 
social base of the Abertzale Left was not impermeable to all this.  
The evolution of the nature of ETA’s armed campaign had also influenced its 
constituency’s gradual detachment from armed struggle. The use of car bombs, which 
caused a considerable amount of non-selected victims, provoked disaffection among its 
social base in the 1980s. The qualitative leap of killing political representatives generated 
disagreements. Specific actions such as the long kidnapping of Ortega Lara and the killing 
of Miguel Angel Blanco were, in their cruelty, turning points in the evolving view of the 
Abertzale Left social base regarding ETA. Public dissents were rare, but sporadic public 
disagreements and the eventual split of Aralar were evidence of a growing disagreement 





Yet, despite this unfavorable context for the continuation of armed struggle, a 
faction of the Abertzale Left was prepared to continue. In fact, the majority of ETA 
militants (including prisoners) decided to carry on armed struggle as late as 2008. In the 
past, it would have been enough for the whole Abertzale Left movement to accept the 
inevitability of another long cycle of violence. ETA was considered the vanguard of the 
movement. Decisions concerning armed strategy were ETA’s exclusive competence, and 
the political and civil organizations of the Abertzale Left had never put that reality into 
question, until 2008. The clandestine nature of the armed group and its ambiguous and 
opaque relationship with the rest of the organizations of the Abertzale Left makes it 
difficult to clarify what factors enhanced and enabled the politicos’ challenge of ETA. The 
gradual weakening of ETA by the state repression weakened its ability to exercise a 
political leadership within the movement as well. After subsequent failures of attempted 
resolution processes in which the ETA leadership’s decisions were instrumental, veteran 
political leaders of the Abertzale Left, who were in the political arena since the 1980s, lost 
confidence in a leadership exercised by much younger ETA militants, who were regularly 
arrested and replaced after a short period of time in command. The bombing of the Madrid 
airport in December 2006 while the ceasefire was still in force was the last straw regarding 
the loss of confidence in the leadership of ETA. With that attack ETA undermined its 
credibility for future processes, as it opened an avenue to commit military actions even 
during ceasefires. For the veteran leaders of the Abertzale Left, it was a serious and 
unacceptable mistake. ETA’s internal crisis in 2007-2008, which divided the organization 
into two opposing factions for a while, was a further factor for the definitive loss of 





the leadership of the movement should not be exercised by the armed group anymore. In 
addition, the continuous arrests of members of the executive committee weakened the 
leadership of ETA and facilitated a challenge of its authority. 
Some details of this pivotal shift of balance of power within the Abertzale Left are 
still unknown, but a consistent narrative can be told. The leadership of Batasuna did not 
have the support of the majority of the coordination body of the different organizations of 
the Abertzale Left, but they were convinced they had the support of the majority of their 
social base. With the disagreements among the cadres of the Abertzale Left regarding the 
direction model and the scope of the debate, the coordination body entered into a crisis. 
Then, the leaders of Batasuna decided to carry on with the debate. At this point, it is not 
easy to determine whether it was a debate among the social base of Batasuna, the party, or 
among the whole Abertzale Left, the movement. The ambiguous and undefined boundaries 
between the two concepts allows both interpretations, and the fact that the majority of 
Batasuna also make up the majority of the Abertzale Left allowed the Batasuna leadership 
to present the debate’s conclusions as the will of the majority of the whole movement.  It 
appears that the Batasuna leadership acted outside the traditional procedures of the 
Abertzale Left because they did not believe in that direction model anymore, and because 
they were convinced that it was an obstacle to implement the will of the majority of their 
constituency. Among other actors, the newspaper Gara played an instrumental role as a 
messenger and interpreter of the faction willing the end of the political-military strategy.  
Once the debate opened to the rank and file, the change of course was easily 





underground militants. ETA tried to commit armed actions as late as January 2010. It is 
unknown when exactly the leadership of ETA accepted that a unilateral and definitive 
cessation was the best option. The prisoners’ collective body (EPPK) did not embrace the 
strategic shift until September 2011. However, the risk of splitting was successfully 
avoided. Once the proposal of abandoning armed struggle obtained the support of the 
majority of the constituency, the members opposing it accepted it by discipline. No ‘Real’ 
or ‘Continuity’ ETAs emerged from the dispute, which is a major achievement for the 
Abertzale Left as a political movement, but also for the objective to end armed 
confrontation, as it would not be over in the event of a split.  
A split within the Abertzale Left would have been a desirable outcome for many 
political rivals. The political leaders of the Abertzale Left contend that the Spanish 
government sought to provoke a split, especially through police operations against factions 
opposed to the abandonment of arms. It is a credible hypothesis, but there is no way to 
confirm it. What is certain is that the political rivals of the Abertzale Left, with the 
exceptions of those who eventually became their allies, wanted to avoid the emergence of 
a strengthened Abertzale Left as a consequence of the end of violence. The PNV refused 
to participate in initiatives such as the Gernika declaration because they regarded it as a 
tool favoring the Abertzale Left’s strategic interests. Overall, the PNV overall supported 
the peace effort to facilitate the end of ETA, although it was aware that the success of the 
process could strengthen the political movement that was eager to challenge PNV’s 
hegemony within Basque nationalism. The PSOE, with Zapatero running the Spanish 





did not openly facilitate the peacebuilding effort, but it did not prevent international actors 
from getting involved. Furthermore, it engaged in a process of indirect and secret contacts 
with ETA in order to accelerate the implementation of the abandonment of armed struggle. 
Obviously, they wanted ETA to announce its end before the end of Zapatero’s mandate. 
Yet, whereas Zapatero was allowing a peace effort aiming for the end of ETA, police 
operations against civil organizations of the Abertzale Left suggested that the government 
was at the same time trying to weaken the Abertzale Left and, perhaps, trying to provoke 
a split in it.  
Meanwhile, PP’s priority was to attack and undermine Zapatero on the grounds that 
he was making political concessions to ETA. In the Basque arena, PP wanted to avoid the 
political reintegration of the Abertzale Left and its reinforcement. In PP’s view, what had 
to be achieved was not a quick end of ETA, but the defeat of the whole Basque pro-
independence movement. The most radical faction of the PP, along with the powerful 
conservative media outlets and the main victims’ organizations, acted as if the end of ETA 
was bad news. Against all evidence, they sustained that ETA was a victor in a process in 
which the Spanish state had surrendered, on the grounds that the Abertzale Left had been 
allowed to participate in elections and, as a consequence of the popular vote, had obtained 
a substantial share of power in the Basque political institutions. The role played by these 
factions provides evidence that their main problem was not ETA’s violence, but the 
prospect of a strong pro-independence movement in the Basque Country.  
As for the forces which eventually became allies of the Abertzale Left, their direct 





opportunity. EA and Alternatiba engaged in political alliances with the Abertzale Left 
without any guarantee of a definitive end of violence. They believed that the leadership of 
Batasuna was sincere, but they could not know whether they would actually win their 
internal struggle. However, they knew that their alliance was an argument for the advocates 
of abandoning violence, as it proved that the absence of violence effectively opened new 
opportunities for alliances which could strengthen the pro-independence movement. EA 
and Alternatiba had always rejected ETA’s violence and had always been fully integrated 
in the current political framework, but their alliance with an insofar outlawed party put 
them at the edge of illegalization. However, being outlawed was not their biggest risk. Had 
ETA refused to abandon armed struggle while EA and Alternatiba were allied to the 
Abertzale Left, the two parties would have paid a high political price. 
At the same time, it was an opportunity for both political forces. EA’s political 
strength and influence had gradually diminished since its foundation in 1986, and it was at 
the verge of becoming a marginal force. Alternatiba, a splinter group of a minor leftist 
coalition with no representation in Basque major political institutions, was already a 
marginal force in the Basque political scenario. Becoming instrumental agencies in the 
process of facilitating the end of ETA gave both parties a leverage they would not have 
had otherwise. After the success of the process of the end of ETA’s campaign, they are 
now partners in a political coalition with a strong presence in all Basque institutions, and 
with the prospect of competing for the political hegemony in the Basque Country. 
Aralar, the fourth force to join the pro-independence alliance, went through a 





still active. It was the recipient of the ballots of those critical of ETA but still willing to 
vote for left-wing nationalist candidates. Once the Abertzale Left abandoned the political-
military strategy and built a coalition with EA and Alternatiba, Aralar found itself with no 
political space. The “civil abertzale left” claimed by Aralar since its foundation was there. 
It joined it, but not without internal difficulties. Some prominent members of Aralar left 
the party because they were opposed to joining forces with the Abertzale Left, on the 
grounds that they did not break from their past of complicity with violence. 
The analysis of the press coverage of the events related to the process toward the 
end of ETA, and its contrast with the narratives provided by the actors a few years later, 
ratifies what other researchers found in relation to the media coverage of the Basque 
conflict, namely that the media outlets act more as political actors of the conflict than as 
information sources of the real occurrences. The examination of the contents published by 
the press and its comparison with later accounts by the actors show that the narratives 
provided by the media at the time did not reflect the genuine facts as they were. Overall, 
they released only partial news related to the process, and they very often provided 
interpretations that were not in accordance with the real developments. Many occurrences 
were happening in the shade, and journalists had access only to the information the actors 
considered could be safely disclosed.  
However, actors involved in the conflict or in the peace effort were not the only 
restraint for the release of reliable information. The media organizations are also actors in 
the Basque conflict, and have their own partisan views regarding the nature of the conflict 





journalism principles in the name of political objectives has been a common practice in the 
Spanish and Basque media’s coverage of the process leading to the end of ETA. Most of 
the media outlets acted in harmony with the counterterrorist effort led by the government. 
When the subject is ETA, journalistic principles such as the need of contrasting and 
verifying information, avoiding speculation, and respecting the presumption of innocence 
of those arrested are systematically forgotten. If terrorism is involved, all information and 
interpretation coming from the government, police and judiciary are commonly treated as 
incontestable truth. The sacrifice of journalism principles is even more striking in the case 
of the media outlets opposed to any peacebuilding, which framed all steps toward the end 
of the Basque groups’ campaign as bad news. The study on the quality standards of the 
news published by the newspapers under study reinforced the conclusion that good 
practices of journalism are usually sacrificed in the name of political interests. Investigative 
and specialist journalism has commonly been replaced by partisan journalism.  
The analysis of the contents released by some Basque media organizations show 
that the proximity –and ideological harmony– with actors involved in the conflict and in 
the peace effort can enable access to more accurate information about the reality, but also 
that this proximity can condition and limit the disclosure of this information about the 
ongoing process. The scarce information on the whereabouts of the internal debate within 
the Abertzale Left and the behind-the-scenes peacebuilding efforts suggests that, beyond 
the understandable difficulties to access information from behind the scenes, journalists 
and media organizations sometimes choose not to release contents if they consider their 





journalistic use of an opaque political terminology shared with the political actors, without 
translating it to a more informative and understandable language, show that proximity to 
or harmony with the political sources often becomes an obstacle to the release of 
unambiguous narratives of the events in question.  
All in all, the examination of the media’s narrative evidences that a generalization 
on the role played by the media in the Basque conflict and its resolution effort would not 
be accurate, as each media outlet has acted following its own editorial line and journalistic 
standards. However, it can be concluded that there is a significant difference on the media 
coverage provided by the Spanish and Basque papers. In accordance with the dominant 
view in the Spanish public opinion, most of the Spanish papers enhanced the discourse ion 
favor of a pure counterterrorist solution, while obstructing the development of a peace 
effort through dialogue. In contrast, some of the Basque papers tend to put in question the 
counterterrorist policies. Overall, the media has not been a facilitating factor for the success 
of the process leading to ETA’s end, but a polarizing and obstructing factor.   
The international facilitators had to operate within the difficult context of 
demonization of peace through dialogue and dominance of counterterrorism discourse. The 
last failed peace process attempt of 2005-2007 buried any possibility for further 
negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government. Still, international actors involved 
in the 2005-2007 process continued to be committed to the Basque peacebuilding effort. 
They enabled initiatives which facilitated that Basque and Spanish actors would make the 
required decisions toward the end of ETA’s armed campaign. Ending armed activity was 





task. An instrumental role was played by international agencies such as the Center Henri 
Dunant for Humanitarian Dialogue and the government of Norway, groups specifically 
created for the Basque peace efforts such as the International Contact Group led by Brian 
Currin and the International Verification Commission led by Ram Mannikalingam, as well 
as individuals such as Jonathan Powell and others. Some of them maintained access to ETA 
and the Spanish government. Discretion was an absolute priority of their work, as any 
information leak would be a great embarrassment for the Spanish government, and, 
therefore, would have meant the closure of the open channels and the exchange of messages 
that eventually accelerated the process toward the end of ETA’s campaign. 
The Aiete conference was the culmination of the international facilitators’ role. The 
shaping of the problem as a political conflict—with shared responsibilities by ETA, the 
Spanish and French governments and the Basque political actors alike—offered the armed 
group an acceptable context to respond to the international actors’ demand. There were no 
political negotiations, but there was an international recognition of the political dimension 
of the conflict behind the violent issue, and a demand for a peace process. The effective 
multilateral contacts enabled by international mediators, both in the public sphere and 
behind the scenes, have reinforced the value of dialogue as a tool for conflict resolution, 
even in a context lacking a standard peace process. The decision to abandon armed activity 
was unilateral, but dialogue was needed to implement that decision.  
ETA and the Spanish Government did not sign any bilateral agreement, but 
international facilitators, who mediated between ETA and the Spanish government, wrote 





consequences of the conflict. The Abertzale Left, ETA and some international facilitators 
understood that the Zapatero cabinet was committed to the guidelines designed in the ‘road 
map.’ The Aiete conference, with the participation of personalities such as Kofi Annan, 
was a direct consequence of the agreed ‘road map.’ The Norway government proved its 
commitment when it allowed a three-member delegation of ETA to enter its territory and, 
for several months, wait for emissaries of the Spanish government. The post-Aiete dialogue 
was never initiated, which is a further confirmation of the unilaterality of ETA’s decision: 
the Basque group claimed that the Spanish government did not fulfil the commitments 
adopted before international actors, but it did not question its own decision to lay down 
arms because of it. In spite of the absence of any dialogue with the Spanish government, 
and ETA’s understanding that the Spanish government did not keep its word, ETA’s 
decision has so far proved irrevocable. 
Every case of conflict resolution or termination is to some extent unique, and all 
cases share to some extent similarities with each other. The end of ETA’s armed activities 
is a case of transformation from armed insurgency to politics, which is the case of many 
other groups once engaged in armed resistance. However, two factors distinguish ETA 
from most of the transformation cases: first, its transition to politics has not been a 
consequence of negotiations, but a unilateral decision triggered by a demand coming from 
its own constituency; and, secondly, the implementation of that unilateral decision has been 
enabled by an innovative model of ambiguous peacebuilding. The model presented by the 
end of ETA is in this regard unique, as unique has been its long endurance in an 





within a democratic member-state of the European Union, who denies any legal avenue for 
secession through political means.  The epilogue of ETA’s end makes the process even 
more unique, as a rebel armed group is offering a government to hand in or disable its 
weapons with no demands for political concessions, and the government refuses to engage 
in a dialogue to enable ETA’s disarmament. Future investigations might allow a more 
definitive conclusion regarding the degree of exceptionality of the Basque case in the light 
of the typologies of the end of insurgent groups and the different models of peacebuilding. 
The analysis of the model of the end of ETA’s campaign shows that an outcome of 
the conflict can lead to parallel discourses of defeat and success. ETA has ended its armed 
activity without having achieved its objectives and with no bargaining power to deal with 
the fate of its militants in jail, exile, and hiding. Yet, the failure of their strategy to provoke 
a negotiation with the state can be countered with the alleged success of driving the 
majority of the Basques to question the current political framework and claim the right of 
the Basques to determine their political status. In addition, the pro-independence left-wing 
movement to which ETA belongs has emerged as a strong political force with a prospect 
of competing for political hegemony in Basque politics. The two opposing rationales do 
not have the same ground, though. The failure of the war of attrition to provoke negotiation 
is unquestionable. In contrast, the influence of ETA’s armed struggle in the current political 
stance of the majority of the Basques regarding their willingness to determine their political 
status is highly arguable, and the emergence of a powerful pro-independence coalition is a 
direct consequence of the cessation of violence, not a consequence of its practice. However, 





activity does not fit a narrative of unqualified failure or defeat. In the end, a political 
movement that historically supported armed struggle as an instrumental element for their 
political-military strategy has acknowledged the failure of its strategy and, thus, has carried 
out a deep transformation toward exclusively political means which has resulted in a 
success, as it has placed the left-wing political movement in its strongest political position 
ever. 
7.3. Final considerations 
The armed activity of ETA is over, but ETA is not. The organization is still alive. Hundreds 
of ETA members are either in prison, exile or hiding, and the group still has deposits of 
weapons waiting to be dismantled. According to the ‘road map’ agreed on by the Spanish 
government and ETA through international actors—whose contents were to some extent 
made public by the Aiete declaration—all these issues should have been discussed between 
ETA and the Spanish government in Norway, right after the announcement of the definitive 
end. Neither Zapatero nor Rajoy engaged in such a process. Moreover, ETA’s subsequent 
offers to engage in a disarmament process has been rebuffed by the Rajoy cabinet. The 
government demands that ETA should dismantle and disappear, but an insurgent 
organization with so many militants and resources needs a proper framework and a legal 
coverage to implement its disarmament and dismantle in an orderly and secure manner. 
Those issues needs to be addressed bilaterally or multilaterally, as the involvement of the 
governments is required. The Abertzale Left, when theorizing on unilateralism, always 
warned that bilateralism would someday be necessary to deal with the consequences of the 





for the violence to come back, but the Spanish government’s approach—followed by the 
French government’s—is hindering a firm end.  
This research has focused on the reasons and factors which led ETA to decide to 
end armed insurgency. A wide political context and many actors have influenced the 
process under study, and all have been considered in this research, although the main focus 
has been concentrated on the Abertzale Left and ETA, as the Basque armed group ended 
its campaign as a consequence of a unilateral decision. That is why the Spanish and French 
state decisions and policies have been examined at a background level, and not as the core 
issue. Furthermore, the investigation topic has been the end of ETA’s campaign, not its 
long persistence. Indeed, the nature of the counterterrorism policies and the states’ 
unwillingness to address the political roots of the dispute behind ETA’s armed campaign 
should be considered and closely examined in any attempt to research the causes of the 
exceptional endurance of the Basque armed conflict. State repression has often gone 
beyond the rule of the law, and violated human rights of many citizens in the name of 
counterterrorism. Death-squads, torture, and police excesses have not been strangers to 
state policies. Furthermore, the expansive understanding of terrorist activities has led the 
Spanish state to undermine the civil and political rights of a significant part of the Basque 
society. In this regard, the recognition of the effectiveness of the banning of Batasuna and 
the judicial persecution of the Abertzale Left as tools to push ETA toward its end does not 
imply an acknowledgment of its fairness. On the contrary, this expansion of the concept of 





politics a broad part of the Basque electorate, and convicted as terrorists hundreds of 
political and civil activists, who had never had individual responsibility in illegal acts.  
 A political conflict does not imply that an armed conflict has to occur, as the 
unilateral decision of ending it without having addressed its political roots demonstrates. 
Nonetheless, ETA’s existence and persistence are a reflection of a political dispute. A clash 
on sovereignty is still in place. A significant part of the Basque population claims that 
Basques should be entitled to determine by themselves whether to remain or not within the 
Spanish state, whereas the Spanish constitution backed by the majority of the Spanish 
population asserts that sovereignty solely lies in the Spanish people as a whole, and that its 
territory is indivisible. This is the core of the controversy: is Spain as a whole the sole 
decision-making subject regarding sovereignty, or could a part of the population who 
regard themselves as a nation also be a political subject in the event of a majority willing 
so? The end of the Basque group’s campaign did not require solving the core conflict, but 
consolidation of peace requires addressing the political dispute. Looking for agreements 
that would remove grievances and reasons for confrontation is a duty of policy makers, as 
well as adjusting political frameworks to the will of the citizens. Giving in to ETA’s claims 
and shaping a political framework in accordance to the armed group’s will for the sake of 
peace would not have been fair. Yet, offering political and democratic avenues to all 
political options, including independence—as the British government did to Scotland—
would have improved democracy, and removed reasons for non-democratic alternatives. It 





dialogue for political resolution, but multilateral dialogue and action are required to agree 
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